Private sector influence and the international political economy of banking regulation: The formation of the Basel II Accord 1998-2004. by Young, Kevin Lloyd
The London School o f Economics and Political Science
Private Sector Influence and the International Political Economy
of Banking Regulation:
The Formation o f the Basel II Accord 1998-2004
Kevin Lloyd Young
A thesis submitted to the Department of Government of the London School of 
Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, March 2009
1
UMI Number: U615988
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS  
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com plete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, th ese  will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U615988
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
British ityai y o» Holtncal 
rinrl Fi.onomic ouence
Declaration
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MRes/PhD degree of the London 
School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly 
indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me 
and any other person is clearly identified in it).
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full 
acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without the prior written consent of 
the author.
I warrant that this authorization does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third 
party.
2
Abstract
This study undertakes an empirical investigation of private sector influence over 
transnational financial regulatory policymaking. I examine the relationship between the content, 
context, and success of private sector attempts to influence the formation of the Basel II Accord 
between 1998 and 2004. I call these efforts ‘private sector campaigns’, and engage in an 
empirical analysis of campaigns organized at both the transnational level and at the national 
levels in Canada, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States.
The analysis employs a mixed-method research design involving process tracing analysis, 
fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) and statistical regression analysis. Using 
extensive primary source material, I test a number of different hypotheses prevalent within 
relevant academic literatures regarding the specific means that private sector groups use to 
influence their regulators, as well as the transnational and national pathways by which private 
sector influence translates into actual regulatory policy change.
While I find evidence for a number o f important instances of private sector influence over 
the content of the Basel II Accord, I find that this influence is much more contingent and 
context-dependent than depictions o f ‘regulatory capture’ in the IPE of finance literature suggest. 
In particular, the presence of business conflict strongly affects the success of private sector 
campaigns. Furthermore, I find that while there are a number of necessary conditions that have to 
be in place for influence to occur, there is no individually sufficient condition for influence. 
Rather, only a particular combination of conditions is sufficient in generating private sector 
influence. This particular set of conditions is, however, highly fragile.
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Introduction
Opening Up the Black Box 
o f Private Sector Influence
Understanding the power of private sector groups in influencing financial regulation has 
long been a central concern for political economists. The emergence of new, transnational 
financial regulatory bodies over the last 25 years, whose decisions have wide-reaching effects 
and global implications, has made this issue both more pressing and more complex.1 Extensive 
claims have been made within the International Political Economy (IPE) literature and elsewhere 
regarding ‘regulatory capture’ at this level of governance; such claims assert that private sector 
groups’ influence over transnational regulation has been systematic and pervasive.2 Yet 
surprisingly, for all the claims, and for a phenomenon that has far-reaching impacts on 
contemporary human welfare, very little is actually known about how private sector groups 
influence the content of financial regulation; concerning transnational financial regulatory 
standard formation, this knowledge is even sparser.3 In this sense, private sector influence 
represents a ‘black box’: a phenomenon to which many refer, but seldom look inside or closely 
examine.4
In this study, I look inside the ‘black box’ of private sector influence. I do not seek to re- 
theorize that box; rather, I undertake a detailed, systematic empirical analysis to examine its 
contents. My analysis seeks to address o f the following central question: How do private sector 
groups influence transnational financial regulatory policymaking? I investigate the different 
actions and strategies that private sector groups employ in their attempts to influence the content
11 employ transnationalism here to connote a rule-making institution which is organized above the level of the state, 
but which is not strictly composed of state representatives, and does not possess coercive authority. See Kahler and 
Lake 2008, pp. 269-70. Some international relations scholars use the term ‘transgovernmental’ to refer to 
relationships between state actors who are not members of executives/cabinets, a usage begun by Keohane and Nye 
1974.
2 See Stigler 1971. This term, and its use within the IPE of finance literature, is discussed extensively in Chapter I.
31 understand private sector groups to connote private business enterprises and their associations.
4 See Watson 2007, p. 14. On black boxes in social science generally, see Mahoney 2004.
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of financial regulatory policy.5 1 call such private sector activity, and the context in which these 
actions took place, ‘private sector campaigns’. I investigate the relationship between the content, 
context, and success of these campaigns through a variety of methods, both quantitative and 
qualitative. Using extensive empirical primary source material, I test a number of different 
hypotheses prevalent within relevant academic literatures regarding the specific means that 
private sector groups use to influence their regulators, as well as the pathways by which private 
sector influence translates into regulatory policy change at the transnational level.
Herein I specifically investigate the influence of private sector groups on transnational 
regulatory policymaking by investigating the formation of the Basel II Accord between 1998 and 
2004.6 Basel II is an international regulatory standard developed by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS), an informal group of central bankers and banking regulators 
drawn during this period from the ‘G10’ states: the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Switzerland, Sweden, Spain, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, Japan, Germany, France, 
Canada and Belgium.7 As I detail in this study, the process of drafting the Basel II Accord 
involved years of detailed technical analysis, consultation, and negotiation. It evolved from a set 
of preliminary ideas about how best to approach banking regulation in 1998, into an extremely 
detailed 239 page document of regulatory policies in 2004, which included everything from the 
regulation of detailed risk models and internal bank operations, to the definition of capital itself.
By engaging in a systematic analysis of private sector campaigns directed at influencing 
Basel II’s content, I find that private sector influence was much more uneven and circumscribed 
than depictions within the existing IPE literature suggest. Though private sector groups 
sometimes successfully influenced the content of the Accord, this success was contingent on a 
particular set of conditions. First, while private sector groups can utilize a diverse range of power 
resources in the realization of their ends, I find that their influence is highly contingent upon the 
factor of business conflict. Second, I find that a number of specific conditions are necessary for 
influence to occur, but that no individual condition is sufficient for influence. Third, I find that
51 use the term influence to connote the manner in which one or more actors induce change in an outcome such that 
it is different from what would have otherwise taken place. By private sector influence over regulatory policy, I refer 
to the manner in which a regulatory policy has been informed by actions taken by private sector groups which 
changed the content of that policy in a discemable way.
6 Formally, the Basel II Accord is known as International Convergence o f Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards: A Revised Framework See BCBS June 2004.
7 Spain was invited to the BCBS in 2000, and did not formally participate in the BCBS before this point.
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there exists an optimal combination of conditions which, once in place, are sufficient in 
generating private sector influence. This particular set of conditions is, however, highly fragile.
As I detail below, focusing on the formation of the Basel II Accord to understand how 
private sector influence operates has a number of distinct advantages. First, the BCBS is widely 
regarded as a central institution in the global governance of finance; its most recent regulatory 
standard, Basel II, is similarly considered an important transnational regulatory policy. Second, 
scholars of IPE have treated the formation o f Basel II as the quintessential example of how 
private sector groups systematically influence the development of transnational financial 
regulatory standards.
The Importance o f the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
The BCBS is consistently identified as the archetypal example of a transnationally 
organized technical institution setting the pace of financial regulation, and is considered central 
to the system of global financial governance. 8 Alexander, Dhumale and Eatwell have noted that 
“[t]he Basel Committee has become the most influential international financial standard-setting 
body” in the world today.9 This fact is relatively undisputed regardless of the normative 
evaluation of its policies. For example, Rude’s Marxian critique has argued that the BCBS 
constitutes one of the “core features of neoliberal global capitalism’s supervisory and regulatory 
regime.”10 Meanwhile, the Financial Times, hardly the bastion of Marxian sympathizing, has 
compared the BCBS to the financial-sector equivalent of the Council of Nicea, thereby 
suggesting that Basel II is as important to financial risk management as the Council to the rebirth 
of Christianity in the Middle Ages. 11 Even though Basel II has received tremendous criticism 
concerning its content and its legitimacy, Steel and Litan observe that bank regulators in the G10 
nevertheless continue to “worship at the altar of Basel.”12 Basel II in particular is seen as a 
central example of either everything that is wrong with the current structure of global financial
8 See, for example, Jordan and Majnoni 2003, p. 262; Porter 2003, pp. 535-537; Pauly, 2008, pp. 73-89; Alexander 
Dhumale and Eatwell 2006, pp. 34-78; Helleiner and Pagliari 2010, p. 2.
9 Alexandar, Dhumale and Eatwell 2006, p. 54; Porter 2005, pp. 57-65; Davies and Green 2008, pp. 32-47.
10 Rude 2008, p. 205.
11 Pretzlik September 2003, p. 26.
12 Steel and Litan 2006, p. 25.
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regulation, or everything that is right about it. Regardless, Eatwell’s recent remark that "[t]he 
analytical foundations of regulation over the past three decades are clearly defined in the 
structure of Basel II” seems prescient.13
The governance of the BCBS has been a particular point of fascination for social 
scientists for some time due to its peculiar structure. The particular institutional design of the 
BCBS has meant that its decisions are several steps removed from sovereign authority. The 
participants within the BCBS are not elected representatives, and in most cases they have not 
even been formally delegated to take decisions within the BCBS on behalf of governments. 
Rather, participants are bureaucrats within regulatory agencies and central banks. Although such 
institutions are a part of the formal state apparatus, they are, by design, highly independent from 
elected legislatures and executives.14 Additionally, the decisions of the BCBS itself are not 
subject to approval by any national government or external authority.15 As Underhill and Zhang 
have correctly asserted, the BCBS is characterized “by virtual separation from any accountable 
political process.”16 Most decisions are made on the basis of technical discussion in a manner 
commensurate with ‘deliberation’, meaning that most engagement is informal in character, and 
the de facto  decision-rule is implicit consensus.17 However, as anyone familiar with the 
formation of the 1988 Basel Accord knows, this deliberative norm does not mean that power 
dynamics are absent from the BCBS.18 Apart from the power dynamics between regulators and 
private sector, one must also consider the geopolitical tensions and power struggles among 
regulators themselves.19
The output of the BCBS has far reaching consequences in terms of how financial 
regulation is conducted all over the world. In addition to establishing regulatory standards for the 
G10, and because of strong incentives for states to emulate BCBS standards, it exercises global
13 Eatwell 2009, p. 37.
14 See Gilardi 2007; Gilardi 2002; McNamara 2002; Thatcher 2002.
15 The G10 Governors within the Bank for International Settlements approve major policy outputs of the BCBS, but 
this role is largely ceremonial, and in any case is composed of some of the same institutions as the BCBS itself. See 
Davies and Green 2008, pp. 218-219.
16 Underhill and Zhang 2006, p. 29.
17 See, for example, Slaughter 2004, p. 160; Kussin and Kette 2006; These observations are also substantiated by 
interviews conducted with BCBS participants.
18 As Kahler and Lake have argued, while the BCBS has exhibited some elements of hierarchy, on the whole it can 
be characterized as a network. Kahler and Lake 2008, pp. 269-272.
19 See Kapstein 1992 for the BCBS; See also Drezner 2007.
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influence.20 International capital markets use Basel-based standards to evaluate the financial 
soundness o f banks, and international institutions, such as the IMF, have also used BCBS 
standards as a crucial metric.21 National regulatory agencies outside the G10 attempt to make 
their banking systems Basel-compliant to signal the good health o f their financial systems to 
international markets.22 For these reasons, and because of the peculiarities of the BCBS’ 
governance structure discussed above, the output of the BCBS has been regarded as a prime 
example of ‘soft law’, as its standards are enforced, but not through legal, sovereign authority.23 
Additionally, Basel standards have a profound effect on the internal operations of banks around 
the world. They affect the daily practices of risk management, and are integrated into the culture 
of firms. The output of the BCBS thus indirectly constitutes, as one US banker put it, “the lingua 
franca of capital.”24
Basel II and Private Sector Influence
During the period under study, Basel II was, as one observer put it, “the biggest thing 
happening in banking.”25 As a systematic revision to the original Basel Capital Accord of 1988, 
Basel II set out to develop detailed regulatory minimum standards for how banks were to assign 
regulatory capital to particular kinds of risks. Rather than specifying a simple, straightforward set 
of risk categories delineating banks’ regulatory capital holdings as the original Accord did, Basel 
II attempted to evaluate, on a microeconomic basis, the specific level of risk associated with 
particular internal processes of banks. Because the BCBS and its output have far-reaching 
consequences, the particular content of the Basel II Accord was widely contested in numerous 
ways over the course of its development. Within the BCBS, regulators argued, and sometimes 
bargained over, the Accord’s details. Private sector groups of all kinds also challenged the 
design of the Accord in various ways, at both the national and transnational levels.
20 See Kerwer 2005; Ho 2002. By 1998, over 120 countries either claimed to have adopted the 1988 Basel Accord or 
were in the process of doing so. See Alexandar, Rahul and Eatwell 2006, p. 42; Genshell and Plumper 1997, pp. 
630-31.
21 See Alexandar, Rahul and Eatwell 2006, pp. 41-42, 229.
22 See Kern, Rahul and Eatwell 2006, pp. 42,229. See Brownbridge and Kirkpatrick 1999.
23 See Abbott and Snidal 2000; Panourgias 2001; Delonis 2004; Abbott and Snidal 2008.
24 Interview 83P.
25 Andrew Kuritzkes, a Managing Director at Mercer Oliver Wyman & Co., quoted in Paletta April 2004.
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The extensive private sector activity that surrounded Basel II*s formation has led many 
IPE scholars to assert that global ‘regulatory capture’ occurred, a pervasive argument I discuss in 
detail in Chapter 1. As we shall see, however, while some private sector campaigns were 
successful in influencing Basel II’s content, many others were not successful at all. This 
variation serves as a useful means to explore how private sector groups influence transnational 
financial regulatory policymaking, because it provides a basis of variation on the dependent 
variable or ‘outcome’ of interest. While Basel II is a single regulatory standard, it has many 
different regulatory policies within it, which had substantial variation in outcomes -  a point not 
well appreciated within the existing depictions of the Accord. There is also substantial variation 
in the content and context of private sector campaigns. Some campaigns were waged at the 
national level; other campaigns were transnational in character. Some campaigns were 
characterized by the use of detailed technical studies as part of a coordinated strategy to convince 
regulators of the need for regulatory policy change; other campaigns simply signaled that 
policies would be bad for business or the national economy more broadly. This diversity thus 
provides a source of variation in the main explanatory variables of interest, namely the specific 
content and context of private sector campaigns.
To analyze the relationship between the content and context of private sector campaigns 
and their varied outcomes, I investigate actual processes of advocacy and interaction, and 
compare patterns across the different campaigns. I draw upon the extensive paper trail of 
documents and studies that Basel II left in its wake. Private sector groups often posted their 
letters publicly on the internet; the BCBS itself produced innumerable studies and reports, as did 
national regulators; and many of the relevant parties offered their views in the form of speeches 
and interviews with journalists, during and after the period of interest. To complement this data, I 
conducted semi-structured interviews with 97 individuals involved in the advocacy surrounding, 
and formation of, Basel II; that is to say, I spoke with representatives of the private sector, 
relevant national regulatory bodies, and the participants within the BCBS itself.
Scope and Assumptions o f the Study
Despite the advantages conferred by focusing on Basel, there are several limitations 
associated with having Basel II as the central focus of this study. Basel II is a regulatory standard
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in the domain of banking, not the financial sector as a whole. It might thus be asserted that this 
study’s findings are particular to the world of banking regulation, and not the wider world of 
finance, such as the regulation of hedge funds, currency trading, money laundering, securities 
regulation, etc. This focus on banking can indeed be regarded as a limitation. Banking is, 
however, a highly important domain of financial sector activity. In fact, banking is commonly 
considered the central pillar of the financial system, since banks are the central private 
institutions in the economy that generate the supply of credit.26 Furthermore, most public policy 
consequences of financial regulation involve banks in some way, since banks act as 
intermediaries and participants in a wide range of financial activities other than the allocation of 
credit. Indeed, the policies examined herein involve the regulation of discrete aspects of bank 
behavior, such as their management of derivatives, securitized assets, and operational risk in 
addition to typical bank activity, namely, the management of credit risk. Additionally, several of 
the private sector campaigns investigated in this study involve not only the mobilization of 
banks, but also other groups within the financial sector and beyond it.
The approach taken here focuses at its core on the actions of private sector groups. I 
acknowledge that many approaches of political economy stress the rational interests of actors, 
and rather than trace actual processes of action and change seek to observe ‘causal effects’ of 
actors based on different institutional and structural constraints.27 Rather than assuming the 
interests of actors, I ascertain their expressed preferences based on close empirical observation. 
Preferences are understood as subjectively perceived affinities — something an actor wants, but 
doesn’t necessarily ‘objectively’ require. This understanding stands in contrast to ‘interests’, 
which is more of a constitutive property of an actor, irrespective of that actors’ judgment, 
decisions, or subjective position. I emphasize the importance of observing preferences and action 
because it enables a different kind of empiricism than undertaken by many existing empirical 
studies. In this regard my approach differs from perspectives which do not examine the 
instrumental actions of actors, but rather focus upon the related institutional or structural 
conditions in which they operate, such as statist, institutionalist, and open-economy models of 
political economy.28 In such work, institutions, or the structural conditions of action, are co­
26 For a useful review of this widely held notion, see Busch 2009, pp. 23-24.
27 See Lake 2009, p. 49; Frieden 1991; Rogowski 1989; Bates 1997; Frieden and Rogowski 1996; Posen 1993.
28 Cf. Lake 2009; Drezner 2006; Konings 2008
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varied with outcomes, and are understood to do the causal work. As such, the actual articulation 
of interest groups are empirically presumed rather than empirically examined. The claim that 
interests are endogenous to institutional conditions may be empirically correct, but evidence 
must be forthcoming in order to qualify it as an empirical claim; otherwise it is merely an 
assumption. Nonetheless, the approach taken in this study considers the role of institutions and 
the structural conditions of action seriously, not only by situating the processes described in their 
appropriate context, but by considering institutions and structural power variables as potential 
explanatory factors alongside the more ‘agency-driven’ factors at the core of the study.
Insofar as this study is primarily an exercise in empirical hypothesis testing, I do not 
associate the process of enquiry herein with any specific theoretical tradition within IPE. I 
recognize, however, that basic political ontologies represent distinct choices which one cannot 
abstain from. As such, this study adheres to the broad parameters of empirical pragmatism on the 
one hand, and neo-pluralism on the other. As a broad framework for understanding business 
influence, neopluralism considers not only the instrumental actions of private sector groups, but 
also their structural power resources as potential explanatory factors.29 By empirical pragmatism, 
I refer to the notion, held by its practitioners, that patterns within social structures exist, and that 
observers can discern these patterns through empirical enquiry, if imperfectly.30 Pragmatist 
accounts of political processes are explicitly committed to the refining and testing of empirical 
knowledge, but are less ambitious than neo-positivism in attaining law-like generalization.31 As 
many have recently pointed out in meta-theoretical debates within IPE, empiricism need not 
coincide with restrictive quantitative approaches, or even all tenants of neo-positivism.32
This study combines empirical pragmatism with neo-pluralism in a substantive sense in 
that I not only consider a range of explanatory conditions and causal mechanisms, but I use a 
diversity of methods as well. Neo-pluralism as a mode of enquiry considers a plurality of causal 
factors in affecting outcomes of interest, and stresses the contingency of business influence. I 
adopt this perspective of contingency, but consider it an empirical proposition subject to testing.
29 See Lindblom 1977; Cemy 2010; Falkner 2010; Sell 2000.
30 See Farrell and Finnemore 2009, pp. 65-67; Katzenstein and Sil 2008; Grynaviski 2010, p. 7; from Dewey 1986, 
pp. 196-97
31 Farrel and Finnemore 2009, p. 67. Though as Grynaviski notes, pragmatists do posit generalized propositions. See 
Grynaviski 2010, p. 7, from Dewey 1986, pp. 196-97.
32 See Blythe 2009; Helleiner 2009, p. 381; Cameron and Palan 2009; see Jackson 2010 on the ‘analyticist' 
alternative position.
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The emphasis on contingency in IPE has been emphasized by many, not least by prominent 
proponents of neo-Pluralism.33 Contingency is, however, an empirical claim: if a process or 
outcome is contingent, what is it contingent orft Contingency is an ontological claim as well; but 
has this ontology been matched with an appropriate methodology?34 In terms of tracing the 
contingency of processes within cases, various methods have enabled the assessment of such 
contingency, such as the emphasis on path dependence in historical institutionalism, the 
extended-form games of analytic narratives, and the multiple, and unexpected, equilibria of 
agent-based modeling. All of these methods expand social scientists’ capacity to trace and 
observe contingent social processes within cases.35 When analysis across cases is concerned, 
however, the breadth of practices is less impressive, since many analysts simply rely on 
statistical analysis as a matter of course.36 The recent innovation of Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (QCA) is a method of across-case analysis which is particularly adept at analyzing the 
contingency of social processes. While it has been increasingly employed in comparative politics 
and sociology, it has not been applied to IPE. This study employs this method as the central form 
of across-case analysis.
Before proceeding, I want to clearly define some terminology used within this study. I 
use the encompassing term ‘regulators’ rather than ‘supervisors’ for reasons of consistency, and 
because this study focuses exclusively on regulatory policy formation, rather than 
implementation. When I refer to members of the BCBS I refer to these as ‘regulators’ rather than 
as ‘central bankers and regulators’. This decision can be justified because BCBS members’ 
behavior in Basel II formation reflects the concerns of regulators rather than central bankers, 
who are primarily concerned with the conduct of monetary policy. Finally, I do not employ the 
language of ‘lobbying’. While lobbying is sometimes understood broadly as the attempt to 
influence a policy, it is often understood as activity undertaken by professional lobbyists 
calculated to influence elected representatives. Since this study is interested in relationships 
between a variety of actors, and legislators are not the sole or even central focus, I do not use the 
term lobbying except when a professional, registered lobbyist is involved.
33 Cf. Amin and Palan 2003; Cemy 2009; Cemy 2010; Macartney 2009.
34 On such alignment, see Hall 2003.
35 See North 1990; Bates et. al. 1998; Miller and Page 2007.
36 See Malianak and Tierney 2009, p. 19. Even within statistical analysis, complex interdependencies and 
interactions are employed but often poorly understood, as demonstrated by recent interventions within the 
methodological literature. See Franzese and Hays 2008; Brambor et. al. 2006.
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Plan o f  the Study
This study is divided into 10 different chapters. Chapter 1 surveys and engages with the 
existing academic literature on the power relationships between private sector groups and 
financial regulation. I argue that within the relevant IPE literature, understandings of private 
sector influence in banking regulation are not adequately developed, and I make this case with 
reference to the existing research on the formation of the Basel II Accord. In particular, I assert 
that both the empirical and logical standards of the existing literature are unsatisfactory, 
especially in light of strong claims regarding ‘regulatory capture’. I draw from both the IPE 
literature as well as the wider literature on the political economy of regulation to derive several 
testable hypotheses regarding how private sector groups influence transnational financial 
regulation. A total of eight hypotheses are derived - four concern the ‘means’ that private sector 
groups use to influence their regulators, two important scope conditions, and two concerning the 
pathways that private sector groups utilize to effect influence.
Chapter 2 sets out the research design of the study. The methodologies employed in the 
study -  process tracing, fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA), and statistical 
regression analysis — are discussed in terms of their respective strengths and weaknesses. I define 
the main dependent variable that I employ, ‘permissive regulatory policy change’, and I describe 
the constitution and measurement of the wide variety of explanatory variables used in the study. I 
then outline the process by which private sector campaigns were selected for investigation, and 
specifically define what this study understands as a ‘case’.
Chapters 3-9 engage in detailed process tracing analysis of different private sector 
campaigns associated with a range of different regulatory policies. The first o f these, Chapter 3, 
examines different private sector campaigns which were organized transnationally. Six different 
transnational campaigns are analyzed, ranging from efforts to advocate for the use of internal 
bank models to assess risk, to efforts to change policies concerning specific risk parameters. I 
analyze and evaluate the success of transnational mobilization over these policies, and find that 
while in a number of instances private sector influence occurred, the extent and character of 
influence is not congruent with the depictions in the existing IPE literature.
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Chapter 4 examines a private sector campaign organized at the national level in Germany 
to target the Accord’s treatment of commercial real estate. I find that while private sector groups 
played an important role in securing their desired policy outcome, their influence was over the 
bargaining strength of their national regulators within the BCBS negotiations, and not over the 
position o f these regulators.
Chapter 5 examines national private sector campaigns concerned with Basel’s provisions 
on lending to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). This chapter discusses campaigns in 
the UK and Japan, but focuses on the successive national private sector campaigns within 
Germany which sought to create a specific new regulatory policy that would protect lending to 
SMEs.
Chapter 6 engages in an analysis of the extensive private sector campaigns against the 
Accord’s operational risk policy. This chapter focuses on campaigns waged within the US, and 
details their efforts from 2001 to 2004 in a series of complex efforts involving different 
coalitions and legislative oversight.
Chapter 7 examines the private sector campaigns concerned with two policies designed to 
regulate banks’ real estate exposures. I focus first on a very specific regulatory policy designed 
to regulate ‘high volatility’ commercial real estate lending, and find that an extensive coalition of 
small banks, large banks, and real estate groups organized to successfully influence this policy in 
the US, but that a second attempt at influence failed. I then describe the private sector campaigns 
associated with the Basel II policy toward residential mortgages, where business conflict was 
persistent.
Chapter 8 examines private sector campaigns regarding Basel II’s treatment of banks’ 
‘expected losses’ and credit card exposures. I examine both a number of national and 
transnational efforts to change these policies, and find that it was only in the United States that 
private sector campaigns were successful, but only under very particular conditions. I find that 
while private sector groups were very successful at influencing their regulators, their influence 
over Basel IPs actual policy content was much more limited.
Chapter 9 examines private sector campaigns associated with the Accord’s policy toward 
securitization. I find that while a number of different campaigns at both the national and
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transnational level were unsuccessful in influencing the securitization policy, one concerted US- 
level campaign was successful, albeit in a highly circumscribed way.
Chapter 10 engages in detailed across-case analysis to assess the empirical patterns found 
in the different campaigns examined. Using fsQCA, it finds general support for a number of 
different hypotheses in the study when understood as necessary conditions. However, no 
individual hypothesis is sufficient in explaining private sector influence. Rather, I find that 
private sector influence was associated with a particular ‘recipe’, that is, a particular combination 
o f conditions sufficient to explain influence across cases. Private sector groups not only have to 
provide information to their national regulators and have non-bank allies, but they have to do so 
in the context of both a particular legislative environment and the absence of business conflict. I 
test the robustness of this ‘recipe’ using both statistical regression analysis and further fsQCA, 
and find that a variety of different methods support this particular combination of conditions.
The study concludes by reflecting on its central empirical findings. I argue that existing 
understandings of private sector influence over financial regulation have provided a useful 
framework for discussion, but that many of the depictions and conclusions within the existing 
literature are misleading. Private sector influence over transnational financial regulatory 
policymaking, I contend, is a much more contingent and fragile force than is commonly 
assumed. While private sector influence has been pervasive in that it occurred throughout Basel 
II’s formation and over a range of different regulatory policies, I argue that this influence was 
highly contingent and contextually bound. Private sector groups were not only unable to 
influence Basel II in the presence of business conflict, but there is actually a very specific 
combination of conditions which are both necessary and sufficient for private sector groups to 
succeed in their efforts. This recipe of conditions, however, is itself highly fragile, since its 
individual components are not under the control of any one actor. I discuss the relevance of these 
findings for existing research traditions within political economy and reflect on the particular 
approach taken in this study.
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Chapter 1
Existing Literature and Hypotheses
This chapter outlines the existing research on the political economy of banking 
regulation, from which it derives a series of testable hypotheses regarding how private sector 
groups influence their regulators. The chapter is divided into three sections. Section One situates 
the study in the context of the International Political Economy (IPE) of finance literature, and 
argues that the understanding of private sector influence in banking regulation is not well 
developed. Section Two makes the case that such a weakness exists by surveying the existing 
research on the formation of the Basel II Accord. It is argued that both the empirical and logical 
standards of the existing literature are unsatisfactory, especially in light of strong claims 
regarding ‘regulatory capture’. Section Three then surveys the broader literature on the political 
economy of banking regulation and derives eight testable hypotheses regarding how private 
sector groups influence transnational financial regulation.
Section 1 
International Political Economy 
and Private Sector Influence
Describing and analyzing policy outcomes and power relationships in the domain of 
finance has been an important component of many research programs within IPE. Yet it is in the 
realm of finance that the analysis of private sector power remains relatively elusive. The power 
resources available to private sector groups to influence financial regulation are often theorized;
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and they are described even more often.37 However they are seldom subject to empirical scrutiny 
by means o f empirical hypothesis testing.38 Perhaps part of the reason for this is because of the 
normative-ontological focus of much of the engagement with the political economy of financial 
regulation. A normative focus is hardly surprising, given the manifold and far-reaching policy 
consequences of financial regulation. Likewise, an ontological focus has been important — not 
only because “ontology lies at the beginning of any enquiry,” 39 as Cox wisely remarked, but also 
because an acceptable conception of the international financial system, and the power relations 
within it, has been a central concern to early scholarship within IPE.40 Yet one can also concur 
with Watson’s recent critique that a large amount of work in the IPE of finance focuses on 
normative critiques of the outcomes of contemporary economic processes, rather than 
interrogating the empirical basis behind such processes. As Watson has remarked,
Much excellent work as recently been published in this vein, feeding powerful moral 
arguments about why it would be desirable to transcend the existing state of affairs. But this 
still does not negate the need for a rather deeper understanding o f the actual practices which 
dominate the day to-day operation of the international financial system.41
Watson encourages us to engage in “unpacking the ‘black box’ o f international finance” through 
detailed empirical study 42 In this vein, this study aims to make a contribution to the IPE of 
finance literature by engaging in a detailed empirical analysis of private sector influence over 
transnational regulatory policymaking. As I argue below, this is an area of enquiry which has 
been traversed extensively in recent years, but which remains unsatisfactory in terms of the 
empirical standards which are actually brought to bear. After reviewing the existing literature on 
the BCBS, I make this point with reference to the extensive literature investigating the formation 
of Basel II.
Section 2 
The Existing Literature on the BCBS
37 See, for example the recent high-profile comments of Strauss-Kahn in IMF Survey Online, 2009; Tett and Turner 
in Ford 2009.
38 Exceptions include Busch 2007; Underhill and Zhang 2008; Griffith-Jones and Persaud 2008
39 Cox 1996, p. 114.
40 Cf. Strange 1988; Braudel 1984; Underhill et. al. 2000.
41 Watson 2007, pp. 212-213.
42 Watson 2007, p. 212. A similar case has been made by Bum 2006, pp. 4-10.
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Within the IPE of finance literature, the BCBS and its activities have occupied an 
important place. Indeed, many of the central research contributions to thinking about regulatory 
cooperation have focused on the BCBS. In particular, there has been a concerted focus on the 
formation o f the 1988 Basel Capital Accord, and more recently on the Basel II Accord, as we 
shall see below.
The 1988 Basel Capital Accord
An extensive academic literature studies the formation of the 1988 Basel Capital Accord. 
The central concern of this literature has been to explain the impressive degree of transnational 
regulatory co-operation which facilitated the realization of the Accord. Kapstein has argued 
extensively that such cooperation was the product of the assertion of US-UK financial market 
power alongside a shared set of norms for banking supervisors to cooperate for the purposes of 
financial stability.43 While market power is central to this analysis, it is the decisions of states 
that is of paramount interest. In this regard, Kapstein argued that the US pressured foreign 
governments (in particular the Japanese) by threatening to cut off their access to the US financial 
system.44 Similarly (but as part of a comparative study of capital market regulation more 
generally), Simmons has also analyzed the formation of the first Basel Accord, and posited the 
central role of US initiatives to use US financial sectoral power as leverage to generate an 
international standard.45
In contrast to these studies, Oatley and Nabors have argued a more central role for private 
sector groups in the formation of the 1988 Accord, as their account sought to emphasize the 
dimension of redistribution and conflict, rather than functionalism and cooperation they 
attributed to the original work of Kapstein.46 Reflecting a public choice model of regulation, 
Oatley and Nabors have underlined the importance of private sector initiative in forging the 
Basel Accord. In their depiction of the 1988 Basel Accord’s formation, US regulators were 
motivated by the promotion of the private preferences of US banks.47 Seeking to minimize the
43 See Kapstein 1989; Kapstein 1992; Kapstein 2006.
44 See Kapstein 1992, p. 226; Genschel and Plumper 1997, pp. 629-31.
45 Simmons 2001.
46 Oatley and Nabors 1998.
47 Oatley and Nabors 1998.
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impact o f new domestic capital adequacy regulation in the US, US banks pressured Congress and 
the US regulators to seek international regulatory cooperation in a process they called 
‘redistributive cooperation.’ Singer has in many ways drawn from and expanded this model, and 
has used the 1988 Basel Accord as an example of the conditions under which international 
financial regulatory cooperation occurs.48 In this regard, his model posits that while domestic 
regulators have an incentive to engage in international cooperation, it is not until either a 
negative financial shock or the spectre of legislative intervention that a regulator will do so. 
Regulatory cooperation is thus motivated not by technical issues and functionalism, but by the 
broad political constraints on the regulators’ objectives, a mechanism which is discussed below.49
While the literature on the formation of the 1988 Basel Capital Accord may have 
contributed to the understanding of international financial regulatory cooperation, the focus of 
this literature has been on the demand for such cooperation, rather than the actual content of the 
regulations themselves once a commitment to cooperation was relatively secured, i.e. its supply. 
The literature on the formation of the 2004 Basel Capital Accord (Basel II), however, has put the 
influence of private sector groups at its core, arguing that the supply of regulation has been very 
heavily informed, if not determined, by particular private sector groups.
Existing Literature on the 2004 Basel Capital Accord
Basel II is discussed in a wide variety of academic literature, but typically it is in regard 
to a normative evaluation of its orientation and its consequences, rather than an explanation for 
how its regulatory policies came into being.50 The manifold and extensive critiques of the 
Accord’s content in this regard will not be reviewed here. Suffice it to say that Basel II is 
commonly regarded as virtually synonymous with modernization in banking regulation, with all 
its innovations, strengths, and problems.51 A wide variety of literature has critiqued not only the 
content of Basel II, but also the context in which it was developed -  especially in light of its
48 Singer 2004; Singer 2007.
49 Singer (2007) noted a number of dynamics at play in the Basel II negotiations, such as extensive private sector 
critique of Basel II and US congressional involvement, but such engagement was descriptive rather than analytical. 
See Singer 2007, pp. 62-65,121.
50 See Alexandar Dhumale and Eatwell 2006, pp. 227-238.
51 As evident in multiple discussions within Mayes and Wood 2007.
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shortcomings in light of the contemporary regulatory environment.52 Amidst the plethora of 
normative critiques of Basel II, there have been a number of empirical evaluations of the role of 
private sector groups in its formation as well.
The Existing Literature on Basel II and Private Sector Influence
A wide variety of academic literature has commented on the relationship between private 
sector groups and the construction of Basel II. There is considerable conjecture in this regard, but 
very little actual evidence brought to bear. Most accounts of Basel II’s development in the 
academic literature refer to Basel II’s content being the result of private sector influence, but the 
extent, or details, or mechanisms of this process are not analyzed. Rochet, for example, states 
that Basel II involved “intense bargaining with large banks”, and Flemming has asserted that the 
formation of Basel II involved “intense lobbying” by banking associations and individual 
financial institutions, but neither author provides any details or analysis of how this occurred, let 
alone evidence o f its existence.53 Steel and Litan state that the formation of Basel II was “at 
times influenced by the banks it purported to regulate.”54 How such influence operated, or the 
extensity of it, is not discussed, and only anecdotal examples are used.55
Other depictions also suggest a substantial mobilization of large banks followed by policy 
change aligned with their preferences, but the analysis begs the question of whether or not such 
correlation was causally spurious or not, especially in light of the lack of evidence provided. For 
example, in his extensive normative critique of the content of Basel II, Tarullo has argued that 
the formation of the Accord was characterized by involvement of large internationally active 
banks who “organized themselves to maximize their influence in pursuit of their shared 
interest...”56 and that “...the large international banks with potentially the most to gain from a 
change of regulatory paradigm...had organized themselves both at national and international
52 For earlier contextual critiques, see, for example Wade 2007, pp. 126-127; Barth, Caprio and Levine 2006, pp. 67- 
69; Siebert 2009, p. 160; Power 2005, p. 595.
53 Rochet 2008, p. 273; Fleming 2003, p. 47.
54 Steel and Litan 2006, p. 27.
55 See Steel and Litan 2006, pp. 23-24.
56 Tarullo 2008, p. 100.
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levels in an effort to influence the final Basel II rules.”57 Despite their implied success in this 
regard, no empirical evidence is provided in regard to how this process of influence operated.
Aside from stylized descriptions of private sector influence, the formation of Basel II has 
been consistently cited within the IPE literature as an instance o f ‘regulatory capture’ by private 
sector interests, invoking the notion from Stigler that the content of regulation is designed in the 
interests of the regulated industry itself.58 Claessens, et. al. argue that the claim that BCBS was a 
victim o f policy capture “might be exaggerated”, but that “the long-institutionalized relationship 
between regulators and the regulated in financial supervision...approximates conditions of 
capture.” In this regard, the claim is that Basel II “derived directly from the proposals of the 
private sector.”59 Underhill and Zhang make the same claims, but also advance the case for 
capture further by stating that the formation of Basel II60 represents a case of “the growing ability 
of private market agents to set rules”61 and a prime example of “the domination of global 
financial supervision and regulation by private actors.”62
The mechanisms of such ‘policy capture’ are sometimes hypothesized, but the analytical 
strength of the actual analysis is not as strong as the empirical assertions made. Underhill and 
Zhang for example suggest that regulatory authorities have become dependent on the information 
and expertise provided by private sector groups.63 In the context of Basel II, Griffith-Jones and 
Persaud provide more detail for a similar hypothesis. They posit that private bankers possess 
better technical expertise than regulators, as well as superior resources to pay for studies that 
better inform their positions. They suggest that “ ...through superior expertise and information, 
regulators often become persuaded of the bankers’ position. This is the most perfect and least 
visible form of influence -  a capture of minds.”64 This argument posits an interesting causal 
mechanism which, unfortunately, is not tested empirically, but rather is simply posited. Griffith- 
Jones and Persaud note that large banks interacted with the BCBS, and furthermore that many of
57 Tarullo 2008, p. 104.
58 See Stigler 1971. The Stiglerian notion of regulatory capture is discussed in more detail below.
59 Claessens, Underhill and Zhang 2008, p. 321.
60 Their study consists of not only the BCBS, but also the International Organization of Securities Commissions.
61 See Underhill and Zhang 2008, pp. 546, 537.
62 Underhill and Zhang 2008, p. 553.
63 Underhill and Zhang 2008, p. 553. See Cemy 1994a, p. 331.
64 Griffith-Jones and Persaud 2008, p. 266.
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the policies within the Accord are advantageous to large banks.65 This observation leads them to 
the conjecture that large banks have systematically influenced the formation of such policies. 
Rather than demonstrating this case, private sector influence is presumed on the basis of co­
variation alone, rather than by examining the process by which decisions were actually made, or 
by examining how different regulatory policies within the Accord had different contents.66
Within recent work by Helleiner and Porter, Basel II is cited the prime example of 
“capture of the regulatory process by the industry it is supposed to regulate.” Helleiner and 
Porter refer specifically to the problem of elite technocracy that the BCBS implies, positing that 
the highly technical character of regulatory networks like the BCBS “provide privileged access 
points for business”, making it “especially susceptible to ‘capture’ by the financial firms they are 
supposed to be regulating.”68 As support for this hypothesis, they cite the fact that the Institute of 
International Finance “worked very closely” with the BCBS, “successfully suggesting and 
promoting the use of the internal risk models.”69 As evidence for this claim, they submit only a 
reference to a retrospective document of the Institute of International Finance, which claims that 
these changes were initiated at its own behest.70 While Helleiner and Porters’ conclusions may 
be correct, we have no way of evaluating such claims on the basis o f such sparse evidence.
Tsingou’s research on the formation of Basel II is more focused and analytical than most 
other analyses, but the analysis is itself insufficient in understanding the operation of private 
sector influence. In one work, Tsingou uses the formation of Basel II as the main example in 
arguing that, “[in] the banking industry, the private sector is writing its own script, increasingly 
influencing not just the function of regulation but also that of supervision.”71 She argues that “a 
wide variety of established business associations have taken over a standard-setting regulatory 
role at various stages of the policy process”, citing the Institute of International Finance in this 
regard in playing an active consulting and lobbying role in the formation of the Basel II Accord. 
While the mechanisms of such influence are not explored, a subsequent work provides more
65 In their words, “one means of assessing the degree of influence wielded by the various players is to determine 
who wins and who loses” Griffith-Jones and Persaud 2008, p. 264.
66 Griffith-Jones and Persaud 2008, p. 226.
67 Helleiner and Porter 2009, p. 20.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 See IIF 2007. See also the similar claims in Porter 2009, p. 4; Porter 2006, pp. 107-108.
71 Tsingou 2004, p. 11.
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detail, whereby Tsingou argues that private interests have become internalized within the BCBS 
during the making of Basel II, because the process itself is characterized in a way. It is argued 
that private sector preferences have been internalized in the making of Basel II -  not necessarily 
because of a “conscious and deliberate strategy of capture but rather, as a consequence of formal 
and informal practices of public-private interaction and agreement among an increasingly 
coherent and transnational policy community.”72 Tsingou argues in this regard that a small elite 
group of private actors have acquired semi-institutionalized functions in the making of Basel II. 
Like Helleiner and Porter, she cites the influence of the Institute of International Finance, with 
the evidence being that this organization was extensively involved in the consultation process
• •  73during the drafting of the Accord, offering feedback and providing expertise during this period 
A particular focus of Tsingou’s critique in this regard is that the Accord’s policies are market- 
based or market-generated and favor large sophisticated banks, which match the Institute of 
International Finance’s own preferences.74 Rather than supporting this hypothesis on the basis of 
the content of actual interaction between the Institute of International Finance and the BCBS, it 
is supported by the fact that interaction between the IIF and the BCBS took place at all, and by 
the fact that policy outcomes are understood to match private sector preferences.75
Another prominent work in the IPE of finance literature which has analyzed the 
formation of Basel II has been put forward by Wood. Wood devotes an entire book to a broad 
study of the BCBS’ work since its origins, and has devoted a chapter to describing and assessing 
the creation of the Basel II Accord (until 2003, thus before it was fully completed). Wood’s 
analysis is richer in detail and nuance than many of his contemporaries, but like them he asserts 
that private sector influence occurred without demonstrating how. Wood states, for example, that 
“the BCBS has been forced to back down on a number of issues where big banks have refused to 
accept the Committee’s proposals,” seeing a number of policy changes as “capitulation by the 
Committee” and sees existing regulatory policies as “essentially concessions” to large banks. 
These claims are not supported with reference to empirical evidence beyond the basic correlation 
that large banks critiqued policy proposals, and at a later time they were changed.76 In a similar
72 Tsingou 2008, pp. 61-62.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 See Tsingou 2008, pp. 60-61.
76 Wood 2005, pp. 123, 141, 132-33.
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manner to Claessens et. al., Wood argues that “the specter o f regulatory capture is not far 
away.”77 Unlike many of his contemporaries, Wood attempts to illustrate regulatory policy 
changes which occurred at various points in the formation of Basel II. However the analysis is 
descriptive only, in that the specific reasons why “US financial actors” were able to influence 
their regulators is not explored.
Since the recent global financial crisis, the claims of the BCBS falling victim to 
regulatory capture have only increased; yet instead of insufficient evidence used to support this 
claim, no evidence is used at all, but rather either only reference to previous studies. Ocampo has 
argued that the BCBS has been subject to “the capture of regulation by large multinational 
banks”; Tsingou has commented that Basel II is regarded as “the perfect example of regulatory 
and supervisory capture”; and Golden and Vogel have argued that the BCBS "fell victim to 
regulatory capture by large international banks, which allowed these institutions to influence and 
lobby regulatory outcomes to their individual advantage, but to the detriment of financial 
stability."78 Indeed, regulatory capture in general is often discussed self-evidently, given the size 
of the global financial crisis and the policy calamity that is understood to underlie it.79
Central Weaknesses in the Literature
While the existing literature on the role of private sector groups in Basel II’s formation is 
very diverse, there are nevertheless two central weaknesses which stand out. First, specific 
hypotheses are not tested, based on a range of evidence. This weakness is related to the fact that 
there is no variation in the dependent variable of interest -  the content of regulatory policy itself. 
In this regard, existing analyses have emphasized regulatory policies within Basel II which are 
understood as favorable to private sector groups, however conceived, whether they are “US 
financial actors”, the Institute of International Finance, or “large banks.” However, the regulatory 
policies of the Accord which were not favorable to these private sector groups, and which were 
vigorously opposed, are not examined. In some ways this non-variation reflects the objectives of
77 Wood 2005, p. 157.
78 Ocampo 20091, p. 10; Tsingou 2010, p. 24; Goldin and Vogel 2010, p. 13.
79 See for example the remarks by Stiglitz on capture in Stiglitz 2009, pp. 5-6; Mattli and Woods 2008, p. v.
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the research, which is not to examine private sector influence systematically, but rather to 
provide suggestive evidence that it has occurred.
As the widespread use of the term ‘regulatory capture’ signifies, much of the 
foundational thinking that informs the IPE of finance work is informed by Stigler’s pioneering 
work on the political economy of regulation. Stigler argued that public officials were wont to 
design regulation to favor groups that offer them the highest degree of political support. As such, 
the content of regulation would reflect private interests — particularly those groups that could 
successfully influence policymakers -  rather than the public interest at large.80 In this guise, 
Stigler sought to point out that regulation can be ‘captured’ by private sector groups (typically 
concentrated producer groups) who have organized to influence regulators.81 While the public 
choice literature which followed Stigler was much less certain of the extent to which capture was 
possible, the notion of capture provided an analytic device for many to pursue nonetheless. 
Following this tradition, many studies within the wider political economy literature have sought 
as their objective to demonstrate evidence which supports the notion this ‘private interests’ view 
of regulation.83 This literature can be regarded as analytically superior, because it considers a 
range of regulatory policy outcomes, and utilizes a research design which hypotheses are 
explicitly tested, rather than simply posited. However the objective of this research, like most 
IPE research, is to argue that influence occurred — not to examine how.
The second central weakness within the existing literature is that the standards of 
evidence employed are weak, especially in comparison to the claim of regulatory capture, which 
implies a substantial and unequivocal degree of private sector influence. In most of the above 
analyses, public-private interaction is assumed as a sufficient condition for private sector 
influence. To simply assume this is potentially very misleading. Evidence that a private sector 
group interacted with the BCBS does not mean that it managed to have its preferences met
80 See Stigler 1971.
81 In his words, “as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its 
benefit.” See Stigler 1971, p. 3.
82 In particular, Becker and Pelzman were much more critical of the notion that in a liberal democratic context where 
there are a plurality of different interests vowing for state influence, that capture will be extensive. See Becker 1983; 
Peltzman 1976; Pelzman 1989.
83 See Kroszner and Strahan 1999; Kroszner 2001; Kroszner and Strahan 2001; Heinemann and Schuler 2004.
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because o f  that interaction.84 Such a notion is an empirical issue that has to be subject to scrutiny, 
rather than simply assumed. Similarly, it is logically possible that public-private interaction isn’t 
even relevant to the content of regulatory policy at all. If we consider the possibility that large 
banks exert structural power over regulatory policies, for example, interaction with the BCBS 
may not even be a necessary condition for influence to take place, let alone a sufficient one. 
Once again, this is an empirical question -  and it would be equally fallacious to simply assume 
the answer either way.
Any conjecture about private sector influence over regulatory policy — including the 
strong ‘regulatory capture’ prevalent within the IPE literature cited above -  cannot be supported 
through simple correlative evidence alone. A correlation between policy outcomes and private 
sector preferences is not necessarily indicative of influence because that correlation may be due 
to an additional factor, for example the endogenous preferences of regulators, or a bargaining 
dynamic between them which has nothing to do with private sector groups and their preferences. 
This relates to what Mahoney has called the ‘black box’ problem in social science.85 When a 
study is based on co-variation alone, researchers cannot meaningfully identify the connection 
between cause and effect. Furthermore, to the extent that correlative analysis can be a useful tool 
for assessing patterns in empirical phenomena, basic standards of inference dictate that one needs 
variation in the outcome being explained; however, none of the existing academic literature on 
Basel II’s formation has researched such variation.
While the existing literature on the influence of private sector groups on the formation of 
the Basle II Accord can be regarded as unsatisfactory, there are nevertheless a number of 
analytical tools available within the broader literature in the IPE of finance and also the broader 
political economy literature that can provide a way forward. Exploring if, and how, private sector 
groups influence transnational financial regulatory policymaking entails an understanding of two 
dynamics. First, we need to understand what means private sector groups possess to potentially 
influence their regulators, organized either at the national or transnational level. Second,
84 See Fuchs 2007, pp. 89-90. Dur and De Bievre have recently demonstrated this problem with respect to European 
trade policy, whereby NGOs have been given unprecedented access to policymakers, but have not influenced actual 
policy. See Dur and De Bievre 2007.
85 See Mahoney 2004, pp. 464-465; see also Gerring 2008 on ‘looking inside the black box’ of causal processes. The 
attempt to look inside the ‘black box’ of ‘regulatory capture’ has been pursued by Boehm 2007, although this has 
been in relation to the economics of corruption specifically.
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assuming private sector groups employ those means successfully, we need to know what possible 
pathways private sector groups have at their disposal for securing regulatory policy change at the 
transnational level.
Section 3 
Private Sector Influence over Banking Regulators: 
Hypotheses
The relationship between private sector groups and regulators in the financial sphere has 
been the subject of considerable attention within political economy for some decades. In order to 
derive hypotheses from the existing literature, I first review the political economy literature 
which has posited hypotheses regarding the specific instrumental actions which private sector 
groups take to influence financial regulation. I then review the ways in which private sector 
groups are understood to exercise structural power over their regulators, and thus influence 
financial regulation not by the actions that they take, but by the way in which their presence is 
constituted in the political economic context of the time. Third, I review the particular scope 
conditions that have been hypothesized within the literature; in other words, the contextual 
circumstances which are understood to affect and condition the influence of private sector groups 
over financial regulators.
The Instrumentalist Tradition
Central to a large body of work within political economy of financial regulation has been 
the notion that private sector groups exert influence by engaging in particular actions which can 
shape the content of regulation in line with their preferences. Fuchs and Lederer have recently 
labeled these ‘instrumental’ perspectives on private sector influence, and therefore I group these 
together as ‘instrumentalist perspectives.86 Within the diversity of literature that has followed 
this trajectory of thinking, two different research programs can be demarcated, which emphasize 
different kinds of means. One tradition, drawing from public choice theory, has emphasized
86 Fuchs and Lederer 2007.
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formal pressure on regulators, while another tradition, drawing from policy network theory, has 
emphasized recurring and mutually constituting relationships between private sector groups and 
regulators, as a communicative process.
Legislatures, Executives, and the Means o f Pressure
Those emphasizing the role of formal institutions of governance, such as national 
legislatures have emphasized the ways in which private sector groups interact with legislators 
desire for re-election. Lukauskas, for example, has explicitly utilized the Stiglerian public choice 
model of regulatory policymaking and applied it to financial regulation in the country case of 
Spain, whereby legislative calculation plays the primary explanatory role in explaining both 
financial market restrictions and liberalization.87 Rosenbluth and Schaap have conducted an 
across-case analysis of 22 industrialized democracies and find evidence that electoral rules affect
banking regulatory outcomes, suggesting evidence for the notion that banks can utilize the
* 88 legislative process in some way to shape regulation in their favor. In a detailed study of the US
savings and loans crisis and its aftermath, Kane has investigated the efforts by US savings and
loan institutions to influence the US congress.89
Other work in this tradition has been much more explicit in terms of mechanisms 
specified. A central focus, especially within US-focused literature, has been on the direct 
financial support that private sector groups can provide to elected officials in order to assist in 
their reelection. This ‘campaign contributions’ hypothesis has been central to the research of 
Kroszner and Stratmann, who have examined the way in which Political Action Committees 
have been formed to finance special US Congressional committees, and also in the recent work 
of Broz on the relationship between the US Congress and the IMF, where large commercial 
bank’s campaign contributions are found to be statistically correlated with votes regarding the 
IMF budget.90 More recently, Igan, Mishra and Tressel have demonstrated a robust statistical
87 See Lukauskas 1997.
88 Rosenbluth and Schaap 2003.
89 Kane 1990.
90 Cf. See Kroszner and Stratmann 1998; Broz 2009.
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relationship between how much a bank spends on lobbying and how risky their lending practices 
are, suggesting that banks can purchase the benefits associated with moral hazard.91
The literature exploring the ‘campaign contributions’ hypothesis has represented an 
important part of the broader literature on private sector influence. However there are two 
reasons why it is not a engaged with in this study, however. First, while private sector 
campaign contributions to elected officials is a widespread practice in some countries (especially 
in the United States), it is not in other countries (such as Canada, the UK, or Germany). While 
the study of campaign contributions may be relevant to US domestic policymaking or US foreign 
policy, it is not a hypothesis that can be tested across different country contexts (and certainly 
not at the transnational level). Secondly and more substantively, like many regulatory policies, 
the construction of Basel II was not constructed by legislators, but rather was constructed by 
regulatory bureaucracies within the executive branch of government. The issue which is most 
relevant, therefore, is how a specialized regulatory institution within an executive-branch 
bureaucracy can be influenced by private sector groups.93 This raises an explanatory challenge 
because financial regulatory policy is often delegated to regulatory bureaucracies which are, by 
institutional design, relatively insulated from forms of political influence — especially in recent
94years.
If the issue of influence on a formally independent regulatory bureaucracy is what needs 
to be explained, rather than on a legislature itself, what can provide this explanation? A specific 
causal mechanism o f private sector influence seems at first glance to be elusive, because the 
interests, actions, and malleability of an elected legislature are different from that of an unelected 
regulatory bureaucracy. As Hamilton once put it, central bankers are “always at one remove from 
their political masters.”95 While not engaging with financial sector regulation, Weingast and 
Moran’s seminal study of legislative influence on regulatory agencies suggest that such pressure 
can be systematic by the ever-present threat of discipline on the parameters of the regulatory
91 See Igan, Mishra, and Tressel 2009. See also Mian, Sufi and Trebbi 2009.
921 have pursued this hypothesis elsewhere in the context of a variety of US regulatory decisions at the legislative 
and executive level.
93 See Furlong 2005.
94 McNamara 2003; Thatcher and Stone-Sweet 2003; Gilardi 2007.
95 Hamilton 1986, p. 199.
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bureaucracy’s decisions.96 Engaging with this line of inquiry within the IPE literature, Singer has 
posited a more specific mechanism in the context of financial regulation. Following Ferejohn and 
Shipan’s work on bureaucratic autonomy, Singer has argued that the threat of legislative 
oversight acts as the “bane of a regulators’ existence”, since it threatens a regulators autonomy 
and prestige.97 This suggests a specific causal mechanism for how private sector groups 
influence executive-level regulatory bureaucracies: by utilizing legislative oversight to discipline 
regulators’ behavior.
This ‘legislative oversight’ hypothesis is highly germane to this study, because it posits a 
specific mechanism by which private sector groups influence members of the BCBS. A private 
sector campaign which can utilize the lever of legislative oversight would be expected to have 
success in achieving the objective of influence (or, stated probabilistically, more success than a 
campaign without such a lever). Formally stated, this hypothesis is as follows:
H j: The Legislative Oversight Hypothesis. Private sector groups influence financial
regulation if they utilize the lever o f legislative oversight over their regulators.
The omnipresent threat of legislative oversight can be assessed empirically by taking into 
account by examining the level of formal regulatory independence that a regulatory bureaucracy 
has from the legislature. The more direct threat of legislative oversight is also readily observable 
in the content of legislative oversight hearings. Observable evidence in support o f the legislative 
oversight hypothesis would be that the introduction of formal legislative oversight is found to 
affect the observed actions of a regulator such that the regulator acts in a manner more closely 
aligned with the preferences of the private sector campaign. This could be manifest either 
through a changed position that a regulator has with respect to a given regulatory policy, or 
through the changed behavior that the regulator exhibits subsequent to such oversight. For a 
description of the manner in which these observations are made, and the sources of empirical 
material in this regard, see Chapter 2.
96 Weingast and Moran 1983.
97 Singer 2004; Singer 2007; Ferejohn and Shipan 1990. Posen’s work has also posed a notion of a legislative 
oversight threat affecting the behavior of the US Federal Reserve Board. See Posen 1993, p. 53.
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Policy Networks: Communicative Means o f Influence
Another tradition within the literature on the political economy of financial regulation has 
been to conceptualize the relations between private sector groups and regulators as part of the 
same ‘policy network’, in which there is a diffuse but reoccurring set of social relationships
OR »which serve the functional objectives of each member of this network. Rather than emphasizing 
relations of power and antagonism, this tradition emphases interaction and interdependence." 
This tradition has arguably been central to research on the political economy o f financial 
regulation, especially qualitative research, with early work in the field such as that of Mayer and 
Moran, and more recent work by Cemy and Tsingou that explicitly uses a network-relational 
ontology to understand the operation of financial sector power.100 The literature reviewed above 
which has explored the formation of Basel II has also described the relationship of private sector 
groups and the BCBS as one of a policy network.101
The aim of such literature is not always to explain private sector influence (often it is to 
simply describe the fascinating relationships which exist), but a number of research programs 
have sought to do explain private sector influence. Reinicke’s extensive study of banking 
regulatory reform in the United States in the 1980s explicitly utilizes a notion of a domestic 
policy network, with private sector mobilization at the heart o f the analysis.102 More recently, 
Busch has conducted an extensive historical study of the politics of banking regulation in the 
context of globalization, and traces the evolution of the banking sectors of Germany, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States from 1974 to 1999, and has also used 
this frame.103 While this tradition tends not to emphasize antagonistic relationships between 
private sector groups and financial regulators, this should not suggest that there are no 
hypothesized means through which private sector groups exert their influence. On the contrary, 
there are two hypothesized means by which private sector groups can exert influence in the
98 For policy network theory, networks are understood and analyzed as institutions, especially due to their capacity 
to establish rules and long-lasting patterns of social relations for how agents react. See Thatcher 1998.
99 Compston 2009.
100 See for example the notion of a network employed in the early work of Mayer, and even more explicitly in the 
work of Moran. Mayer 1974, pp. 361-362; Moran 1986. More recently, Cemy has explicitly advocated a network- 
based understanding of relationships within the financial sector. See Cemy 2002; Tsingou 2010, p. 22.
101 Both Porter and Tsingou refer to the relationship as a policy network, Claessens, et. al. have called it a “long- 
institutionalized relationship”. See Claessens Underhill and Zhang, p. 321; Porter 2010.
102 Reinicke 1995.
103 Busch 2008.
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context of a policy network: through mobilization, and through the transfer of detailed 
information.
On the one hand, private sector groups can mobilize in order to voice their preferences 
with respect to a proposed or potential regulation. Mobilization can be understood as the 
instrumental effort that made by private sector groups to communicate their views to 
regulators.104 As such the ‘mobilization hypothesis’ can be stated as follows:
H.2 '. The Mobilization Hypothesis. Private sector groups influence financial 
regulation if they work to communicate their preferences to the relevant 
regulator(s).
Mobilization can take a number of different forms, such as authoring and sending a letter or 
comment on a given regulatory policy, offering comment within a public forum, or through 
direct personal interlocution with regulators themselves. Inherent in the notion of mobilization is 
that the communication of preferences is not automatic, but rather involves an intentional effort 
and process o f organization.105 Observable evidence in support of this hypothesis would be that
f *
(a) regulator(s) changed their course of action on a given regulatory policy following sustained 
efforts by private sector groups to mobilize around this same policy.
The other communicative ‘means’ by which private sector groups are understood to 
influence financial regulatory policy is by providing detailed information to regulators as they 
are constructing regulatory policy. The notion is that regulators can be persuaded by new and 
detailed information that they receive from private sector groups which causes them to change a 
prior regulatory policy decision.106 Alternatively, regulators might be dependent on private sector 
groups for information, such that the mechanism is not so much persuasion, but private sector- 
sourced information (and thus bias) as an input to the regulatory policymaking process itself. 
Information can be understood as a critical resource because of the ways in which regulatory 
agencies lack certain forms of information about the potential costs and benefits to the policies
104 The language of mobilization is used explicitly in Reinicke 1995; Fuchs 2007; Sell 2003. For a critique, see 
Macartney 2008.
105 Even studies of private sector oppositional signaling within the central bank literature presuppose that critical 
commentary requires some degree of organization. See Maier and Bezoen 2004; Maier Sturm and De Haan 2002; 
Havrilesky 1993.
106 On the strategic use of information, see Bouwen 2002 (p. 360 uses the example of banks).
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they design and implement.107 Alternatively, such informational dependencies might persist 
because the mathematical complexity of financial markets supersedes regulators’ understanding 
-  a point first posited by Cemy within the IPE literature.108 Sometimes referred to as the “coin of 
the realm” of interest group politics, the importance of information is recognized throughout the 
IPE of finance literature when it focuses on banking regulation.109 This hypothesis can be stated 
as follows:
H$: The Information Network Hypothesis. Private sector groups influence 
financial regulation by offering information to their regulators which supports 
their case for regulatory policy change by adding to their knowledge.
Empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis would include the transmission of evidence- 
based, empirical assessment of a regulatory policy by one or more private sector groups which 
adds to regulators’ knowledge in a way favorable to private sector preferences. This exchange of 
information would have to be discerned to be a contributing factor in initiating a regulatory 
policy change which was in line with the critics’ preferences. This hypothesis is germane to this 
study not only because it has been widely hypothesized within the political economy literature 
generally, but also because it has been posited as a specific reason for Basel II’s particular 
content as well, as discussed above.110
One further hypothesis which exists within the literature is that private sector groups 
influence regulatory policymaking by means of their close sociological relationships with 
regulators themselves, in particular the fact that regulators retire into positions within banks, and 
vice versa. This ‘revolving door’ hypothesis is sometimes posited within the literature, but is not 
a focus of this study.111 Examining such a hypothesis in detail requires an examination o f inter­
personnel ties and relationships in a manner which is outside the scope of this study.112 The
107 This is why, within the business and politics literature, lobbying is sometimes viewed as a “legislative subsidy”. 
See Hall and Deardorff 2006. See also Compston 2009.
108 Cemy 1994a, p. 331; Cemy 144b
109 See Warwick Commission 2009, pp. 6-7; Kerch 2007; Fuchs 2007 Hardy 2006, p. 5; Porter 2009, p. 7; Sell 2003, 
pp. 98-100; Bouwen 2002.
110 See Tsingou 208, p. 61; Underhill and Zhang 2008, p. 553; Kussin and Kette 2006, p. 298; Griffith-Jones and 
Persaud 2008.
111 See Gormley 1979; Gormley 1983; Cohen 1986.
112 For a recent theoretical engagement with this hypothesis, Seabrooke and Tsingou 2009. See also Santos 2006, pp. 
55-58.
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difficulties of measuring the revolving door have been remarked upon extensively within the 
political economy literature, however, and thus I consider it an institutional variant which may 
affect outcomes. Thus the revolving door is considered both when evaluating countries in the 
process of case selection (in Chapter 2) and in assessing across-case patterns within the 
campaigns and outcomes investigated (in Chapter 10).
The Structuralist Tradition
In contrast to the tradition o f political economy which has sought to explore the 
instrumental actions that private sector groups take in order to influence financial regulation, 
what is sometimes referred to as a ‘structuralist’ tradition emphasizes the ways in which private 
sector groups wield influence not through the actions they take, but by their nature as economic 
entities and their embeddedness in the political economic contexts in which they operate.113 The 
literature which explores structural power is very diverse. As a concept in political science it is 
often regarded as emerging from the critiques of liberal pluralism within American political 
science (e.g. Dahl), in which scholars of power such as Bacharach and Baratz and Lukes 
emphasized the dimensions of power which are less readily observable in the behavior o f agents 
(and for Lukes, sometimes even uncontested).114 Lindblom brought such interventions more 
directly to the study of private sector influence, by emphasizing the privileged role of business in 
governmental policymaking.115 Long before this pluralist tradition, thinking about structural 
power was prominent in Marxian scholarship, from the work of Kautsky to Kalecki to Althusser 
and Poulantzas.116
Within IPE, it was Strange who popularized the formal use of the term structural power. 
While she understood the concept as derived from Marxian theory,117 Strange also sought to 
extend the concept to relations of security and knowledge as well (and argued that neo-Marxian
1,3 The use of the term ‘structuralist’ is widespread in both the business and politics literature and in studies within 
global governance. See Fuchs and Lederer 2007; Sell 2000, p. 92.
114 See Dahl 1961; Bacharach and Baratz 1970; Lukes 1974.
1,5 See Lindblom 1977; Lindblom 1980.
116 See Poulantzas 1978; Kalecki 1943
117 Ssee Strange 1984, p. 191; Strange 1988, p. 30
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scholarship understood finance very poorly). Strange formally defined structural power in 
various different ways,119 but the meaning of the concept is generally the same: that an actor can 
exert influence the behavior of other actors without taking an action, by means of the structural 
relation both are situated within. Thus the application of direct (and hence observable) pressure 
is absent from many power relationships; however, such indirect interaction does not mean that 
power itself is absent. As Barnett and Duvall have recently pointed out, structural power is
understood to operate through the social relations of constitution, rather than through the
120exercising of specific instrumental actions.
Despite the fact that research on structural power adheres to a core principle, scholars 
have envisaged a variety of ways in which structural power is actually exercised. Some scholars 
refer to the structural power of states in the international economic system.121 This is perhaps not 
simply an artifact of the realist tradition in international relations theory, but rather a 
consequence of the fact that monetary policy decisions and international financial diplomacy are 
the typically the domain of states. Other work however has emphasized structural power not in 
terms of relations between states, but by considering relations within them. In this vein, a vast 
literature within both neo-pluralist and Neo-Marxian traditions has explored the state’s 
‘structural dependence of capital’, a claim that denotes the ability of firms to exercise influence 
over policymaking by virtue of their ability to control the investment function in capitalist 
societies.122 Within studies of the IPE finance in particular, there is an emphasis on the 
articulation of structural power by means of firms’ ability to (potentially) decide their 
jurisdiction, and to shape the parameters of policymaking under the particular opportunity 
structure afforded to states under conditions of internationally mobile capital.123 Other literature 
associated with the World Systems approaches and the ‘French Regulation School’ of political
economy has emphasized the structural dependence of capitalist states on financial sector
118 Strange 1988, pp. 26,30; Strange 1986, p. 86-90
1,9 See, for example, Strange 1988, pp. 24-5; Strange 1984, p. 191; Strange 1988, p. 31.
120 See Barnett and Duvall 2005, pp. 52-53. They also note the important differences from institutional power.
121 See for example Strange 1984, p. 190; Strange 1989. Consider as well the work closer to a realist tradition see 
Simmons 2001, Drezner 2007. Finally, see the Marxian scholarship which emphasizes the US state-financial sector 
relationship as a state-driven nexus of power which structures the international environment See Gowan 1999; 
Gowan 2001; Panitch and Gindin 2008; Konings 2008; Wade and Veneroso 1998.
122 See Bloch 1977; Lindblom 1977; Lindblom 1980; Przeworski and Wallerstein 1988; Swank 1992. For an 
application, see Bernhagen and Brauninger 2005
123 See the early exponents in Gill and Law 1989, pp. 487-88, Strange 1990, Andrews 1994, Crystal 1994; Pauly
1995. For empirical applications of this articulation of structural power, see Gill 1995; Mosley 2003; Hardie 2006.
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accumulation in particular, pointing out the structural imperatives to protect the profits of 
finance’s leading arenas of innovation in order to stave off a wider crisis of late capitalist 
development, such as in conjectures concerning ‘financialization’ of capitalist economies.124
Empirical research which addresses structural power in the domain of financial affairs is 
variegated. Most work which focuses on the political economy of financial regulation does so by 
describing broad processes of regulatory change, rather than specific regulatory policy decisions. 
Articulations of ‘statist structural power’ and ‘mobility structural power’ have engendered 
associated research programs, and occasionally hypotheses are tested in this regard.125 However 
much of the literature which articulates the ‘structural power of capital’ and processes of 
‘financialization’ does so as part of larger normative-ontological efforts, often emphasizing the 
consequences of regulatory change that systemic transformations of capitalism have brought 
about, rather than seeking to explain the causes of that change.126 For the purposes of this study, 
the testable hypothesis can be states as follows:
H j: The Structural Power Hypothesis. Private sector groups influence financial 
regulation in situations where they have a structural advantage in having their 
preferences met.
Observable evidence in support of this hypothesis could take a variety of different forms, 
depending on the particular way in which structural power is understood to operate in different 
contexts. As such, and because structural power is challenging to account for empirically (a point 
discussed below), I test this hypothesis by considering different dimensions and forms of 
structural power, and using a variety of measurements, variables, and methods to do so. As
127Bemhagen has pointed out, there are no established standards for measuring structural power. 
This lack is perhaps not because structural power comes in many variants, but because the vast 
majority of work on structural power is dedicated to either exploring the concept or describing its 
presumed effects, rather than analytically testing hypotheses in relation to it. Because of this
124 See Lipietz 2001; Arrighi and Moore 2001; Epstein 2006; Bellamy-Foster 2007.
125 As evinced by Dresner 2008,2009; Mosley 2004; Mardie 2006.
126 Cf. Panitch and Gindin 2005; Raviv 2008; Sassen 2010. Notable exceptions include the empirical work of 
Bernhagen and Brauninger 2005, Bemhagen 2007, Helleiner 2008, and Bemhagen 2008.
127 Bemhagen 2008.
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dynamic, and following Bernhagen, I employ multiple measures of structural power, as detailed
1 ^ 0
in Chapter 2 and analyzed in Chapter 10.
Scope Conditions o f Private Sector Influence
A number of factors also need to be considered which might condition the extent to 
which private sector groups are successful in achieving their objectives of influencing financial 
regulation. These can be treated as hypothesized ‘scope conditions’ that may condition the 
efficacy o f the other explanatory factors discussed above. Two hypothesized scope conditions 
stand out within the literature: the role of private sector (“business”) conflict and the role of 
private sector coalitions.
Recent research within IPE has demonstrated the efficacy of private sector conflict in
1 9 0conditioning private sector influence, both at the national and international levels. " Some 
quantitative studies have found inter-industry rivalry to be an important factor in affecting 
influence.130 Other political economy research uses different language to emphasize the same 
phenomenon, such as the Neo-Marxian literature which emphasizes ‘fractionalization of capital’, 
as relevant for determining the influence of private sector preferences over policy outcomes. 
Indeed, whether or not the interests of the financial sector and the rest of business community are 
fundamentally ‘opposed’ or ‘fused’ has been at the center of many debates within political 
economy, and recent work in IPE of finance is no exception.132 For the purposes o f this study, 
business conflict can be stated as a formally hypothesized scope condition as follows:
H s: The Business Conflict Hypothesis. The ability for one or more private sector 
groups to influence financial regulation is conditional on the extent of 
fragmentation within the campaign.
128 Bernhagen 2008, pp. 90-91.
129 See Nowell 1996; Cox 1996; Polbom and Sahakyan 2007; Falkner 2010. For a case study on trade, see Stant
1996. On environmental policy, see Falkner 2001; Falkner 2007.
130 On banking regulation, see Kroszner and Strahan 1999; Kroszner 201; Kroszner and Strahan 2001; Heinemann 
and Schuler 2004
131 See Van der Pijl 1984, p. 3; Marx 1978, pp. 109-179; Overbeek 2004; Van Apeldoom 2004; Skidmore-Hess 
1996
132 See Patich and Gindin 2008; Macartney 2009; Schwartz has recently depicted this division as one stemming back 
to institutionalists such as Veblen, and Marxists such as Hilferding. See Schwartz 2009, pp. 126-127; Hilferding 
1981. See also Hendershott, Less and Tompkins 2002.
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Observable evidence used to assess this hypothesis would include the degree o f preference 
unanimity or degree of fragmentation within a given private sector campaign. A campaign 
characterized by private sector groups expressing a singular, unified position regarding a given 
regulatory policy can be discerned from a campaign where there is discord, and private sector 
groups express different preferences for the same policy, with some private sector groups 
opposing the campaign.
Another scope condition to be considered is the extent to which private sector groups are 
able to organize their advocacy in coalitions. A prominent observation within the political 
economy literature is that private sector groups utilize the coordinative and representational 
advantages of associability.133 Private sector coalitions are part of many different hypotheses 
explored within the IPE literature, and a number of studies put this factor at the center of their 
analysis.134 The importance of coalitions has also been emphasized in a variety of literature 
examining the influence of banks and banking regulation, such as in the work of Posen, Lutz and
1 ^  5 •Eberle, and Gould. Stated formally, this emphasis on coalitions is formally stated as follows:
H$: The Coalitional Hypothesis. The ability for one or more private sector group 
to successfully influence financial regulation is conditional upon them forming 
explicit or implicit alliances with other private sector groups.
Observable evidence used to test this hypothesis would be the presence of coalitional activity 
among private sector groups as they attempt to influence regulatory policymaking. If their 
success is conditional upon the presence of such coalitions, then this hypothesis receives support. 
It should be noted, however, that the coalitional hypothesis is not a scope condition for structural 
power (at least when structural power is considered by itself), since coalitional activity is a form 
of instrumental action. This hypothesis is fundamentally different from H$ in the sense that the 
presence or absence of private sector coalitions is not the same phenomena as whether or not a 
given campaign features private sector conflict. For example, a campaign can feature a strong 
coalition between a variety of private sector groups trying to influence a given regulatory policy, 
at the same time that other groups offer regulators strong support over that same policy, and
133 See Grote, Lang and Schneider 2008; Gray and Lowery 1999.
134 See Nitzan 2001, p. 252; Aitken 2005, pp. 337-338.
135 Posen 1993; Lutz and Eberle 2007; Gould 2003, p. 561; Gould 2006.
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speak out against the oppositional coalition. Since private sector coalitions can take a variety of 
forms, as Chapter 2 outlines, I consider two different variables in this regard.
In addition to exploring the means that private sector groups use to influence regulators, 
it is also important to know how such influence over a given regulator translates into concrete 
regulatory policy change. It is a logical necessity that in order to influence the content of Basel 
II, private sector groups have to influence the decisions of the BCBS in some way. But how does 
this actually work? Two different possibilities are formally hypothesized below, and are justified 
based on the substantive issues within the literature.
Pathways o f Influence
As Dlir and De Bievre have recently pointed out, the study of private sector influence 
over policymaking is challenging precisely because of its different channels, or possible 
‘pathways’, of influence.136 The present study takes this concern seriously, especially because it 
is possible that private sector influence operates differently at different levels of governance. One 
particularly prominent hypothesis already within the literature on Basel II is that private sector 
groups influence the BCBS by organizing at the transnational level and influencing it directly. 
Many scholars have argued that one private sector group in particular, the Institute of 
International Finance, exercised influence over Basel II in this way. In this regard, Helleiner and 
Porter, Underhill and Zhang and Tsingou have all posited a transnational pathway of 
influence.137 Stated formally, this can be expressed as follows:
Hy: The Transnational Pathway Hypothesis. Private sector groups successfully 
influence regulatory policy outcomes by targeting the collective decisions of 
regulators as a group, i.e. as they are organized at the transnational level.
Empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis would demonstrate that a given private sector 
campaign is shown to have an observable effect on a regulatory policy outcome as it is being 
designed at the transnational level. Aside from being a prominently posited hypothesis within the
136 Diir and De Bievre 2007, p. 8.
137 Helleiner and Porter 2009, p. 20; Underhill and Zhang 2008, p. 553; Tsingou 2006, pp. 61-62.
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existing literature on Basel II, this hypothesis also connects in clear ways with the broader 
literature on private sector influence in global governance, which has argued that private sector 
groups have expanded their influence in transnational decision-making processes in particular.138
It is also possible for private sector groups to influence individual regulators at the 
national level, and to have them then bargain on behalf of private sector demands, in the manner 
commensurate with ‘two level games’ literature.139 Given that the decision rule within the BCBS 
is implicit consensus, this pathway of influence would seem very plausible, because any one 
member of the BCBS could have their demands relatively easily met in such an environment. In 
this regard, it is possible that private sector groups organized at the national level influence their 
national regulators, who then translate this influence into regulatory policy change within the 
BCBS of which they are members. Such a national pathway o f influence has been explicitly 
posited by Steel and Litan, Tarullo, and Wood in the context of Basel II.140 A similar, but more 
general, depiction has been made by the Warwick Commission when they state that in the 
context of transnational regulatory policy decisions “[cjaptured national regulators became 
champions of their national banks abroad.”141 Stated formally this hypothesis can be represented 
as follows:
Hg: The National Carrier Hypothesis. Private sector groups influence a
regulatory policy outcome by affecting the position and/or behavior of a national 
regulator who is successful in securing negotiated agreement at the transnational 
level for this position.
Empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis would need to fulfill two criteria. First, a given 
private sector campaign would have an observable effect on a national regulator, either in terms 
of changing their behavior or their position with respect to a given policy. Second, this 
influenced national regulator would then have to take actions which secure negotiated agreement 
within the BCBS on the terms desired by the private sector campaign. Existing empirical
138 See Higgott, Underhill, and Bieler 2000; Fuchs and Lederer 2007, p. 5.
139 See Putnam 1988; Evans 1993.
140 Steel and Litan 2006, pp. 23-24; Wood 2005, p. 158; Tarullo 2008, p. 104; See also the passing accounts of 
Koenig-Archigbugi and Zum 2006, p. 247; King and Sinclair 2003, p. 351.
141 Warwick Commission 2009, p. 27.
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research within the IPE of finance has demonstrated some support for this particular 
hypothesis.142
This ‘national carrier hypothesis’ is a challenging hypothesis to empirically test, because 
there are different ways in which a national regulator can be influenced at the national level that 
could affect outcomes. On the one hand, because each member of the BCBS takes part in a 
deliberative process, and because their consent is required for regulatory policymaking decisions, 
the position of the national regulator matters. By position I refer to the stance that a national 
regulator takes with respect to a given regulatory policy. On the other hand, the substantial 
literature on international negotiation theory suggests a second possibility as well. What this 
literature suggests is that negotiated outcomes are the result not only of the positions of 
negotiating actors, but also their bargaining resources. This study considers both o f these 
possibilities and, as I detail in Chapter 2, I develop different criteria for empirically measuring 
these different possibilities.
This section has established three different kinds of hypotheses which exist in the 
literature concerning private sector influence over financial regulation, as denoted in Table 1.0 
below. First, there are hypotheses that posit specific power resources, or what I have called 
‘means’ potentially available to private sector groups in the pursuit of regulatory policy change. 
Four such hypotheses were laid out: the use of legislative oversight, mobilization, the use of 
detailed information, and the deployment of structural power. Second, two hypotheses have 
specified particular scope conditions under which private sector influence over a regulator might 
be conditioned, namely private sector conflict and the presence of private sector coalitions were 
laid out. Third, two separate hypotheses were established which describe the different possible 
pathways by which private sector influence translates into regulatory policy change.
142 See, for example, Posner 2009, p. 687; Quaglia 2008; Mattli and Buthe 2003.
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Table 1.0: Summary of Hypotheses
Name of Hypothesis Hypothesis is Discerning...
Hj Legislative Oversight The Means of Influence
h 2 Mobilization The Means of Influence
H3 Information Network The Means of Influence
h 4 Structural Power The Means of Influence
h 5 Business Conflict A Scope Condition Affecting Influence
h 6 Coalitions A Scope Condition Affecting Influence
h 7 Transnational Pathway The Pathway of Influence
h 8 National Carrier Pathway The Pathway of Influence
With these eight hypotheses now explicated and justified in the context of the existing literature, 
Chapter 2 explains in detail the research design of the study which subjects them to empirical 
testing.
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Chapter 2
Research Design
Discerning private sector influence on any policy process is a challenging task. Not only 
do the multiple possible paths to an outcome make hypothesis testing against empirical material 
challenging, but influence itself can also be a process which is difficult to examine empirically. 
This study seeks to explain how, whether, and under what conditions private sector groups 
influence transnational financial regulatory policy outcomes by testing a variety of hypotheses 
within the literature elucidated in Chapter 1. This chapter describes the research design employed 
in the study, and is divided into five sections. Section 1 describes the methodological approaches 
used in this study, emphasizing the mixture of methods employed. Process-tracing, qualitative 
comparative analysis (QCA), and statistical regression analysis are all employed in order to 
capitalize upon their respective strengths and minimize their respective weaknesses. Section 2 
focuses on the definition, measurement, and calibration of the dependent variables of interest to 
the study. Section 3 then describes and elaborates the relevant explanatory variables under 
consideration, noting how these are calibrated and measured. Section 4 describes how private 
sector campaigns are selected for analysis as the basic unit of analysis within the study.
Section 1 
Methodological Approach of the Study
At the most elementary level, this study investigates one relationship: the relationship 
between private sector campaigns and regulatory policy outcomes. This relationship is 
investigated using a variety of different methods. Process-tracing analysis is employed for 
within-case analysis, i.e. in order to investigate the relationship between a given private sector
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campaign and a regulatory policy outcome within a given case. Across-case analysis investigates 
a number of different private sector campaigns as they corresponded to different regulatory 
policy outcomes, and assesses patterns which exist across these relationships. Two different 
methodologies are employed in order to assess such patterns: fuzzy-set qualitative comparative 
analysis (fsQCA), and statistical regression analysis. Each of these methodologies have 
particular strengths and weaknesses, which are discussed below.
Process Tracing For Within-Case Analysis
To explore causal relationships between the particular content and context of private 
sector campaigns, the reactions of regulators and policy outcomes, I employ the method of 
process tracing.143 Process tracing analysis identifies the key events, individuals, relationships, 
and decisions that link causal conditions to outcomes.144 Because of its emphasis on empirical 
detail, process tracing enables the researcher with an in-depth knowledge of the events and 
processes within each case examined. For this reason, Gerring has described the method as 
getting “inside the box” and investigating the detailed mechanisms and events which interact 
over time to shape outcomes.145 Thus, in contrast to across-case analysis, which rely on forms of 
inference that observe association and/or variation across variables/conditions and outcomes, 
process tracing explains the decision-making process by which initial conditions within a case 
are actually translated into outcomes.
This method is especially well suited to this study, because it allows for the rich 
contextual background of cases to be highlighted, for decision-making among actors to be 
explored, and for the elaborate causal process to be explained.146 Process tracing allows for the 
exploration of causal linkages between events in a chronological fashion as events unfold in a 
narrative.147 A detailed description of how policies were constructed, contested, and negotiated 
among relevant actors enables an in-depth analysis of how private sector campaigns interacted 
with regulatory responses over time. Yet process tracing is not just description, since the analysis
143 George and Bennett 2005.
144 Mahoney 2000b; Collier, Brady and Seawright 2005.
145 Gerring 2008.
146 See the discussion in Diir 2008a. See also Diir 2008b, p. 1224.
147 George and Bennett 2005, 206.
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seeks to both simultaneously provide a thick description of empirical phenomena and to analyze 
these phenomena with explicit reference to external criteria.148 In this regard the analysis traces 
processes of private sector campaigns and regulatory responses, but does so with the aim to 
assess the strength of the particular hypotheses developed in Chapter 1. Because process tracing 
takes a narrative form, the number of falsification points are maximized, thus subjecting 
inferences to additional scrutiny and transparency.149 Furthermore, spurious correlations between 
observed phenomena can be revealed within a case, and thus such cases can be omitted from 
later across-case analysis in order to prevent the distortion of results. It is entirely possible, for 
example, that private sector groups took a number of actions in a given campaign, and this 
corresponded (‘co-varied’) with a particular regulatory policy outcome. This does not mean 
however that the private sector campaign is the cause of that outcome. Indeed, there may be a 
variety of other factors that led to a particular regulatory policy outcome. Process tracing helps to 
establish this by considering a range of evidence which highlights potential causes other than the 
one of interest. As Bennett has recently pointed out, process tracing is also invaluable in 
assessing whether or not there are additional factors present outside the realm of causes which 
are investigated in a given study.150 To the extent that evidence of a regulatory policy outcome 
exists which has nothing to do with a private sector campaign, I consider the relationship 
between the private sector campaign and regulatory policy change to be causally spurious.
Despite its advantages, process tracing analysis has at least three weaknesses that relate to 
the aims of this study. First, process-tracing is extremely demanding empirically. The empirical 
demands of process-tracing interest group influence are particularly acute, given the number of 
causal steps in a chain that require empirical evidence. Processes of private sector lobbying, and 
regulatory decision-making are lengthy, complex, involve a plethora o f actors, decisions, and 
interactions. These heavy empirical demands relate indirectly to the second weakness of process- 
tracing analysis, that of generality. If a causal process is uncovered for a particular case, how 
unique is that process, and how well does it speak to more general trends in the phenomena being 
studied? Generalizations across cases are not possible, not only because the number o f cases
148 Falleti 2006.
149 This is a point recently raised in Bennett 2008. More generally, Buthe has discussed the particular challenges 
associated with the use of narratives, but noted that these challenges are reduced by the use of multiple narratives.
See Buthe 2002.
150 See Bennett 2008.
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typically considered in process tracing analyses is typically very small, but also because the 
method itself has no tools for across-case analysis. Third and most substantively, the method of 
process-tracing may obfuscate the less observable causal pathways of interest group influence. 
As Diir has recently pointed out, in particular, process-tracing may lead researchers to strongly 
associate levels of interest group activity to influence.151 This may mean that spurious 
relationships are deemed causal, when indeed they are not. Alternatively, it may mean that some 
less observable causal mechanisms of influence are obfuscated from view. For example, 
structural forms of power, or low levels of interest group activity which are nevertheless 
powerful beyond the recognition of the researcher, will be either elusive or, worse still, missed 
altogether, because they cannot fit within the causal chain of events being ‘traced.’
Each of these weaknesses is addressed in this study by a combination of thorough 
attentive analysis and the complementing of process-tracing analysis with other methods. While 
the empirical challenges of process-tracing are omnipresent in any research, in this study I 
address this by utilizing extensive and diverse primary sources. The formation of the Basel II 
Accord left a paper trail of publicly available documentation that is more extensive than most (if 
not all) previous international financial negotiations. This extensive documentation included not 
only the detailed comment letters by private sector groups, but also studies conducted by the 
BCBS itself, speeches given by its members, and press reports of progress made during the 
negotiations. Financial journalists also tracked events as they occurred, creating a record of 
comments made by BCBS members and private sector groups as well. More substantively, 97 
semi-structured focused interviews were conducted with those individuals involved in Basel IPs 
development, from both private sector groups and the regulatory community (See Appendix 1). 
The challenge of generalizing across findings is not overcome through process-tracing itself, but 
rather from the fact that the findings from each policy case investigated are summarized and used 
in later fsQCA. The challenge of attributing influence to an easily observable process rather than 
an elusively observable one is overcome both by considering less easily observable phenomena 
in the narrative and by complementing process tracing with across-case analysis.
Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA)
151 See Diir 2008a, p. 563.
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In order to facilitate across-case analysis, I engage with a comparison of the findings 
from each of the cases examined through process-tracing. Typical employments of the 
comparative method utilize a comparison of a small number of carefully selected cases, whereby 
the presence or absence of particular characteristics within each case are compared as the basis 
for across-case causal inference.152 While the specific research design in this comparative 
tradition varies, the ability to generalize across all possible instances of a given phenomenon of 
interest can often be limited, given the small number of comparisons actually being made. In 
response to these perceived analytical shortcomings, recent research in political economy has 
employed statistical techniques in order to assess processes of co-variation across a wide range 
of cases, typically through linear regression analysis.153 While there are distinct benefits of such 
a method (see below), one significant limitation of this tradition is that for results to have 
statistical significance, and hence for covariate inferences to be made, a very large number of 
cases, or ‘observations’ are required.
Recent methodological innovations within social science have provided a means to 
conduct across-case analysis in a way that overcomes this limitation. Qualitative comparative 
analysis (QCA) builds on the basis of comparative method but allows for a larger number of 
possible cases to be considered than would otherwise be manageable in a simple case- 
comparative analysis.154 A key distinction from linear statistical analysis is that QCA 
understands processes of social causation to be fundamentally configurational, as opposed to 
additive, and allows the researcher to conduct tests of whether or not a given causal condition 
can be deemed as necessary and/or sufficient for an outcome to occur.155 Across-case analysis is 
conducted on the basis of its adherence to logical premises of set-theory, rather than the 
probabilistic mode of analysis of statistical co-variation.156 Relatedly, the issue of equifinality -  
that there may be more than one causal pathway to an outcome -  is overcome through the use of 
Boolean algebra, which is an alternative to linear algebra.157
152 See Ragin 1987.
153 As Maliniak and Tierney have argued (using statistics), such a quantitative methodology has become increasingly 
popular within IPE over the last 20 years. Maliniak and Tierney 2009, p. 19.
154 Ragin 1987.
155 Ragin 2000.
156 On this distinction, see See Schlosser et. al. 2009, p. 9.
157 See Ragin 1992a. See Geortz 2009, p. 22.
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Advances in the application of QCA now allow for the use of data which are not binary- 
categorical (i.e. 0 or 1), such that the ‘coding’ of set membership take place in more granular, or 
‘fuzzy’ membership scores. Fuzzy sets are a way of accounting for social phenomenon using a 
simple interval scale coding method with a form of calibration based on set membership. Fuzzy 
set analysis facilitates the precision and comparability o f quantitative analysis and at the same 
time allow the use of substantive knowledge of qualitative analysis to calibrate these
1 ^ Rmeasurements. Fuzzy sets thus constitute a bridge between quantitative and qualitative 
approaches to measurement of social phenomena, in that full membership (coding of 1) and full 
non-membership are (coding of 0) are qualitative states, not ‘measured’ or ‘counted’ data 
observations.159 Yet between these two qualitative states of full and partial membership in a set 
are varying degrees of membership, ranging from ‘more out than in but not fully out’ (close to 0 
but below .5) to ‘more in than out but not fully in’ (close to 1 but above .5). Coding a ‘variable’ 
(i.e. either a causal condition or an outcome) in this way allows for quantitative comparison 
across cases and at the same time enables fine-grained variation across different causal 
configurations, capturing not all, but more subtle differences in the observation of social 
phenomena than would otherwise be the case.
There are three principal weaknesses of fsQCA which are germane to this study. The first 
is what might be called its procedural weakness, and involves the assignment of membership 
scores to variables (fuzzy-set ‘coding’). While there are a number of methods that can be 
employed for the coding of variables, when the data is not already coded and available from 
some external source, the fuzzy-set coding that takes place is often performed non-transparently, 
and is not reported as a procedure. Transparency of the process of coding is important because 
fsQCA usually involves a qualitative judgment on behalf of the researcher.160 The second and 
more substantive weakness of fsQCA is that it assumes a persistent association between causal 
conditions and outcomes to be a causal one, when in fact this relation of association may not be 
causal.161 For lack of a better term, this can be called the ‘assumed causality problem.’ These
158 See Rihoux 2008
159 See Ragin 2000.
160 Lieberson, for example, has argued that QCA results are very sensitive to the researcher’s discriminatory power. 
See Lieberson 2004. Many who use fsQCA argue that using the method requires a substantive knowledge of the 
cases under investigation, and indeed this has become a common justification within the literature. See for example 
Katz et. al. 2005; Rihoux and Ragin 2004; Avdagic 2010.
161 Seawright has critiqued the use of fsQCA on this basis. See Jason Seawright 2004, pp. 16-17.
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weaknesses are compounded by a third — what might be called the ‘rough assessment’ problem: 
the fact that, unlike standard statistical methods, fsQCA is a method which does not produce 
estimations of error.162 This is a substantial problem for some scholars, since explanation of 
social phenomena are most commonly understood probabilistically (A causes B 90% of the 
time), rather than deterministically (A leads to B).163 In this regard, it might be claimed that 
while fsQCA can assess the sufficiency and necessity of a causal condition or combination of 
causal conditions in producing an outcome, it cannot demonstrate the strength of these 
relationships.
The weaknesses of fsQCA highlighted above are surmounted by the complementary use 
of the other complementary methods used in this study. On the one hand, the detailed within- 
case analysis involved in process-tracing allows for a procedurally transparent process of coding 
fuzzy-set membership scores for each variable in each case. For example, a score of .67 for 
legislative oversight (mostly but not fully in the ‘set’) can be justified rigorously with reference 
to empirical evidence. Furthermore, such qualitative judgments are transparent and thus have the 
status that they can be potentially challenged. On the other hand, the problem of ‘assumed 
causality’ is overcome by the fact that causal relationships between explanatory and dependent 
variables are already established through process-tracing analysis.164 If and when there is no 
causal link established between a private sector campaign and the regulatory outcome of interest, 
the dependent variable is coded as zero in the fsQCA dataset from which across-case analyses 
are drawn. The ‘rough assessment’ problem of fsQCA is overcome through the use of quasi- 
probabilistic estimates of how well a given causal condition or combinations of causal conditions 
fits a logical test of necessity or sufficiency. These are called ‘consistency scores’, and these 
scores are employed in this study, as Chapter 10 demonstrates in detail.165
162 Wade and Goldstein, for example, have critiqued the fact that QCA disregards confidence-affecting information 
that both qualitative and statistical analyses typically contain. See Wade and Goldstein 2003.
163 Lieberson has made this critique against the method of small-N comparative approaches, including QCA. See 
Lieberson 1992.
164 The use of fsQCA as a complementary technique is explicitly supported in some of the recent methodological 
discussions of the method. See Rihoux 2008; Ragin 2006b; Grofman and Schneider 2009.
165 See Ragin 2006a; Ragin 2008.
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Statistical Regression Analysis
While fsQCA facilitates the majority of across-case analysis in the study, there are 
nevertheless still some advantages o f more conventional statistical methods to conduct across- 
case analysis. On the one hand, regression analysis can offer the researcher an assessment of the 
statistical significance of a given variable of interest. Despite the sometimes complex 
mathematics behind regression techniques, often the most valuable information is simply 
whether a given variable matters, relative to the mean of all other variables in the regression. 
‘Statistical correlation’ can thus be a powerful tool to make inferences about whether a given 
phenomenon is important, or simply part of the background noise and chaos o f any complex 
collection of social processes. Furthermore, because statistical analysis engages in a computation 
o f the ‘net effects’ of each explanatory variable of interest, it can decipher an otherwise elusive 
process of co-variation that might be missed in other methodologies. For example, a general and 
dispersed effect of one variable may be a statistically significant covariant to the dependent 
variable of interest when assessing patterns across a large-N sample, but such an effect may be 
elusive when each case is observed individually. This would be the case when social power 
relations operate in a diffuse, rather than a direct manner, such as structural power.
Some of the weaknesses of statistical regression analysis have already been highlighted 
above (such as the problem of equifinality), but also include the demands of a large number of 
observations, the difficulty of correctly specifying a regression model, and the simplifying 
assumptions required for many statistical analyses to be meaningful (such as unit homogeneity 
and independence, etc.).166 Rather than abandoning regression analysis as an analytical tool, I 
employ statistical regression analysis selectively, for two specific purposes. First, I employ 
regression analysis in order to test for the efficacy of the structural power hypothesis to explain 
regulatory outcomes across cases. As described in Chapter 1, structural power is predominantly 
understood to operate in a diffuse, rather than direct manner, and as such may be difficult to 
observe effectively through even careful process-tracing.167 Furthermore, the kinds of indicators 
for structural power are economic in nature, and thus more easily employed within statistical
166 See Kittel 2006; de Meur et al 2009; See Ragin 2008, pp. 4-6, 176-182;
167 Further to this point, the use of regression analysis is appropriate because, as recently pointed out by Posner, 
structural power is widely understood as a probabilistic explanatory variable. See Posner 2009, p. 682.
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analysis because of their nature as standardized variables less subject to the discriminatory power 
of the researcher (see discussion of explanatory variables below).
Using Mixed Methods and Triangulation
While the study employs a diversity of methods, the objective is not to have different 
methods compete for an answer to the same question. Rather, it is to draw on different 
methodological traditions to address the central research question in different ways in order to 
triangulate a more robust set of answers. As many interventions within social science 
methodology debates have recognized, methodological choices involve trade-offs.168 However, 
the strongest research designs are arguably those which utilize different methods in order to 
investigate the same, or related, phenomena o f interest.169 By combining process-tracing analysis 
within cases with both large-N regression analysis and fsQCA, the study seeks to obtain both a 
rich analytical sense of the mechanisms of private sector influence, and to uncover empirical 
patterns therein.170
Section 2 
Constitution and Measurement o f the 
Dependent Variable
This study asks how, whether, and under what conditions private sector campaigns 
influence regulatory policy outcomes. The empirical outcome this study tries to explain (i.e. the 
‘dependent variable’) can be defined as change in the regulatory policy outcome. This dependent 
variable is understood in a very particular way: that is, as the difference between the original 
regulatory policy proposal made by the BCBS and the final regulatory policy outcome. The 
dependent variable is thus a measure of policy change, and not the characteristics of the policy
168 See Collier, Brady and Seawright 2005.
169 See Collier and Elman 2008; Hedstrom 2008.
170 The compatability of FsQCA with other methods is increasingly recognized in recent literature. See for example 
Verkuilen 2005; Smithson 2005; Grofman and Schneider 2009. For an application in the international politics 
literature, see Koenig-Archibugi 2004. For an application to the political economy of regulation, see Maggetti 2007.
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itself. There are a number of different qualities of any given policy and its change over time that 
might be considered, but this study focuses on one element that is a central feature of each 
regulatory policy within the Accord, and also a central feature of banking regulation more 
generally. This feature is the extent to which a regulatory policy reflects regulatory stringency 
versus permissiveness. Regulatory stringency is understood to refer to the way in which a 
financial regulation increases the minimum capital adequacy required for a given activity. If a 
policy increases required capital adequacy, it represents a more ‘stringent’ regulation than the 
status quo. In contrast, regulatory ‘permissiveness’ is the extent to which a financial regulation 
decreases required capital adequacy relative to the status quo, and is thus ‘permissive’ in 
allowing banks to hold less capital adequacy than would otherwise be the case.
Coding for regulatory policy change in this way also helps to account for the variations in 
regulatory policymaking. For example, if a given regulatory policy is proposed and then 
removed from the Accord, this change can be registered. In such an instance, if the original 
regulatory policy proposal was a stringent one (i.e. if it meant that regulatory capital would 
increase relative to the status quo), then this change registers as permissive regulatory policy 
change.171 This framework for measuring the dependent variable as change also allows for the 
consideration o f regulatory policy change at the agenda-setting level. For example, in instances 
when private sector groups proposed a regulatory policy successfully, and if this regulatory 
policy decreases regulatory capital requirements for banks, then this change is registered as 
permissive regulatory policy change.
There are good reasons to operationalize ‘permissive regulatory policy change’ as a 
dependent variable. The regulation of capital adequacy is a critical instrument through which 
banking regulators influence bank behavior.172 The regulation of banks’ capital adequacy is 
costly for banks, because it involves the reallocation of resources.173 Because banks themselves 
bear those costs most directly than regulators do, they have an interest in regulation which is less 
burdensome to them. As such, banks usually have an interest in more permissive regulatory
171 Conversely, if the original regulatory policy proposal was a permissive one, and was then removed, this does not 
constitute permissive regulatory policy change, but rather stringent regulatory policy change. Importantly, this is a 
rarity and is not accounted for in my study.
172 Lastra 2005, pp. 226-227
173 See Persaid and Nugee 2007, pp. 209-210; Elliehausen 1998; FSA 2002; Santos 2001, pp. 52-57.
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policies relative to more stringent ones.174 Regulators, on the other hand, face a different set of 
incentives. Regulators are members of public bureaucracies, are not profit-oriented, and often 
have an institutional remit of securing the financial system’s stability.175 As such, they usually 
have a greater inclination toward more stringent regulatory policies than do the banks that they 
regulate. To be sure, these divergent relative preferences do not mean that regulators will not 
sometimes decide to design a permissive regulatory policy. If they do, however, it is unlikely to 
be the case that banks will prefer a more stringent policy than what is being proposed by 
regulators. Indeed, banks would have an incentive to change this regulatory policy in an even 
more permissive direction. Thus, the typical situation is one of relative divergence of 
preferences, not absolute ones.
Basel II was about more than simply capital adequacy alone. The Accord also concerned 
issues of supervisory review (Pillar II) and market discipline (Pillar III). However, Pillar I was 
by far the most central aspect of policy development, and of private sector contention, within the 
Accord. It is within this Pillar that one finds the most substantive regulatory policies o f the 
Accord, namely, the set of instructions and parameters concerning how the regulation of banking 
activity is to be conducted within the BCBS. Thus, Pillar I forms the bulk of the Accord’s 
content.176 It is hardly surprising that contestation centered around Pillar I, since these 
requirements represent a clear and binding force over banks’ behavior through capital 
requirements. Indeed, as we shall see in subsequent chapters, several private sector campaigns 
encouraged Pillar I regulatory policies to be ‘moved’ to Pillar II, precisely because doing so 
would mean the removal of a costly constraint.
I code the dependent variable on the basis of qualitative criteria, and employ set theory to 
standardize these values.177 In terms of fuzzy set analysis, I define the dependent variable as the 
degree to which a regulatory policy outcome conforms to the membership in the set of 
‘permissive regulatory policy change’ (PRPC) as described above. Full membership (outcome 
coded as 1) in the set of permissive regulatory policy change is defined as a regulatory policy
174 The exception to this would be in instances when banks prefer stringent regulatory policies which generate 
barriers to competition between themselves and competing banks. As this study demonstrates in the context of Basel 
II, this was a rarity.
175 See Alexandar Eatwell and Dhumale 2006.
176 By page count, 81% of the Accord is Pillar I, 7% is Pillar II, and 6% is Pillar III.
177 For a discussion of how fuzzy set logic provides a set of tools for transforming raw data and concepts into 
standardized measurements, see Geortz 2009, p. 22.
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change that constitutes a clear and unambiguous decrease in the capital requirements associated 
with the specific form of bank behavior in question as compared to the previous state. When a 
regulatory policy does not experience any change in its capital requirements, this constitutes non­
membership (outcome codes as 0) in the PRPC set. With regard to the various levels of partial 
(.67 and .33) membership in the set, a four-value fuzzy-set is used. A description of the 
indicators used in this coding is described in Appendix 2.
Influence: Where and When 
As many have pointed out within the political economy literature, private sector influence
178over policymaking may occur at several different stages of the policymaking process. 
Considering such different stages of policymaking is an important part of the empirical strategy 
of this study. Figure 2.0 below illustrates the different stages of transnational regulatory 
policymaking. Between the initial stage of a regulatory policy proposal (stage 1) and the final 
regulatory policy proposal (stage 4), there are several different possibilities for private sector 
groups to exercise influence. One possibility is that private sector groups can take actions (box 
2a) which influence a regulatory policy by either eliciting a reaction on behalf of an individual 
national regulator (box 3b), whose actions may (box 4a) or may not (box 4b) lead to regulatory 
policy change. Alternatively, private sector groups could take actions (2a) which influence the 
BCBS as a collective (3 a), which then may lead to regulatory policy change (box 4a). For both of 
these possibilities, the possibility of influence is at the ‘negotiation phase’, where policies are 
formed. Another possibility for private sector influence is a campaign tries to influence a 
regulatory policy proposal before it is even proposed (stage 0), thereby exerting influence at the 
‘agenda-setting phase’ of policymaking. At this stage, private sector groups may take actions 
(box 0a) which affect the initial regulatory policy proposal (la). Provided that this proposal is not 
different from the final regulatory policy itself (i.e. 4a), this scenario is also understood as a form 
of influence.
178 Cf. Austin-Smith 1993; Schmidt 2002. More recently it has been explicitly employed to studies of multilateral 
public policy formation - see Abbott and Snidal 2008
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Figure 2.0: Logical possibilities for private sector influence to occur
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While private influence may take place at either the agenda-setting phase or the 
negotiation phase o f policymaking, it is not only through the actions o f  private sector groups that 
influence might occur. As row b in Figure 2.0 above connotes, the possibility o f  structural power 
influencing outcomes means that influence might occur from the non-action o f  private sector 
groups as well, i.e. by means o f structural power. Such a possibility has important implications 
for empirical examination, given the fact that non-actions are, by definition, non-observable. The 
influence o f  structural power in the negotiation phase (box 2b) is, however, potentially 
observable through its effects, specifically though the observed difference between the regulatory 
policy proposal ( la )  and the final regulatory policy (4a). However, the possibility o f  structural 
power influencing the regulatory policy proposal at the agenda-setting phase (Ob) is not possible 
to observe through its effects. This is because there is no clear empirical basis from which to
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compare the difference between what the regulatory policy proposal would have been had 
structural power been absent and the actual regulatory policy proposal.
This difficulty of measuring structural power’s effects at the agenda-setting phase raises 
the question of whether or not structural power can even be investigated empirically at all, given 
that structural power conditions (whatever their relevant dimension) should not be expected to 
change from the agenda-setting phase to the policymaking phase described above. As such, the 
investigation of structural power at the policymaking phase might be considered moot -  after all, 
it was already ‘exhausted’ as a possible causal factor. In other words, if structural power had an 
effect, we would not know, and if it did not have an effect, it certainly should not be expected to 
now. However, as Diir has pointed out, structural power need not be considered as an automatic, 
omnipresent factor affecting policy outcomes, since decision-makers often lack the necessary 
information with which to decide how costly a given policy might be.179 Following this line of 
thinking, some recent empirical studies have investigated the structural power of business in the
• 1 g Q
policymaking process by operationalizing measures of ‘signaling’ o f business disapproval. In 
these studies, structural power comes to the fore during the policymaking phase, not the agenda- 
setting phase. In the case of the highly detailed and complex financial regulatory policies under 
investigation in this study, this possibility should not be discounted. Assuming that structural 
power operates only or primarily at the agenda-setting stage assumes that BCBS participants 
have perfect information on the full costs of regulatory policy decisions, and can therefore can 
adjust their decisions accordingly. I consider such an assumption a strong one to make, 
especially in light of the significant amount of quantitative studies that the BCBS undertook to 
understand the likely impact of their proposed policies. As such, I take the effects of structural 
power as potentially measureable at the policymaking phase in addition to the agenda-setting 
phase.
Intermediate Dependent Variables
The main intermediate dependent variable in the study indicates whether or not a given 
national regulator has been influenced or not. This variable ‘Regulator Influenced’ is a simple
179 See Diir 2008b: 1223.
180 Berhagen and Brauninger 205; Bemhagen 2008, p. 85; Bernhagen 2007
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logical OR computation of two other intermediate dependent variables.181 These two variables 
assess the way in which regulators may or may not react to private sector campaigns over 
particular policies. As Chapter 1 outlined (and as is conveyed in box 3b in Figure 2.0 above), 
there are two dimensions of interest in this respect. On the one hand, private sector groups might 
influence the position of a regulator — meaning the regulator’s stance in regard to the policy in 
terms of their expressed preference. On the other hand, private sector groups might influence the 
behavior of a regulator -  meaning that their campaign has a causal effect on how a given 
regulator acts among other regulators. If a private sector campaign is successful at achieving 
either, or both, of these proximate objectives, the ‘regulator influenced’ variable has value.
The changed position of a regulator refers to the fact that a regulators’ original position 
with respect to a given policy changes to a new position, such that this position is now either 
more permissive or more stringent than before. This is a very difficult factor to assess 
empirically, because banking regulators often do not express their particular policy preferences 
very often. However through qualitative analysis of how regulators were reacting to the different 
claims of different groups, at different times, it is possible to assess in many instances if and how 
a regulator changed their position with respect to a given policy. Additionally, interviews 
conducted with private sector groups and the regulators themselves helps to establish evidence 
toward such inferences, as does the statements of regulators to the financial press at the time. 
Recognizing this challenge, the study employs a simple variable, ‘Change in Regulators’ 
Position’ (CRP). This is coded along a four-value fuzzy-set scale, and is detailed in Table 2.2 
below.
The behavior of a regulator refers to the way in which a given regulator behaves vis-a-vis 
other regulators. Because Basel II is the product of a transnational negotiation among regulators, 
an analysis of the process of a given policy’s development is a function not only of the positions 
of the various regulators within the BCBS, but also how they behave in relation to each other. It 
is well understood, based on substantive empirical evidence, that the modal behavior of 
regulators on the BCBS tends to be the highly cooperative, deliberative behavior characteristic of 
highly technical negotiations.182 However, this mode of engagement is not the only behavior
181 A ‘logical OR’ computation takes the highest value in two sets in order to compute the new set.
182 See, for example, Slaughter 2004, p. 160; Kussin and Kette 2006.
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possible in the negotiations. It is also possible for a given regulator to engage in what negotiation 
theorists have called ‘value claiming’ negotiation behavior.183 Value-claiming behavior is 
exhibited when a regulator tries to claim special concessions in order to maximize the outcomes’ 
alignment with their position irrespective of the wishes of other regulators.184 Odell has recently 
provided criteria for operationalizing value-claiming behavior in international negotiation 
contexts, and offers a list of indicators, which are reproduced in Appendix 2.185 For the purposes 
of this study, this concept is operationalized into the variable “ value-claiming behavior’ (VCB).
Like the CRP variable, VCB is also difficult to assess empirically. However, a number of 
sources o f qualitative evidence help establish the values for this variable within a given 
campaign. Semi-structured interviews conducted with the regulators that participated in the 
BCBS negotiations helps to establish empirical evidence in this regard. Statements that 
regulators made in speeches conducted during the period of the negotiations, as well as 
statements made to the financial press at the time also help to establish empirical material that 
can assess such behavior. Some research on behavioral distinctions in international negotiations 
is skeptical of the possibility of measuring characteristics like value-claiming empirically.186 
While these challenges with such empirical observation are very real, they are nevertheless 
reduced in the present study because the modal behavior of the negotiators is generally already 
known (value-creating behavior). As in all partial equilibrium analysis, deviations from this 
modal position are easier to assess than assessing the behavior of a negotiator at any given time. 
The VCB variable is coded along a four value fuzzy-set as described in Table 2.3.
Section 3 
Defining and Explaining the Explanatory Variables
This section describes the explanatory variables used in the study. While a variety of 
measurement techniques are employed, what is important is that many of these explanatory
183 See Walton and McKersie 1965; Lax and Sebenius 1986.
184 In Odell’s words, it is when a negotiator “insists on an agreement under which one side will gain at the expense 
of the other”. Odell 2001, p. 21.
185 Odell 2001, pp. 39-52. For a recent application, see Odell 2009, pp. 273-299.
186 See Dietelhoff and Muller 2005.
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variables provide a means to test one or more of the given hypotheses of interest, as described in 
Chapter 1. Private sector campaigns are composed of all the actions that private sector groups 
took within a particular context (national and/or transnational) as part of their attempts to 
influence a regulatory policy outcome. I understand private sector groups to be formal, privately 
governed organizations which exist to generate positive returns for their owners. These entities 
are ‘groups’ in the sense that they are organized agglomerations of individuals, firms, and 
organizations who exist within a defined institutional setting. In addition, because many of the 
actions taken in campaigns are by associations, and some even by associations of associations, 
the term ‘groups’ seems more appropriate.
I have consulted a wide variety of empirical material in order to assess the content of 
private sector campaigns, and the vast majority of this information is primary source material. 
Letters and publicly available documentation created by private sector groups of various kinds 
provides a rich, though not unlimited, source of empirical material. First and foremost, such 
documentation gives a relatively good indication of private sector groups’ regulatory preferences 
on a particular policy, and what kind of positions were being taken on such a policy. Available 
documentation from conferences, including presentations and speeches, is also used. In addition, 
in a number of instances non-public, internal documentation has been made available to me 
which has provided valuable information that was not otherwise available, or that corroborated 
other information. Comments made in the news media by relevant actors has also be a valuable 
source of empirical material, and accounts of events by other observers in the news media are 
also used to supplement and triangulate information (though such accounts are not a primary 
source). Finally, extensive semi-structured, focused interviews were also conducted with both 
private sector participants and regulators. I travelled to eight different countries to interview 97 
different individuals who were intimately involved in the formation of Basel II. Appendix 1 
provides a list of interview participants as well as a brief discussion of interview methodology.
Private Sector Mobilization
The first set of explanatory variables assesses the extent to which private sector groups 
are engaged in active mobilization over a particular policy. I define private sector mobilization as
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the extent to which private sector groups organize themselves to communicate opposition toward 
a given regulatory policy. Attempting to capture the various dimensions of how private sector 
groups mobilize implies that forms of organization and associability matter in a way that may 
potentially influence outcomes. A private sector campaign in which firms and/or associations of 
firms make critical comments on a policy but do nothing more than that is a very different 
campaign from one in which private sector groups organize working groups to strategize how to 
influence a policy, engage in regular discussions with their regulators, and offer substantive 
commentary on the policy’s content. Full membership in this set (1) is fulfilled when private 
sector groups are actively pursuing an organized strategy to seek to change a particular 
regulatory policy outcome. Full non-membership (0) in this set does not mean that there is no 
private sector opposition to the policy in question, only that this opposition is articulated in a 
very basic manner, as a critical comment by a group or groups, as a ‘signal’ rather than a 
‘mobilized’, substantive set of actions.
The Use o f Information in the Campaign
In order to assess the extent to which information plays a role in a given private sector 
campaign, a specific variable is employed to capture this. Information is understood here not to 
mean information in the broadest sense of a communicable message or pieces of communicable 
attributes, but rather in the more specific sense of articulated reasons why a given policy should 
or should not have certain characteristics. This notion is captured in the variable ‘Informational 
Density of Campaign’. Full membership in this set requires that private sector groups articulated 
an extensive set of reasons for their position on a policy and these reasons were supported with 
detailed, structured evidence, such as quantitative data. Capturing the role of information as a 
resource in this way is very crude; however, it does allow for a basic differentiation of a private 
sector campaign in which private sector groups simply said ‘we don’t like policy X and it should 
be changed’, from a private sector campaign in which private sector groups said ‘we don’t like 
policy X and our extensive study, attached, of the correct content of policy X supports our case.’ 
In each case study of private sector campaigns, I detail specifically what kind of information 
private sector groups presented to regulators, and describe their studies when they had them.
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Private Sector Coalitions
A second set o f explanatory variables is related to the first but seeks to measure not the 
mobilization of private sector groups, but rather the extent to which mobilization is articulated 
through coalitions. As established in Chapter 1, a prominent tradition within the business and 
politics literature is that firms do not only act individually to influence policy, but utilize the 
coordinative and representational advantages of associability. Coalitions can take a number of 
different forms, and this study operationalizes two different explanatory variables to capture this 
diversity. The first o f these variables capture private sector coalitions organized at the national 
level. Membership in this set occurs when there is evidence of at least two of the following 
phenomena within the context of a given private sector campaign: 1) a variety (i.e. more than 3) 
individual firms are mobilizing around a particular policy at the same time and articulate the 
same position; 2) more than one association of private sector groups are mobilizing around a 
particular policy at the same time and articulate the same position; and 3) the different 
firms/associations that are mobilizing over a given policy are actively coordinating their 
strategies together. This criteria is applied equally to private sector coalitions within 
transnational campaigns and national campaigns.
I also include an additional explanatory variable which assess not the presence or absence 
of private sector coalitions, but rather particular characteristics of the actors within a campaign 
when a coalition is present. To take into consideration whether or not banks are organized into 
coalitions with non-bank private sector groups, I employ the variable ‘Non-Bank Allies’ (NBA). 
Membership in this set is fulfilled when, in a given campaign, private sector groups other than 
banks or banking associations are mobilized around the policy in question in the same way that 
the banks in the campaign are, i.e. oppositionally and aimed at the same kind of policy change. 
Because this variable is plural (i.e. allies as opposed to ally), full membership in the set entails 
the presence of at least two non-bank allies.
Enemies o f the Campaign
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In order to test the Business Conflict hypothesis, I include a variable that captures dissent 
within the private sector. Even if a private sector campaign involves a coalition of groups trying 
to change a policy in a certain way, some private sector groups outside of the coalition may not 
o f the same view, and may support the policy in question, for whatever reason. In this guise, the 
variable ‘Enemies of the Campaign’ (EC) is assigned full membership when there are a group of 
private sector firms or an association mobilizing to assert a position in contradistinction to the 
rest o f the campaign. They have to articulate a position which is unambiguously against the 
position of the private sector groups who seek PRPC, and they have to be publically supportive 
of the regulator’s position when the regulator’s position is not the same as the oppositional 
campaign.
Legislative Oversight
In order to test the Legislative Oversight hypothesis, I investigate a number of private 
sector campaigns where legislative oversight occurred. A legislative oversight hearing is defined 
as a formal proceeding in which a representative(s) of a country’s banking regulatory agency 
is/are brought before a legislative committee in order to discuss the regulators’ position on a 
particular issue. In the case of this study, that particular issue must be a specific regulatory policy 
being developed in Basel II. Data for this variable is obtained by first obtaining information 
about which G10 countries experienced legislative oversight associated with the Basel II Accord, 
and which did not. On the basis of extensive interviews conducted within the BCBS, it can be 
concluded that formal legislative oversight only occurred in three countries: Germany, Japan, 
and the United States. Minutes of legislative hearings in each of these countries’ parliamentary 
finance committees were then consulted for mention of the ‘Basel II’, ‘the Basel Committee, or 
near variants thereof. When this test yielded a positive result, the minutes were searched in terms 
of their particular content for mentions of particular regulatory policies. The basic content and 
tenor of legislative oversight hearings in each country are summarized in Appendix 7. However 
the within-case analyses in each chapter makes reference to the particular issues as they emerged 
within a given campaign.
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Legislative Oversight is operationalized into two different variables. Supportive 
Legislative Oversight connotes that the legislative oversight present was supportive of the 
particular private sector campaign in question. Oppositional Legislative Oversight connotes that 
the legislative oversight was opposed to the campaign (and thus supportive of the regulator’s 
proposed policy and not the arguments of private sector groups). A supportive legislative 
environment is one where the policy in question is deliberated in a way sympathetic to the 
private sector campaign in question. This support (or opposition, as the case may be) is indicated 
by questions posed by legislators that criticizes the regulators’ position when the regulator and 
private sector groups have divergent positions. It may also be indicated by how positively private 
sector testimony is received in formal hearings. Whether Legislative Oversight is coded in its 
supportive or oppositional variants is a highly qualitative judgment, and is justified in the context 
of the qualitative analysis of each campaign in which legislative oversight is present.
Explanatory Variables for Structural Power
As was outlined in Chapter 1, whilst there is a single underlying principle to the notion of 
structural power, in financial regulatory politics it is conceived of in a highly multi-faceted way. 
In order to investigate the importance of structural power empirically, I conceptualize two 
different ways (or ‘dimensions’) in which structural power can vary within the context o f the 
study, each of which has two associated ‘forms’ of structural power within it, as denoted in 
Figure N below.
The first dimension of structural power that is considered are the forms which vary across 
country. The first of these is the structural power of the state in the international financial system. 
This is understood not only in terms of the financial sectoral resources that each state possesses, 
but how much it possesses in relation to other states. The second form o f structural power which 
varies across BCBS countries has to do with the internal relations within each state -  specifically 
the structural dependence of the state on finance capital. Following the language of some of the 
early work on external and internal strength of states,187 these two forms of structural power can
187 The language, though in a different meaning, is employed in Krasner 1977; Zysman 1977.
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be conceived of as ‘external strength’ of the state and ‘internal strength’ of the state, 
respectively, as in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: The Dimensions and Forms of Structural Power Explored
Dimension of Structural Power Explored
Structural Power Condition 
Varying by State
Structural Power Condition 
Varying by Regulatory 
Policy
Form 1 ‘External’ Structural Power 
of the State in International 
Finance
Importance to 
Financial ization
Form 2 ‘Internal’ Structural 
Dependency of the State on 
Finance Capital
Potential Mobility of the 
Associated Business Line
The second dimension of structural power considered in the study includes the forms of 
structural power which vary by regulatory policy. Some regulatory policies are associated with 
forms of economic activity which may be deemed more structurally important to financialized 
accumulation. For example, securitization might be understood to be a critical component in 
financialized accumulation, meaning that there are structural power-based constraints on 
regulatory policymaking in this area, for example. Other regulatory policies are associated with 
forms of economic activity which are understood to exercise structural power by means of their 
mobility. Policies associated with derivatives transactions, for example, might be associated with 
different kind of structural constraints as those for small business lending.
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Section 4 
Policies and Case Selection
Now that the dependent and explanatory variables and their measurement have been 
described, the question remains: how are these variables to be analyzed in relation to each other? 
As outlined earlier, this study engages in an analysis of different private sector campaigns. Any 
given campaign is associated with a particular policy that it intends to influence in some way. 
But what constitutes a policy, and which policies are to be investigated? This section first 
addresses these questions, and then describes the method used to select the private sector 
campaigns under analysis.
The Constitution o f a Policy
The Basel II Accord consists of 239 pages of detailed regulatory requirements ranging 
from highly complex mathematical models to explicit instructions about discretionary 
supervisory interventions. Many aspects o f the Accord were qualitative, and many were 
quantitative. Some aspects of the Accord offered precise instructions, while others offered only 
general guidance. This diversity and complexity requires a definition of how a discrete aspect of 
the Accord can be said to constitute a specific regulatory policy. In this study, I adhere to the 
following broad definition: For an aspect o f  Basel II  to be a policy, it must refer to a discrete 
area o f bank behavior in some way. Basel II is composed of three different ‘pillars’: capital 
requirements, supervisory review, and market discipline. Within each of these pillars, there are a 
number of different policies. However for the purposes of this study, only the policies within the 
first pillar of capital requirements will be investigated. There are several reasons for this. Not 
only was the first pillar the most important and the most contested, as mentioned earlier, but 
confining the study to focus on Pillar I policies means that findings are comparable across 
different policies, as each involve regulatory capital requirements.
Appendix 3 details the constitution of the total population of policies to be included in the 
study. As this Appendix details, for a policy to be included into the total population of policies, it 
has to fulfill three criteria. First, it has to be deemed significant by the BCBS. Second, it has to 
be coherent in terms of its content. Third, it has to be relevant for the study. According to these
78
criteria, a total o f  12 different policies exist within the Accord. Most o f  these policies involve the 
more advanced approaches within the Accord, which is commensurate with the study’s aim of 
understanding regulatory policies associated with large banks. These policies are summarized in 
Table 2.0 below, which details the timeline when each policy was being developed/negotiated.
Table 2.0: Population of Policies and Descriptive Foci
10
11
12
Timeline of Policy
98 99 00 01 02 03 04
Name of Policy
Operational risk
Full internal models
Commercial real estate
Internal Ratings approach
Interest Rate Risk
W Factor
Expected Losses
Residential mortgages
SME Lending
HVCRE
Securitization
Revolving (Credit Cards)
The Constitution o f  Cases and Addressing Possible Interdependencies
Now that a variety o f regulatory policies have been selected for analysis, I must clarify 
how private sector campaigns -  the basic unit or ‘case’ o f analysis — were selected for empirical 
investigation. At the most basic level, a case is the basic unit o f analysis which is subject to
com parison.188 This study defines a case as an instance o f private sector campaigning which
1 8 0conforms to a particular configuration o f causal conditions at a given time. A private sector 
campaign is thus understood not only as the actions o f  private sector groups in the attempt to
188 See Gerring 2004; Ragin 1992b, p. 1.
189 I understand cases as configurations here in the same manner described by Ragin 2000, i.e. as “combinations o f 
aspects and conditions” that exist among the set-theoretic categories derived by the researcher. See Ragin 2000, p. 
13.
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influence outcomes, but also the particular contextual (i.e. macro-institutional, structural) 
conditions under which they took these actions.
Because cases are understood configurationally, new factors which arise over the course 
o f a private sector campaign mean that a new case has emerged. Thus when conditions change 
within the configuration of private sector actions and their contexts, this new configuration is 
considered to be a new case.190 Or, for example, when private sector groups engage in coalitional 
activity for reasons they hadn’t before, or when legislative oversight is initiated, these new 
conditions change the configuration of causal conditions and (potentially) outcomes, thus 
constituting a new case.191 In order to make the coding of extended form cases as transparent as 
possible, at the end of each chapter, a ‘Configuration Table’ is provided which offers a summary 
of the fuzzy-set membership scores to each o f the explanatory and dependent variables in the 
study.
This particular method of constituting cases has the benefit of maximizing 
configurational diversity, and thus the possible different combinations o f causal conditions 
linked to outcomes. However it also raises other methodological issues that need to be addressed 
— in particular the fact that cases might be interdependent. While QCA does not rely on the strict 
‘observational independence’ assumption that statistical regression analysis does, 
interdependencies across cases should nevertheless be avoided. Such interdependencies across 
cases could arise in two different ways: what I call ‘spillover effects’ on the one hand, and ‘issue 
linkage’ on the other. On the one hand, if there are several campaigns at different times within a 
given country associated with the same policy, it is possible that earlier campaign success (or 
failure) influenced later campaign successes (or failures). Consequently, it might be argued that 
such ‘spillover effects’ represent an across-case interdependency which could distort across-case
190 This particular practice has been employed by researchers working in the QCA tradition, for example most 
recently by Metelits, who has differentiated each of her three country cases into three different periods of time based 
on the unique configuration of causal conditions that they exhibit. See Metelits 2009, pp. 675-676. This approach of 
differentiating by cases is also employed when researchers have endeavored to incorporate timing into QCA. See 
Caren and Panofsky 2005. Carrerra, Dunleavy and Bastow 2009 also operationalize their cases as periods of time. 
The related method of analytic narratives operationalizes different cases in a similar way, as illustrated in the 
successive ‘cuts’ within a narrative, suggesting changes to the configuration of the extended form game used as an 
analytic device. See Bates et. al. 1998.
191 Such an approach can be justified in the guise o f ‘recasing’ as described by Ragin, whereby the process o f small- 
N research often uncovers new values of variables, and thus the need to conceptualize different cases. See Ragin 
1992c, pp. 223-225. The notion of critical junctures and contingent events in the qualitative methodology literature 
also support such an approaches’ underlying assumptions. See Collier and Collier 1990; Mahoney 2000a.
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findings. Such interdependencies are taken into account by marking all such cases with an ‘I* in 
the Configuration Table at the end of each Chapter and then by treating these cases differently in 
subsequent across-case analysis. Specifically, for instances where permissive regulatory policy 
change took place, but might be dependent on earlier, unsuccessful efforts by private sector 
groups, I collapse the relevant cases into one single case using the logical OR procedure 
specified within the QCA literature. This involves taking the highest fuzzy-set value for a given 
variable over a range of interdependent cases, such that, if private sector groups mobilized at 
different levels over time, it is their maximal efforts that is taken into consideration. For cases 
where private sector groups were unsuccessful at achieving permissive regulatory policy change 
after an earlier successful campaign, I consider these cases as a unique kind of case which I 
analyse separately — what I call ‘after-campaigns’. For both of these approaches, I run a series of 
test in Chapter 10 to probe whether or not across-case findings are affected by these 
considerations, and if so, how.
Interdependencies might also exist by means of ‘issue linkage’, whereby the negotiation 
of one policy is dependent on the negotiation of another policy. This could distort the true 
relationship between the explanatory and dependent variables, suggesting that a policy 
experienced permissive regulatory policy change because of the content and context of private 
sector campaigns when such policy change was due to (or due in part to) issue linkage. The 
particular character of the Basel II policymaking process minimized the potential for such an 
interdependency across policies, since most regulatory policies were designed as discrete 
entities. Moreover, they were developed not only at different points in time, but also by different 
individuals in different subcommittees within the BCBS. Operational risk, for example, was 
handled by a Risk Management Group; securitization by a Securitization Sub-Group; the W- 
Factor was handled by the Capital Group in 2001, while the SME policy was handled by the 
Capital Group in 2002.192 Nevertheless, the presence of issue linkage entering into a regulatory 
policy decision is something that I explored empirically. The extensive interviews I conducted 
with BCBS participants put emphasis on understanding the reasons for policymaking decisions, 
and changes to those decisions. Consequently, it is thus possible to ascertain which campaigns
192 Whilst it is true that many ‘sticking points’ in the policy formation process were handled by the ‘full’ BCBS, 
according to participants in the process, often the difficult negotiation points were handled at lower levels, and were 
simply approved at the full BCBS level.
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were affected by issue-linkage, and how. The extent to which issue-linkage may have affected 
the success o f private sector campaigns is discussed both within the relevant empirical chapters, 
and also in Chapter 10, which engages in across-case analysis.
The Selection o f  Campaigns
In order to select campaign activity for analysis, I have employed a variety o f deductive 
and inductive techniques. I first use basic, indicative evidence o f where private sector campaign 
activity took place, in order to arrive at a selection o f BCBS countries for focused study. This 
process involved comparing basic indicators o f campaign activity in order to assess both where 
private sector activity was most extensive and in what ways it differed from country to country. 
Drawing on the vast archive o f BCBS correspondence with private sector groups over the course 
o f Basel II’s development. Figure 2.2 below displays the composition o f different authors, 
differentiated by nationality.
Figure 2.2: Campaign Activity in Different G10 Countries
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The United States, the United Kingdom and Germany are selected on the basis that there 
is indicative evidence of substantial private sector campaigns within these countries. This 
evidence of activity makes these countries ideal for the purpose of process-tracing analysis 
inasmuch as that method demands empirical material. However, there might be other unknown 
but potentially important reasons why national private sector campaigns did not leave as 
extensive paper trail as these countries. In this vein, Canada and Japan are added on the basis that 
they provide additional institutional variation of potential use to the study (see below). Selecting 
five countries, and not more, is important from the perspective of empirical manageability, given 
the importance placed on primary empirical research. An important question, however, remains: 
to what extent do these selected countries represent a form of selection bias? In particular, does 
this selection of countries adversely affect the across-country diversity of the national campaigns 
examined? To answer this question, I consider the across-country variation on a range of 
different institutional characteristics of each BCBS country, and ask whether or not the sample of 
countries selected displays any particular selection effects with respect to these different 
characteristics.
I first consider the extent to which the country in question can be considered a ‘liberal 
market economy’ (LME) or a ‘coordinated market economy’ (CME), based on the 
characterizations in the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ literature. 193 According to this particular 
institutionalist theory, CMEs are characterized as having more ‘bank-based’ systems of finance, 
whereby the position of banks in the entire political economy is more central.194 It might be the 
case, therefore, that private sector campaigns in CMEs have different characteristics or have 
higher rates of success. This is an important source of institutional variation to consider, as the 
CME-LME distinction comes up repeatedly in discussions of banking regulatory change in 
particular.195 I computed a CME score for each BCBS country based on Hall and Gingerich’s 
recent empirical work which aggregates the number of institutional features within a given 
country which conform to CME features.196 As Figure 2.3 below illustrates, the CME scores 
across the BCBS countries is highly variable. However, the countries selected for the study not
193 See Hall and Soskice 2001a; Hancke', Rhodes and Thatcher 2004.
194 Hall and Soskice 2001b; See also Cemy 2010, p. 252.
195 See Wade 2007, pp. 125-27; Froud et. al. 2007, pp. 341-42; Zimmerman 2010 pp. 125-26; Schwartz 153-55.
196 Hall and Gingerich 2009, p. 458 (Table 2)
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only capture this variation, they maximize it, with countries like the US and UK strongly 
‘liberal’ and Germany and Japan strongly ‘coordinated’.
Figure 2.3: CME Scores Across the G10
Such a quantitative measure o f the CME-LME typology is completely consistent with depictions 
in the more qualitative literature, especially that which pits the archetypal examples o f  the 
Anglo-American banking systems against those o f  Germany and Japan.197
Another source o f institutional variation to consider is the cultural and legal-institutional 
framework within which banks, governments, and regulators operate. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
one important informal institution highlighted within the literature is the revolving door between 
banking regulatory agencies and the banking sector itself. Another is the formal, legal ‘de ju re ’ 
independence o f the banking regulatory agency from the government. Both o f  these institutions 
vary across countries, and are the subjects o f  considerable introspection across the literature. 
Barth, Caprio and Levine conducted extensive across-country surveys in 2000 which obtained a
1 Q8
quantified representation o f these institutions, which are reported in Figures 2.4 and 2.5 below.
197 Cf. Lutz and Eberle 2007; Hall and Soskice 2001; Zimmerman 2010.
198 See Barth Caprio and Levine 2001.
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Figure 2.4: Revolving Door Scores Figure 2.5: De Jure Regulatory
  _______________________________ Independence Scores
d 3
3
As Figure 2.4 reports, the revolving door scores vary a great deal among BCBS countries (data 
for France and Switzerland were not available), but this variation is clearly represented within 
the countries selected for the study. Figure 2.5 illustrates the de jure independence o f the 
regulatory agency from the government o f  each respective BCBS country, with higher scores 
indicating more independence. The variation across the BCBS is not considerable in this respect, 
with most BCBS countries having a high degree o f de jure regulatory independence. Once again, 
however, the variation that does exist is captured in the countries selected for the study. In 
addition to these forms o f variation, I considered the way in which such variation combines to 
construct a common institutional environment, whereby the revolving door and de jure 
regulatory independence are understood as parts o f the same phenomenon o f regulatory 
independence.199 To consider this dynamic, I performed a factor analysis using a sample o f 80 
different countries included in the Barth et. al. Specifically, I ran a principle-components factor 
analysis using both the revolving door and the de jure regulatory independence data to generate a 
unique factor score for each country.200 Figure 2.6 below reports the factor scores for each BCBS
199 This follows the thinking o f  Barth et. al. 2003 in this respect, though they combine scores additively, not on the 
basis o f factor scores in this instance.
200 A simple principle factor analysis does not yield different results in terms o f  relative placements o f  these 
countries -  only the scale is different.
85
country (France and Switzerland are dropped from the sample due to a missing revolving door 
score). These results indicate that there is variation across the BCBS countries, but once again 
such variation is captured by the BCBS countries included in the study.
Figure 2.6: Factor Scores for the Regulatory 
Independence o f the G10 Countries
3 T
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The national political environment is another source o f variation across the G10 during 
the period o f the study. As far as formal institutions are concerned, each BCBS country is a 
Parliamentary system o f  government, with the exception o f the United States. There is also 
substantial variation among the electoral institutions o f each country selected. Japan and 
Germany are systems o f Proportional Representation, while the US, UK and Canada are not; the 
UK and Canada are first-past-the-post W estminster systems, while the US has a completely 
different, Presidential system altogether.201
A further consideration is the extent to which regulatory policies are politicized in 
various countries. To consider this dimension o f political life in each BCBS country, I utilized 
Benoit and Laver’s survey o f policy competition, in which expert surveys were used to score the 
positions o f each o f the main political parties in a given country with respect to deregulation. A 
score o f 1 to 20 was used for each party, whereby 1 was used to denote ‘favours high levels o f
201 Electoral system diversity is considered in Busch 2008.
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state regulation and control o f  the m arket’ and 20 was used to denote ‘favours deregulation o f 
markets at every opportunity’.202 These values were computed for ‘im portance’ and ‘position on’ 
deregulation. Using this data, I calculated an overall value for each BCBS country by 
multiplying the share o f the vote for each party by the score o f  each party to arrive at a single 
value. As Figure 2.7 below illustrates, there is not considerable variation on these values (data 
for France and Germany was not available).
Figure 2.7: Deregulatory Political Environment
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Notable outliers include Japan, whose politics placed noticeably less importance to 
deregulation, and Belgium, whose position on deregulation is less favorable than the other 
countries. There are, unfortunately, no quantitative scores for Germany (though in substantive 
grounds it is difficult to believe the position on deregulation is not at the low end o f  the scale). 
Using the same dataset from Benoit and Laver’s expert surveys, I also calculated the left-right 
scores (whereby 1 denotes left-wing and 20 denotes right-wing) using the same method above, 
with results reported in Figure 2.8 below. Figure 2.9 then repeats the analysis for the ruling party 
for the election year in which the surveys were conducted (all were from 2001-2004). What this 
analysis illustrates is that the left-right orientation o f the electorate across BCBS does not vary, 
but the left-right orientation o f the ruling parties does vary. This variation is, however, fully 
captured in the countries selected within the study, with Germany being ruled by a left-wing
202 Benoit, Kenneth, November), p. 4
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party, and the United States a right-wing party during the period under investigation, and both 
the UK and Canada being ruled by slightly right-of-center parties.
Figure 2.8: Figure 2.9:
Left-Right Political Environment Left-Right Position of Ruling Party
Based on the above analysis o f  variation across BCBS countries, there is a good basis for 
selecting the sub-set o f  countries I have chosen. With this sub-set countries selected, I then 
engaged in an exploratory process o f  investigating instances wherein private sector campaigns 
did and did not take place. As an indicator o f private sector campaign activity, I first discerned 
the basic content o f  private sector campaigns by investigating not only the detailed written 
responses o f private sector groups that were sent to the BCBS, but also comments made within 
the financial press, speeches, press releases, and written reports and testimonies given within 
national legislatures on the regulatory policies in question, and internal documentation. This 
strategy was inductive in that it literally involved a thoroughgoing exploratory search for 
evidence o f private sector activity. Information was further supplemented through interviews 
conducted with individuals who were involved both within private sector groups and individuals 
who were involved within the regulatory agencies concerned.
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For transnational campaigns, the process o f  case selection is identical to that described 
above, with the exception that country-level information was not available for obvious 
reasons.203 Instead o f delimiting cases on the basis o f  whether or not private sector activity was 
found to take place within a particular country over a particular policy, the delimiter is whether 
there is evidence o f any transnational organization taking place over a given policy. Evidence 
suggesting the presence o f  a transnational campaign was obtained from the documentation 
produced by the Institute o f International Finance (IIF) and the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (ISDA), the two ‘global peak’ associations o f financial sector groups 
during the period under investigation.
As Table 2.1 below illustrates, for some policies campaigns were waged in a variety o f  
countries, while campaigns for other policies were confined to one country. While some 
campaigns were waged primarily transnationally, others were waged both transnationally and on 
a national basis.
Table 2.1: Population of Campaigns and Their Associated Policies
Regulatory Policy 
Within Basel II
Country
Full Internal Models
Internal Ratings Approach
Interest Rate Risk
W factor
Operational Risk
Commercial Real Estate
SME Lending
HVCRE
Residential Mortgages
10 Revolving (Credit Cards)
1 1 Expected Losses
12 Securitization
203 This point has been confirmed in several interviews, such as 32P, 33P, and 96P.
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Explication o f Analyses o f Private Sector Campaigns
The campaigns under investigation in this study are organized by scale and by 
chronology. Chapter 3 investigates those campaigns which were primarily transnational in 
character (with the exception of the transnational expected losses and securitization campaigns, 
which are examined in later chapters as they interacted with national campaigns taking place). 
Chapters 4 through 9 examine national private sector campaigns. Here, I organize my analysis 
chronologically and contextually. For example, the campaigns associated with the expected 
losses policy and the credit cards policy are grouped together because these policies were both 
developed at the same time, and involved interactions with regulators in a similar contextual 
environment.
In each empirical chapter, I discuss the main findings and focus my comments on the 
extent to which cases offer support for particular hypotheses. I do so not only because o f the 
large number of hypotheses evaluated, but because of both the nature of the data involved and 
the nature of process tracing. The data involved in most of the campaigns analyzed is such that 
failure is more common than success, which means that there is ample opportunity for negative 
evaluations of hypotheses. The particular strength of process-tracing analysis, however, is in 
positively evaluating hypotheses, i.e. in showing links between the presence of particular 
conditions/factors and outcomes. To be sure, negative findings are just as important, but are 
more efficiently evaluated through across-case analysis. Because of the use of fsQCA, I leave the 
examination of across-case relationships to be explored systematically in Chapter 10. This 
approach also allows me to evaluate the strength of causal mechanisms observed within process 
tracing analysis, while at the same time leaving open the possibility that complex causal 
processes that are beyond my immediate observation within each case may play a role in 
affecting outcomes.
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Section 5: 
Structural Power Selection Effects
This section analyses whether or not the sample of countries included in the study have 
characteristics which generate a form of selection bias regarding structural power. Considering 
such selection bias is important since structural power is a much less readily observable property 
than other phenomena of interest to the study. In conducting the analysis of such ‘structural 
power selection effects’, it is first necessary to establish the parameters of variation among 
BCBS countries, which necessitates measuring structural power in both of its main state-varying 
forms, that being the ‘relative structural power of the state in finance’ and the ‘structural 
dependence of the state on finance capital’ {policy-level structural power selection affects are 
addressed at the beginning of Chapter 10). First, I considered the structural power of each BCBS 
state, considering in particular the relative strength and dominance of different BCBS countries. I 
employed a variety of data for this purpose from both the World Bank World Development 
Indicators and data from The Banker database. For each BCBS country, this dataset includes the 
standardized, US dollar-values (current prices) for Gross National Income, the average Tier 1 
capital of the largest 10 banks, the average assets of the largest 10 banks, the percentage of Tier 1 
capital of the top 100 banks in the world, and a measure of how many of the top 10 banks in a 
given country are in the The Banker top 100 list (each of these values is taken from 2001, the 
mid-point year o f the study). Each of these values is intended to measure the financial sector 
resources within each BCBS country, and thus each can be understood as an indicator of the 
structural power resources of the state in question. Since the Structural Power of the State is 
understood in relational, rather than absolute terms, there is a need to produce a relationally- 
based indicator which indicates which BCBS countries are strong in this dimension, and which 
are weak. Consequently, I conducted a statistical factor analysis of the data described above, 
using a principle-component factoring model.204 This factor analysis revealed that for each of the 
quantitative indictors described above, there is a common element or underlying ‘factor’ 
common to all variables. Figure 2.10 below reports the predicted factor scores for each BCBS 
country produced through this analysis.
204 1 only included data from BCBS countries in this dataset since it is the relationships among BCBS members 
which is relevant to the study, not the structural power of all states in the international system of states.
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Figure 2.10: Factor Scores for the ‘Relative Structural 
Power of the State in Finance’
As this data illustrates, there is a substantial degree o f variation across BCBS countries when it 
comes to the relative structural power o f the state in finance, with countries like the United 
Kingdom, Japan and Germany as structurally dominant (above the Y axis), and the United States 
by far the most structurally powerful, and thus ‘externally strong’ states. Like other middle 
powers such as Belgium or Sweden, Canada is considered, in relational terms, to be an 
‘externally weak’ state in financial-structural power terms.
To measure the structural dependence o f  the state on finance capital, data was gathered 
indicating the importance o f the banking sector in terms o f  taxation, economic activity, and 
employment in each BCBS state. More precisely, this data included the percentage o f  tax 
revenue that the banking sector contributes to total tax revenue, the percentage o f employment in 
the banking sector as a percentage o f total employment, and the average percentage o f income o f 
the banking sector as a percentage o f GDP, all averaged for the years 1998-2004. Because the 
structural dependence o f the state on finance capital is not a relational concept across countries, 
but rather a relational concept within countries, I included data not only from BCBS countries 
but also for all other comparable countries from which data was available, in order to generate a
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more robust factor analysis.205 These countries were also OECD members: Austria, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, and Poland. Luxemburg stands out 
far above all other states, and is thus excluded on the basis that factor analysis may lead to 
distorted results in the presence o f extreme outliers.206 In order to construct an indicator o f the 
structural power o f finance capital within each state, I conducted a factor analysis o f  the data 
described above, using principle-component factoring model to designate a factor score for each 
BCBS country. All three variables are found to be related to the same underlying single factor. 
As Figure 2.11 below illustrates, there is a great deal o f  variation among BCBS countries in 
terms o f their factor scores.207
Figure 2.11: Factor Score Values indicating the Structural Dependence 
of the State on Finance Capital
i
205 Data for all countries except Canada and the United Kingdom were from stat OECD database; data for Canadian 
bank employment figures were from CBA 2009. Data for the UK was drawn from Cullinane 2005.
206 It is already very clear that Luxembourg is structurally dependent on finance capital -  it is a city state oriented 
around financial services, with over 80% o f  the employed population in the banking sector.
207 Notably, these relative results are not affected by the removal o f  any one o f  the three variables in the factor 
model.
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Rather than using these actual factor scores as the basis of measurement in and of 
themselves, these values are employed in order to aid the general classification of countries (see 
2.12 below). The fact that BCBS countries such as France, Germany, Japan, Spain, and Sweden 
have factor scores below zero indicates that (in relation to all other countries represented in the 
sample) these states are ‘internally strong’ in terms of the structural dependence of the state on 
financial capital. All other states are ‘internally weak’, because the structural dependence of 
these states on finance capital is high. Figure 2.12 illustrates the placement of BCBS countries 
along a 2x2 matrix indicating the array of combinations of internal and external structural power 
conditions which vary by state.
Figure 2.12: Matrix of External and Internal Structural 
Power Conditions among G10 Countries
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From the basis of the placement of BCBS countries in this matrix, we can conclude that three out 
of four of the forms of country-level structural power variation are represented. Externally weak 
but internally strong states are, however, not represented in the study. This feature is an 
important consideration for later analysis in Chapter 10, and shall inform the extent to which 
generalizations regarding structural power will be made.
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Because the method used to select private sector campaigns uses indicators of private 
sector activity, it is possible that the campaigns examined are those in which the structural power 
dynamics at play were either weak, strong, or biased in some way as a selective distortion of the 
sample of BCBS countries. To analyze this possibility, I first conducted an empirical test of the 
extent to which various simple indicators o f private sector campaign activity were correlated 
with various indicators of the structural power discussed above. Against each of these variables, I 
ran correlation tests for three different indicators of private sector activity in each BCBS country. 
The first of these was the total number of letters submitted to the BCBS from a given country — 
the indicator illustrated in Figure 2.2 above. The second was a measure of how many of the 
regulatory policies investigated in this study were criticized in the written comments of the 
national banking associations of each BCBS country. The third was a proxy measure of how 
intensely banking associations engaged in such critique — when over 100 words were written on 
a given regulatory policy, I counted this policy; otherwise the policy was not counted. I ran 
simple correlation tests between each of these variables and both of the main structural power 
variables described above, defining an 80% correlation value as highly correlated. I used every 
permutation of the structural power variables possible: the raw factor scores, the crisp-set values, 
continuous fuzzy-set values, and manual fuzzy-set values. None of these values were highly 
correlated, suggesting that the country selection method was not biased to include or exclude the 
structural power characteristics of states.208
208 Indeed, the highest was the raw factor score for the structural power of the state in finance and the number of 
total letters submitted, at 75%.
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Chapter 3
Transnational Private Sector Campaigns
This chapter undertakes a detailed process tracing analysis of regulatory policies targeted 
by transnational private sector campaigns. I focus on six different private sector campaigns 
concerning different aspects of the Accord. I construct different policy case narratives for each of 
these campaigns, and consider the unique configuration of causal conditions within, and 
outcomes of, each campaign. As we shall discover, there was considerable variation in regulatory 
policy outcomes. In some cases, private sector groups were successful in their efforts, meaning 
that they achieved permissive regulatory policy change. In other instances, however, they were 
unsuccessful, meaning that permissive regulatory policy change failed to occur.
As the first empirical chapter of the study, this chapter helps to establish some of the 
basic features of Basel IPs actual content. In particular, it establishes the fact that the Accord 
does not employ banks’ own credit risk internal models, but rather allows banks to use their own 
credit risk ratings. This point is significant not only because later campaigns examined in 
subsequent chapters need to be understood in this context, but also because the existing IPE of 
finance literature has commented on the issue of internal models considerably. Many of the 
existing accounts of private sector influence reviewed in Chapter 1 have argued that banks have 
been successful in influencing the Accord by allowing them to use their own internal risk models 
with which to set levels of regulatory capital.209 As we shall see below, however, an extensive 
transnational campaign was waged in the effort to have Basel II allow for the use of full internal 
models, but the BCBS refused.
Each of the five campaigns examined herein are divided into separate ‘policy narratives’, 
in which the content, context, and outcomes of each transnational campaign are analyzed through 
process tracing. The first policy narrative deals with the private sector campaign to advocate for 
the use of full internal credit risk models in the Accord. The second policy narrative focuses on a
209 See Steil and Litan 2006, p. 23; Mattli and Woods p. v; Singer 2010, p. 99; Singer 2009, p. 26
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very large and extensive policy which formed the analytical bedrock for most subsequent 
policies in the Accord: namely, the policy concerning the use of internal ratings for regulatory 
capital purposes. The third policy narrative focuses on the campaign associated with interest rate 
the risk policy. The fourth policy case narrative examines the private sector campaign associated 
with the initial development of the operational risk policy. The fifth policy case narrative 
concerns a campaign associated with a regulatory policy developed to deal with a very specific 
form of risk known as ‘residual risk’ associated with the use of credit derivatives.
Each of these cases provides evidence of the substantial degree of mobilization, 
information exchange, and coalition-based activity that took place at the transnational level. As I 
demonstrate, however, the level of success in achieving permissive regulatory policy change was 
very mixed. Banks and their associations were successful in some cases -  but this was often in a 
very unexpected or circumscribed way. In other cases, they were spectacularly unsuccessful.
Section 1 
The Campaign for Full Internal Models:
1998-1999
In 1998, just as the BCBS began to seriously contemplate a revision of the Basel Accord, 
a transnational private sector campaign emerged to press its vision of a new agreement. This 
campaign was spearheaded by the Institute of International Finance (IIF), the transnational 
association of banks that had acted since 1982, following the Latin American debt crisis, as the 
industry’s transnational representative body. The IIF had commented on the BCBS’s activities 
since the early 1990s, and during the development of the Market Risk Amendment from 1995- 
97, the IIF had made several recommendations to the BCBS that encouraged an ongoing 
dialogue between bankers and regulators at the transnational level. Once the IIF received 
indications that the new Accord would attempt to make use of banking industry best practices, it 
began arguing for a policy position favored by its membership. Namely, it wanted the policy to 
allow banks with sophisticated internal risk management and measurement systems to calculate 
their own levels of capital adequacy by using their own internal credit risk models.210 Complex
210 This contention had existed within the IIF since at least 1995. See IIF 2007, pp. 61-62. The position was also 
sometimes floated within the international financial press at the time as well, especially after the Market Risk 
Amendment. See Financial Times 1998.
97
credit risk modeling systems had proliferated within the US banking community. In 1997 
JPMorgan had published their advanced credit risk methodology, called CreditMetrics, Credit 
Suisse’s Financial Products Division had released CreditRisk+ in the same year, and similar such 
models were being used within the US banking community especially.211
The campaign for full internal models must be understood in its historical context. 
Interest in banks’ own internal credit models had been growing within the BCBS, as were efforts 
to try to learn from best practices within large complex banking organizations. The Chair of the 
BCBS at the time, Tom de Swaan of the Netherlands Central Bank, had organized a meeting 
with the IIF as part of their efforts to learn about the new risk management practices that had 
been developing in the world’s largest banks.212 Many members of the IIF saw this as a sign of 
encouragement. Private sector actors viewed the election of Bill McDonough of the New York 
Federal Reserve Bank as Chair of the BCBS in 1998 as further encouragement, since he 
indicated his interest in using best practice from the banking industry’s risk management systems 
as part o f the effort to rework the Basel Accord.213
O f all the members of the BCBS, the Fed was the most enthusiastic about the possibility 
of using banks’ own internal risk management practices for the purposes of banking 
regulation.214 There was a sentiment within the Fed that the complexity of financial innovation 
made “intrusive supervision less meaningful, if not virtually impossible”; indeed, US Agencies 
were increasingly reliant upon banks’ own internal risk management systems when assessing 
their adequacy.215 Large banks, such as JP Morgan in the United States, and Credit Suisse in 
Switzerland, had developed very sophisticated credit risk models, and BCBS staff was tracking 
their advances in the new science of credit risk management. Within the Federal Reserve Board, 
the supervisory interest in these methods was particularly strong, and by the mid 1990s there 
were already research initiatives in place to investigate the use of banks’ own credit risk models 
as part of regulatory practice.216 As interest in the internal risk management practices o f banks
211 Crouchy, Galai and Mark 2005, pp. 225-253.
212 Interview 22R.
213 Interviews 65R, 95R, 73R, 79R. Citibank hosted an IIF dinner and invited McDonough, who informed 
participants that the Accord was being revised. See IIF 2007, p. 19.
214 See Meyer March 1998; Meyer June 1999.
215 Ferguson 1998; Interview 74R; See Courtis 2000, p. 50.
216 Interview 36R, 74R, 79R, 82R. See Jones and Mingo 1999. See also Lopez and Saidenberg 1999.
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grew, the Fed conducted extensive surveys of bank practices.217 The UK’s new FSA was also 
paying close attention to innovations in credit risk modeling, and its head of financial 
supervision announced that when banks demonstrated that their own credit risk modeling 
methods were sound, they would be credited when their capital ratios were set.218
The IIF saw the increased interest in internal bank practices as an opportunity to advocate 
for its own particular preferences. In the words of one IIF participant in this process, “We had 
hope. We had hope that they were actually going to go all the way toward recognizing portfolio 
credit risk modeling ....full internal modeling.”219 IIF members began to try and further persuade 
the BCBS that credit risk models were advanced enough to be used in an international regulatory 
framework. The IIF organized through their Working Group on Capital Adequacy, which was 
composed of those senior credit risk managers in IIF member banks.220 The group produced a 
report urging the BCBS to update the regulatory capital rules for credit risk in accordance with 
banks’ own internal credit risk models.221 The IIF Working Group on Capital Adequacy 
advocated that the BCBS “move quickly to recognize bank’s internal credit risk modeling 
systems to generate regulatory capital cushions that would be more closely attuned to real 
risks.”222 They argued to the BCBS that if the Basel framework was not revised in this way, it 
would lead to distortionary behavior and undermine the credibility of the existing Accord.223 The 
move to a full internal models approach to capital adequacy regulation, the IIF argued, would be 
in the best interests of both regulators and banks.224 The International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA) argued a similar position at the time, pointing out that prevailing risk- 
weighting categories in the Basel Accord had been defined by types of counterparties, rather than 
the exposures’ actual credit quality, and that credit risk mitigation, such as the use of derivatives, 
were only sparsely acknowledged.225
217 See English and Nelson 1998.
218 Harris 1998, p. 4.
219 Interview 6 IP.
220 IIF 2001b, p. 3.
221 IIF 1998.
222 IIF March 2000b, p. 2; IIF 2007, p. 69.
223 IIF March 1998, p. 37, in IIF 2007, p. 69.
224 See IIF 2007, p. 19.
225 ISDA 1998, in ISDA Feb 2000, p. 8.
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Regulators ’ Reaction
While there was consensus within the BCBS that the Accord should be reformed, views 
on the potential usefulness and viability of using full internal credit risk models for regulatory 
purposes were mixed. While the Fed was the BCBS participant closest to the IIF position at the 
time, the US Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and especially the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) were strongly against the idea from the outset. 226 There 
were also skepticisms within the rest of the BCBS. The German delegates doubted data 
availability, the comprehensiveness of the models, and their own ability to supervise banks using 
such models.227 Because the Fed had the greatest interest in credit risk models, it established a 
Task Force on Internal Credit Risk Models to assess the potential use of banks’ internal credit 
risk and capital models within the context of banking supervision.228 After careful study of the 
issue — involving an intense period of interviewing many US banks — the Fed’s own conclusion 
was that there were still considerable challenges that would need to be addressed before an 
internal models approach could be employed within the new Basel Accord. Among these were a 
lack of a common framework for defining credit losses, difficulties in calibrating key model 
parameters due to data limitations, and problems with the validation o f such models.229
Other work within the Fed came to strikingly similar conclusions.230 These views were 
consistent with the research and views held by UK regulators at the time. Bank of England staff 
were noting at the time that there were “significant hurdles that will have to be overcome” before 
banks can use their own systems to set regulatory standards.231 Similarly, while staff at the Bank 
of England sympathized with the evolution toward best practice, there was a concern that 
regulatory capital levels might fall too low as a result o f full internal models 232
Despite the skepticism concerning the use o f internal models, the BCBS decided to 
conduct a GlO-wide study on the issue. The BCBS Models Task Force undertook an extensive
226 Interviews 95R, 79R, 73R. There were also problems within the predictability of these models. See Wagley 1989,
p. 1
227 Interview 93R
228 Interview 80R
229 Federal Reserve Board May 1998, p. 2. See also Meyer June 1999, p. 5. Interview 74R
230 See English and Nelson 1998; Mingo and Jones 1999
231 Jackson et. al. 1999.
232 See Jackson et. al 1999, p. 9.
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study wherein 31 senior regulatory officials from the G10 surveyed and analyzed the credit risk 
modeling practices of the 20 largest banks in the world in 10 different countries. This 
consultation process involved BCBS regulatory institutions looking into the internal modeling 
practices of large banks. Although the BCBS had initiated these investigations in response to ILF 
and ISDA’s campaigns, regulators soon found further evidence of deficiency within private
233sector practices.
Contrary to the views held within the IIF and the ISDA at the time, the BCBS’ Models 
Task Force concluded that internal credit risk models were not a simple extension of market risk 
models, for two reasons. First, the Task Force had found that there were significant data 
limitations within the banks that they surveyed, and thus concluded that the simplifying 
assumptions and proxy data required for regulatory purposes could have consequential 
repercussions for bank solvency if  they were inaccurate.234 Second, the Task Force was not 
convinced that internal credit risk models could be validated based on a common standard. In 
order to validate bank’s models, BCBS regulators would require several years of data for back­
testing, spanning several credit cycles.235 In the words of one BCBS participant, comparing 
internal models was “like comparing apples and oranges and cauliflower”, and after careful study 
had concluded that “No one in the Committee thought it made the slightest bit of sense”.236
There was consensus within the BCBS that a full internal models approach should not be 
employed.237 The industry arguments were simply not convincing in light of their research. In 
the words of one BCBS participant referring to the private sector effort, “[t]hey pushed. And we 
said no.”238 Groups like the IIF and ISDA were clearly disappointed, although some within the 
banking community thought that the BCBS may reconsider the issue in the future.239 When the 
BCBS released its first consultative paper in June 1999, it reiterated its earlier conclusion, 
namely that there were too many technical difficulties with including full internal credit risk
233 Interview 79R. Corroborated with Interview 19R.
234 There simply wasn’t enough convincing data on credit risk models’ sensitivity to structural assumptions and 
parameter estimates. See BCBS April 1999, pp. 1-2
235 BCBS April 1999, pp. 1-2.
236 Interview 67R
237 Interviews 92R, 67R, 93R.
238 Interview 67R
239 See Ranson 1998, p. 1; Financial Regulator 2000, p. 46; Graham 1999, p. 8.
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models in the Accord, including the problem o f data availability and model validation.240 Claes 
Norgren, the head o f the Capital Task Force, stated at the time that the BCBS had excluded such 
models on the grounds that “these models are not yet developed enough to allow for this kind o f 
use.”241 However, the document also suggested on several occasions in the document that credit 
risk models might be used in the future.242 The BCBS Secretariat noted that they commended the 
private use o f  such models, and would monitor their progress closely; nevertheless they would 
not be part o f  the Basel II Accord.243 Subsequent — although comparatively modest -  attempts 
were made by private sector groups to encourage the use o f  full internal credit risk models, and 
these too were not heeded. The fact that the BCBS never accepted the industry arguments had 
important consequences, as it meant that even the Advanced IRB approach necessitated higher 
capital requirements than each o f the major internal risk models banks employed at the time, as 
demonstrated by Figure 3.0 below.
Figure 3.0: Basel II Internal Ratings-Based Approach
and Bank Internal Models Compared244
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240 BCBS January 2001a, p. 4.
241 Norgren 1999, pp. 41-42.
242 See BCBS January 2001a, pp. 4-5, p.
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244 Data is from Crouchy, Galai and Mark 2005, p. 223.
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Section 2 
The Campaign for Internal Ratings: 
1999-2001
While the BCBS rejected the industry view that full internal models should be used in the 
Accord to set levels of regulatory capital, it was still enthusiastic about drawing upon the 
banking industry’s best practices.245 Instead of employing its own internal models within the 
Accord, the BCBS agreed that it would utilize banks’ own internal risk ratings. Work done at the 
Fed enabled this decision, in which they used the basic logic and mathematics of internal credit 
risk models to produce a regulatory model that the BCBS could use.246 It was agreed within the 
BCBS that, for the most sophisticated banks in the world, the new Accord would enable banks to 
make their own assessments of risk on a given exposure, an assessment which then served as an 
input to a model the BCBS designed to calculate a risk-based regulatory capital charge. This 
gave the BCBS the ability to draw from industry best practice while at the same time maintaining 
their discretion as regulators. The BCBS Models Task Force sought out to engage with private 
sector groups organized at the transnational level in order to gain information about best 
practices within the banking industry.247
Extensive Mobilization and Transnational Coalitions
Private sector groups mobilized an extensive transnational campaign in response to the 
BCBS’s proposal, and these efforts were largely led by the IIF. The IIF began these efforts with 
an internal reorganization. A month after the release of the June 1999 document, the IIF’s Board 
of Directors established a Steering Committee on Regulatory Capital specifically to increase the 
IIF’s involvement in the formation of Basel II.248 While the IIF Working Group on Capital 
Adequacy was already in existence, and focused on the technical dimensions of banking 
regulatory reform proposals, the IIF Board of Directors mandated that the Steering Committee on
245 Interviews 18R, 67R; 22R, 18R.
246 Interview 76R; See also Gordy 1998; Gordy 2003
247 Interviews 18R, 95R
248 Interview 22P.
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Regulatory Capital produce a broader perspective in order to guide the technical work, and 
develop an overall response to the BCBS’s proposals.249 The IIF had considerable insider- 
knowledge on their side. The vice-Chair of the Steering Committee was Tom de Swaan, the 
former Chair of the BCBS, now on the Managing Board of Directors from ABN-AMRO.250
The IIF was able to use its position as the peak transnational association of large banks to
interact with the BCBS participants on a regular basis during this period. In this vein the BCBS
used discussions and data from the IIF as part of their research agenda to investigate the best way
1
to develop an internal ratings-based approach. This process involved informal consultations, 
when IIF groups would meet with the BCBS or a BCBS sub-committee to discuss specific 
technical issues, and a more formal process of gathering data, usually with the Models Task 
Force. The BCBS also consulted bilaterally with 30 large banks across the G10 in order to gather 
information about banks’ internal rating systems, and to assess practices in this area.252 The 
Models Task Force analyzed their findings and found that while there was significant diversity in 
internal ratings practices among banks, as well as open questions about parameter estimations, 
there were nevertheless some common elements.253 The Task Force compiled their findings and 
published them in the explicit effort to receive further industry input on the soundness of the 
BCBS’ analysis.254
The IIF sought to influence these efforts by producing a report of internal rating practices 
for the BCBS Models Task Force in February 2000, outlining the industry’s common 
practices.255 In addition to surveying their membership and coordinating technical responses to 
the BCBS’ specific queries, the IIF also advocated a specific approach. On the basis of their own 
expertise and discussions with BCBS members, the IIF formulated a policy proposal for internal 
ratings in the new Accord. Specifically, the IIF Steering Committee on Regulatory Capital 
proposed what they called a ‘spectrum approach’ for internal ratings, whereby more 
sophisticated banks would be able to advance to calculate their own internal ratings in successive
249 IIF May 2001, p. 14.
250 See IIF 2007, p. 20
251 Interview 53P,
252 BCBS January 2000a, p. 3.
253 See BCBS January 2000b, pp. 4, 9,24,27.
254 BCBS January 2000b, p. 3
255 Internal IIF document, obtained under anonymity.
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stages.256 The IIF also advocated that the risk weighting should be continuous, based on the 
measurement o f expected losses of bank’s credit risk exposures, and detailed a set of standards 
for the supervisory oversight of internal rating systems.257
The ISDA also responded with their own proposals to attempt to influence the Models 
Task Force’s work, gathering together a number of its member banks who used their own 
internal models across a variety of portfolios, and compiled detailed data.258 Like the IIF, the 
ISDA also advocated a specific proposal resembling their own preferences, known as an ‘index 
approach’ to the use of internal ratings.259 It was somewhat similar to the IIF’s proposal, but 
generally cruder. While the ISDA didn’t have as much informal engagement with the BCBS on 
the general content of credit risk models, it did engage with the UK FSA which, together with 
the US regulators and the Bank of France, was conducting the bulk of the technical work within 
the Models Task Force.260
The ISDA and the IIF also worked together. Both groups (which had significantly 
overlapping memberships at the time) sought to decrease the BCBS’ uncertainty on which risk 
ratings banks would be able to estimate internally. Because of the failed campaign for internal 
models, there was a concern that the BCBS did not accept the notion of comparability across 
banks’ internal risk management systems. To this end, the IIF and the ISDA launched the Credit 
Risk Modeling Project, which surveyed the internal risk modeling systems used by some of the 
largest 25 banks in 10 different countries.261 The IIF and ISDA met with the BCBS Models Task 
Force to discuss their empirical findings, which were that risk models across banks yielded 
directionally similar results (i.e. similar patterns). They advocated specifically that the most 
significant drivers of risk measures were credit quality, asset value correlations, and loss given 
default.262
256 IIF March 2000a, pp. 21-28
257 IIF March 2000b, pp. 36-39
258 ISDA 2000, p. 26
259 In this approach, regulatory capital would be based on different indexed combinations of PD and maturity, all 
based around a benchmark asset. ISDA 2000, p. 25
260 See UK Advisory Group January 2000.
261 See ISDA February 2000; IIF 2007, pp. 69-70. For an empirical analysis, see Crouchy, Galai and Mark 2005, pp. 
207-208.
262 IIF 2007, p. 70
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The IIF and the ISDA were not the only transnational association trying to shape the 
content of Basel II’s internal ratings-based approach. A new group composed o f risk 
professionals from major banks in Canada and the United States forged a working group through 
the Risk Management Association (RMA), based out of Philadelphia. The RMA forged a new 
group, the ‘RMA Capital Working Group’ in December 1999 to provide a concerted response to 
the Basel II proposals. The Capital Group was composed of risk managers large banks, and like 
the IIF and the ISDA, the RMA Capital Group sought to demonstrate the range of practices 
within the banking industry.263 Using data from each of their 11 large member banks, the Capital 
Group generated a matrix of rating scales which generated risk-weighted capital adequacy curves 
for use in the Accord, and also advocated for the expanded coverage of ratings (for example to 
retail exposures).264 Like the IIF, the Capital Group also argued that the retail section of the 
Accord could differentiate between different sub-categories of lending, such as credit cards, 
residential mortgages, consumer credit, and so forth.265
Policy Outcome: An Internal Ratings-Based Approach
Unlike the transnational campaign to advocate for the use of full internal models, the 
campaign for internal ratings can be seen as a success, albeit a partial one. The BCBS regarded 
the information it received from private sector groups as highly valuable, and helped the Models 
Task Force to develop some of the technical elements of the Internal Ratings-Based approach 
within the Accord.266 The Models Task Force had worked considerably with industry groups at 
the transnational level, and the published draft in January 2001 demonstrated this joint effort.267 
In general, the IRB approach reflected a general model of credit risk that private sector groups 
had supported. Yet instead of crude risk buckets, or even a ‘matrix’ of risk weights, the BCBS 
exceeded most industry expectations by producing a model in which bank’s credit risk capital
263 Interviews 57P, 60P.
264 Interview 55P; RMA March 2000, pp. 17-18.
265 RMA March 2000, pp. 17-18; IIF 2007, p. 76
266 BCBS May 2000, pp. 1-2; Interviews 77R, 95R.
267 The BCBS also explicitly acknowledged the assistance from industry consultations at the time on this particular 
point. BCBS January 2001a, p. 1.
106
was a continuous function of parametric risk drivers, just as the IIF had advocated.268 This 
internal ratings-based approach was also differentiated for two different levels of sophistication, 
namely an ‘Advanced IRB’ approach, similar to what the IIF had argued for its ‘spectrum 
approach’, which was designed for use for the most technically sophisticated banks in the world, 
and a ‘Foundation IRB’ approach, for less technically sophisticated banks. The latter approach 
was not the result of any transnational campaign, but rather due to recognition within the BCBS 
that some banks, while not extremely sophisticated in their risk modeling practices, could 
estimate at least some risk parameters.
The transnational campaign for internal ratings cannot be seen as a complete success, 
however, and the extent of the permissive regulatory policy change should not be exaggerated. 
On average, the IRB approach would lead to a 5% reduction in capital requirements for credit 
risk from the Basel I status quo.270 This modest change reflected the fact that, throughout the 
process of consultation with the banking community, the BCBS’ confidence in banks’ own 
capacities were somewhat diminished. In the words of one BCBS delegate, “the banks were 
clearly vastly overoptimistic about what their capabilities were.”271 This skepticism limited the 
transnational campaign’s influence in setting the levels of capital requirements associated with 
different levels o f risk. Thus, even though banks would now be permitted to use their own 
internal ratings to a certain extent, the regulatory model the BCBS employed was actually 
designed to increase regulatory capital relative to banks’ own internal practices. Table 3.0 below 
illustrates the differences between the Advanced IRB model within Basel II, and the model 
proposed by the IIF-ISDA mentioned above. These figures are based on comparable levels of 
externally rated risk (AAA for low risk exposures, CCC for high risk exposures, etc.).
268 The integration of the IIF’s ‘spectrum approach’ into the internal ratings-based approach of Basel II is celebrated 
by the IIF as their first central achievement. See IIF 2007, p. 76
269 Interviews 95R, 73R.
270 BCBS November 2001a, p. 3 (Table 1). A small number of banks would have increased capital requirements, but 
the majority would decrease. See BCBS November 2001a, p. 6; See BCBS November 2001b.
271 Interview 19R.
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Table 3.0: Basel II’s Advanced Internal Ratings Based Approach and 
the IIF-ISDA proposal compared272
Level of BCBS IIF-
Risk ISDA
AAA 0.56 0.22
AA 1.12 0.43
A 1.34 0.57
BBB 3.83 1.95
Benchmark 8 4.41
BB 9.87 5.34
B 27.4 17.74
CCC 50 50
As these values illustrate, even though the BCBS pursued the use of internal ratings championed 
by private sector groups, the BCBS also designed the Accord in such a way as to be noticeably 
more stringent than private sector proposals. Thus, while the BCBS allowed large and 
sophisticated banks to estimate their own ratings, the regulatory capital assumptions of the 
supervisory model used was twice the median estimate that private sector groups had 
advocated.273 Such an approach was met with considerable private sector contestation at the 
time, given the conservatism of the Basel II approach to internal ratings.274
Section 3 
The Interest Rate Risk Campaign: 
1999-2000
Much to the surprise of banking communities around the world, the June 1999 first 
consultative draft of Basel II proposed the inclusion of an explicit Pillar I capital charge for 
interest rate risk in the banking book. The proposed regulatory policy would require banks with 
‘above average’ interest rate risks to hold additional regulatory capital.275 Following earlier work 
the BCBS had conducted in this area, the regulation was intended to capture the ‘outliers’ in 
terms of interest rate risk, thereby minimizing it. Interest rate risk was widely acknowledged
272 Data obtained from Crouchy, Galai and Mark 2005, p.210, Table 6.4.
273 See ISDA April 2001; IIF May 2001, pp. 6-7
274 See IIF May 2001a, p. 43; ISDA April 2001; IIF 2001a, pp. 6-7; RMA 2001, p. i-iii. See also Helk 2001.
275 BCBS January 2001a, pp. 48-49
108
within the BCBS as an important driver of financial sector risk. In this guise the BCBS had, first 
in 1993, and again in 1997, designed standards and recommendations for the management of 
interest rate risk.276 With the overhaul of the Basel Accord, it was a natural progression to try to 
capture this important driver of risk.277 The majority of the BCBS felt that the interest rate risk 
policy was an important component of the new Accord, although some felt particularly strongly 
about the need for the policy.
The Private Sector Campaign
Private sector opposition to the interest rate risk policy was strong and well-coordinated 
at the transnational level.278 Intemationally-active banks were especially concerned given the 
complications o f simultaneously measuring interest rate risk across a bank’s many national 
subsidiaries. Banking associations such as the Institut International D’Etudes Bancaires (the 
informal group of top executives of the largest European banks) argued that any general policy 
toward interest rate risk would not be able to capture the actual risk profile of any individual 
bank, and would interfere with business management decisions.279 The IIF was firmly opposed to 
the policy, and both their Steering Committee on Regulatory Capital and their Working Group 
on Capital Adequacy made clear to the BCBS in no uncertain terms why they thought the policy 
was a bad idea.280 As a consortium of international bankers, the IIF was especially concerned 
that the interest rate risk policy would undermine international banking practices. They insisted 
that establishing what exactly constituted an outlier raised profound issues in terms of interest 
rate differentials between countries. This difficulty was particularly problematic for banks 
operating in several national locations, they maintained, as it would create distortions and large 
regulatory costs for such banks.281 In both written communication to the BCBS as a whole and in 
exchanges with the RMG, the IIF and its members argued that there should not be any explicit 
regulatory capital charge under Pillar I of the Accord. Rather, the IIF advocated that interest rate
276 See BCBS April 1997
277 Interviews 74R, 77R, 90R
278 National banking associations in the US and Germany argued against the policy, but there was no real campaign 
took place, as efforts were focused transnationally. See American Bankers Association March 2000, pp. 1-2
279 IIDB, January 2000.
280 IIF March 2000a, p. 25.
281 See IIF March 2000b, p. 16
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risk should be captured under Pillar II, where there would be no explicit capital charge, only 
supervisory review.282
Negotiating a Policy Outcome
As the year 2000 proceeded, the design of a specific Pillar I regulatory capital charge for 
capturing interest rate risk was proving challenging for the BCBS. In particular, the RMG’s staff, 
even the most advanced experts within the Fed Board, had difficulty discerning the duration of 
core deposits across countries.283 As a result, a number of BCBS delegates expressed their 
growing reservations concerning the interest rate risk policy (specifically, the extent to which 
core deposits could be measured across institutions), and it was felt that a decision needed to be 
made in order to proceed. The interest rate risk was thus put on the agenda for the BCBS meeting 
in Craiga in August 2000, which focused on outstanding issues that needed to be resolved. At 
this meeting, two BCBS members had developed strong views that the interest rate risk policy 
would be unacceptable. The first of these BCBS members came from the US delegation. While 
the Fed was in favor of pursuing the interest rate risk policy, the OCC did not agree, and viewed 
the interest rate risk policy as something best captured by in-depth supervision of banks.284 The 
OCC was generally critical of the quantification of risk, and of trust in supervisory discretion, 
which may have influenced their decision against the policy as well. Furthermore, thanks to 
Congressional demands for a regulatory policy beginning in the 1990s, they had years of 
frustrating experience trying to model interest rate.
The second of these BCBS members was the Japanese delegation. At the time of the 
Craiga meeting, they communicated that they could not accept the interest rate risk policy. They 
believed it would especially costly for Japanese banks, which were already under considerable 
strain at the time. Rather than engaging in value-claiming behavior, the Japanese delegation 
simply stated their preferences, and referenced their domestic constraint of overhauling an 
already weak banking system. Indeed, with the US delegation also objecting to the policy, there
282 IIF March 2000b, p. 17; IIF March 2000a, p. 25
283 Interview 77R.
284 The concern was over the outliers in the banking system, they felt that the regulatory issue could be best dealt 
with under Pillar II. See Jerry Hawke’s later testimony at the House Financial Services Committee February 2003, 
pp. 24-25
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was no need for value-claiming behavior. The rest of the BCBS wanted interest rate risk in Pillar 
I o f the Accord, but did not offer any challenge or counteroffer to either the US or the Japanese 
delegations. With two negotiation partners disagreeing -  both of whom were major economic 
powers -  it was difficult for anyone to resist accommodating their preferences.285
The interest rate risk policy was moved from Pillar I to Pillar II, a clear instance of 
permissive regulatory policy change.286 Private sector groups were unambiguously pleased with 
the result, and the decision was heralded as an important, ‘sensible’ decision of the BCBS and 
the IIF discontinued its campaign.287 Despite the fact that permissive regulatory policy change 
occurred, the IIF’s campaign cannot be causally linked to the outcome. The regulatory policy 
change which occurred was not due to private sector opposition, but rather to objections to the 
policy made by the US and Japanese BCBS delegations themselves. This case should force us to 
question the extent of private sector influence, and illustrates that even if a campaign’s demands 
correlate with policy change in the desired direction, this relationship can be spurious. It is of 
course possible that the Japanese regulators’ position was simply a reflection of their banks’ 
preferences — thus demonstrating some support for the Structural Power Hypothesis. The precise 
motivations of the Japanese regulators is unclear, but accounts from within the BCBS RMG, 
however, affirmed that it was the US delegations’ lack of agreement that was pivotal, rather than 
the Japanese position.
Section 4
The Transnational Operational Risk Campaign:
1999-2000
One of the most ambitious elements of the BCBS’ June 1999 proposal was an explicit 
capital charge for operational risk.288 In contrast to credit risk, which involves risks associated 
with extending and managing credit relations, operational risk is conceptualized as the form of 
risks related to the potential failure of banks’ internal processes, or from external events.289 The
285 Interviews 90R, 24R, 77R.
286 As Scott has observed, the lack of interest rate risk in Basel II represents a serious omission in the sense that it 
decreases regulatory capital considerably. See Scott 2005, p. 12.
287 IIF May 2001b, p. 11; ISDA May 2001, p. 49.
288 On the regulatory ambitions of the BCBS in this regard, see Power 2005.
289 Thus, as banks have become larger and more complex operational risk has risen in comparative importance. See 
Schooner and Taylor 2010, pp. 131-145.
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BCBS had already delved into the issue in a previous publication, which underpinned their 
subsequent work in the creation of Basel II.290 In the June 1999 draft of Basel II, a proposal for 
an explicit capital charge for operational risk was advanced, but only in a very basic form. The 
BCBS delegates knew that this proposal was highly controversial, because the quantification of 
operational risk had not yet been well-developed by the private sector, and operational risk 
management was still in its infancy. Yet the BCBS took the position as a Committee that if the 
banking industry doesn’t have a consolidated technique to measure operational risk, then they 
should be encouraged to find one.291 Furthermore, putting forth an operational risk capital charge 
meant that total capital in the G10 banking system would increase, an aim seen as very important 
to many Continental European members of the BCBS. Making the Accord risk-sensitive would 
mean, after all, that regulatory capital requirements for credit risk might go down. An explicit 
capital charge for operational risk would help countervail this tendency.
The specifics o f the operational risk policy’s design were handled through the BCBS’ 
Risk Management Group (RMG). Reflecting the Fed’s interest in this area, it was headed by 
Roger Cole, a Senior Associate Director at the Division of Banking Supervision Federal Reserve 
Board.292 The BCBS RMG was actively seeking industry input on how operational risk was 
managed within their institutions, and how a capital charge might best be designed. In September 
1999 they conducted a survey with G10 banks on their operational loss experiences. In 
November they held two one day workshops with banks and other industry participants in order 
to discuss the various issues involved in defining and quantifying operational risk.293
The Private Sector Campaign
A broad coalition of transnationally organized private sector groups mobilized to respond 
to the operational risk policy proposal. The first series of efforts involved the provision of an 
operational risk definition that the BCBS could use, with private sector groups like the British
290 See BCBS September 1998a; BCBS September 1998b. Additionally, issues in operational risk were a centerpiece 
of the International Banking Supervisors Conference held in Sydney in 1998.
291 Interview 18R.
292 Previously the RMG had been co-chaired by Christine Cumming as well (from 1997-1999), from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York.
293 BCBS November 1999.
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Banker’s association, the Risk Management Association, the ISDA and the IIF working together 
to develop a common industry definition.294 Although consensus developed on the definition of 
operational risk, the concrete form that the operational risk policy should actually take was the 
subject of greatly heated debate. The vast majority o f private sector groups that expressed their 
views opposed the operational risk policy from the outset. It was widely believed that operational 
risk management was either better suited to qualitative management techniques, or that it simply 
could not be measured as a form of risk.
While private sector groups opposed the operational risk policy within a number of 
countries, it was at the transnational level that a concerted campaign took place.295 The ISDA 
was strongly against the use of a Pillar I capital charge, and they argued to the BCBS that banks 
already manage operational risk through qualitative mechanisms of oversight.296 Furthermore, 
they argued, a Pillar I capital charge would divert focus from internal risk controls within banks, 
and would likely be very costly.297 The IDSA also used the argument that because operational 
risk management was still evolving within the industry, any Pillar I capital charge would 
necessarily lag behind best practice, at an increasing rate as time progressed.298 Working with 
their membership (which at the time included 213 of the largest banks in the world), ISDA also 
systematically analyzed 12 different methodologies through which an operational risk capital 
charge might be calculated, and offered a critique of each.299 This critique was much more 
technically extensive; it drew from a consortium of 21 large banks drawn from Canada, France, 
Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, South Africa, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States, to produce an extensive report arguing against the use of a quantitative Pillar I 
capital charge, and for a qualitative criteria to be established.300
The IIF went even further in its critique of the operational risk Pillar I capital charge. In 
January 2000, it established its own Working Group on Operational Risk, which was composed 
of 40 large transnationally active banks interested in this policy, with most of them expressing
294 Interview 55P; Shirreff 1999, p. 8; IIF March 2000a, p. 24
295 American Bankers Association March 2000, p. 2; ZKA March 2000, pp. 36-42; Interviews 15P, 36P
296 ISDA February 2000, pp. 40,46. See also ISDA September 2000.
297 ISDA February 2000, p. 42
298 ISDA, February 2000, p. 43
299 ISDA February 2000, p. 43.
300See ISDA October 2000; ISDA September 2000
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strong opposition (with some exceptions, as we shall see below).301 Like the ISDA, the IIF took 
the position that operational risk should not have a Pillar I capital charge, and that it should be 
placed in Pillar II of the Accord.302 The IIF Working Group on Operational Risk engaged directly 
with the RMG at BCBS meetings, and the RMG was very receptive to industry-wide views at the 
time, as it sought to use the IIF to gauge operational risk practices within the banking industry.
Within the IIF Working Group on Operational Risk (WGOR), a small number of risk 
professionals saw that the BCBS’s proposal for an operational risk charge as more of an 
opportunity than a threat. Unlike the rest of the IIF, who bitterly opposed the idea that something 
like operational risk could be quantified, they had considerable experience within their 
institutions in such quantification. As such, they voiced their support for the policy. How this 
group reacted provides this case with a unique opportunity to test the Business Conflict 
hypothesis.
Business Conflict: The International Technical Working Group (ITWG)
Differences of opinion within the IIF resulted in the formation of a new transnational 
group. One of the individuals from this still unorganized dissident rank suggested forming 
separate working groups within the WGOR, in order to represent a spectrum of perspectives to 
the BCBS’s proposal.304 This proposal was strongly resisted by IIF staff.305 The IIF was, after all, 
a transnational association which sought to create a transnational-level industry consensus, not to 
provide multiple and contradictory views.306 Following this rejection, the dissident experts 
sought to organize its own working group, separate from the IIF. What soon became known as 
the International Technical Working Group (ITWG) was an informal group of operational risk 
experts who met on a frequent basis, often in tandem with IIF and BCBS meetings, to formulate 
positions, conduct research, and regularly engage with the BCBS RMG. Because it emerged
301 Interview 69P.
302 IIF May 2001a, p. 19
303 Interview 77R
304 Many of the operational risk supporters had participated in the ISDA/BBA/RMA/PWC studies carried out in 
1997 and 1999, and knew each other from that period.
305 Interviews 68P, 69P.
306 Interview 69P.
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from within the ranks of the IIF, its membership was highly transnational, comprised of 
individuals not only from large US banks, but Canadian, German and Dutch banks as well. 
Initially the ITWG was composed o f Royal Bank of Canada, the Canadian Imperial Bank of 
Commerce, Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, and AMN-AMRO. JPMorgan Chase would soon join, as 
would several others (all on an informal basis).
Soon after its formation, the ITWG managed to engage directly with the RMG. At a 
BCBS summit held in Stockholm, the IIF made some general oppositional claims concerning the 
BCBS RMG proposal, reflecting the strong majority opposition to the policy. Members o f the 
RMG and the ITWG began meeting soon thereafter.
At their next encounter, the ITWG presented a proposal that systematically laid out some 
of their views. It was clear to the members of the BCBS RMG that it “brought together a group 
of practitioners that had a lot more knowledge in terms of what they were talking about than the 
regulators.”307 Since the ITWG was not oppositional, but rather supportive of developing an 
operational risk capital charge, the ITWG quickly earned the trust of the BCBS RMG, especially 
Cole.308 The RMG had good reasons to trust the ITWG as an interlocutor and source of 
information. Rather than representing their banking organizations as a whole, the individuals of 
the ITWG presented themselves as risk professionals within their banks. This claim was credible 
to the RMG, because the ITWG was informal, and thus the senior members of their banks could 
not impose discipline on their decisions or stances. As one former RMG participant put it, “they 
weren’t going up the line to the top of the house.”309 The ITWG began to engage in dialogue 
with the BCBS RMG on a regular basis, both in person and through teleconference meetings on 
specific issues. The ITWG established internal working groups, would present papers to the 
BCBS RMG, and on occasion would meet with sub-groups of regulators on technical questions.
The ITWG's Contributions
307 Interview 77R.
308 Interviews 77R, 69P, 68P.
309 Interview 77R.
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Once the ITWG began working closely with the RMG, it made a number of large 
contributions to the development of the operational risk policy. First, the ITWG expanded the 
definition of operational risk itself in a way that made the operational risk policy more 
encompassing and thus the capital charge higher than it would have been otherwise. While the 
IIF Working Group on Operational Risk had developed the basis o f a definition for operational 
risk as early as March 2000, neither the ITWG nor the RMG were completely satisfied with its 
comprehensiveness, or rather lack thereof. As the RMG continued to work with the ITWG, it 
increasingly discovered the size and content of major operational risk losses within large banking 
organizations.310 One of the large operational losses that the ITWG presented to the RMG was 
the loss associated with litigation. These were especially high in UK-based operations, and even 
more so in the US. Both the ITWG and the RMG decided that the definition of operational risk 
had to be expanded to include litigation risk. This inclusion was consequential, since including 
litigation risk meant potentially increasing the size of the operational risk capital charge by a 
substantial margin, thus adding to the policy’s stringency.311 The inclusion of litigation risk 
would appear in the January 2001 draft of Basel II, and remain in the final version.312
Secondly, the ITWG contributed the analytical foundations for the advanced 
methodology for the operational risk policy. A dominant tendency at the time was to 
conceptualize operational risk, and its mitigation, in terms similar to banks’ conceptualization of 
credit risk. As such, the ITWG often championed what was known as the ‘Loss Distribution 
Approach’, which was in many ways modeled after credit risk, but had its intellectual 
foundations in actuarial models drawn from the vast literature on insurance pricing. This 
approach was appealing to the Fed, and was also positively regarded by the German and 
Japanese members of the RMG.313 In stark contrast to credit risk, BCBS participants had much 
less experience with this variety of risk, and thus giving more autonomy to the banks themselves 
did not seem like a bad idea. With some support for this ‘internal’ approach to operational risk
310 Interview 77R.
3,1 Interview 77R.
312 BCBS January 2001a, p. 94; BCBS June 2004, p. 137.
313 As evinced by the extensive survey and referencing of the ITWG in Mori and Harada 2001.
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quantification, the RMG gave the ITWG considerable autonomy in developing what became 
known as the Internal Measurement Approach.314
Policy Outcome: An Advanced Operational Risk Approach
In January 2001, the BCBS released the draft of the Basel II operational risk policy. 
Reflecting private sector views, operational risk was defined as “the risk of direct or indirect loss 
resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external 
events.”315 While private sector groups had contributed to the making of this definition, this 
definition notably included litigation risk, increasing the regulatory stringency of the policy 
considerably. Furthermore, the operational risk policy as a whole was highly stringent, and 
retained the initial proposal for a Pillar I capital charge. The RMG estimated the average G10 
contribution of operational risk to total required capital at approximately 20% of total regulatory 
capital.316 This quantity made the operational risk policy by far the most stringent policy in the 
entire Accord. Because of the efforts of the ITWG, the RMG was able to design a workable 
operational risk policy which had the support of a number of large banks. The role of the ITWG 
in this regard, as described above, suggests strong support for the Business Conflict hypothesis.
The Internal Measurement Approach was designed to incentivize banks to develop a 
more sophisticated system of internal risk management, and reach a level o f capital below 20% 
of banks’ regulatory capital. This development was seen as “a critical step along the evolutionary 
path that leads banks to the most sophisticated approaches”, however it was accompanied with a 
regulatory capital floor so that capital remained extremely high.317 This reflected a widely held 
concern that regulatory capital should not fall too low as the result of Basel II reform.318
The role of private sector groups in the development of the operational risk policy 
demonstrates evidence in support of the Business Conflict hypothesis. While early private sector
314 Interview 68P.
3.5 BCBS January 2001a, p. 94; BCBS January 2001b, p. 5
3.6 BCBS January 2001b.
317 BCBS January 2001b, p. 8; BCBS January 2001a, p. 96.
318 BCBS, January 2001b, p. 14; BCBS January 2001a, p. 96. Later in September 2001, the BCBS announced that 
the level would be set at 75% of the capital requirement under the Standardized Approach to Credit Risk. BCBS 
September 2001, p. 4.
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efforts of the BBA, RMA, ISDA and the IIF may have contributed to the initial definitional basis 
for operational risk, the specific efforts of the ITWG made the definition more conservative by 
adding litigation risk. Furthermore, the extensive transnational oppositional mobilization was 
completely unsuccessful. With a supportive interlocutor in the form of the ITWG, the RMG was 
able to achieve its objectives while largely ignoring the mobilization o f groups like the IIF and 
the ISDA, who opposed their efforts.
Section 5 
The Campaign Over 
Residual R isk-The ‘W-factor’ Policy: 2001
One o f the most important new advances in the Basel II Accord as it was being developed 
was the attempt to recognize banks’ risk mitigation strategies, and to reward them for these 
practices by offering regulatory capital relief. In general, the use of credit derivatives and other 
collateralized transactions was seen to reduce the credit risk profile of banks. At the same time, 
there was a desire to deal with the use of derivatives systematically, reflecting in part the fact that 
they were increasingly used as capital arbitrage techniques.319 The derivatives market had grown 
substantially by this time, and given some regulatory experience and future uncertainty with the 
development o f these markets, there was some support for regulatory stringency in this area.
The Continental European BCBS members took a more cautious approach to the use of 
credit derivatives in comparison with the US and Canadian regulators, who had a longer history 
of supervision, and consequently more confidence and a liberal attitude toward this form of bank 
activity.320 Yet experience with derivatives was no unilateral guarantor of a liberal attitude. The 
UK FSA had as much supervisory experience as the US Agencies in this area, and yet their 
perspective was much more cautious. Given uncertainty regarding the evolution of derivative 
markets, and the fact that banks would likely find clever ways to subvert any regulatory regime 
around them, it was a member of the UK delegation, Oliver Page of the UK FSA, who argued for
319 Jackson 1999, p. 25
320 Interviews 19R, 95R,.
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the importance of a general regulatory instrument to add capital requirements to collateralized 
transactions.
Page put forward the simple but somewhat radical idea that when banks engaged in 
certain kinds of collateralized guarantees and credit derivative transactions, there should always 
be a residual capital charge to capture the unaccounted for ‘residual’ risk: a form of risk that 
always remained, despite whatever technique banks employed to mitigate credit risk through the 
use of financial instruments. This risk was captured in a policy called the ‘W-factor’.
The W-factor sought to reduce the regulatory benefit that a bank would otherwise receive 
for its efforts to engage in credit risk mitigation. As such, it sought to encourage banks to 
monitor the credit quality of the borrower in collateralized transactions, with the perspective that 
a collateralized transaction always has some risk within it. Page’s view was that, despite the 
benefits of credit risk mitigation instruments, collateralized transactions are never completely 
without risk. When banks were to estimate their probability of default, this figure was to be 
increased by this ‘w-factor’, which was set at .15 for most transactions, meaning that there was a 
15% regulatory capital add-on for collateralized transactions, recognizing this residual level of 
risk. The majority of the BCBS was not opposed to the policy, as it helped to increase overall 
capital.321 The US delegation, in contrast, opposed this policy from the outset, but let the 
proposal be released nonetheless.322 Page was able to push this idea into the second consultative 
paper of January 2001 because he chaired the Capital Group at the time.
The Private Sector Campaign
When the BCBS announced the W-Factor policy in January 2001, it quickly became a 
target for condemnation within the private sector, especially among large banks in the US and 
the UK, but banks in other G10 countries were also opposed as well.323 It was at the transnational 
level that the campaign opposing the W-factor was most extensive. This took the form of both 
the IIF and the IDSA offering sustained critiques of the w-factor, both in their formal letters to
321 Interviews 88R, 90R
322 Interviews 88R, 89R.
323 See Citigroup 2001, pp. 16-18; JP Morgan Chase 2001, pp. 7, 9, 10; BBA and LIB A 2001, p. 85; Japanese 
Bankers’ Association 2001, p. 5
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the BCBS, and in their engagements with the BCBS directly as transnational representatives of 
the industry. The IIF criticized the W-Factor extensively, arguing that it was chosen arbitrarily, 
and that it should be eliminated altogether. The IIF argued to the BCBS that while residual risks 
from collateralized transactions did indeed exist, “this does not justify imposition o f a standard 
penalty on all collateralized transactions”, and argued for a more fine-grained approach based on 
the probability of loss. The IIF argued that the indiscriminate regulatory capital charge of the W- 
factor policy would discourage banks from exercising good risk management.324 The US-UK 
based Bond Market Association was against it, and argued that it should be eliminated.325 
However by far the most coordinated transnational associational coalition of opposition to the 
policy was organized by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), who 
organized in cooperation with the British Bankers Association (BBA) and the London 
Investment Bankers’ Association (LIBA). This coalition of opposition was partly strategic: 
there was a widespread understanding at the time that the policy was designed by the UK FSA, a 
fact that only encouraged UK banks to argue against it.327 Drawing from the specialist 
knowledge within the UK banking community, the coalition argued that the W-factor policy 
mistakenly entangled credit, market, and legal risk into one single measure.328 The ISDA had 
recognized that residual risk exists, in a 2000 report to the BCBS, but had discerned a very 
specific use of the term, and had estimated a regulatory capital charge at 2.5%.329 Now with a 
multiplier of 15%, the coalition argued that the w-factor effectively represented a risk-insensitive 
tax imposed on banks’ activities. The ISDA-BBA-LIBA coalition provided an extensive 
argument that credit risk mitigation contracts did not in fact carry more legal risk than other 
forms of bank contracting, and that the W-factor would distort the pricing of credit risk in the 
market, since instruments such as credit default swaps would be made more expensive. The w- 
factor, the ISDA-BBA-LIBA coalition argued, would lead banks to secure transactions as 
guarantees, rather than using credit default swaps, which were understood to mitigate risk. This
324 IIF 2001, pp. 24-25.
325 Bond Market Association 2001, pp. 6-7
326 ISDA May 2001, p. 7
327 Interview 92P.
328 ISDA May 2001, p. 22
329 See ISDA, February 2000, p. 36
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practice, the coalition argued, would lead to a substantial rise in the cost o f credit protection, thus 
undermining the BCBS’s stated goals of minimizing risk in the banking system.330
Regulatory Response
A sustained transnational campaign of private sector opposition to the policy had made 
the W-Factor a favorite target of the financial press, which tended to side in favor of private 
sector criticism.331 Despite this criticism, Page of the UK delegation did not find the various 
industry arguments very persuasive, since their arguments were based on generous assumptions 
of how risk mitigation actually worked during times o f financial stress. Page rejected the view 
that markets for credit risk protection, such as derivatives like credit default swaps, were highly 
liquid. He understood collateral to be very difficult for banks to liquidate in times of financial 
stress, when liquidity in such markets can dry up very quickly.332
The US delegation, far from being supportive of the W-factor policy, regarded private 
sector opposition as simply further confirmation of their own aversion toward the policy.333 The 
US delegation knew that the policy would be very costly for US banks: in the words of one 
BCBS delegate, “industry was beside itself with yet another add on...”334 Yet it wasn’t simply 
the regulatory costs that the US delegation disliked, but rather also the nature of the policy itself. 
One delegate saw it as a ‘square peg in a round hole’ — a crude and badly conceived policy that 
didn’t serve to make credit risk mitigation more risk sensitive.335 Yet even in addition to being 
crude, it also made the credit risk mitigation section of the Accord more complex.336 The US 
delegation had even stated publicly that they were hesitant about the W-factor shortly after the 
policy proposal was released.337 Privately, US delegates, particularly the Fed, had always been 
highly critical of it, but they had not voiced their objections in prior deliberations in Basel. Now
330 ISDA May 2001, p. 25.
331 This point was recognized also by Wood 2005.
332 As indicated in text of JP Morgan Chase 2001, p. 12
333 Interviews 39R, 40R.
334 Interview 70R.
335 Interviews 88R, 73R
336 Interview 73R.
337 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System et. al., January 2001, p. 14
121
with the policy universally condemned by banks and associations all over the world, their stance 
within the BCBS was strengthened.338
At the September 2001 meeting of the BCBS in Basel, the BCBS decided it needed to 
make a decision as to whether or not to keep, adjust or drop the W-factor policy. It was evident 
to all concerned that the W-factor policy should be dropped; in the words of one BCBS delegate, 
the policy “couldn’t withstand this wave of resistance.”339 Yet Page was adamant that it should 
remain in the Accord. Page himself was under pressure from Bill McDonough, the Chair of the 
Basel Committee at the time, to rid Basel II of the W-Factor, given the level of criticism. Page 
was not convinced by his colleagues that the policy should be changed; however, he understood 
the need for compromise within the BCBS. As the Chair of the Capital Group, he was able to 
push through the policy in the first place. Yet he also saw the opportunity for issue-linkage: if he 
gave up the W-factor, he could gain something else in return. An informal traded compromise 
was reached: Page would concede to the W-factor’s removal, while he would gain assurances 
from the rest of the BCBS that his concern over the pro-cyclical aspects of the Accord would be 
addressed in future deliberations.340 It was thus agreed that the W-factor would be effectively 
removed from the risk calculations, and would be left a matter for national supervisory 
discretion, in Pillar II of the Accord.341 This compromise represented an instance o f permissive 
regulatory policy change. A regulatory policy proposal which represented a considerable 
increase in regulatory capital disappeared over the course of just one meeting.
Private sector groups played a role in encouraging this outcome, but a circumscribed one. 
The transnational campaign aimed at convincing the UK FSA to change its position was 
unsuccessful. The US delegates’ position did not change either, since they were opposed to the 
policy from the beginning. The only thing that changed between January 2001 and September 
2001 was an extensive transnational campaign by private sector groups to critique the policy. 
This campaign strengthened the oppositional stance of the US delegation, including the Chair of 
the BCBS, in their negotiation position relative to Page. This case thus offers some support to the 
Mobilization hypothesis, as extensive opposition and organization proved decisive in securing
338 Interviews 39R, 40R.
339 Interview 93 R.
340 Interview 19R.
341 See BCBS September 2001, p. 2.
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the private sector’s desired outcome. It is thus tem pting to conclude that structural power played 
a role here; however, structural power was a constant factor during this period, and thus cannot 
be considered catalytic.342 Nevertheless, this case provides support for the Transnational 
Pathway hypothesis, since private sector groups contributed to permissive regulatory policy 
change. W hile it is tempting to suggest that a national-level pathway was at work in this case, 
there is no evidence that any particular US lobbying activity led to any change by US regulators, 
since they them selves were already convinced. However, it is possible that given the importance 
o f derivatives for the US in particular (see Figure 3.1) that structural power was at work in 
convincing them o f  their original position in the first place.
Figure 3.1: Derivatives Turnover in Different National Markets 
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This being said, it seems more plausible that structural power was at work in the removal 
o f the W -factor policy in a more transnational fashion. As has been established in a number o f 
literatures, derivatives were a critical com ponent o f  the international financial system at the 
time.344 Other evidence suggests that the W -factor may have been dealt with under significant 
structural constraints. In 2001 BCBS countries had 90.5% o f  the world share o f premium traded
342 On the structural importance of credit derivatives in this period, see Wigan 2009.
343 Source: World Federation of Exchanges - http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics/annual/2001/futures-and- 
options-contract-volume
344 Dodd 2005; Wigan 2010; Bienefeld 2007, pp. 23-24.
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derivatives contracts within their markets.345 However, they only had 71% of the world volume 
of derivatives contracts, and such contract volume is the better indicator since the W-factor had 
to do with residual risk associated with contracts.346 Because the W-factor involved a regulatory 
cost on transactions, it is conceivable that derivatives markets could have migrated outside the 
BCBS in some fashion, or at least that this could have been conceived to do so.
Conclusion
This chapter has analyzed five different transnationally organized private sector 
campaigns. As we have seen, there was substantial variation in the dependent variable of interest, 
that is, permissive regulatory policy change (PRPC). Only three private sector campaigns were 
associated with permissive regulatory policy change, and one of these (the campaign over the 
interest rate risk policy) did not offer any causal evidence linking the content of the campaign to 
the permissive regulatory policy change that occurred. Taken together, these cases stand in 
contrast to the ‘regulatory capture’ hypothesis widely employed within the IPE of finance 
literature. Rather than ‘capturing’ the BCBS, private sector groups succeeded in influencing the 
content of the Accord only occasionally, and often in very circumscribed ways.
The first case demonstrated that a transnationally mobilized campaign which advocated 
for full internal models was unsuccessful in achieving permissive regulatory policy change. 
While full internal models were rejected, the use of banks’ own internal ratings was, however, 
accepted. Though this cannot be causally associated with private sector efforts, I have coded the 
outcome in the Configuration Table below as .33 for reasons of caution, so that later across-case 
analysis in Chapter 10 does not consider this as a case of clear-cut failure.
The second case examined the campaign associated with the use of banks’ own internal 
ratings, and was associated with permissive regulatory policy change. Although the extent of the 
permissive regulatory policy change in this case was circumscribed, there is sufficient evidence 
that the specific information that private sector groups provided to the BCBS Models Task Force
345 Calculated from data from the World Federation of Exchanges, Table VI.3 - Futures and Options Total Premium 
Traded (Year 2001) http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics/annual/2001/futures-and-options-total-premium- 
traded
346 This is calculated by taking the sum of all futures and options contracts for 2001, based on data from World 
Federation of Exchanges, Table VI. 1 Futures and Options Contract Volume (Year 2001), http://www.world- 
exchanges.org/statistics/annual/2001/futures-and-options-contract-volume.
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can be said to have influenced this policy. As we have seen, this information was the result of 
mobilization and was coordinated through important coalitional efforts at the transnational level: 
thus the Mobilization, Coalitions, and Information Network hypotheses received support from 
this case, as each of these factors was important in achieving permissive regulatory policy 
change.
The third case investigated the private sector campaign against the interest rate risk 
policy. As we have seen, while there were some efforts to mobilize in opposition to this policy, 
and the policy did experience permissive regulatory policy change, private sector activity cannot 
be causally associated with this change. Instead, permissive regulatory policy change was 
associated with the internal dynamics among regulators within the BCBS — thus in the 
Configuration Table below I have coded PRPC as 0 in order not to distort later fsQCA.
The fourth case examined in this chapter, concerning the operational risk policy, 
demonstrated support for the Business Conflict hypothesis. We have seen that despite a 
substantial degree of private sector mobilization, and the use of information within this 
campaign, the best efforts of the campaign were unable to achieve permissive regulatory policy 
change. This failure can be attributed to the instrumental role of the ITWG, an informal group 
which went against the tide of criticism to work with the BCBS to generate what was one of the 
most stringent regulatory policies in the entire Accord.
The case which examined the ‘W-Factor’ demonstrated support for the Mobilization and 
Structural Power hypotheses. Rather than convincing any particular member of the BCBS 
through information or some other means, private sector mobilization in opposition contributed 
to permissive regulatory policy change in that it facilitated the BCBS to persuade the UKFSA to 
abandon its policy proposal. As we have seen, there were considerable structural constraints at 
work that may have played an important role in both the US’ initial position and the eventual UK 
position.
Because each of the campaigns examined in this chapter were transnationally organized, 
this chapter offered an opportunity to test the Transnational Pathway hypothesis. As we have 
seen, this hypothesis received support in only two of the six campaigns examined here. This 
variegated result does not suggest that this particular pathway of influence should be challenged
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outright. Indeed, we have seen that in two cases private sector groups played an important role in 
influencing instances o f  permissive regulatory policy change. These two cases, it must be 
pointed out however, cannot be easily described as a situation o f  regulatory capture. In the 
internal ratings campaign, the BCBS actively solicited information from private sector groups. 
While this information was subsequently provided, the BCBS still utilized stringent measures 
within the policy, as we have seen. In the case o f  the W-factor, the campaign did not persuade 
any regulator to change their position, but rather affected the negotiation dynamic within the 
BCBS. The valuable information contained within this chapter provides the basis to conduct an 
across-case analysis o f  the aforementioned transnationally organized campaigns and their 
outcomes. The Configuration Table below summarizes the fuzzy-set scores associated with the 
main explanatory variables o f  interest, and thus provides the basis for fsQCA in Chapter 10.
Configuration for Transnational Campaigns Examined in Chapter 3
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Chapter 4
The German Commercial Real Estate Campaign
This focused empirical chapter engages in detailed process tracing analysis of private 
sector campaigns associated with a small and very specific policy in Basel II -  the regulatory 
policy toward commercial real estate in the Standardized Approach of the Accord. These 
campaigns took place only in one country: Germany. And while it ultimately concerned one 
single risk weight, and led only to a footnote in the final Accord, the campaigns over the 
commercial real estate policy nearly jeopardized the entire Accord.
This chapter is divided into two sections. Section 1 describes the development of the 
commercial real estate policy between February 1999 and June 1999, and the private sector 
campaign that emerged to alter them. Importantly, this case demonstrates that the influence 
private sector groups successfully exercised was over German delegates’ behavior within the 
BCBS, and not over their position concerning this regulatory policy. Section 2 describes the 
second private sector campaign against Basel’s evolving commercial real estate policy, which 
occurred between July 1999 and January 2000. The private sector campaign during this phase 
was much more extensive, and enjoyed the benefits of stronger mobilization, a national coalition, 
and legislative oversight. It also demonstrates, however, that private sector influence is a more 
complex process than commonly assumed, since the campaign examined herein did not affect the 
position of the regulators, but only their behavior.
Section 1 
Beginning with Disagreement
In early 1999, as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) was set to release 
the first draft of its new Accord, an unexpected event occurred. A unique debate arose,
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concerning the treatment of commercial real estate in the new Accord. Shortly before the release 
of the first draft o f Basel II, the German delegation within the BCBS began arguing against the 
proposed treatment for commercial real estate. While the draft Accord assigned residential 
mortgage lending a 50% risk-weight, commercial real estate — widely believed to be one of the 
more volatile loan portfolios -  was assigned a 100% risk weight. This provision seemed sensible 
enough to the US delegates, since commercial real estate lending by banks had contributed to a 
series of banking crises within their country, especially in the early 1990s.347 Such a memory had 
generated an inherent distrust among regulators o f the volatility of mortgage lending, especially 
commercial real estate lending. As the BCBS Chairman and head of the New York Federal 
Reserve, Bill McDonough, put it during this period, “[t]he ability of banks to make bad real 
estate loans is legendary.”348 Indeed, the skepticism toward the German delegations’ claims were 
widespread.349
Conversely, based on their experience as supervisors, the German delegates viewed the 
majority of commercial real estate lending activity as fundamentally safe, and certainly not 
deserving of a 100% risk weight. Furthermore, given that the existing EU regulations had already 
set commercial real estate lending to 50%, German observers feared that Basel’s provisions 
would negatively affect the German banking system, and the German economy generally. The 
German delegates argued that the German commercial mortgage lending market was unique, and 
as such deserved a special exception.
Private Sector Interests Brought in to the Negotiation
At the BCBS level, it was not possible for the German delegation to convince their 
international colleagues that commercial real estate lending in Germany should receive a special 
low risk weighting. As the issue was reaching a critical point in the negotiations, the BaKred 
made a decision to draw private sector attention to what was occurring in the BCBS. It decided
347 See Duebel 2002.
348 William McDonough, quoted in Coyle 1999.
349 Interview 18R.
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to inform the German banking community of the German regulators’ dilemma within the BCBS, 
and to solicit help in securing a negotiated agreement.350 Prior to this point, private sector groups 
were not aware of the specific details the BCBS deliberations.351 The President of the BaKred, 
Jochen Sanio, approached the Verband der Deutscher Hypothekenbanken (VdH, the German 
Association of Mortgage Banks), informing them of the situation. Specifically, he asked the VdH 
for concrete empirical material that would back up the Germans’ negotiating position. As the 
association representing the largest mortgage banks in Germany, it regarded the policy as 
potentially exercising a direct and negative impact on its members; consequently, the VdH 
quickly prepared a response. Through its membership in the Central Credit Committee (ZKA), 
the German association of peak national banking associations, the VdH had already 
commissioned a study in 1996 that backed up their position, and they used this research as part 
of the information they sent to the German delegation.352
Backed up by the VdH, the German delegation argued at the BCBS that the historically 
low default rate of commercial mortgage lending justified a 50%, not a 100% capital charge. In 
other words, a bank issuing a commercial real estate loan should hold aside not 8% of its capital 
in conjunction with a given loan, but 4%, according to the 8% level of overall capital adequacy. 
Using the data provided by the VdH, the German delegation was able to supplement their 
historical argument with an empirical one, using bank level data that strengthened their position. 
Thus, the German delegation made the case to the rest of the BCBS that because commercial real 
estate lending in Germany was limited to 60% of the value of the given property, this special 
characteristic made for a stable, reliable issuance of credit, and they demonstrated empirically 
the low default rates within these markets.
The empirical evidence that the German delegation provided did not convince the rest of 
the BCBS. The Japanese, Swedish and UK regulators shared the US’ experience of highly 
volatility real estate markets, and supported US concerns.353 By all accounts, however, it was the 
US BCBS delegation that was at the time particularly opposed.354 In response to US resistance, 
the German delegation arranged for a special bilateral meeting between German and US
350 Interview 93P.
351 Interview 93P.
352 See Hagen and Holter 2002.
353 See Financial Times 1999; Walker 1999; Corroborated in interviews 18R, 19R, 70R.
354 For a succinct summary, see The Economist May 1999.
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delegates. Technical experts on real estate markets were brought from both delegations, but they 
failed to resolve differences, and the US delegation remained unconvinced.355
Escalation, Deadlock, and Delay
The German and US delegations were at loggerheads, and this standoff 
encouraged the German delegation to take tough value-claiming stances in 
the broader BCBS negotiation. As later attested by Sanio in parliamentary 
testimony, this was the first time in the 25-year history of the BCBS that a country 
has threatened to veto a policy decision.356
Both the Bundesbank and the BaFin, along with the VDH and ZKA, proceeded to successfully 
raise their concerns with their contacts within the Ministry of Finance. This development did not 
go unnoticed by the US delegation, who read comments by Kaio Koch-Weser, the Secretary of 
State for the Ministry of Finance, in the German financial press.357 The US delegation also knew 
that the German mortgage banks were now involved with the issue, and some rightly believed 
that this involvement was due to Sanio’s own recruitment efforts.358 At this point, however, the 
dynamic had taken on its own momentum within Germany.
The US delegation indicated that they would not accept the German position on 
commercial real estate. There were two reasons for the US position. The first was skepticism 
regarding the German position’s factual basis. Although German empirical claims had been 
questioned from the outset, the US delegation had by now found increasing evidence to support 
their suspicion. Compounding American skepticism in this regard was the politicization of 
commercial real estate issue in Germany, which led the Fed to believe that the data they were 
receiving from the Germans was potentially tainted. The second reason why the US delegation 
refused the German position was their concern regarding the consequences of exceptionalism in 
the political economy of real estate. While they were well aware of the influence of mortgage
355 Interview 70R.
356 Bundestag December 1999, p. 15.
357 Interview 89R.
358 Interview 70R.
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banks in Germany, the Fed didn’t want US banks to push for any ‘national exceptionalism’ 
clauses within in the US.359
The entire draft o f the new Accord was delayed due to the controversy surrounding the 
commercial real estate policy, and the 9 April 1999 deadline passed without the release of a 
draft. It was unclear how long the delay would last. McDonough wrote to BCBS members 
indicating that publication would be delayed indefinitely.360 The planned 9 April London press 
conference was cancelled.361
Continuing Foment
The deadlock in negotiations served both to increase private sector mobilization within 
Germany, and to consolidate and strengthen the German delegation’s value-claiming behavior in 
the negotiation. The VdH was now communicating regularly with not only the Bundesbank, 
BaFin, and the Ministry of Finance, but also the BdB, whose President, Martin Kohlhaussen, 
now spoke out publically for the “support and enforcement of the justified German interests,” 
and praised the German delegation “for not accepting the American foray.” 362 While there had 
previously been some hesitation in regard to how ‘hard’ to fight for the commercial real estate 
policy within the German delegation, it was now believed that there was no going back: the 
policy had achieved national significance.
The delay in the Accord’s release and the German delegation’s particular position 
affected social relations within the BCBS. The German delegation was criticized within the 
BCBS for leaking details of the negotiations to its own domestic banks, and US-German tension 
even spilled over into other BIS functions.364 In such a context, the BCBS Secretariat was careful 
to underplay the significance of the difficulties, but as one anonymous BCBS member put it at
359 Interview 90R; 65R.
360 Graham April 1999.
361 See Wall Street Journal 1999; Seiberg April 1999.
362 Frankfurter Allgemeine 1999; Boerzen-Zeitung April 1999.
363 Interview 90R.
364 This is the account of Financial Times Banking editor at the time. See Graham May 1999b; see also Shirreff 
1999.
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the time, “[we] are going to keep working on it, but we don’t want to put a word like ‘soon’ on
,,365
Continued Value-Claiming
The Chairman of the US Federal Reserve Board, Alan Greenspan, vaguely asserted at the 
time that the delay was being caused by “politics”.366 Despite continued skepticism concerning 
German claims, empirical or otherwise, the German delegation’s value-claiming behavior, 
particularly its noted political constraints, meant that their demands had to be addressed, and 
urgently if the new Basel Accord was to proceed. The Fed gathered a great deal o f data to 
support the US position; however, by this point the German delegation was making its case not 
simply by asserting factual claims, but (in one US regulators’ words), “by pounding on the 
table.”367 Sanio was resourceful and unapologetic concerning the German position; the 
Bundesbank now fully supported him, and he reportedly made the claim that given such strong 
pressure from German politicians, the German delegation was likely to walk away from Basel II 
altogether.368
The June Compromise
With the commercial real estate risk weightings still highly contentious and unresolved, 
the issue went to sub-meetings of the US, UK and German delegates, in which there was “very 
heated discussion and debates and dialogue”.369 In a minor concession the German delegation 
dropped the issue o f a special risk-weighting of Pfandbriefe.370 By June 1999, a compromise 
position was reached. What did the US get from this exchange? According to one member of the 
Fed at the time, “What we got was formal movement in the process.”371 According to another 
member of the US delegation from the OCC, “we wanted the Germans to stay and we had to find
365 Graham April 1999.
366 Alan Greenspan, quoted in Rehm 1999.
357 Interview 39R.
368 Interview 88R; 70R.
369 Anonymous us regulator fed.
370 Interview 21R. Pfandbriefe were very significant -  economically and politically -  but it did not represent an 
immediate threat; Interview 93P.
371 Interview 39R.
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out a combination on that issue”.372 Remarkably, the compromise achieved at the time was to 
allow the draft Accord to be released, despite the issue’s lack o f resolution o f  at the technical 
level. The US delegation — and indeed the rest of the BCBS -  committed to allowing exceptional 
treatment to commercial real estate, but only under certain specified conditions. However, at the 
time those conditions were unclear; all parties committed to address the issue after the release of 
the Accord for public consultation. What did the German delegation achieve? On the issue of 
commercial real estate lending, the draft stated:
In view of the experience in numerous countries that commercial property lending has 
been a recurring cause of troubled assets in the banking industry over the past few 
decades, the Committee holds to the view that mortgages on commercial real estate do 
not, in principle, justify other than a 100% weighting of the loans secured.373
The compromise — at least to hold the German BCBS delegates over for the meantime — was 
contained in the word ‘in principle.’ Over the subsequent months, the US and German delegates 
would negotiate the substantive meaning of this abstraction. In the meantime, the German 
delegation could walk away as victors to their domestic banking associations -  especially to their 
specialized mortgage banks, the Hypothekenbanken, their national association the VdH.
Section 2 
The Second Commercial Real Estate Campaign
Despite the June 1999 compromise, the commercial real estate issue was far from settled. 
The VdH found the compromise acceptable for the time being, but nevertheless continued to 
engage in new forms of mobilization for the full regulatory policy changes that they wanted.374 
US-German differences persisted. In one former BCBS member’s view, the commercial real 
estate issue was the most difficult of all conflicts throughout the period. “It was hard...and I 
think they all had their views on this -  each feeling that they knew how this should be done and 
that the other one’s solution would be intolerable in their local banking environment.”375 The US
372 Interview 29R.
373 BCBS June 1999, p. 31.
374 Boerzen-Zeitung June 1999; Interview 39P.
375 Interview 18R.
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delegation wasn’t simply concerned over Germany’s very particular national interest being 
represented within the new Accord; they were remained skeptical of the German delegation’s 
factual position.376
German private sector groups were continuing to advocate for permissive regulatory 
policy change. They redoubled their efforts to establish a credible empirical basis for private 
sector demands. By September 1999, the VdH, with extensive support from the ZKA, had 
completed an extensive survey of covered loan loss rates in real estate from 1988 to 1998 to 
support the German delegation’s position.377 The expanded participation of all of the member 
associations of the ZKA allowed the data the VdH needed to be pooled more widely than before. 
While the VdH had the largest mortgage banks in their membership, now their data extended 
coverage to 80% of the German mortgage loan market, and covering from 1988 to 1998.378 The 
average losses for first mortgages was found to be .04% over a ten-year period -  an extremely 
low figure. Reflecting the continuing divide on the issue, such figures did not satisfy the rest of 
the BCBS Credit Risk Subgroup, who continued to doubt the data’s merits.379
In light of the Ministry of Finance and Bundesbank’s acknowledgment of US-German 
conflict over commercial real estate, the (opposition) CDU/CSU faction of the Parliamentary 
Finance Committee asked to put the issue of Basel II onto the agenda of the Bundestag, 
specifically the Parliamentary Finance Committee. Legislative oversight had begun. This first 
hearing in December 1999 sought to oversee the process of negotiation over Basel II, and the 
Bundesbank and BaKred’s specific actions over key issues. Sanio stated to the Committee that 
“There is a struggle for finding a compromise concerning this problem for nine months now”, 
and added that the US had staged an unprecedented press campaign against the German position, 
with leading articles in the Economist™  Various members of the Parliamentary Finance 
Committee asked if a declaration from them would help the German negotiating position. While 
Sanio welcomed the idea, the senior member of the Ministry o f Finance stated it was too early,
376 Interviews 29R, 87R.
377 See Hagen and Holter 2002.
378 See Hagen and Holter 2002, pp. 33-34.
379 See VdH 2000, p. 53.
380 1 5 December 1999, p. 15.
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and there was still some room for negotiation.381 The ZKA would continue to press the German 
regulatory authorities on the commercial real estate policy.382
The VdH were not satisfied with the situation, and decided to intensify their efforts at 
securing change. As they wanted to ensure that their empirics were taken seriously by the rest of 
the BCBS, the VdH decided to complement the study of the ZKA with yet another. In an attempt 
to assure the BCBS of the legitimacy and objectivity of their data, they hired the consultancy 
firm Empirica to conduct a survey of VdH member data. Empirica disaggregated data from four 
VdH members and tried to capture the fact that existing loss rates in the German mortgage 
market were due to German reunification.
The ZKA wrote to the BCBS as a whole in March 2000, and argued that strict lending 
and valuation rules in force in Germany justified the 50% exceptional treatment they were 
demanded.383 With legislative oversight now underway in Germany, the ZKA had been 
communicating their concerns to the Parliamentary Finance Committee, and informed them of 
their study’s results concerning probabilities of default in the German real estate sector, which in 
turn gave further support to the German position.384 By April 2000, the negotiations on CRE 
were still proving difficult since, as reported by Sanio at the time, “the US is not willing to give 
in at all.”385 During the next Parliamentary Finance Committee hearing, Sanio now asked 
explicitly for a common decision of the Parliament in order to strengthen the German 
delegation.386 The head of the Parliamentary Finance Committee welcomed the request, and 
asked the entire German parliament to agree on it.387 While issues such as external-internal 
ratings and the potential fate of German SMEs were now also on the agenda, the issue of 
commercial real estate had especially strong salience, because it was clear that the German 
delegation’s position was not advancing.388
For the Bundestag, the issue of commercial real estate lending was intimately related to 
the real economy in Germany, and the prospects of small and medium-sized enterprises, since it
381 15 December 1999, pp. 18-19.
382 ZKA march 2000, p. 13.
383 See ZKA March 2000, p. 13.
384 See Bundestag June 2000, p. 3.
385 Bundestag April 2000, p. 17
386 Bundestag April 2000, pp. 17-18.
387 Bundestag April 2000, p. 18.
388 Bundestag April 2000, p. 24.
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was believed that the low interest rate lending practices in Germany offered distinct advantages 
to this important cornerstone of its economy.389 In June, as part o f a position taken within the 
Bundestag by all major parties, a demand was made on the German regulatory authorities to 
ensure the protection of German commercial real estate, specifically that the ratings for 
commercial real estate lending must not exceed a 50% weighting.390 The resolution was 
interpreted as greatly strengthening the German delegation’s position in the international 
negotiation. In the words of the Chair of the Parliamentary Finance Committee, the resolution 
was “intended to strengthen the negotiation position of Germany and Europe toward the 
American representative delegation in the BCBS”391 The slightly more skeptical Bundesbank felt 
that its hands were now completely tied, and it had to argue more aggressively on the 
commercial real estate issue.392 The VdH were delighted that the German delegates now enjoyed 
an extra strength in negotiations at the BCBS level.393
The rest of the BCBS was very surprised that a national parliament had made an explicit 
set of demands on their regulatory authorities.394 There had already been veto threats posed by 
the German delegation, and substantial intervention by the German Ministry of Finance, but the 
current level of political intervention was especially strong. Claes Norgren of the Swedish FSA 
and Chairman of the Capital Task Force arranged a meeting in Craiga (just outside of 
Stockholm) to resolve this and other issues (including the interest rate risk and operational risk 
policies described in Chapter 3). The US, UK, Japanese, French and German members of the 
BCBS met in August 2000. As one BCBS participant recalls:
What had to happen was politically Jochen had to get what he needed...I was really of the view
that they should not have got it. But that would have tanked the whole thing. That would have
been the breaking point. Germany would have never signed onto this.395
With the need for a resolution especially pressing, Bill McDonough instructed one of his senior 
staff for the BCBS delegation, Darryl Hendricks, to work with Sanio to reach a technical 
solution. It was decided that the 50% weighting would remain -  at national discretion -  but
389 Bundestag June 2000, p. 3
390 See Bundestag June 2000, p. 1.
391 See Bundestag September 2000, p. 15.
392 Interview 90R
393 Interview 93 P.
394 Interview 90R
395 Interview 70R
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subject to a series of ‘hard tests’ to prove that the risk in commercial lending was in fact 
justifying the exception. A substantial amount of work went into designing these parameters, and 
the discussion went from a profoundly political one to a thoroughly technical one. Thankfully for 
the German delegation, the Japanese delegates of the BCBS -  who were initially against the idea 
of the German’s proposal — now began to take interest in the issue, and Japanese support
<iQ ir
facilitated the German delegation’s continued value-claiming. The US was trying its best to 
fashion a ‘hard test’ for the commercial real estate exception rule, but it was well understood that 
the German delegates to the BCBS had a much stronger negotiating position.397 For those 
involved in the working group , the explicit reference to the preferences of the German members 
of Parliament made the discussion very difficult.398 Remaining differences between the German 
and US delegations were resolved through intervention by the BCBS Secretariat.399 This 
invention led to the final closure of the German commercial real estate exception rule.
The solution finally reached was intended to satisfy the Germans and the US. In the end, 
it was a footnote that ultimately resolved almost a year and a half of tumult for the BCBS. This 
footnote specified that in some specific cases, mortgage loans could attain a 50% risk weight, as 
the Germans had initially demanded. Reflecting the German preferences the parameters of this 
‘hard test’ were especially suited to economic conditions within German mortgage markets. As 
the US didn’t want to use this supervisory discretion, they included the stipulation that states 
which invoked the exceptional treatment clause had to publicly demonstrate that the strict 
conditions required to do so had been met. The US Agencies also made it clear to their own 
industries that they would not allow the exceptional treatment that this footnote outlined.400 The 
footnote -  later accompanied by an entire internal BCBS document401 — would remain in the new 
Basel Accord in each subsequent draft, until its final completion in 2004.402 For the VdH, their 
worst fears were averted, and they viewed the compromise at the BCBS as a victory.403 The 
German delegation was also able to report the positive results of the German Parliament’s
396 Interview 90R
397 Interview 21R; Bundestag November 2000, p. 47.
398 Interview 8R.
399 Interview 21R
400 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System et. al. 2001, p. 2.
401 This document is not available to the public, and its title is BS0090.
402 See BCBS January 2001a, p. 11; BCBS April 2003, p. 20; BCBS June 2004, p. 20.
403 See VdH 2001, p. 3.
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actions back to the Parliamentary Finance Committee, and indeed that they were able to achieve 
even more than they had initially thought possible.404
Conclusion
This chapter undertook process tracing analysis of Basel IPs commercial real estate 
policy, which witnessed two different national private sector campaigns. I demonstrated how a 
permissive regulatory policy change came about, and highlighted the complex yet important role 
played by private sector groups. We saw that German BCBS delegates’ oppositional position 
concerning the commercial real estate policy preceded private sector opposition, and that the 
latter was in fact the product of German regulators’ agitation. Confronted with considerable 
resistance from the rest o f the BCBS, the German delegation (specifically BaKred) came to the 
German Association of Mortgage Banks (VdH) for assistance, who provided German regulators 
with data to use in the negotiation. Yet once a private sector campaign became mobilized, and 
had the German government on its side, the rest of the BCBS’ skepticism concerning the factual 
basis for the German delegate’s concerns grew -  especially the United States. Under these 
conditions, the German delegation engaged in value-claiming behavior, which secured a 
commitment — but no concrete policy change -  on the commercial real estate policy.
The second commercial real estate campaign found that, when issues were still 
unresolved six months later, private sector groups in Germany, now organized more as a national 
coalition, providing the German delegation with data and securing a strong constraint on 
regulators in the form of legislative constraint. While private sector mobilization did not change 
the position of the German regulators, such mobilization did affect their behavior, as it offered 
them a credible constraint on the negotiation with the rest of the BCBS, which in turn eventually 
secured them the desired outcome. This case offers support for the Information Network, 
Legislative Oversight, and Coalitions hypotheses. Yet while private sector groups played an 
important role in securing permissive regulatory policy change, the success of their campaign 
was contingent on the fact that regulators themselves asked for information, and even asked their 
legislature for a more formal constraint in the supranational negotiation. Thus it is important to
404 See Bundestag September 2000, p. 15.
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underscore the fact that private sector campaigning was a contingent part o f a larger process, 
rather than the main driving force behind permissive regulatory policy change. A crucial finding 
o f this case nevertheless is that private sector groups did not influence the position  o f  their 
regulator, but rather their behavior within the BCBS. In this sense, the National Carrier 
Hypothesis has been supported, but only in a very particular way. The Configuration Table 
below illustrates the fuzzy-set scores for the campaigns o f this chapter. These values offer a 
valuable source o f configurational diversity that will contribute to systematic across-case 
analysis in Chapter 10. These fuzzy-set scores provide part o f the data which can assess the 
extent to which the hypotheses o f  interest to the study may be conditionally supported or 
challenged on the basis o f  patterns found across the entire range o f cases in the study.
Configuration Table for Campaigns and Their Outcomes Examined in Chapter 4
30
« JO
5"
«■
r&
CTQ
C_ W
s
<65 2
“0 n© HCL -oo *0
65
© “0 S ’O "■
03 e
re n o3*
n
o
©_ c o c/1y 5  o »  O j-f: 65
R* 3
5
re
3
C.
n
5 ;
S ’
"0
O 32J
3
5* O
3 3*65 © 5 ’-1 3
N65
o '
<-»■
o '
3
3
n•<
<■&
3n«
3
ora
U9
5 '
era
3
a.
2
o
r  rn re°s. us.S ’ S'sr _ sr 
< P  <
3 03 5a n 5
“  3 -  =  o  o  C
o f r  g? g * 2. £
3 > 3 5 3 o' 3
= I. $ TC g W
n> r> < 3“ EL 3
W> V> f t  r* -  —✓
CRE 1 DE 0.33 1 0 1 0.67 0.67 0.67 0 0 0.33 0■ hp p  8  r iM  BBS M 88i  W m m  HMRBI —. N888MN .* - 81
CRE 2 DE 7 1 1 0 1 1 1 1  0 0 1 0
139
Chapter 5
The SME Campaigns
This chapter analyses private sector campaigns concerning the effects of Basel II on 
lending to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The concern among many private sector 
groups was that Basel IPs approach toward risk-based capital adequacy standards would impede 
lending to SMEs. In contrast to the campaigns in most other chapters in which private sector 
campaigns have been organized around reacting to specific regulatory policies produced by the 
BCBS, in this chapter a different dynamic is at work. The campaigns investigated in this chapter 
analyze efforts by private sector groups to institute a new regulatory policy within the Accord 
which would specifically protect lending to SMEs. While very modest campaigns existed in the 
UK and Japan, the private sector campaigns in Germany represented some of the most extensive 
and complex efforts of private sector groups to influence the Accord.
This chapter engages in detailed process-tracing analysis to explore the relationship 
between the content and context of these campaigns, as well as their associated outcomes. I find 
significant empirical evidence linking private sector campaigning to permissive regulatory policy 
change, but only under very specific conditions. A diverse coalition of private sector groups 
including large and small banks, banking sector organizations, and business and crafts 
associations mobilized to generate legislative oversight over German regulators. This influence, 
as we shall discover below, involved a dynamic process, which took years to yield permissive 
regulatory policy change.
Section 1 describes the private sector campaigns which emerged in response to Basel II’s 
perceived adverse effects on SME lending. I primarily explore campaigns waged in the United 
Kingdom and Japan. I argue that Japanese regulators were not influenced by this campaign as it 
lacked industry support beyond the Shingiin banks. Section 2 then analyses the SME campaign 
which emerged in Germany in 1999 and 2000.1 demonstrate that this extensive campaign, which 
enjoyed the benefit of legislative oversight on its sidq, failed  to influence the German regulators.
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Section 3 then describes the German private sector campaign o f 2001 and 2002. Under the 
conditions of this campaign, private sector groups successfully exploited a substantial degree of 
legislative oversight as a means of disciplining their regulators into meeting their preferences. 
While this concerted strategy was successful in influencing the German regulators, it was not 
immediately successful in generating permissive regulatory policy change at the BCBS level, 
since other members resisted German efforts. However, continued value-claiming behavior by 
the German delegates at the BCBS level ensured an outcome that was commensurate with 
private sector demands. Section 4 briefly sets out the reactive private sector campaign which 
took place in Germany in 2003 designed to change the SME policy in an even more permissive 
direction.
Section 1 
SME Campaigns in the UK and Japan
United Kingdom
After the release of the January 2001 draft of the Basel II Accord, the British Banker’s 
Association and the London Investment Bankers’ Associations wrote that the content of the 
Accord would require ‘further development’ in order to deal with the treatment of the SME 
exposures of banks.405 The sentiment within the BBA and LIB A was that the Foundation IRB 
portion of the Accord would severely affect SME financing because of its contentious definition 
of a retail portfolio. These groups provided a number of technical suggestions concerning how 
this perceived problem could be handled, and laid these proposals out for their regulators.406 
Beyond this basic level of engagement, however, campaign proposals and organizing more 
generally in the UK was not extensive.407 While the BBA and the LIBA formed a coalition to 
work on the issue, they did not forge linkages with any other private sector groups. They did not
405 BBA and LIBA 2001, p. 3
406 BBA and LIBA 2001, pp. 16-17.
407 Interview 92P.
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seek to raise the policy within the national legislature, and indeed they only raised the issue 
briefly with the UK FSA and the Bank of England, the UK’s BCBS delegates.408
Japan
Private sector groups in Japan mobilized to oppose Basel II’s potential discriminatory 
effects on SME lending. While there are two main providers of SME finance in Japan, the 
Regional Banks and the Shingiin banks, only the latter mobilized over this issue 409 Shingiin 
banks were regional, generally smaller, cooperative banks which engaged in relatively simple 
financial transactions.410 The National Association of Shingiin Banks argued that Basel II’s risk 
weighting system was wholly inappropriate for Japanese SME financing. Specifically, they did 
not maintain detailed financial documentation concerning their lending businesses, which made 
Basel II approaches unworkable. Furthermore, they argued, Japanese SME lending practices 
assess risk on the basis of the personal qualifications of the SME manager, and collateral 
provided by real estate and personal guarantees; consequently, Shingiin banks can reschedule 
lending practices fairly easily.411
The Shingiin banks were able to capitalize on a legislative environment conducive to 
their concerns. While there were no legislative hearings focused on Basel II only, the legislative 
environment in which Basel II entered was extremely contentious. Representatives of the Diet 
sometimes spoke of the BCBS in extremely negative terms, often seeing the 1988 Accord as a 
touchstone for foolish diplomacy.412 Since the late 1990s there were ongoing fears within Japan 
that bank lending to SMEs was declining.413 Given the context of concern with SME financing in 
Japan at the time, it did not take long for the issue to arise in the Diet. Toshimasa Yamada, an 
LDP Member of Parliament from Hiroshima, had conducted private hearings with CEOs of small
408 Interview 92P.
409 See Second Association of Regional Banks 2001; Regional Banks Association of Japan 2001.
410 Whereas regional banks in Japan held about 18% of the countries’ assets, the Shingiin banks held about 
7.5%.Figures are calculated by author based on 2002 data by Van Rixtel 2003, p. 9
411 National Association of Shingiin Banks 2001, p. 2.
412 See Diet February 2001; Diet March 2001.
413 As Walter has pointed out, there was a political concern within the ruling LDP party of Japan to protect the SME 
sector in the face of financial regulatory change. See Walter 2006, p. 418 ; See also Hards 1998.
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Japanese banks and discovered that they were very concerned about Basel II.414 Accordingly, 
Yamada raised the issue in a hearing of the Diet Committee on Economy and Industry, at a 
legislative oversight hearing of Shoichi Tagaki, the Director General of the JFSA’s Supervisory 
Division 415 Yamada argued to the Committee that what the JFSA was trying to do would 
negatively impact SME finance in Japan, and that the capital adequacy standards for small 
Japanese banks should be lowered to less than 4% of total capital adequacy.416 Yamada strongly 
criticized the FSA for not recognizing the reality on the ground for small bankers and 
businesspeople. He charged that small Japanese banks in the countryside would suffer under 
Basel II, and that it should not be applied to small financial institutions.417 Takagi flatly 
disagreed, however, stating that in fact CEOs of small banks have a diversity of opinions on the 
issue, and that capital adequacy of small banks were already far too low by international 
standards.
Despite the JFSAs resistance, the issue of SME finance and Basel II was frequently 
discussed in the Diet at the time, in venues such as the Budget Committee, the Finance 
Committee, and the Committee on Economy and Industry.418 The National Association of 
Shingiin Banks. Capitalizing on this high level of political interests, banks continued their 
campaigns, even approaching the JFSA directly with their critique, arguing that the JFSA should 
do more to differentiate between large and small banks.419 After being told by the JFSA that this 
would not happen, the President of the National Association of Shingiin Banks, Yukihiko 
Nagano, testified before the Diet, strongly arguing that Basel II would adversely affect SME 
lending in the country.420 While Nagano did not testify again, the link between Basel II and 
adverse consequences to small Japanese banks and SMEs was brought up in several Diet 
Committee settings.421
414 It is unclear whether banks came to him, or vice versa.
415 Diet November 2001.
416 Diet November 2001.
417 Diet November 2001.
4,8 See Diet February 2002a; Diet February 2002b; Diet March 2002.
419 As told by Nagano in Diet March 2002.
420 This was particularly critical, he argued to the Diet, because there is no longer any cooperation between Japanese 
government ministries regarding SME finance.
421 Diet October 2002; Diet November 2002.
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Despite considerable legislative attention, Shingiin banks’ campaign did not persuade the 
JFSA to change its position. Even in heated discussions on Basel II and SMEs within the BCBS, 
the Japanese delegation took either a very neutral or muted position.422 This case suggests that 
private sector mobilization in the presence of legislative oversight is not sufficient to either 
influence regulators or generate permissive regulatory policy change. As such this case 
challenges the efficacy of the Legislative Oversight hypothesis.
Section 2 
The First German SME Campaign 
June 1999-December 2000
Shortly after the release of the June 1999 draft o f the Accord, concern began surfacing 
among German banks that the new revised Basel Accord might interfere with the system of 
bank-based financing of the German SME sector. A central concern was that Basel IFs reliance 
on external ratings might penalize the system of bank-based financing in Germany, and that its 
specific risk-sensitive approach would not accommodate the particularities of German bank 
lending to SMEs.423 By 2000, there was widespread concern regarding the potential increase in 
the cost of credit to SMEs. This concern elicited the attention not only of the financial sector in 
its various guises, but also of non-financial firms.
A strong national coalition began to develop in Germany. Within the ZKA, it was 
believed that the issue of SME sensitivity had to be addressed, and the smaller banking 
associations, the BVR and DSGV, actively participated in this campaign. The National 
Federation of Industry (Bundesverband der deutscher Industrie, or BDI) targeted the Accord’s 
higher credit costs for German industry, given the relative paucity of external rating coverage in 
Germany, in stark contrast to the USA.424 They joined the banking associations in arguing for the 
use of banks’ own internal ratings.425 The head crafts association of Germany, the Zentralverband 
der Deutschen Handwerks (ZDH) also became involved, as they too feared forthcoming damage
422 Interviews 19R, 24R, 35R, 89R, 90R, 95R.
423 Germany actually experienced an expansion in external ratings coverage since 1999. See Sinclair 2005, pp. 133- 
135. Corroborated in Interview 7P
424 BDI September 1999; Interview 4P.
425 BDI October 1999.
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to lines of credit to small enterprises. The Federation of German Industry and Commerce, the 
DIHK, increasingly pressed for reform of Basel II in order to protect the fate of German 
SMEs.426 All of these business associations communicated their concerns not only to the 
Bundesbank and BaKred, but also to members of the Bundestag.427
German business associations like the BDI, ZDH, and DIHK on the fact that SME 
promotion was seen as the foundation for German economic recovery and innovation at the 
time.428After oversight hearings of the BaKred and Bundesbank began (see Chapter 4 on the 
commercial real estate campaign), in which members of the ZKA were also formally 
represented, the Bundestag drew up an all-party resolution which instructed the German BCBS 
delegates to achieve positive results for the German SME sector. The Bundestag cited the need 
for the German delegation to “avoid disadvantages and burden for the economy of the 
Mittelstand.”429 The motion framed these objectives in terms of the importance of the SME 
sector for the German economy; however, the commercial real estate policy was the more 
immediate concern at the time (see Chapter 4), and consequently the SME issue did not receive 
full attention.
Despite the fact that German private sector groups had some a supportive legislative 
environment on their side, eliciting support from the Bundestag, the BaKred and the Bundesbank 
were proving resistant to pressure. During Parliamentary oversight hearings on Basel II, the ZKA 
proposed a new, compensatory policy to be inserted into the Accord to protect SMEs.430 The 
BaFin and Bundesbank flatly rejected this idea.431 The BaKred and Bundesbank focused on other 
developments within the BCBS negotiations, and argued to both MPs and the ZKA that there 
was no real threat to the German SME sector from Basel II.432 While the German regulators were 
well aware of the criticisms lodged by private sector groups, the notion of adjusting an 
international financial agreement to ensure sector-specific protection for a class of firms was not 
seriously considered a legitimate priority. 433 German regulators regarded such a proposal as an
426 Interviews 5P, 6P.
427 Interviews 5P, 6P, 14P
428 See Ryner 2003, p. 213
429 Bundestag June 2000, p. 1
430 See Bundestag April 2000.
431 See Bundestag April 2000.
432 Bundestag November 2000, pp. 54-55.
433 Interview 90R
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inappropriate response to these regulators’ overall concerns with financial stability and risk 
management.434 The private sector campaigns over the SME issue had succeeded in putting the 
issue on the political agenda in Germany; however, they had failed to alter the position of the 
German regulators. No regulatory policy change occurred as a result, and the January 2001 draft 
of the Accord did not contain an SME policy.
Section 3 
The 2001-2002 German SME Campaign
After the release of the January 2001 draft of Basel II, German private sector groups were 
even more concerned with its potential consequences to the SME sector, specifically the 
potential increase in the cost of credit lending to SMEs.435 German banks and banking 
associations met with the Bundestag and BaKred bilaterally to express their concerns, and did 
not feel satisfied with their regulators’ reactions.436 Consequently, they embarked on an explicit 
strategy to increase political pressure on the Bundesbank and the BaKred by raising the profile of 
their concerns.437 The ZKA was similarly displeased with the level of response they received 
within the Bundestag; consequently, they sought to raise the profile of their SME concerns by 
targeting the members of the Bundestag and discussing their concerns with the Ministry of 
Finance.438
The ZKA soon became the central organ of an extensive national coalition of groups 
opposed to the Accord’s lack of special adjustments for SME lending. Public-sector banks such 
as the German Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau, or 
KfW) provided data and analysis for this campaign. They had begun early research into the
434 Interview 90R
435 Interview 12P.
436 Interview, 7P, 12P.
437 Interview 12P.
438 When the BaKred and Bundestag were brought in for oversight hearings, the Committee was relatively uncritical 
of the non-actions taken on SME issues. See Bundestag November 2000, p. 47.
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potential effects of Basel II on credit allocation to SMEs, and circulated these studies widely -  
including to the Ministry of Finance.439
German business associations continued to mobilize, but now diversified their tactics. 
The DIHK arranged communiques and meetings with their local members; they spoke to 
representatives of both the BaKred and Bundesbank; they communicated with the Ministry of 
Finance; and they used their well-developed network within the German parliament to make 
their views known and provide MPs with information on the issue.440 The ZDH, as the national 
representative of the crafts sector in Germany, was particularly strategic in their approach. They 
sought to maximize the politicization o f Basel II to their advantage as much as possible by not 
only speaking with the Ministry o f Finance, the BaKred, and the Bundesbank, but also holding 
press conferences on the issue, making many oral statements during hearings on the issue, and 
organizing meetings with German members of Parliament.441 The ZDH also acted as a central 
distribution point for the German Craft Chambers (its member organizations), and actively 
encouraged its regional members to spread and politicize the issue across Germany.442 A key 
element of the ZDH’s strategy was its deployment of the national symbolism surrounding the 
German ‘Mittelstand’ (which translates roughly into both ‘SME’ and ‘middle class’ in German), 
by speaking to journalists and promoting articles in German daily newspapers such as Das Bild 
and other periodicals that set public opinion among the working class and small businesspeople — 
and which were also read by German parliamentarians as a gauge of public opinion.443
The national bank and business associations within Germany worked together through a 
strongly-networked, informal national coalition of opposition. Business associations such as the 
BDI, DIHK, and ZDH exchanged information with the ZKA.444 Individual members of the ZKA 
such as the BVR and the DSGV also provided support for business associations’ efforts directly, 
and at the same time encouraged these groups’ members to speak to their politicians at the
439 Interview 7P.
440 Interviews 5P, 6P
441 ZDH July 2001; Interview 14P.
442 As evinced by internal ZDH documentation. See ZDH October 1999.
443 Interview 14P; ZDH February 2001, p. 4
444 Several members of the ZKA even joined committees within the ZDH in order to encourage a consolidated 
effort. Interviews IIP, 12P, 14P; ZDH February 2001 p. 4.
147
regional level.445 The ZDH and ZKA worked together in their various engagements 
communicating their concerns to the Ministry of Finance, the BaKred and the Bundesbank.446 
Private sector groups in this network also reached out to other business associations, such as the 
Central Committee of Electricians (ZVE, Zentralverband des Elektrohandwerks).447 The large 
private banking association within Germany, the Bundesverband der Deutscher Banken (BdB), 
typically focused on other aspects of Basel II, also began to speak out on the SME issue, and 
worked with the Bundesverband deutscher Industrie (BDI) to coordinate their response.448
After this extensive campaign of mobilization and coalition-building, the Bundestag’s 
position became much more focused on the SME issue. Not only did the above groups contact 
individual German MPs, but MPs were also beginning to contact the ZKA for information on an 
informal and confidential basis.449 The Executive branch also raised its concerns, and the Federal 
Ministry of the Economy, for example, had signaled that it would fight for the financial security 
of the Mittelstand.450
National Regulators ’ Response
Despite the best efforts of private sector groups, the German regulatory authorities 
remained unresponsive451 For example, the BDI worked with the KfW to organize a major, high- 
profile conference Basel II’s effects on SME financing, even inviting the Bundesbank as a 
speaker.452 Reflecting the different views at the time, the Vice President of the BDI argued that 
the cost of credit to German businesses would surely increase under Basel II,453 while the 
member of the Bundesbank Board argued that increased regulatory capital would not affect 
credit pricing.454 Both the Bundesbank and the BaFin continued to acknowledge concerns
445 Interviews 12P,13P.
446 ZDH February 2001, p. 4; ZDH July 2001.
447 ZDH July 2001.
448 Interview 24R.
449 Interview 12P.
450 See Rogowsky 2001, p. 5. The BDI was highly skeptical of this position, however. See Von Wartenberg 
February 2001, p. 7.
451 Interview 21R.
452 See Von Wartenberg February 2001.
453 See BDI February 2001.
454 See Stark 2001.
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regarding SME lending, while simultaneously insisting that the gains already made within the 
Accord, such as the recognition of internal ratings, were positive for SMEs.455
Although the BaKred and Bundesbank were regularly involved in hearings on the issue at 
the Parliamentary Finance Committee, their reluctant stance on the SME issue continued. Sanio 
continued to insist that the Mittelstand would not be threatened by Basel II, and even argued 
before a hearing of the Parliamentary Finance Committee that German banks might experience 
windfall profits thanks to Basel II provisions.456 Though a representative of the BdB actively 
rejected this assertion,457 Sanio suggested in response that if bank lending decreased following 
ratification of the Accord, it might reflect banks’ strategic use of the Accord as an occasion to 
restructure lending practices.458 The KfW argued that, on the basis of their research, the credit 
situation would surely deteriorate for German SMEs. 459 However both Hoffman and Sanio 
rejected the KfW study’s credibility, asserting it was based on too many assumptions and 
inappropriate empirical analysis.460
Nevertheless, the more the Parliamentary Finance Committee learned about the Basel II 
situation, the more their concern grew. Several members of the Committee traveled to New York 
and Washington to investigate the situation there.461 The CDU/CSU members of the Committee 
advocated further and more extensive public hearings on the issue. Most significantly, however, 
the Chair of the Parliamentary Finance Committee decided to produce an all-party resolution to 
address the concerns that private sector groups had brought to the fore.462 The Parliamentary 
resolution was unambiguously in line with what private sector demands.463 The document 
advocated that the final structure o f credit risk in Basel II lead to an increase in credit to German
455 Bundestag March 2001; see also See BaKred May 2001a..
456 Bundestag May 2001a, p. 45
457 Bundestag May 2001a, p. 48
458 Bundestag May 2001a, p. 47
459 Bundestag May 2001a, p. 49
460 Bundestag May 2001a, p. 50
461 See Bundestag June 2001, pp. 66-67.
462 Bundestag May 2001a, pp. 51-52.
463 Some individuals involved suggested that this list of demands was actually written by private sector groups. This 
corroborates with some evidence in the Parliamentary record. See Munestag May 2001a, p. 52.
149
firms, and mandated German BCBS delegates to ensure a positive overall outcome for the 
German SME sector.464
Negotiating the German SME Demands at Basel
While in previous BCBS deliberations the German delegation had expressed their 
preferences to avoid disadvantage to the German SME sector, they had expressed this preference 
in early discussions concerning the use of internal and external ratings. Now, following a 
concerted German private sector campaign and the supportive legislative attention, the May 2001 
resolution of the Bundestag gave the German delegation a clear mandate to advocate explicitly 
for a special, separate treatment that would protect SME lending within the Basel II 
framework.465 The German delegation stated in no uncertain terms to the rest of the BCBS that 
there must be an explicit policy developed regarding the treatment of SME lending.
The case was made among their BCBS colleagues, and formally in an open letter to the 
entire BCBS. The Bundesbank and BaKred argued for the superior credit quality of German 
SMEs, emphasizing repeatedly how important the sector was to the German economy.466 Their 
open letter to the rest of the BCBS, it might be noted, bears the exact same day as the Bundestag 
motion on the subject; moreover, in the letter the BaFin and Bundesbank noted, “we expect the 
German Parliament...to take an active stand on central issues...in the near future.”467 Indeed, the 
German delegates at the time perceived the SME issue to be a very serious political demand by 
their Parliament, and recognized that they were operating under significant political 
constraints 468 The German delegation’s preferences were expressed as demands that had to be 
accommodated for the Basel II negotiations to move forward.469
The reaction to the German delegation’s value-claiming behavior was neither well- 
received nor easily resolved. Many BCBS members were well aware of the legislative situation
464 Bundestag May 2001b, p. 1.
465 Corroborated with accounts from Interviews 70R, 35R, 29R. In the words of one BCBS participant, “it was 
percolating. And then it sort o f ramped up.” Interview 7R.
466 They argued that from their supervisory perspective, “there is [sic] no grounds for any reservation against the 
prospect of a continued good credit quality of the Mittelstand.” See BaKred May 2001b, pp. 4-5.
467 BaKred May 2001b, p. 1.
468 Interviews 90R, 21R,24R.
^Interviews 39R, 40R.
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in Germany, and saw the German delegation’s behavior during the negotiations as fundamentally 
politically motivated.470 While BCBS members such as Switzerland, Italy, and France were 
somewhat sympathetic to the concerns of the German delegation (each of these regulators 
supervised banks with substantial SME portfolios as well), none of them actively advocated for 
any changes to the Accord. Among the non-German BCBS members, the US delegation was the 
most skeptical471 Nevertheless, the value-claiming behavior of the German delegation was taken 
very seriously: the Fed representatives working on Basel II issues took the German SME 
demands back to their Board.472
The rest of the BCBS decided that the German SME demand needed to be addressed and 
that, in some form, and it would require the lowering of capital for SME lending compared to the 
earlier proposals. The BCBS announced this decision publicly in July 2001.473 Despite this 
public commitment, a specific SME policy had yet to be designed, which led to great debate 
within the BCBS, as some members had also expressed skepticism regarding banks’ ability to 
identify whether or not SME exposures should be included as part of the retail portfolio or the 
corporate portfolio.474
A further stumbling block was the aforementioned intransigent opposition of the US 
delegation. To pacify American concerns, the German delegation invited staff from the Fed to 
Germany to conduct an audit of banks’ portfolios. In so doing, the German delegation hoped to 
demonstrate the good quality of German SME lending - yet the US delegation had their initially 
skeptical views justified by the visit.475
The German Campaign Continues
German private sector groups were pleased that the issue was on the BCBS agenda, but 
were disappointed with the lack of a concrete SME policy that satisfied their regulatory
470 Interviews 18R, 70R, 87R, 89R.
471 Interviews 70R, 78R, 87R.
472 Interviews 39R, 40R.
473 See BCBS June 2001. After this decision, Sanio pleaded back in Germany that this should quell fears within 
Germany and should lead to a “calming of the emotions.” Sanio July 2001.
474 BCBS 2001, p. 6.
475 Interview 70R.
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preferences. They continued their oppositional campaign, maintaining contact with German MPs 
and the Ministry of Finance. Some of these efforts were highly strategic: for example, to 
generate additional political leverage, the ZDH strategized to organize their concerns at the 
Hamburg Chamber of Commerce as this was the riding of Jochen Hofmann, the MP responsible 
for economic and financial affairs within the Office of the Chancellor.476 In an election year, 
such strategies appeared to have paid off remarkably well. In September, the SPD-Green 
coalition published their own new resolution designed to compete with the all-party resolution 
released earlier in May.477 Two weeks later, the National Minister of the Economy, Werner 
Muller made the Federal Government’s dissatisfaction even more clear to the German press, 
stating the Federal Governments grave dissatisfaction with the Accord.478 One week later, an 
even more significant gesture was made. The German Chancellor, Gerhard Schroder, threatened 
publicly to veto the translation of Basel II into European law unless significant changes were 
made.479 The Bundesbank followed Schroeder’s veto threat by stepping up their concerns 
regarding SME sensitivity within the BCBS.480
The rest of the BCBS were well aware of politicized nature of the SME issue in 
Germany. There were members of the BCBS who were literate in the German language, and who 
read German news periodicals which commented widely on the politicization of the SME 
issue.481 Many were found it odd and surprising that the German banking and business 
community could affect the formation of the Accord so profoundly and unexpectedly.482
Sanio flew to Washington for a special meeting with the Fed to meet the new head of the 
Fed’s BCBS delegation, Vice-Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board Roger Ferguson, Jr., to 
work out an informal agreement on the issue.483 Although the BCBS had previously debated the 
classification of SME portfolios, the German delegation’s concerns effectively now settled the 
issue, and the BCBS ultimately resolved that regulators could use their national discretion to
476 ZDH July 2001.
477 Bundestag September 2001.
478 Bundestag October 2001.
479 This was, significantly, in speech before the BVR. See Engelen 2002, p. 97. Schroder also made this remark 
regarding a veto while on a diplomatic trip to India and China See Ehrlich and Lebert 2001.
480 See Borsen-Zeitung October 2001.
481 Engelen 2002, pp. 97-98.
482 Interviews mcD
483 Ferguson became vice-president of the Federal Reserve Board on 26 July 2001.
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define what SME exposures could go into the retail portfolio.484 At the full BCBS meeting in 
Basel in December, the BCBS agreed that credit to the SME sector must not be impeded, and 
announced publicly that it would make specific initiatives to address the issue 485
Continued Mobilization
German private sector groups continued to mobilize extensively, eager for specifics 
concerning Basel II’s SME policy. Private sector groups such as the ZKA, ZDH, BDI and DIHK 
continued to contact Members of Parliament with their concerns, and the issue was now more 
salient than ever. Legislative oversight hearings within the Bundestag continued, and even the 
Party of Democratic Socialism proposed their own set of Basel II proposals.486 The Office of the 
Chancellor established a Chancellor’s Roundtable on Basel II, inviting members of the peak 
national private sector associations to participate.487 By the Spring of 2002, Basel II was still a 
heavily politicized issue in Germany.488 Symbolic of the level of concern within Germany on the 
issue, BCBS Chair McDonough came to Germany twice to address the situation, once before an 
audience of bankers, and another time to meet with Schroder directly.489 By late June, the 
government was holding press conferences on Basel II issues, the Chancellor’s Round Table on 
Basel II was still in operation, the Parliamentary Finance Committee was continuing its oversight 
hearings on the Accord.490
Regulatory Policy Outcome
Throughout 2002, the SME issue was taken very seriously within the BCBS, both at the 
full Committee level and at the working group level. With public commitment from the rest of 
the BCBS, the German delegation encouraged the discussion to center on a risk-weight
484 Internal Documentation November 2001.
485 BCBS December 2001, p. 1.
486 Bundestag January 2002.
487 Inteview 25R. See Bundestag April 2002.
488 See for example Initiativkreis Wirtschaft and Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung 2002.
489 Interviews 65R, 90R.
490 See Bundestag July 2002
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adjustment that explicitly took the size of firms into account in the Accord. It was decided that 
the risk weightings would depend on business size, a solution that could be easily worked on 
within the existing proposals.491 In July the BCBS finally agreed upon a concrete SME policy 492
The policy constituted a series of targeted changes and exceptions to the risk-weight 
curves within the Accord. These changes allowed banks to require up to 20% less regulatory 
capital for most SME borrowers, and to set aside an average of 10% less regulatory capital 
against loans to SMEs compared with loans to large corporations. For the corporate portfolio, an 
explicit ‘firm-size adjustment’ was made to directly alter the risk-weight curve for SME lending 
deemed in the corporate category. Even more significantly, that the BCBS decided that banks 
that managed small-business related exposures “in a manner similar to retail exposures” would 
be permitted to apply these exposures to the retail IRB risk weight curves, provided that their 
total exposure was less than 1 Million Euros.493 Other technical elements of the risk parameters 
within the IRB approaches in the Accord were changed, such that the factor of maturity within 
risk calculations now included special preferential treatment for small firms.494
These changes represented a clear instance of permissive regulatory policy change. As 
Fabi, Laviola and Reedtz have argued, the BCBS “reduced the capital charges for almost all risk 
levels and provide[d] better treatment of credit risk in the case of SMEs.”495 The German private 
sector campaign had accomplished its goal. A complex coalition had mobilized extensively, and 
had generated legislative oversight to successful obtain its goal of permissive regulatory policy 
change. Despite this remarkable success, however, some private sector groups were still not yet 
satisfied.
491 This ‘firm-size adjustment’ would adjust regulatory capital to the revenue of a firm, and as such was a simple 
add-on to the existing elements of the Accord. See Bundestag December, p. 16.
492 See BCBS July 2002.
493 See BCBS July 2002; Imeson 2002.
494 See BCBS July 2002.
495 See Fabi et. al. 2005, p. 521. See also Bates 2003.
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Section 4 
The 2003 German SME Campaign
The significant permissive regulatory policy change of July 2002 was unambiguously 
welcomed by engaged private sector groups.496 Indeed, by the next meeting of the Parliamentary 
Finance Committee, groups such as the BdB stated that the crucial changes necessary for 
German SMEs had been achieved497; the DSGV asserted that the Basel II proposals were now 
economically feasible; the DIHK reported the positive results to its members;498 and the VdH 
stated that because of the national discretion achieved in the July 2002 compromise, they would 
not request further improvement in the area.499
Not all private sector groups were completely satisfied with the SME policy, however, 
and some groups wanted more permissive regulatory policy change. In particular, the business 
associations that had aligned themselves in coalition with the banking associations of Germany 
felt that further changes were needed. A plethora of groups, new and old, urged further changes, 
and targeted the Bundestag in doing so.500
Neither the Bundestag nor the BaFin responded to these demands. Indeed, the Secretary 
of the Parliamentary Finance Committee noted in an internal communique that the SME issue 
was now largely resolved, and the BaFin and Bundesbank could now refrain from making 
special demands in this regard.501 A broad-based national coalition was more difficult to build, 
especially with the German banking associations who had been largely appeased; moreover, the 
German regulators could argue — both to the Bundestag and to the private sector -  that they had 
achieved what had been asked of them. Indeed, the German BCBS delegates continued to use the 
past achievements on the SME issue as defense against further domestic criticisms of Basel II.502 
Indeed, in future engagements within the Bundestag, Sanio actually stated that what was
496 See Euro week 2002. See Bundestag January 2003a, pp. 168-169.
497 Bundestag January 2003b, p. 40
498 Bundestag January 2003b, p. 47
499 Bundestag January 2003, p. 41. However later the VdH tried to argue that private investors should be treated like 
SMEs, under certain conditions. See VDH March 2003, p. 58.
500 See Bundestag January 2003b, p. 49; ZDH July 2003; BDI July 2003; Bundestag January 2003, p. 43
501 According to internal Bundestag memos. See Bundestag January 2003a, p. 168.
502 See Meister May 2003, pp. 23,29; BCBS May 2003, pp. 23, 29.
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achieved at that point for German SMEs was actually beyond the scope of what was risk- 
equitable.503
Although German business associations continued to mobilize in pursuit of further gains, 
they were not successful. Legislative oversight over the Basel II negotiations continued, but 
further attempts to make demands on German delegates did not work. For example, in July 2003, 
members of the CDU-CSU faction within the Parliamentary Finance Committee wanted to 
institute another all-party motion, send it to the Ministry of Finance, and have it represent a new 
set of negotiation demands for the German BCBS delegation. The SPD and Green members of 
the Parliamentary Finance Committee disagreed, arguing that they shouldn’t simply represent the 
demands of banks with no real justification.504
Conclusion
This chapter has investigated the private sector campaigns concerning bank lending to 
small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). I first explored private sector campaigns in the UK 
and Japan. While these campaigns were relatively modest, the Japanese campaign did have the 
benefit of legislative oversight on its side. However both campaigns failed to influence either 
their regulators or the content of the Accord itself. I then described the extensive efforts of 
private sector groups in Germany. While in their first campaign of 1999 and 2000, private sector 
groups were unsuccessful in their efforts, by 2001 they had mobilized considerably into a 
national coalition which had strong legislative oversight on its side. I have demonstrated that this 
particular set of conditions was instrumental in changing both the position and the behavior of 
the German regulators. At the same time, value-claiming behavior within the BCBS did not lead 
to instantaneous permissive regulatory policy change in the form of an SME policy. German 
private sector groups continued their mobilization, however, and with continued legislative 
attention to the issue they ensured an outcome that was commensurate with their preferences. 
These cases show support -  though not unequivocal support -  for the Legislative Oversight and 
Coalitions hypotheses especially, since these two conditions were shown to be vital to the 
success of private sector efforts.
503 Bundestag May 2003, p. 53.
504 See Bundestag July 2003, pp. 39-41.
156
The final case examined, the German SME campaign o f 2003, illustrates the contingency 
o f legislative oversight under particular conditions. While private sector groups such as business 
associations and crafts associations wanted further changes to Basel II to accommodate SME 
lending, these changes were not forthcoming. The fact that mobilization and the national 
coalition were much less robust than in earlier efforts may suggest that private sector influence 
may be contingent on a particular recipe o f conditions. Such variation among causal 
configurations and outcomes is summarized in the configuration table below, and will be 
valuable for later fsQCA analysis in Chapter 10, including notation indicating possible 
interdependencies which will also be considered in across-case analysis.
Configuration Table for Private Sector Campaigns 
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Chapter 6
The National Operational Risk Campaigns
This chapter analyses the nationally organized private sector campaigns that targeted the 
Basel II Accord’s operational risk policy from 2001 to 2004. While campaign activity existed in 
the UK and Germany, it was in the US that private sector opposition was most extensively 
organized. These campaigns, and the macro-institutional environment in which they occurred, 
are arguably the most complex in the study. Much like the SME campaigns examined in Chapter 
5, the efforts by private sector groups to influence the operational risk policy in the US were 
dynamic, in that they evolved alongside the policy itself. This evolution in turn affected the 
behavior o f private sector groups in important ways, often leading to divisions within the US 
banking community concerning whether they should oppose or support the operational risk 
policy. This chapter traces the evolution of this business conflict, and analyses its consequences 
on regulatory policy outcomes.
The operational risk policy is critical to subsequent chapters which focus on other private 
sector campaigns organized in the US, because that the campaigns targeting operational risk 
were fundamental to the generation of legislative oversight in the US in 2003 and 2004. The 
main empirical finding this chapter provides is that in the presence of business conflict, 
legislative oversight is ineffectual in either influencing regulators or generating permissive 
regulatory policy change.
This chapter is divided into four different sections. Section 1 begins by describing the 
variety of reactive private sector campaigns that took place in different countries after the release 
of the January 2001 operational risk policy, and demonstrates that it was in the United States 
where private sector campaigns were most extensive. It then details the complex campaign that 
took place in the US in 2001. The result of this private sector campaign was a substantive degree
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of permissive regulatory policy change. However, these changes did not simply result from 
private sector demands upon regulators, but rather represent a strategic set o f changes made by 
the Fed in a unique and highly constrained environment.
Section 2 describes the private sector campaign that took place in 2002, in which certain 
strongly oppositional private sector groups argued against the operational risk policy. This 
section explores the simultaneous growth of business conflict in the US banking community and 
the Congressional interest in the policy. While some regulatory policy change did take place 
during this period, it does not constitute permissive regulatory policy change.
Section 3 details the private sector campaign which took place from January 2003 to June 
2003, during the period in which legislative oversight was strongly focused on the operational 
risk policy, and when private sector groups mobilized substantial resources to advocate for 
permissive regulatory policy change. Despite the advantages of an ideal environment due to 
legislative oversight, the private sector campaign was unsuccessful. Section 4 then outlines the 
private sector campaign which took place from July 2003 until June 2004. Despite considerable 
efforts, this one too was unsuccessful in achieving permissive regulatory policy change.
Section 1
Private Sector Campaigns across Countries
One of the most contentious policies of the Basel II Accord was the policy designed for 
operational risk in the January 2001 draft of the Accord. As was described within Chapter 3, the 
operational risk policy, as it then existed, represented a substantial increase in the regulatory 
capital requirements of banks. It was highly conservative, constituting the most stringent policy 
in the entire Accord. It is therefore perhaps not surprising that it was almost universally criticized 
by private sector groups across the G10.
Private sector campaigns were organized against the operational risk policy in the UK, 
Germany, and the United States. In the UK, the banking community opposed several aspects of 
the policy, but such opposition was muted, as British bankers were generally willing to work
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with the BCBS’ proposals.505 The British Bankers’ Association and London Bankers’ 
Association criticized the ‘poorly constructed and oversight charge’ as wrong-headed and overly 
focused on quantification, but advocated for further changes, rather than abolition.506 The issue 
came up in their various engagements with the Bank of England and the UKFSA, but was not a 
major issue.507 Within the German banking community, the operational risk policy was 
criticized, but private sector groups did not mobilize extensively over the policy, and it was not 
very contentious.508 The ZKA regarded the operational risk policy of the BCBS as highly 
problematic, criticizing the 20% figure as arbitrary, highly exaggerated, and against the aim of 
establishing risk-sensitivity in the new Accord.509 It offered a substantive criticism o f the BCBS’ 
operational risk policy, but ultimately believed the policy to be too open and ambiguous to 
engender a sustained campaign of opposition.510 The policy was criticized by other private 
sector groups in Germany as well, but a sustained campaign failed to develop.511
In contrast to the situation in the UK and Germany, the private sector campaign within 
the United States following the January 2001 draft of the Accord was extensive. Part of the 
reason for this difference was because of the nature of many US banks and the business lines that 
they had. Banks that engaged in custodial services — the managing and processing of financial 
assets -  effectively concentrate operational risk. As Appendix 5 points out, 6 out of the 10 largest 
custodial services were conducted by US firms, with some firms concentrating this kind of 
activity acutely. Additionally, private sector campaigns were most extensive in the US because 
US regulators were stewarding the development of the policy itself. While the operational risk 
provisions were discussed and negotiated at the international (i.e. BCBS) level, the bulk of the 
technical work and stewardship of the process was headed by the US Fed, especially individuals 
at the Fed Board and the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
The US Private Sector Campaign
505 LIBA and BBA, 2001, p. 6.
506 LIBA and BBA, 2001, p. 6.
507 The reasons for this are unknown. Interview 92P.
508 Interviews 12P, 9 IP, 90R, 21R.
509 ZKA 2001, p. 5.
510 ZKA 2001, pp. 95-10; Interviews 12P, 90R.
511 Interview 17P
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The reactive private sector campaign which emerged in the United States following the 
publication of the January 2001 draft of Basel II was highly complex. Three different camps 
emerged — each with their own unique views on the policy. The first group, the majority of large 
US banks, maintained that the 20% charge for operational risk was not only misguided but 
arbitrary, and grossly overstated the amount of capital that was actually needed for operational 
risk.512 With such widespread concern among such important actors, the main US banking 
associations, such as the American Bankers’ Association, the Risk Management Association, and 
the Financial Services Roundtable, also represented this view at the time.513 The operational risk 
policy was seen by this ‘oppositional majority’ as not only ill-conceived, but an instrument for 
the BCBS to increase levels of regulatory capital in order to compensate for possible deductions 
in the regulatory capital in other parts of the Accord.
The second group was a small group of bankers who, in general, supported the policy. 
Most of these bankers had been involved in the ITWG (see Chapter 3), and thus already had 
extensive interaction with the RMG at the international level. In engagements at the national 
level, when the US Agencies held high-level meetings with US banks, this group of bankers 
asserted their support for the policy as a whole. While they shared some of their colleagues’ 
criticisms that the policy was too stringent, they strongly agreed with the spirit of the policy, 
especially its mandated Pillar I regulatory capital charge. This ‘supportive minority’ group was, 
as this moniker suggests, very small, but it drew bankers from very large institutions, such as 
Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, and KeyCorp. Importantly, each of these banks were much more 
advanced than their peers in terms of operational risk management, and thus the policy could 
enhance their comparative advantage.514 Because of these banks’ involvement in the ITWG, the 
high costs associated with the operational risk policy were also less surprising to them.
A third group of banks represented what might be called the ‘radical opposition.’ This 
small group of banks was very strongly opposed to the operational risk Pillar I capital charge, 
because of their involvement in particular kind of banking services. There were four large banks,
512 See Wachovia 2001, p. 4; Washington Mutual 2001, p. 3; Bank of America, pp. 11-12; MBNA 2001, pp. 2,11- 
13; Capital One 2001, p. 4; PNC 2001, p. 2. Other smaller US banks also opposed the policy at the time, such as 
Southside Bank. See Southside Bank 2001, p. 6
5,3 FSR 2001, p. 1.
514 Citigroup 2001; JP Morgan Chase 2001, pp. 22-26 of 2001; See Congress June 2003b, p. 4.
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often referred to as ‘processing banks’, in the United States which engaged primarily or 
substantially in custodial services: State Street, Mellon Bank, Northern Trust, and Bank of New 
York. Credit Suisse First Boston, a Swiss Bank with substantial operations in the USA, also had 
significant custodial services, and also strongly opposed the operational risk policy for similar 
reasons. Such banks effectively concentrated operational risks, since they managed assets for 
other banks, pension funds, and other financial institutions (see Appendix 5).
The senior management and regulatory affairs departments of two of these banks, State 
Street and Mellon, wanted the operational risk capital charge to constitute their primary critique 
in their formal and informal responses to Basel II.515 Through discussions with their retained 
consultant in Washington, Federal Financial Analytics, they organized themselves into a new 
private sector group, named the Financial Guardian Group, which opposed the policy on their 
behalf through an office and staff in Washington, D.C., and led by Karen Shaw Petrou, a well- 
known advocate for financial services firms in the Capitol.516 Both State Street and Mellon 
would engage with the US Agencies on a bilateral basis concerning this policy; however, the 
groundwork and high-profile interactions were handled by the FGG, which could be much more 
vociferous.
Private sector groups in each of these different groups — the oppositional majority, the 
supportive group, and the radical opposition -  communicated their concerns directly to the US 
Agencies, principally to the Fed Board, the Boston Fed, and to the OCC, both formally and 
informally. Indeed, the US regulators began holding meetings with large US banks to inform 
them of the ongoing work concerning the policy.517 During such meetings, the divisions within 
the US banking community were evident. The vast majority of bankers argued in opposition to 
the policy, maintaining it should be included in Pillar II instead of Pillar I, that is, without a 
regulatory capital charge. In this regard, the majoritarian opposition and the radical opposition 
were united. Yet the bankers from Citi, JPMC and KeyCorp argued otherwise -  and found
515 See, for example, FGG 2001, p. 10.
516 Interview 97P
5,7 Interviews 37R, 38R, 49R, 66R, 57P, 53P.
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themselves isolated with respect to the need for a Pillar I charge.518 Where there was unity was 
that the charge was too high.
Regulators ’ Reactions
The US regulators knew that the operational risk policy would be controversial, and 
communicated to the US banking community that open issues remained, and that more work was 
needed to define types of loss and collect relevant data.519 There were, however, divisions among 
the US regulators with respect to the policy. The Fed and the FDIC strongly supported it. The 
OCC, however, was not. Several OCC staff, as well as the Comptroller himself, didn’t agree that 
operational risk could be modeled like credit risk modeling, saw operational risk as 
fundamentally different, and quantification was treated with skepticism.520 Yet despite the fact 
that the OCC “argued until [they were] blue in the face that it should be a Pillar II 
requirement”,521 the rest of the BCBS was supportive of the policy.522 Comptroller Hawke 
couldn’t disagree more, and raised his concerns repeatedly in BCBS discussions.523
A Change in the Policy
In September 2001, the RMG announced a number of important changes to the policy 
that reflected the banking industry’s concerns.524 These changes included a mild redefinition of 
operational risk, which now excluded ‘direct and indirect’ losses and systemic risk,525 as well as 
the announcement of a framework to allow banks to mitigate against the operational risk capital 
charges by providing evidence of their investments in insurance instruments. More 
substantively, however, the RMG reduced the proposed capital charge for the advanced approach
518 Interview 53P. This is also reflected in the comments f  the ABA at the time. See ABA 2001, p. 12.
519 See Board of Governors o f the Federal Reserve System, et. al., p. 6.
520 Interviews 66R, 68R, 87R, 49R. See also later testimony of Hawke, in Congress February 2003, p. 23.
521 Congress February 2003, p. 34
522 See Norgren 2002, p. 3
523 Quote is from Congress June 2003b, pp. 32-33; see also Hawke September 2002, p. 1
524 The RMG had been conducting extensive research with industry groups, including the ITWG and IIF, but also 
with many US banks on an individual basis. The most active banks within the ITWG were US banks.
525 See BCBS September 2001, p. 2
526 See BCBS September 2001
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to operational risk from 20% to 12% - a substantial reduction in regulatory capital requirements. 
The RMG explicitly cited industry arguments in favor of this reduction.527 Feedback from banks 
had already indicated to the RMG that a 20% value might be too high, and that the figure might 
be lowered.528 The RMG’s own research suggested a mean value of 15.3%, and a median value 
of 12.8%.529
In addition to these changes, the RMG also began to develop a new approach which 
retained a Pillar I capital charge, but had a significant qualitative component to it, and utilized 
bank’s own internal risk measurement systems, called the ‘Advanced Measurement Approach’ 
(AMA).530 This approach was effectively a more ambitious approach to operational risk 
regulation than the earlier Internal Measurement Approach, in that it proposed to give banks 
even more autonomy in the regulation of their own internal activities. The ‘supportive group’ 
contributed toward this change by providing extensive data to the Fed, which had persuaded 
them that banks’ own operational loss data was improving rapidly.531 The opposition to the 
operational risk policy also played a role. As BCBS delegates from both the Fed and the OCC 
would later claim (under testimony), these changes were made partly in response to industry 
criticism of the crude operational risk formulas in the other approaches.532 Another part of the 
motivation for the Fed, however, was to keep the OCC on board, as there was a concern that 
their dissent might cause problems.533 The policy was thus the result not of private sector 
opposition alone, but rather of private sector opposition coupled with regulator opposition. As 
one member of the RMG recounted, “It provided a tent that a whole lot of the participants could 
get under. It was inclusive.”534
527 See BCBS September 2001, p. 4.
528 See BCBS, June 2001
529 See BCBS September 2001, pp. 24-26.
530 See BCBS September 2001, pp. 5-6, 16-20.
531 Interviews 38R, 37R; 66R.
532 See Congress June 2003a, p. 21; Congress February 2003, p. 6; Interview 29R.
533 Interviews 77R, 49R.
534 Interview 77R.
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Section 2 
The 2002 US Campaign
In 2002, a new campaign configuration formed surrounding the operational risk policy. 
Most private sector groups who had engaged in the 2001 campaign saw the changes which had 
occurred as extremely positive. Large US banks, as well as the RMA, for example, found they 
now had less to critique.535 The ‘supportive group’ supported the policy even more than before, 
especially about the AMA.536 The ‘radical opposition’, however, while viewing the policy 
changes as steps in the right direction, still regarded it as fundamentally misguided. They chose 
to mobilize extensively in opposition to the policy. The Financial Guardian Group tried to attract 
new members from the other members of the radical opposition of custodian banks in the US that 
stood to be similarly hurt by the policy, but were unsuccessful.537
Given their relative isolation in their 2002 campaign, the Financial Guardian Group 
sought to intensify and diversify their strategy, and wrote to, and met with, a variety of US 
regulatory agencies at various levels to make their criticisms.538 The Fed in particular remained 
unconvinced of their claims, and saw the policy as useful, both for its own purposes and within 
the BCBS in terms of boosting overall levels of capital.539
Facing a resistant Fed, the FGG focused on Congress, and hired the professional lobbying 
firm Hogan and Hartson to take their issue to Capitol Hill by targeting key Congressional 
members with tailor-made messages rousing concern on the operational risk policy in Basel II.540 
Among these was Representative Barney Frank, Ranking Member of the House Financial 
Services Committee at the time, and a representative of Massachusetts’s 7th District, where State
535 Martin 2002. Interviews 80P, 8IP.
536 Jameson 2002; Interview 68P.
537 Interviews 54P, 69P
538 FGG March 2002; Petrou May 2002.
538 FGG March 2002; Petrou May 2002. See also Congress February 2003, p. 51; Interview 57P; Ferguson February 
2003.
539 See Congress February 2003, p. 11; Ferguson February 2003; Confirmed in interviews 38R, 66R, 37R. 
Interviews 53P, 65R, 95R.
540 Interview 97R.
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Street was based.541 State Street was one of Frank’s top 10 largest contributors (the 10th) in the 
2002 electoral cycle, with a donation of $3250.542
The Financial Guardian Group framed their opposition to the operational risk policy in 
national competitiveness terms. At a Full House Financial Services Committee hearing in May 
2002, Petrou used an invitation to speak on the European Financial Services Action Plan to cite 
Basel II, and the operational risk policy in particular, as a competitive distortion damaging to US 
interests, that the Pillar I charge “arises in the EU”, and that it would potentially put US national 
competitiveness and financial safety at risk543 This strategy raised several Congressional 
Representatives’ attention, and when asked what could be done about the situation, Petrou 
replied that Congress should look into the issue if the US regulators would not change their
• - 544position.
Regulators * Response
The Fed continued to resist any change to the operational risk policy Pillar I capital 
charge, even in an environment where the FGG was highly mobilized and legislative oversight 
was on the horizon. It did, however, chose to change one aspect of the policy. Specifically, the 
Fed proposed within the RMG to abandon the regulatory capital floor that they had established 
for the advanced approaches to operational risk back in 2000.545 This meant that regulatory 
capital requirements for operational risk, while still high, could now fall lower than where they 
had been set previously (though see below). While later statements by the Fed suggested this 
decision was made at the behest of the US banking community,546 there are other reasons to 
attribute this decision to another factor which was unrelated to private sector efforts. In 
particular, the decision to remove the AMA capital floor was actually made because of another 
policy decision within the Accord at the time — the imposition of a regulatory capital floor for the 
entire Accord. Leaving a capital floor for operational risk was considered incommensurate with
541 Interviews 43R, 57P, 52P, 57P.
542 Source: OpenSecrets.org
543 Petrou May 2002, p. 21.
544 Petrou May 2002, pp. 23, 29.
545 BCBS July 2002.
546 See Ferguson 2003; This position was be corroborated Interview 49R. See also Zwaniecki 2002.
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this new policy.547 Although the decision to remove the capital floor would potentially decrease 
capital requirements for operational risk, the difference would now simply move to the Accord’s 
overall capital calculation instead. This was seen as an important part of the compromise 
between the US Fed, who strongly championed the AMA, and the rest of the BCBS (in particular 
continental European members), who were more skeptical of it and saw a strong need to use 
operational risk policy as a means of maintaining overall capital. Because this change cannot be 
attributable to private sector actions I have coded the dependent variable .33 (out but not fully 
out) in the Configuration Table at the end of this chapter.
This decision helped to further secure the further support of the non-FGG banking 
community, as well as the continued support of the OCC.548 More isolated than ever, The FGG 
continued their ambitious efforts to change the operational risk policy to a Pillar II treatment, and 
continued their strategy of lobbying Members of Congress, soon convincing several high-ranking 
members of Congress.549 Not only Representative Frank, but now also Chairman of the House 
Financial Services Committee Michael Oxley accepted the plausibility of the argument that the 
US financial industry would be at a competitive disadvantage, and that it represented an 
international compromise, rather than a policy well-suited to US financial institutions.550 The 
more the House Financial Services Committee and its staff investigated the issue of Basel II, the 
more it found grounds for concern: banks had various other concerns as well, the OCC and the 
Fed did not appear to be in agreement in regard to the operational risk policy, and when they 
investigated the issue by calling informal hearings, Fed staff and House staff were in conflict.551
Section 3 
The January-June 2003 US Campaign
After having successfully lobbied Congress for formal hearings on Basel II, the Financial 
Guardian Group was in a very strong position to utilize the legislative oversight over the Fed.
547 Interview 65R. This policy was to be in place for at least the first two years of its implementation, but also laid 
out the option for it to be extended.
548 See Martin 2002; RMA Capital Group June 2003, p. 29; Hawke 2002, p. 1.
549 See Maloney 2002, p. 2.
550 Oxley and Frank 2002.
551 Oxley and Frank 2002, pp. 1-2; Interview 43R, 71P, 89R.
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The operational risk policy was very negatively represented in the February 2003 hearings. 
Every single member of the Committee that spoke was critical of the policy, especially of 
whether or not there should be an explicit Pillar I capital charge. Perhaps not surprisingly, 
Ferguson was the target of the criticism, especially from Ranking Member Frank.552 He House 
Committee focused on the differences between the Fed and the OCC and, interestingly, the OCC 
seemed to embrace these differences. While Ferguson was relatively defensive regarding the 
issue of the Accords’ ‘complexity’, Hawke actively criticized its complexity.553 The same was 
true over their comments on the operational risk policy: Ferguson defended the operational risk 
capital charge, and Hawke criticized it.554 The members of the Financial Guardian Group were, 
not surprisingly, very pleased with the result.
The radical opposition to the operational risk policy was extremely well represented 
through in the first hearing though three different congressional testimonies. Petrou of the 
Financial Guardian Group, as well as David Spina, the CEO of State Street produced particularly 
critical testimony, as did a representative (from Credit Suisse) from the Financial Services 
Roundtable.555 In the 2003 June hearings, the radical opposition launched further critiques of the 
policy, and o f the US regulators in handling it. These hearings featured testimonies not only 
Petrou of the Financial Guardian Group and Ervin of Credit Suisse First Boston, but now also the 
CEO of Mellon. Aside from having the radical opposition well-represented in testimony, the 
subsequent discussion also went very much in the Financial Guardian Group’s favor.556 State 
Street did not testify at the June 2003 hearing, but had attempted to capitalize on the environment 
of legislative oversight at the time, by having Representative Frank acting as an intermediary in 
their discussions with the Fed — a strategy which failed.557
Despite this barrage of criticism to the operational risk policy, however, the radical 
opposition did not have allies in the rest of the banking community. Following the continued 
development of the AMA, for example, the Financial Services Roundtable had become
552 See Congress June 2003b, p. 35. See also
553 See Congress February 2003, pp. 17-18.
554 See Hawke March 2003, pp. 7-8.
555 Congress February 2003, pp. 5, 39; Spina February 2003. See also Ervin 2003, pp. 9-10. Credit Suisse was the 
single largest contributor to House Financial Services Committee Chairman Oxley’s 2002 electoral cycle. Source: 
Opensecrets.org.
556 See Congress June 2003b, p. 46; Congress June 2003a, p. 51
557 See Congress June 2003b, p. 37.
168
fundamentally split on the Pillar 1 versus Pillar II point (a point that was, notably, cited during 
the June Congressional hearings).558 The RMA was also no longer oppositional to the policy, and 
they even established a new working group in the spring to address the technicalities regarding 
implementation, rather than substantive policy change.559 This position reflected the fact that 
many banks had seen the operational risk policy change in light of their input, as discussed 
above. These divisions also emerged in the context of the Congressional hearings. In the Senate 
hearing, the CEO of the RMA offered explicit support for the policy.560 Likewise in his written 
submission to the House Committee, the CFO of KeyCorp enthusiastically supported the AMA, 
and objected to the reasons for placing operational risk in Pillar II.561
The Response o f  the Regulators
Despite the barrage of criticism from the radical opposition, even amidst a highly critical 
legislative environment, the Fed remained resolute in its stance throughout 2003.562 Business 
conflict provided a way for Ferguson to defend the Fed’s position. While being criticized in 
Congress on operational risk, Ferguson was also able to invoke the fact that, two weeks prior the 
New York Fed and the RMG had together hosted a conference on the policy, a conference full of 
supporters of the AMA that showcased the advances that had been made in operational risk 
quantification since the policy was first proposed.563 While the OCC had an opportunity to use its 
considerable negotiation leverage over the Fed to insist on policy changes closer to its own 
preferences, it chose not to, because it saw the AMA as only satisfying its own concerns, and it 
saw the need for compromise at the BCBS level as essential.564 The FDIC, on the other hand, 
saw the operational risk policy as something that increased capital, and therefore in a very 
positive light. The fact that the private sector campaign had been entirely unsuccessful in 
generating permissive regulatory policy change despite these conditions challenges the 
Legislative Oversight hypothesis. The fact that the FGG’s campaign pit them squarely against
558 Congress June 2003b, p. 43; see also FSR July 2003, pp. 3,11.
559 RMA June 2003; Interview 56P.
560 Congress 2003a, p. 47.
561 Congress 2003a, p. 115.
562 See Ferguson April 2003.
563 See also Congress June 2003a, pp. 20, 59.
564 Interview 49R; 29R.
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dominant tendencies within the US banking community offers support for the Business Conflict 
hypothesis.
Section 4 
The July 2003-June 2004 US Campaign
After the June 2003 hearings on Basel II, a new campaign configuration emerged, once 
again led by the FGG. The FGG, as well as State Street and Mellon individually, continued to 
write to the RMG and make arguments about the need to move to a Pillar II treatment of the 
policy.565 The FGG was now also joined, however by other banks, such as Lehman Brothers and 
Merrill Lynch, as well as their association, the Securities Industry Association, in the call to 
move to Pillar II treatment.566 The FGG continued to engage with the US regulators in this 
environment, writing to and meeting with OCC and Fed Staff, and gaining new support from 
Congress as well.567
Despite the best efforts of the radical opposition, business conflict continued to permeate 
the issue of operational risk, as CEOs of banks fought in public periodicals at the time, and the 
issue remained one of division within the Financial Services Roundtable.568 Meanwhile, 
supporters of the policy simply became more vocal, with the CFO of Citigroup and the Head of 
Corporate Operational Risk at JPMC both praising the policy in the financial press at the time.569 
Thus substantial players in the US banking industry resisted further changes, even while 
processing banks and others -  including the large investment banks wanted a move to Pillar II.
Regulators ’ Response
565 The FGG also argued that the BIS’s own Committee on the Global Financial System supported their claims. See 
FGG July 2003; State Street August 2003, p. 1; Mellon 2003.
566 Lehman Brothers 2003; Merrill Lynch 2003; Securities Industry Association 2003.
567 See Petrou March 2004; Santorum 2003; House Committee on Financial Services November 2003, pp. 4-5.
567 House Committee on Financial Services November 2003, pp. 4-5.
568 See Boraks 2003; FSR Nov 2003, pp. 2, 5.
569 See Garver December 2003; Bielski 2003; JPMC November 2003, pp. 48-49. Corroborated by interviews 68P, 
83P.
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While the regulators listened to the ongoing criticisms of the operational risk policy, they 
did not heed them. They remained unresponsive to the radical opposition — even though by early 
spring an additional Congressional hearing was planned on Basel II, signifying further legislative 
oversight.570 The Pillar I operational risk capital charge remained in the Accord, and the 
oppositional campaign of the radical opposition was unsuccessful. Like the earlier campaign, this 
case suggests strong supportive evidence for the Business Conflict hypothesis, since the 
campaign featured deep divisions within the US banking community and permissive regulatory 
policy change did not occur. Not even the voice and substantially powerful investment banking 
community could affect change under these circumstances.
Conclusion
This chapter has explored private sector campaigns organized at the national level which 
were associated with the operational risk policy — by far the most stringent policy in the entire 
Accord. The US private sector campaigns over the operational risk policy detail a number of 
patterns. On the one hand, these campaigns call in to question the disciplining power of 
legislative oversight in ensuring the success of a private sector campaign aimed at liberalizing 
regulatory policy change. Not only was legislative oversight fully present during the campaigns 
examined in 2003 and 2004, but the policy received more supportive attention from legislators 
than any other in the US at the time, and yet these campaigns were unsuccessful. Each of these 
campaigns, however, was also associated with private sector divisions with respect to the policy 
-  ‘enemies’ of the campaign, or ‘business conflict’.
The only campaign that successfully led to permissive regulatory policy change was US 
the campaign in 2001 (Section 1) which occurred in the absence of any legislative oversight. 
This campaign featured private sector mobilization, coalitions, and the use of information, and as 
such each of these associated hypotheses receive support. While private sector groups had an 
important role in influencing this permissive regulatory policy change, this influence does not 
reflect a simple case of ‘regulatory capture’. Private sector groups offered useful data to the Fed, 
which increased the confidence that the operational risk policy could undergo permissive
570 Congress June 2004, pp. 9-10, 17.
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regulatory policy change. But these changes also occurred in the context o f differences o f view 
among the US regulatory community. In particular, the permissive regulatory policy change was 
designed to assuage the O C C ’s concerns, not just those o f industry. This unique context will be 
considered in the across-case analysis o f  Chapter 10.
Configuration Table for Private Sector Campaigns 
and their Outcomes Explored in Chapter 6
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Chapter 7
The Real Estate Campaigns
This chapter focuses on private sector campaigns surrounding Basel IIs regulatory 
policies concerning real estate lending. As such, contention over the content of these policies 
inflamed a variety of oppositional groups not only from the banking community, but also from 
other institutions and associations involved in real estate, such as homebuilders’ associations, 
insurance associations, and real estate professional organizations. The cases in this chapter also 
underscore the importance of business conflict dynamics: at various moments, coalitions 
developed and broke apart, and some private sector groups supported policies which others 
thought reprehensible. The focus of this chapter is on campaigns that took place in the United 
States, where private sector efforts were most extensive.
Section 1 describes the US-based private sector campaign against a stringent regulatory 
policy targeting ‘high volatility’ commercial real estate (HVCRE) lending. As we shall see, this 
campaign involved extensive mobilization among a wide coalition of actors, and took place in an 
environment of legislative oversight, and was successful in generating permissive regulatory 
policy change. A second HVCRE campaign, which took place under similar conditions, failed 
entirely, and is described briefly in Section 2 -  suggesting caution in the generalizability of 
findings across cases.
Section 3 describes the private sector campaigns waged against the Basel II regulatory 
policy for residential mortgages, a policy which was highly permissive, but which in 2003 
became more stringent due to BCBS concerns. While private sector campaigns opposed this 
policy in the United Kingdom, Germany, and Canada, opposition was by far the most extensive 
in the United States. Private sector groups of all kinds united to launch an extensive campaign,
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but one which was, ultimately, entirely unsuccessful in generating permissive regulatory policy 
change. I demonstrate that this failure was due largely to business conflict, as small banks and 
mortgage insurance firms’ activism countervailed the demands o f large banks, and in so doing 
buttressed the US regulators’ stringent policy position.
Section 1 
The High Volatility Commercial 
Real Estate Campaign 
2002-2003
In 2000, as part of the BCBS’ efforts to capture a greater diversity of credit risks in Basel 
II, the BCBS introduced a new category of lending into the Accord to recognize ‘specialized 
lending.’571 Specialized lending was a necessary category, it was decided, because unlike 
‘normal’ corporate lending exposures, it had special emergent properties of risk, often because 
loans defaulted in clusters and in ways not normally acknowledged in many credit risk 
models.572 While there were a number of concerns regarding specialized lending, of particular 
interest was the treatment of a specific kind of commercial real estate (CRE) -  CRE lending that 
exhibited high loss volatility. The Swedish and UK members of the BCBS were highly 
supportive of this initiative, but its particular champion was the US, which saw CRE lending to 
be highly cyclical and in need of a stringent policy (see also Chapter 4).573
Reflecting the concern with CRE lending, a subcommittee was organized to deal with the 
issue, and while representatives from the Bundesbank and the UK FSA participated, the Fed took 
up most of the technical work.574 Proceeding from their research findings in October 2002, the 
BCBS formally released its proposal for what it called ‘high volatility commercial real estate’
M e
(HVCRE) lending -  commercial real estate that had high Asset Value Correlations (AVCs). 
The HVCRE policy stated that classes o f bank lending designated as HVCRE exposures were 
required to use a strict ‘supervisory slotting approach’ for the calculation of the regulatory
571 Interview 77R.
572 See BCBS October 2001, p. 1.
573 Interview 77R; Case 2003, pp. 5, 52.
574 Paucity of data on high-volatility commercial real estate was a serious problem within the BCBS. The Fed had 
some data in this area, but nothing of good quality that was over several credit cycles. See Case 2003, p. 1.
575 See BCBS October 2002, p. 50.
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capital. What this meant that even the most sophisticated banks using advanced intemal-ratings 
based approaches had to classify their CRE exposures using BCBS methodology into categories 
ranging from 100% capital adequacy to 625%.576
Private Sector Reactions
Private sector reactions to the HVCRE policy varied considerably. In Japan and the UK, 
there was no attention paid to the policy. In Germany and Canada, campaigns did not take place, 
because there was the belief that these countries did not have HVCRE, and therefore would not 
be subject to such a policy.577 In the United States, however, the reaction to the HVCRE policy 
was vociferous, and an extensive campaign was mobilized.
The US HVCRE Campaign
Banks argued to the US regulators that the risk weights for HVCRE lending were far too 
high, and that the assumptions underlying it were outdated. Large US banks were among the first 
to mobilize in opposition to the HVCRE policy. They planned to coordinate a collective 
response using data collected through the RMA’s Capital Group, which quickly began 
conducting surveys within their own group and concluded that the risk weights for the HVCRE 
supervisory slots were far too high and reflected an overly conservative bias far out of line with 
the actual risk management techniques employed in the industry.578 They thus advocated 
allowing sophisticated banks to estimate their own risk weights, and thus exempting them from 
the ‘supervisory slotting approach’ of the HVCRE policy.579
The second group which mobilized in opposition to the policy was the real estate 
industry, organized as the Real Estate Roundtable. The Roundtable reflected a diverse 
membership, including large real estate development firms, as well as national associations such 
as the National Association of Realtors, and American Resort Development. Much like the 
Capital Group, the Roundtable argued that since the early 1990s, commercial real estate had
576 See BCBS October 2002, p. 46. Regarding the high risk weights for the HVCRE policy, much of the intuition on 
this policy was based on Esaki, L’Heureux, and Snyderman 1999. The Fed decided however to set the average LGD 
assumption for the HVCRE policy to be 114 times the assumption in this paper.
577 Interviews 60P, 6IP, 93P.
578 See RMA March 2003, p. 14.
579 RMA March 2003, p. 14.
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become safer, and the high specialized lending charges were thus unjustified, given improved 
market information, scrutiny, and underwriting standards.580 While staff at the Roundtable 
engaged in technical debates with the Fed, they also contacted members of Congress with their 
concerns.581
The third private sector group that mobilized was a collection of regional US banks with 
extensive portfolios in the American Southeast. These banks believed they would be quite 
severely impacted by the policy since many of them had substantial CRE exposures. As 
Appendix 6 illustrates, CRE lending for such regional banks constituted a substantial percentage 
of their lending activity; in some Southeastern banks, over 25% of their total portfolios were 
committed to CRE lending. While Southeastern regional banks were small banks in comparison 
to the large banks in the Capital Group, they enjoyed strong relationships with local politicians, 
and willingly exploited these connections. Particularly entrepreneurial in this respect was one of 
the larger ‘small’ regional Southeastern banks, Colonial BancGroup, which made direct contact 
with Congressman Spencer Bacchus of Alabama’s 6th District, where Colonial was based, who 
was also incidentally the Chair of the House Subcommittee on Domestic and International 
Monetary Policy, Trade and Technology.582 Bachus’ 2002 electoral funding drive also had 
Southeastern regional banks at its core (Colonial was the second largest contributor to his 
campaign, and Regions and Wachovia were tied for 4th place).583
Although Fed staff had met with Colonial to try to assuage their concerns, the bank 
testified strongly and vociferously against the HVCRE policy before the House Financial 
Services Committee. Colonial’s Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer, Sarah 
Moore, argued before the House Committee that Basel II would give large US banks an 
unwarranted competitive advantage over smaller US banks, and that the policy would lead to a 
serious decline in real estate lending as a whole, and urged Congress to rein in the US 
regulators.584 Ferguson defended the Fed’s position before Congress, and noted that while he and 
Fed staff were well aware of the banking community’s arguments, the Fed had rejected them on
580 See Real Estate Roundtable March 2003b, p. 2.
581 Real Estate Roundtable March 2003a.
582 Colonial BancGroup was the holding company for Colonial Bank, an Alabama-based bank with exposure in the 
South East (Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Tennessee, Texas and Nevada). See Congress February 2003, p. 47.
583 Based on data from OpenSecrets.org — profile: ‘Spencer Bachus’ 2002 electoral cycle, ‘Top Contributors’.
584 Colonial February 2003, p. 2.
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the basis of empirical evidence.585 Hawke of the OCC, however, distanced himself from the 
Fed’s position, suggesting that there may be reason to be less cautious with CRE lending than in
r o / r
the past; Ferguson was thus forced to disavow the position of a fellow regulator.
Regulators ’ Response
In this highly oppositional context, the Fed remained convinced that the HVCRE policy 
should be kept as initially designed. In fact, the lack of empirical data that private sector groups 
were able to provide to support their claims further entrenched their position. The OCC, 
however, was of a different view. OCC staff members were also concerned with the risk 
associated with certain forms of CRE lending, but had become convinced of private sector 
arguments against the HVCRE policy.587 The argument that lending and underwriting standards 
had improved was convincing, as was the argument that the HVCRE policy would carry large 
costs.588 The environment of legislative oversight at the time meant that the Fed was under 
considerable scrutiny from Congress, and its bargaining power within the US delegation had 
declined.
In this context, the Fed responded by agreeing to change the HVCRE policy to make it 
less stringent. Banks that qualified for internal credit risk modeling approaches for commercial 
real estate lending (i.e. the largest and most sophisticated banks) would now be allowed to 
estimate their own HVCRE risk parameters.589 This was indeed exactly what the RMA Capital 
Group had argued.590 While they were still subject to the relatively stringent model provided by 
the Accord, this change would allow large US banks to obtain lower regulatory capital charges 
than they would otherwise be subject to. Such a dramatic change of the HVCRE policy was not 
controversial within the BCBS, and it was made easily since the Fed had taken complete 
ownership of the design of the policy. Furthermore, the decision removed the basis for large US 
banks’ opposition, and the Capital Group welcomed this change, and subsequently ceased
585 Congress February 2003, pp. 30-31.
586 Congress February 2003, p. 31. There is no evidence which suggests the OCC was under pressure from the Bush 
Administration at the time, and interviews conducted with OCC staff at the time suggest that the concerns were 
internal to the OCC itself.
587 Interview 71R, 87R. See also Hawke’s comments in Congress 2003, p. 30.
588 Interview 87R.
589 See BCBS April 2003, pp. 51-52.
590 See RMA March 2003, pp. 1-2; Interview 44P; 71R.
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mobilizing in opposition to the policy.591 The same was not true for the US real estate 
community, or Southeastern banks, however, who launched a new campaign against the newly 
changed policy -  with new allies at their side.
Section 2 
The Second HVCRE Campaign: 
June 2003-June 2004
A new campaign against the HVCRE policy emerged, and based itself on the publicizing 
the long-standing fear that Basel II will disadvantage small US banks -  a concern that the Fed 
took seriously, given the perceived political power of small regional banks across the country.592 
Instead of changing the policy further, however, the Fed simply indicated that it would interpret 
the HVCRE very loosely -  with only Asset Development and Construction (AD&C) loans being 
considered, as opposed to the whole panoply of loans that were previously considered.593 This 
strategy succeeded in managing some of the concerns of the US Congress and of the policy’s 
private sector critics, but such assuagement was short-lived.594
The real estate industry relied upon its contact within Congress as part of their strategy to 
advocate for change, focusing on particular on Richard Shelby, the Chairman of the Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs about their concerns.595 Colonial was a top 
contributor to Shelby’s 2002 electoral campaign, having donated $35,999 in individual and PAC 
contributions.596 Other groups mobilized as well in this context, such as the NAR, the NAHB, 
and the Mortgage Bankers’ Association -  all advocating that the HVCRE policy be removed 
altogether.597 The NAR and the NAH were both major contributors to Congressman Bachus and
591 See RMA July 2003, p. 5; Wachovia p. 15.
592 Interview 77R, 87R. On the power of real estate lobbyists in the US, see Burbank et. al. 2008, p. 190.
See Burbank et. al. 2008, p. 190.
593 See Case 2003, pp. 39,45-46.
594 See Greenspan May 2002, p. 1; Ferguson June 2003, p. 2; See also Real Estate Roundtable July 2003, p. 2; 
Corroborated by confidential internal documentation.
595 See Real Estate Roundtable June 2003, p. 2; Ferguson July 2003.
596 Source: Opensecrets.org.
597 See Colonial November 2003, p. 10; RER and CMSA November 2003, p. 4.
597 National Association of Realtors October 2003, pp 4-5; RER and CMSA November 2003, p. 4.
597 Financial Services Roundtable November 2003, p. 8; National Association of Home Builders November 2003, 
pp. 4-5.
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Congressman Franks’ 2002 electoral campaigns. Some Southeastern banks such as SunTrust 
began soliciting proposals from outside data purveyors in the commercial real estate industry in 
order to bolster their case, and they were joined in their condemnation by a chorus of other 
Southeastern banks.599 This organized opposition had legislative oversight squarely on its side, as 
in November 2003 11 members of Congress wrote to the US regulators stating that the HVCRE 
policy needed to be eliminated — explicitly citing the very arguments that Southeastern banks had 
been making at the time.600
Regulators ’ Response
Despite the unity of this oppositional campaign, and the fact that it had legislative 
oversight on its side, the US regulators did not change their position with respect the policy. The 
OCC and the Fed did not clash again over the policy, as they believed that what remained was 
prudential. As such, the private sector campaign that took place from July 2003-June 2004 had 
no effect on the HVCRE policy, which remained in the Accord as designed in the spring o f2003.
Section 3 
Campaigns over Residential Mortgage Lending
Since the beginning of Basel II negotiations, the BCBS had aimed to differentiate risk- 
based capital adequacy requirements for banks’ residential mortgage lending. It had been widely 
acknowledged within the BCBS that residential mortgage lending not only constituted a distinct 
form of bank lending and risk, but that it was also a politically sensitive policy area, and 
therefore had to be treated carefully.601 As such, the Basel II policy toward residential mortgage 
lending was already designed as a highly permissive regulatory policy at the BCBS level — 
suggesting some evidence for the Structural Power hypothesis at the agenda-setting stage of
598 In that they were top 10 contributors. Source: Opensecrets.org.
599 See SunTrust July 2003, p. 3; Zions November 2003, p. 4; Synovus October 2003, p. 3; Colonial BancGroup 
November 2003, pp. 7-10.
600 Congress November 2003, p. 6.
601 Interview 90R; See also Calem and LaCour-Little 2001.
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policy development (this is analyzed in Chapter 10, Section 2).602 Because the residential 
mortgage policy was permissive from the outset, private sector groups did not campaign against 
it; in 2003, however, this situation changed.
After conducting more research into banks’ LGD estimates, the BCBS’ Models Task 
Force began to lose confidence in banks’ own estimation abilities (for a description of PDs and 
LGDs, see Appendix 4).603 Because mortgage activity was understood to be cyclical in nature, 
and because residential mortgages were such a large part o f banks’ portfolios, the BCBS decided, 
uncontentiously, to institute a 10% floor for residential mortgage lending, below which banks’ 
LGD estimates could not fall.604 This was seen as a natural thing to do given predicted falls in 
capital, even though there was full awareness that this stringent policy change would prove to be 
a very costly constraint for many banks.605
Private Sector Reactions
Across the G10, reactions to the BCBS’ residential mortgage policies were mixed. On the 
one hand, regulatory capital levels were sure to decline as a result o f the policy, and thus it was 
cautiously welcomed. On the other hand, the compensatory feature of a 10% LGD floor was 
generally viewed very negatively.
Transnational mobilization against the residential mortgage policy was almost non­
existent -  a silence not surprising given that the fact that international banking does not typically 
deal with retail lending activity, of which residential mortgage lending is the main component.606
In the UK, banks and their associations opposed the 10% LGD floor, but did not mobilize 
substantially on the issue. The British Bankers’ Association and the London Investment Bankers’ 
Association argued that the 10% LGD floor was unnecessary, and that it should be moved to
602 This also included changes to the Standardized Approach as well. See BCBS January 2001, pp. 11; BCBS April 
2003, pp. 11-12.
603 See UK Advisory Group February 2003, p. 4; Interview 74R.
604 BCBS May 2003, pp. 24-25; Interviews 74R; 90R.
605 BCBS May 2003, pp. 24-25.
606 See the minor comments in IIF July 2003, p. 11, p. 31; ISDA and BMA July 2003.
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Pillar II o f the Accord to reduce capital requirements.607 The BBA addressed the Bank of 
England and the FSA on their concerns, but the issue was not a priority, and the UK regulators 
gave them indications that the BCBS considered this policy to be highly important. 608 The Bank 
of England was seen as particularly supportive of the 10% LGD floor, and as such the BBA and 
LIBA did not raise the issue again, and even stated formally to the FSA that the residential 
mortgage policy was satisfactory.609
In Germany, the Zentraler Kreditauschuss and the German Association of Mortgage 
Banks also offered criticism, but they did not offer detailed analysis, other than proclaiming it to 
be too onerous.610 Most residential mortgage lending in Germany was handled by smaller 
savings and cooperative banks, and these banks stood to benefit on the whole from the existing 
permissive regulatory policy change. Furthermore, because retail mortgage lending in Germany 
was considered by German regulators and banks to be generally very low risk activity, it was 
also a low margin business for banks, and therefore not a central issue. 611 The issue was not 
debated in the Bundestag.612
In Canada, the residential mortgage policy of Basel II was contentious, and banks there 
mobilized in opposition. The Canadian Bankers’ Association offered an extended critique of the 
10% LGD floor, and offered an alternative policy proposal. They argued to the OSFI and the 
BCBS that the 10% LGD floor was an example of “cumulative conservatism”, and had no 
economic basis.613 Alternatively, the Canadian Bankers’ Association proposed a special 
exemption to the 10% LGD floor, whereby national regulators could exempt their own banks 
from this feature o f the residential mortgage policy of Basel II.614 They offered a technical 
argument, based on quantitative data, that such exemptions would be economically sound and 
would improve the risk sensitivity of the Accord.615 They framed such a proposal as being able 
to reflect the diversity in the historical dynamics of housing markets and the legal environments 
that surround them.
607 BBA and LIBA July 2003, p. 10.
608 Interview 92P.
609 BBA, ISDA, LIBA 2003.
6,0 ZKA July 2003, p. 33; VdH 2003.
611 See Manning 2002.
612 Interviews 12P, 13P.
613 CBA 2003, p. 8
614 CBA 2003, pp. 8-10.
615 CBA 2003, pp. 8-10.
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When they raised their concerns and their alternative proposal to the OSFI, Canadian 
banks also argued that their residential mortgage exposures were extremely different from the 
higher risk activity of the US markets.616 The OSFI listened to these arguments, but responded 
that it would not represent these views at the BCBS level. The 10% LGD floor, they stated, was 
“absolutely non-negotiable,” and the OSFI simply could not win such a struggle within the 
BCBS. The reason, the OSFI stated, was simple: there was no way that the US delegates would 
change this policy.617 As we shall see below, the US delegation had strong incentives to keep the 
10% LGD floor in place.
The US Campaign: Widespread, But Not Universal, Critique
A diverse collection of US private sector groups mobilized to argue against the 10% LGD 
floor. Large US banks such as US Bancorp, JP Morgan Chase, Washington Mutual, Fleet, Wells 
Fargo and Citigroup were all particularly vocal about what they perceived to be the irrational and 
arbitrary stringency o f the policy, as were industry associations such as the ABA and the 
Financial Services Roundtable.618 Very strong opposition was offered by a group calling itself 
the Consumer Mortgage Coalition, a Washington-based advocacy group organized by the 
mortgage banking divisions of JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, and Wells Fargo.619 The 10% LGD 
floor was critiqued as “artificial and not justified on economic grounds”, “distorting] economic 
incentives”, as “fatally burdensome” to US banks; that it would discourage lending to borrowers, 
and would discourage best practice risk management.620 Regarding the latter claim, private sector 
groups argued that Basel II should allow for banks to estimate their LGDs below 10% i f  they 
could demonstrate that they had invested in private mortgage insurance — a case they made in 
written comments and in interactions with regulators 621
6,6 CBA 2003; Interview 6 IP.
617 Interview 6 IP.
618 JPMC July 2003, p. 7; US Bancorp November 2003, p. 5; Fleet July 2003, p. 3; ABA July 2003, p. 3; FSR 
November 2003, p. 9; See Institutional Investor 2003.
6,9 These were Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation, CitiMortgage, Inc., and Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, 
respectively. See Consumer Mortgage Coalition July 2003, p. 3.
620 Quotes are from Citigroup July 2003, p. 5; Consumer Mortgage Coalition July 2003, p. 2; Washington Mutual 
November 2003, p. 15; Wells Fargo August 2003, p. 10; Washington Mutual July 2003, p. 15.
621 See, for example, US Bancorp November 2003, p. 5. See also FOIA November 2003a; FOIA November 2003b, 
p. 4.
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US private sector groups also put forth a critique o f the underlying assumptions o f the 
residential mortgage model itself. The RMA Capital Group formulated an empirical critique o f 
the policy as a whole based on data from seven o f its largest banks to demonstrate how these 
banks estimated their own risks from retail mortgage lending. This analysis demonstrated that 
while the Basel II model was not far removed from banks’ existing internal practices, as levels o f 
risk increased the outcomes o f the model exhibited more regulatory stringency, as demonstrated 
in Figure 7.0 below. Thus, for riskier mortgage lending, such as sub-prime mortgages, levels o f  
regulatory capital would necessarily increase considerably.
Figure 7.0: Estimated Levels of Capital Adequacy 
Across a Range of PD Levels 622
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Deviations from industry practices were particularly disconcerting to the Capital Group at 
the time, because they constituted such a major component o f bank’s retail portfolios.623 Based 
on their own empirical research, they determined that the root o f the regulatory stringency was 
the BCBS’s AVC assumptions. They then conducted an extensive study o f banks’ own internal 
risk management practices in order to demonstrate to the US Agencies that the BCBS’ 15%
622 Data is from RMA February 2003, p. 59 (Appendix 1, Table 13, p. 59). ‘Well Capitalized’ status in the US is 1.5 
times the Basel standard, so the RMA value in column 6 in Table 13 has been divided by 1.5 by the present author.
623 RMA February 2003, p. 46; RMA March 2003.
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AVC policy should be lowered, along with capital requirements for residential mortgage lending. 
Once this data was compiled, the group was able to argue that the AVC assumptions o f Basel IPs 
residential mortgage policy were consistently greater than internal risk management practices 
within m ajor banks, as seen in Figure 7.1 below.
Figure 7.1: Asset-Value Correlation (AVC) Values of the BCBS and RMA
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The Capital Group sent this data to the US Agencies in hopes that it would convince them to 
change their position. Specifically, they hoped that their data would secure an AVC policy o f  6- 
10%, instead o f 15% AVC policy, the former reflecting de facto industry practices.625 Large US 
banks that were members o f the Capital Group cited these findings extensively, as did other 
groups such as the Mortgage Bankers’ Association.626 Most vociferous o f  all was Citigroup, who 
argued (both individually and through the Consumer Mortgage Coalition) that the 15% AVC was 
unnecessarily stringent, and met with all US Agencies to argue that the AVC should be lowered
624 Se RMA February 2003, Appendix I, Table 4, p. 54.
625 See RMA April 2003, p. 69; RMA July 2003.
626 JPMC July 2003, pp. 4, 7; Bank One July 2003, p. 4; MBA November 2003, p. 5.
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for sub-prime lending in particular, since these mortgages liquidate faster and therefore held less 
risk.627
As widespread and vocal as the US campaign opposing the Basel II residential mortgage 
policy was, it featured a substantial degree of business conflict. Two different kinds of private 
sector groups emerged to countervail the opposition of the groups mentioned above: small banks 
and mortgage insurance companies.
Business Conflict from Small Banks
While large US banks and some of their associations opposed the residential mortgage 
policy on the grounds that it was not permissive enough, a number of small banks and their 
associations opposed the policy on the grounds that it was too permissive. The reasons for this 
cleavage have to do with the perceived competitiveness effects of Basel II within the US. Since it 
had been made clear that Basel II would only be applied to the 20 largest banks in the US, small 
banks and their associations became increasingly worried about the possibility of Basel II banks 
out-competing them. While small US banks engaged in very different business models of 
lending, one area in which they did compete was in residential mortgage lending.628 Small banks’ 
and their associations mobilized substantially to communicate their concerns, with many 
different groups and levels of national and state-level associations voicing their concerns over 
competitive equity in mortgage markets due to Basel II.629 Several groups made the issue a 
legislative priority at the time, and the Independent Community Bankers of America formally 
testified before Congress with their concerns.630
Business Conflict from Mortgage Insurance Companies
627 See Citigroup November 2003, p. 24; FOIA January 2004a. FOIA March 2004.
628 See MBA July 2003; National Association o f Realtors July 2003; RER July 2003.
629 ACB July 2003; New Jersey League of Community Bankers November 2003; World Savings July 2003, pp. 
1,3,7; Interview 30P.
630 See New York Bankers’ Association August 2003, p. 2; FOIA July 2003; See Congress 2003b, p. 55; 
Corroborated in Interviews 72P, 30P, 63P.
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Mortgage insurance firms also generated business conflict. On the one hand, they 
supported the US banks’ critique that the 10% LGD floors should be adapted to accommodate 
private mortgage insurance. On the other hand, however, they argued strongly that the AVC 
assumptions of the residential mortgage policy were too permissive.63' This position was 
articulated by the national peak association of mortgage insurers, the Mortgage Insurance 
Companies o f America (MICA). Based on their own expertise dealing with mortgage risk, 
MICA believed that the Basel II residential mortgage policy did not reflect the additional risk 
associated with residential mortgage lending, and that the AVC assumption should be increased 
from 15% to 20%, and in some cases to 23-26%.632 MICA didn’t just argue their case to the US 
regulators, but also actively argued against the arguments that large US banks and their 
associations were making, stating that banks were offering a distorted picture of mortgage 
risk.633
Regulators ’ Response
Among the US regulators, the Fed had taken most responsibility for the residential 
mortgage policy, and the OCC was less interested. Because of the sensitive political environment 
in which the Fed was operating at the time, it had an incentive to treat the policy very carefully. 
After the June 2003 hearing in which the ICBA expressed their concerns with Basel II’s potential 
consequences, Fed staff began consulting with small US banks and their associations. This 
consultative process involved extensive interviews with banks. Based upon their research, Fed 
staff became convinced that Basel IPs residential mortgage policies would give larger US banks 
a competitive advantage over smaller ones.634 As such, the Fed did not agree with the demand to 
change the 10% LGD floor, since they considered it a significant ‘safeguard’ against regulatory 
capital falling too low.635 Moreover, removing the 10% LGD floor would have been politically
631 MICA July 2003, pp. 2-3.
632 See MICA July 2003, p. 9; MICA November 2003, p. 10; FOIA January 2004b.
633 For example, banks such as Citigroup had cited figures from a government study on mortgage risk, and MICA 
argued against the reliability of this study, citing the fact that the data was only drawn from 1996-199, a period with 
was unambiguously positive for the mortgage market. See MICA November 2003, p. 12; See also Pennington-Cross 
2003.
634 As told by later Congressional testimony of the Fed Staff involved. Calem and Follain January 2005, pp. 4, 8-9; 
Congress May 2005, pp. 35,40-41.
635 Corroborated with Interview 75R.
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untenable in the context of legislative oversight, as the Fed was particularly sensitive to the 
congressional access small banks wielded.636 The issue of competition in the US mortgage 
market was the single most important issue on the agenda of small US banks, and the senior staff 
at the Fed were greatly concerned with the potential consequences of their continued 
mobilization 637 At the same time, Fed staff did not accept small US banks’ claims that the 
residential mortgage policy would lead to takeovers and consolidation.638 Consequently, the Fed 
kept the 10% LGD floor in place, despite opposition from large US banks.
The dynamics of business conflict also affected the way the Fed dealt with the other 
contentious feature o f the Basel II residential mortgage policy, the 15% AVC assumption. For a 
number of reasons, the Capital Group’s widely cited data was considered to be of inferior 
quality 639 However, the data provided by the MICA was used extensively, and was considered 
extremely useful because their association’s data covered 85% of the insured loans outstanding 
in the US at the time, and a greater length of time (back to 1987, compared to 1996 for the RMA 
Capital Groups’ data).640 Fed staff worked extensively with three MICA staff to produce a White 
Paper in justification of the 15% AVC, and even turned to MICA staff to deal with arguments the 
Capital Group were making at the time. 641 Not only was the Fed re-affirmed in its position to 
keep the 15% AVC, but private sector groups such as the Capital Group and a number of large 
banks decided that opposing it would be pointless.642 With no changes made to the 15% AVC, 
this feature remained in the final Basel II draft.643
Conclusion
This chapter focused on private sector campaigns concerning policies designed to 
regulate banks’ real estate lending behavior. The emphasis of the process tracing analysis has
636 This corroborates with their outreach efforts following the June 2003 hearings. See Streeter 2003.
637 This is evinced not only by the above, but by the fact that the Fed staffers looking into the residential mortgage 
policy were actively discouraged from publishing their research on the potential competitiveness effects of Basel II 
on US mortgage markets. See Paletta 2005.
638 See Calem 2005.
639 The data provided by the Capital Group was considered to be of inferior quality, since rather that demonstrating 
what actual AVCs were within large US banks, the Capital Group had generated ‘implied’ AVC calculations, which 
were simply estimations.
640 Calem and Follain October 2003, pp. 15-16; FOIA Jauary 2004b, p. 4.
641 As evinced by FOIA January 2004b.
642 Interview 36P. See also RMA 2003, p. 23; Washington Mutual November 2003, p. 16.
643 See BCBS April 2003, p. 60; BCBS June 2004, pp. 69-70.
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been on private sector campaigns organized in the US, which were by far the most substantial. In 
the case o f  the first US HVCRE campaign, a broad and complex coalition o f US private sector 
groups mobilized to oppose a strict regulatory policy. By tracing private sector opposition and 
regulatory response, the analysis found that private sector groups were successful in causing 
perm issive regulatory policy change. W hile this campaign was highly informational, this 
com ponent o f it did not lead to the policy change; rather, it was private sector groups’ use o f 
legislative oversight which caused the Fed to change its position. This campaign provides 
empirical evidence in support o f  the Legislative Oversight and the Coalitions hypotheses. The 
second HVCRE campaign, in contrast, featured many o f the same characteristics as the first 
HVCRE campaign, but a different coalition o f  groups, and was completely unsuccessful in 
achieving permissive regulatory policy change, thus suggesting caution when interpreting the 
power o f  coalitions and legislative oversight, and suggests that there may be other factors which 
may be at play which have driven this non-result. The variation o f  these two cases provides 
useful empirical material for later across-case analysis in Chapter 10.
Table N: Configuration Table for Private Sector Campaigns and their Outcomes
n
oe
3
-o
©
re1
CLTO■o
Q.re
3re'V.
*0
3n
70re
QTQe
©
5"=asre
3rereD.
70re
QTQ3
CTQre
VI
I So
<
3_
3*re
■
O3*
|
5'era
COre
3*3
©'
2
©o* n  %© 2to 3“  3
Z0
31
CO
3
3
7?
rreera.
Sn’3
o
rre
ora.7_
5"
<’re "O re
M
3
"d o fa© o■Bf < ■<
3 © re rere 1VI ©* I
re'v> re
ora’
3*
3
3 oraS’
HVCRE 1 US 1 1 1 0.67 1 1 I t  0 1 0
*■ v  I SHI « m H E H B B H H H H m I m  I m H H
HVCRE 2 US /  0 0 0 0 1 1 1 I 0.33 1 0
Mortgage UK 0 0 0 0 .33 .33 0 0 0 0 0
Mortgage CA 0 0 0 0 0.67 0 0.67 0 0 0 0
Mortgage DE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mortgage US 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 i
188
The US campaigns associated with residential mortgage-lending took place during a 
similar period of time, but the content of this campaign and the environment in which it operated 
differed from the campaigns targeting the HVCRE policy. We have seen that this campaign was 
ultimately unsuccessful, because of the business conflict present -  suggesting strong support for 
the Business Conflict hypothesis. On the one hand, mortgage insurance associations provided the 
Fed with superior data which convinced Fed staff to preserve the policy in its given form. On the 
other hand, small banks and their associations were opposed to changes to the policy in a 
permissive direction, as they felt it offered large banks a competitive advantage.
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Chapter 8
The Expected Losses and 
Credit Card Campaigns
This chapter describes and analyses the private sector campaigns associated with two 
different regulatory policies within Basel II, namely, the policy toward banks’ expected losses, 
and the policy toward banks’ credit card activities. The campaigns that private sector groups 
waged against around these policies were both extensive and complex. As we shall see, the 
extent of influence that private sector groups wielded over regulatory policy outcomes was much 
less extensive than the influence they wielded over their regulators.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section One describes the extensive efforts by every 
country in the study, as well as transnational efforts, to oppose the ‘expected losses’ policy 
within the Accord between January 2001 and April 2003. Section Two describes the efforts of 
American credit card banks who mobilized in opposition to the Basel II credit cards policy 
between January 2001 and April 2003. None of these campaigns, I demonstrate, were successful 
in generating permissive regulatory policy change.
Section Three analyzes the new private sector campaigns which emerged in the United 
States from April 2003 to September 2003, under very different conditions, to challenge both the 
expected losses and credit card policies. Section Four analyzes the US regulators’ response to 
these new private sector campaigns, and finds that not only did the US regulators’ position 
change, but they engaged in value-claiming behavior within the BCBS as well.
Section Five then explores the negotiation of US demands to change the expected losses 
and credit card policies. It describes how these demands were accommodated by the BCBS, and 
how US private sector groups attempted to influence the content of these changes. I demonstrate 
that, with respect to the credit card policy, while US private sector groups did manage to 
generate some permissive regulatory policy change, the extent of this change was circumscribed 
by US regulators. With respect to the expected losses policy, while the policy’s form experienced 
changes, these did not represent permissive regulatory policy change. This chapter concludes
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with an analysis o f the contradictory empirical results obtained by the private sector campaigns. 
While private sector campaigns were, under certain conditions, able to influence their regulators, 
their success at influencing regulatory policy outcomes was less clear-cut
Section 1 
The Expected Losses Campaigns 
January 2001-April 2003
The January 2001 draft of the Accord made it explicit that the Basel II regime would 
require banks to hold regulatory capital against losses that were unexpected due to future 
uncertainty in their business lines (‘unexpected losses’), as well as against those losses that banks 
calculated would occur as a matter of probability: so-called ‘expected losses’. The expected 
losses policy of Basel II was, after the operational risk policy, probably the most heavily 
contested policy in the entire Accord. Because it made banks hold more capital than they would 
normally hold to cover against losses, it was, in essence, an extra layer of conservatism.644
Private Sector Campaigns across Countries
It would not be an exaggeration to claim that the expected losses policy was universally 
condemned by the banking industry, which argued that expected losses were already largely 
covered by reserves, or absorbed by the revenue of business activities.645 As such, banks claimed 
that the Basel II provisions would encourage banks to ‘double count’ the risk o f expected losses, 
which they felt grossly overestimated their true risk exposure. Private sector mobilization in 
opposition to the expected losses policy occurred at both the national and transnational levels.
A substantial international campaign took place very shortly after the BCBS’s 
announcement of the policy in January 2001, and both the IIF and ISDA criticized the policy
644 Interview 95R.
645 For a review of the expected losses debate, and how it affected overall capital, see Kupiec 2003.
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extensively, arguing that it represented ‘double counting’ that would create market distortions.646 
The expected losses policy was considerably contentious within the IIF at the time, but when 
they met with the BCBS Models Task Force in November 2001, they were told that the Models 
Task Force was focused on other technical issues, and did not want to hear about these concerns 
with expected losses.647 The IIF reiterated its concern regarding the expected losses policy to the 
full BCBS as well, repeatedly, yet with similarly disappointing results.648 The ISDA had also 
argued against the EL policy, also to no avail.649 Consequently, both transnational associations 
resigned themselves to defeat on the policy, conceding by May 2001 that the policy was 
conceptually defensible given a lack of international standards in accounting.650
The IIF was not alone in its stark criticism of the policy. As the IIF Steering Committee 
on Regulatory Capital noted in 2001, “[b]ankers around the world share this analysis.”651 This 
assertion was no exaggeration. For example, the Canadian Bankers Association repeatedly made 
the case that the expected losses policy should be removed from the Accord to its regulator (and 
Canada’s BCBS delegate), the Office of the Superintendant of Financial Institutions (the OSFI). 
The Association was particularly concerned with the fact that the expected losses policy did not 
take into consideration banking portfolios such as retail lending, where banks’ own internal 
pricing models covered EL quite explicitly.652 This oversight was a significant issue for 
Canadian banks, as they engage in large amounts of retail activity, and thus they made it a major 
concern from the outset in their engagements with the OSFI.653 While OSFI listened to these 
concerns, they did not respond to them.654 The situation was strikingly similar in the UK, 
although banks there mobilized less actively around the issue there. In their engagements with 
the Bank of England and the FSA, British banks and their associations argued that the policy 
would punish retail lending in particular, but were met with non-responsiveness. After a
646 IIF 2001a, pp. 20-21; ISDA 2001, p.8.
647 Confidential minutes of IIF meeting, 20 November 2001 with Basel Models Task Force.
648 Interview 61R; Confidential internal documentation.
649 ISDA 2001, p. 8
650 ISDA 2001, p. 8; IIF 2001b, pp. 14-15.
651 IIF 2001, p. 15.
652 Confidential minutes taken by Canadian banker; corroborated in Interview 6IP.
653 Interview 59P; 6 IP.
654 Interview 6 IP.
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protracted struggle against the policy, many groups discontinued their mobilization around the 
EL issue, believing it would not and could not be changed.655
In Germany, private sector groups mobilized considerably over the expected losses 
policy. Alongside their protracted campaigns on the SME policy of Basel II, private sector 
groups cited their disdain for the expected losses policy.656 This included not only banks such as 
the National Association of Private Banks, but also non-financial associations such as the 
German Federation of Industry (though it represented a much more limited effort).657 The 
German Association of Savings and Giro Banks (DSGV) had even argued before the 
Parliamentary Finance Committee in May 2001 that the expected losses policy might increase 
the costs o f capital.658 After being “politely refused by regulators”, by 2003 German banks had 
largely given up on their relatively modest campaign to have the expected losses policy 
dropped.659
In the United States, private sector groups were also highly critical of the expected losses 
policy, and banks of all kinds mobilized substantially on this issue, speaking out in extensive 
critiques to the US Agencies.660 In particular, the RMA Capital Group mobilized an extensive 
and detailed technical critique of the policy. They gathered extensive data within their group to 
demonstrate empirically the disparity between the level of capital that Basel II required for a 
typical corporate loan, and the median levels of capital they actually held for that loan; they then 
sent this data to US regulators and other relevant US Agencies and engaged with them repeatedly 
on the issue.661 Despite this strong oppositional mobilization, critiques were politicly “taken into 
consideration”, technical critiques were not engaged with, and no permissive regulatory policy 
change resulted, despite years of mobilization.662
655 For example, see RBS 2001, p. 13;
656 Interviews 9P, 10P.
657 BDI April 2001. p. 3; Interviews 9P, 10P.
658 The issue had not been raised repeatedly in Parliament, however, and at the time it was dwarfed by other issues 
of much greater contention such as the concern with SME finance (See Chapter 5). See Bundestag May 2001, p. 48.
659 BdB July 2003, p. 9; Interviews 9P, 10P. Though see Bundestag October 2003, p. 53
660 First Union 2001, p. 4; Citigroup 2001, pp. 2,6-7,11; Bank One 2001, p. 2; New York Clearing House 2001, pp. 
7-8; Fleet Boston Financial 2001, p. 3; ABA 2001, pp. 8-9; FSR 2001, p. 2; RMA 2001, pp. 16-20.
661 RMA 2001, pp. 16-20; RMA February 2003; Interviews 53P, 55P
662 Interviews 81P, 83P; 53P; 54P; 55P; 81P.
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The Response o f Regulators
At every turn, the BCBS resisted changing the policy. In the words of one BCBS 
delegate, “Every time it came up [in discussions with the banking industry] it was immediately 
dismissed.”663 There were three main reasons why the expected losses policy had become 
cemented into Basel II, ranging from simple conservatism to complex geopolitical 
considerations. First, the expected losses policy allowed for an extra layer of conservatism to be 
built into the Accord. This stringency helped satisfy more conservative members of the BCBS 
such as the US FDIC as well as several Continental European members. Second, the BCBS had 
informally sworn, for geopolitical reasons, not to revisit the definition of capital due to earlier 
disagreements with Japan in the late 1990s.664 Third and finally, revisiting the expected losses 
policy would mean opening up highly technical issues, indeed a full recalibration of all risk 
weights within the Accord, and raised issues of a level playing field if the policy was removed.
Section 2 
The US Credit Card Campaign 
January 2001-April 2003
Over time, as Basel II was elaborated, the policies that regulated the retail portfolio of 
banks were expanded.665 In the process, a very specific policy was designed to tackle a very 
specific issue: namely, the risk associated with a banks’ credit cards business. The BCBS had 
developed a new IRB risk-weight curve that endeavored to provide a more risk-sensitive 
treatment of what were known as ‘qualifying revolving retail exposures’ (QRREs) -  the very 
kind of lending practices that banks managed when they undertook credit card lending.666 The 
Anglo-American members of the BCBS had played the instrumental role in ensuring that the 
retail part of the Accord was differentiated in this way, as they understood the risk associated 
with credit card lending to exhibit special characteristics. In late 2000 the BCBS Capital Task
663 Interviews 88R, 95R.
664 Interview 88R.
665 See JP Morgan Chase 2001, p. 8
666 See BCBS July 2001. The term ‘revolving’ comes from the fact that credit card clients do not pay off their lines 
of credit all at once but rather over time, and are continually tapping into these lines of credit.
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Force subcommittee flagged credit cards as a special kind o f retail exposure with additional and 
unique kinds o f risk. They sought to achieve a conservative regulatory approach to this kind of 
activity through various provisions.667
The parameters for the QRRE framework were formulated to ensure that the AVC 
formula that banks had to use varied inversely with the probability of default (PD). What this 
feature of the policy meant was that capital requirements for credit card lending increased steeply 
for low PD, while at higher levels of PD the increase was more tapered. It was a highly stringent 
assumption that increased the levels of regulatory capital required of banks. In addition, the 
BCBS wanted to apply a capital charge for the part of a line of credit on a credit card that 
consumers haven’t used up yet, the ‘undrawn line’.668 Relatedly, the BCBS wanted to apply new 
stringent regulations to the securitization of credit card lending, whereby securitized credit card 
assets would only be accorded regulatory relief under very strict conditions.669
These relatively conservative regulatory positions on credit card lending meant that the 
‘revolving retail’ policy the BCBS had designed would increase the regulatory capital costs of 
large, sophisticated banks by, on average, 14%.670 While the BCBS Capital Working Group 
formally oversaw the development of provisions concerning retail portfolios, US regulators bore 
most of the responsibility for designing acceptable regulatory treatment of credit card risk.671 
Large banks in the G10 held, on average, about 2% of their total capital in ‘revolving retail’ 
exposures at the time, yet in the US this figure was considerably more -  and these exposures 
were concentrated within just a few large US banks (discussed below).672
Both the development of the credit card policies, and the private sector contention over 
their content, were confined to the US. Although the Federal Reserve Board had initially 
contributed heavily to the development of regulatory provisions concerning credit cards within 
Basel II, by 2002 much of the technical work had fallen largely on the shoulders of the 
Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank, with the OCC and Fed Board also consulting on more
667 For the BCBS wording, see BCBS January 2001, p. 79; BCBS April 2003b, p. 61.
668 For example, if you have a $1000 line of credit on a credit card, even though you only use $300 per month, the 
BCBS was proposing to impose capital requirements on the $700, the undrawn balance. This rule is specified in 
BCBS April 2003, p. 61
669 See BCBS October 2002, pp. 98-99
670 BCBS May 2003, p. 29. See also Wachovia, Letter to BCBS Secretariat, 30 July 2003, p. 8
671 Interview 64R.
672 BCBS May 2003, p. 29
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general issues related to the policy. The rest of the BCBS did not take a strong interest in the 
credit card policies at the time, since it was seen as an issue relevant primarily to the US.673
The US Credit Card Campaign, 2001-2003
The most vocal opponents of the Basel II credit card policy were, perhaps not 
surprisingly, the US banks with substantial credit card business. However, there were important 
differences in the internal organization o f these banks that had consequences for how they 
reacted to the policy. Banks like MBNA, Capital One, Providian Financial, and American 
Express Centurion were ‘mono-line’ credit card banks, meaning that their main business was the 
management of credit card lines. Banks like Chase Manhattan (part of JPMC), and Bank of 
America, on the other hand, were diversified banks with many business lines besides their 
substantial credit card portfolios (Appendix 7 details some of these differences), and thus were 
much less concerned with the policy. The exception was Citigroup.
Citigroup was the largest credit card issuer in the world, and it argued alongside banks 
like Capital One and MBNA, the ‘undrawn lines’ feature of the Basel II credit card policy was 
particularly troubling. For Citigroup, the size of their undrawn lines were almost three times their 
credit card exposures.674 For all US credit card banks combined, this figure was even greater, at 
five times their total managed assets.675 Consequently, even a small capital charge on undrawn 
credit lines would have a large effect on these banks’ overall capital requirements. The treatment 
of credit card securitization in the Accord was a very pressing concern of many credit card 
banks, who used securitization not only as a method of risk management, but as a means of 
funding.For this reason, monoclines like MBNA were “completely opposed” to this aspect of the 
credit card policy, that they had never suffered a loss in their 15-year history of conducting
f\lf\securitizations, and it should be placed in Pillar II of the Accord.
673 Interviews 95R; 66R.
674 In 2001 for example this had amounted to $245 billion. Citigroup 2001, pp. 28-29.
675 At $3 trillion. See Lang et al. 2004, p. 9
676 MBNA May 2001, pp. 6, 8-9.
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The credit card banks had strong associational allies within the US that bolstered their 
arguments. The Financial Services Roundtable argued against the credit card policies in 2001, as 
did the RMA Capital Group, as Bank One, Citigroup, and Providian were all active members. As 
soon as the credit card policy was first announced, the Capital Group pointed out that the BCBS 
were proposing much higher capital requirements than those generated by the most advanced 
large banks within their membership, and they illustrated this case empirically, with reference to 
quantitative data provided by their membership.677 Based on their own coordinated research, they 
were able to make a sophisticated informational argument to regulators. As Figure N illustrates, 
based on their own bank data, they could show that regulatory capital requirements would 
increase for higher quality credit card exposures, but for more risky exposures they would 
remain roughly the same.
Figure 8.0: Regulatory capital requirements and Probability o f Default (PD) 
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In order to persuade US regulators that the credit card policy should be changed, the Capital 
Group focused in particular on the AVC assumptions within Basel IPs credit card policy, in
677 See RMA May 2001, pp. ii, 34-37, 57.
678 Data is from Table 14 of RMA Feb 2003, p. 61.
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which the BCBS had built in conservative assumptions by modeling a downward-sloping AVC 
curve beginning at 15% for low PD and decreasing to 2% for high PD ranges.679 The Capital 
Group sent an extensive quantitative report to the US Agencies in February 2003 with their 
critique of these modeling assumptions.680 Their critique suggested that the best practices within
roi
their firms suggested the use of a fla t AVC curve in the 6-10% range.
Credit card banks tried various other strategies, sending the Fed aggregated loss statistics 
to make their case that risk weightings for credit cards should be lower, and arguing to the OCC 
that they should not be required to hold capital against undrawn lines.682 They argued to both 
regulators that the Basel II credit card policy should allow them to make their own internal 
estimates of AVCs.683
The Response o f Regulators
Despite the considerable efforts that had taken place, the US regulators were not 
convinced by the banks’ arguments, and both the Fed and the OCC treated the data provided by 
the RMA Capital Group with suspicion.684 The arguments regarding undrawn lines were not 
considered convincing, as the regulators still saw undrawn lines as carrying risk.685 Staff at both 
the Fed and the OCC were well aware of how important securitization was for the credit card 
banks, but they had a concern that credit card securitizations did not constitute ‘true sales’, in 
that the risk was not actually offloaded from the bank during the securitization. Thanks to their 
supervisory experience, the OCC had already observed that banks often relied on securitization 
of credit card lending for funding -  and in cases when their credit card trusts began to degrade, 
banks tended to try and provide liquidity to these trusts so that funding didn’t dry up.686 They had 
shut down several extensive predatory credit card banking businesses across the country since
679 RMA Feb 2003, p. 25 (Graph 2), p. 19.
680 See RMA February 2003.
681 Interview 36P.
682 Interview 87R.
683 Interview 64P.
684 Interviews 64P; 36P; 8R.
685 Interviews 87R, 64P.
686 Interview 87R.
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2000, most recently with the SEC in late 2002.687 The Fed did not have this kind of supervisory 
experience with the credit card banks, but as they continued to research the issue they found 
more and more reasons to err on the side of caution. When they pressed banks on an individual 
basis regarding undrawn lines and securitization, they found that there was resistance to 
providing clear answers and data, which only strengthened their conservative suspicions.688 
While US regulators did make some small adjustments to the policy, these reforms generally 
served to increase the regulatory stringency of the policy, rather than to decrease it through
• iTOQ
permissive regulatory policy change. Perhaps not surprisingly, such moves outraged the US 
credit card banks.
Section 3
The New Expected Losses and Credit Card Campaigns 
May 2003 -  September 2003
Following the release of the April 2003 draft of Basel II, US private sector groups were 
incensed at the lack of changes on both the expected losses policy and the credit card policy. 
They had spent considerable time and resources trying to persuade the US Agencies to change 
their positions, yet no permissive regulatory policy change had occurred. However, by this time 
the political-institutional environment had changed. The Congressional hearings on Basel II had 
begun; Bill HR8043 had been proposed by Congress; and the staff at the House Financial 
Services Committee seemed more interested than ever in US banks’ critiques of regulators’ 
positions.
In this context, large US banks continued their strong opposition to the policy, but now 
prioritized the issue more than before. Banks such as JP Morgan Chase and Bank of America 
argued against it as a matter of highest priority not only in their written statements to US
687. See Business Wire 2003.
688
689Between October 2002 and April 2003, a small change was made to the AVC assumptions of the model, in which 
the lowest PD ranges were set slightly lower, at 11% rather than 15%. This had the potential to constitute permissive 
regulatory policy change — were it not for the fact that the this change was accompanied by a 15% increase in the 
amount of expected losses that banks were expected to hold for credit cards. In October 2002, the BCBS had set an 
offset of Future Margin Income to 90% - yet by April 2003 they decreased the offset to 75%. See BCBS October 
2002, pp. 58-59; BCBS April 2003b, p. 60.
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regulators, but also in their informal conversations with them.690 Because the policy affected 
banking practices and bottom lines so universally, US banking associations could easily address 
the issue in their engagements with US regulators and with the House Financial Services 
Committee as well. A plethora of associations and individual banks argued vociferously against 
the expected losses policy in this context.691 The President and CEO of the RMA testified before 
the Senate Banking Committee that the expected losses policy was a major problem that needed 
to be addressed, and other banks were privately engaging with Congress on their concerns as 
well.692
The US credit card banks were also involved in the expected losses policy in a new way. 
In April 2003 the amount of capital that banks now had to hold for expected losses had increased 
by 15%. For US credit card banks, this change was actually a substantial increase in capital 
requirements, since expected losses on credit cards are typically 10 times higher than those on 
other loan products.693 Citibank had always been a vocal opponent o f the expected losses policy, 
but now with this recent change, they had an even greater stake in the expected losses policy’s 
abolition.694 MBNA and Capital One were also furious with the change, and argued that there 
was no empirical basis for the decision.695 Even other banks without substantial credit card 
businesses explicitly ‘linked’ their critique o f the expected losses policy to its envisioned 
detrimental effect upon the credit cards market. Banks such as Wachovia and JPMC, for 
example, made this argument to the US Agencies, alongside their other longstanding arguments 
aimed at eradicating the expected losses policy.696 This ‘linkage’ strategy was not only utilized 
by large individual banks, but also associations, such as the New York Clearing House
607Association and the American Bankers’ Association at the time. A substantial national 
coalition had thus developed in opposition to the expected losses policy.
690 See Bank of America July 2003, p. 2; JP Morgan July 2003, pp. 5-6; Interview 80P,81P,39R
691 Wachovia July 2003, pp. 2,5; Providian Financial July 2003, p. 7; Keycorp May 2003; Wells Fargo August 2003, 
pp. 12-13; Washington Mutual 2003, p. 4; ABA May 2003, p. 3; Consumer Mortgage Coalition July 2003, p. 3; 
RMA July 2003, p. 15; Martin 2002, pp. 40-42; Interviews 36P, 55P.
692 Congress. June 2003a, p. 92; Interviews 65R; 80P; 54P.
693 See Lang et. al. 2007, p. 10.
694 Citigroup May 2001, 29; Citigroup July 2003, p. 5.
695 MBNA July 2003, p. 10; Capital One July 2003, p. 2
696 For example, see Wachovia July 2003, pp. 8-9; JPMorgan Chase May 2003, p. 7.
697 New York Clearing House. June 2001, p. 8.
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Opponents of the Basel II credit card policy also found themselves operating in a more 
congenial legislative environment, and new organized efforts were unleashed following the April 
2003 draft o f the Accord.698 The US credit card industry was an extremely profitable part of the 
US financial sector at the time, and the credit card policy jeopardized their business models and 
their profitability in a serious way.699 MBNA captured the oppositional sentiment to the US 
regulators’ resistance well at the time in a letter to the US regulators, when its CFO stated that 
“MBNA has been a very diligent and active participant throughout the Basel II process, but 
many o f our concerns have been largely ignored.”700
The plight of the US credit card industry in the BCBS negotiations came up repeatedly in 
Congressional hearings; one finds evidence of this legislative attention in the form of testimonies 
by representatives of the Financial Services Roundtable and the Bond Market Association.701 
The credit card banks such as Bank One, Citigroup, and Capital One argued their case to the US 
regulators in this environment, using many of the same information-rich arguments as before, 
and citing data (their own and that of the RMA Capital Group) on the relatively low risk o f credit 
card portfolios.702
While older allies like the American Bankers Association and the Financial Services 
Roundtable contributed their criticisms of the policy (credit card banks were prominent members 
of both of these associations),703 by the spring of 2003 the credit card banks also gained new 
allies. The US credit card management firms, which (for unknown reasons) had not mobilized 
previously, now saw themselves to be directly affected by the credit card policy of Basel II. Visa, 
MasterCard, Discover, and American Express all became attentive to the impending threat of 
Basel II’s credit card policy. With this group of firms now involved in the oppositional 
campaign, the political leverage of the opposition increased. The permanent Washington D.C. 
lobbyists for Visa, MasterCard, Discover, and American Express began contacting staff at the 
House Financial Services Committee with their concerns. Visa also argued to both the BCBS and
698 For a concise review of US bankers’ views on the credit card policy, see Cass 2003, p. SI 1.
699 For an excellent and detailed overview of this issue, see Montgomerie 2006, 2007. See also Retail Banking 
International 2003.
700 MBNA July 2003, p. 12; Capital One expressed similar concerns at the time. See Capital One July 2003, pp. 1-2 
(see also p. 12).
701 Congress. June 2003a, pp. 43, 51.
702 See Bank One July 2003, pp. 2-3; Capital One July 2003, p. 4; Myers 2003; Paletta 2004; Citigroup July 2003, p. 
5; MBNA July 2003, pp. 7-8
703 Financial Services Roundtable July 2003, pp. 6-7.
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to the US Agencies that damage done to the credit card industry would in turn damage the US 
consumer, and the US economy as a whole.704 Now the credit card campaign had not only 
legislative oversight on its side, but allies as well.
Section 4 
The US Regulators’ Response to 
the New Campaigns
By the summer of 2003, private sector arguments against both the expected losses policy 
and the credit card policy were familiar to US regulators — they had heard these arguments for 
some years. What was different was the extent of mobilization and, even more starkly, the 
environment of legislative oversight. In a striking about-face, the Fed Board now concluded that 
the expected losses policy needed to be changed. As one regulator remarked, “No agency can 
ignore what the Congress is saying.”705 When written comments from industry came to the Fed 
Board in the summer of 2003, it became clear to those involved within the Fed Board Staff that 
the issue needed to be resolved urgently.706 Now embroiled in a hostile political environment, the 
Fed feared both the ability of a united US banking community to increase Congressional scrutiny 
of their behavior, as well as the passage o f HR8043. Any amount of further legislative oversight 
would have complicated the Fed’s ability to finalize Basel II at the international level, and thus 
achieve the many goals it had set out to accomplish five years earlier. It needed to manage the 
situation, and in contrast to the opposition to the operational risk policy, for example (see 
Chapter 7), the opposition to the expected losses policy was unequivocal, and united.
An even more dramatic change in position came from the OCC. It supported the Fed’s 
decision to change the expected losses policy, and “became convinced not only that the banks 
were conceptually correct in their arguments” but that retaining the policy “would have severe 
ramifications — not the least of which might be to seriously jeopardize the industry’s acceptance
704 Visa. May 2001, pp. 1-2
705 Interview 78R.
706 Interview 39R.
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of the Basel II framework”.707 Much like the justification within the Fed, the use of information 
alone by private sector groups cannot explain the radical change in the regulators’ position, since 
this was consistent over time. Rather, one must also consider the fact that this information was 
now received in an environment of legislative oversight.
It was also decided that the Basel II credit card policy had to be substantially changed as 
well; interestingly, however, this decision was not driven by the Fed, but rather by the OCC. The 
concerted oppositional campaign by the credit card banks had, for the first time, caused great 
concern for Jerry Hawke, the Comptroller at the time.708 The initiative was taken by the OCC to 
consult with the US credit card banks at high levels to get their views on the issue.709 MBNA and 
Citigroup had been lobbying the OCC privately on the issue, and now Hawke met directly with 
their senior management in Wilmington and New York, respectively.710 The OCC also held a 
special meeting with credit card executives for half a day to allow them to field their concerns.711 
The private sector campaign over the credit card policy had succeeded in persuading the OCC to 
represent their preferences and fight for more permissive regulatory policy change.
The Fed did not share the OCC’s views that the credit card policy needed to be changed. 
Not only was the Fed convinced of the credit card policy’s merits, but they were also critical of 
the OCC’s seemingly sudden accommodation of US credit card banks’ concerns.712 However, 
given the legislative environment at the time, the Fed was not willing to resist the OCC’s now 
strongly-held views and risk jeopardizing the entire Accord. Congress at the time was highly 
critical of inter-Agency disagreement, and indeed had even proposed a bill, HR8043 directly 
affected the Fed’s ability to negotiate a common US position. The bill sought to establish a new 
committee to develop a uniform US position in the Basel II negotiations, and prohibited any US 
Agency from agreeing to any proposed recommendation of the BCBS until that agency reports it
707 Hawke April 2004, p. 16; Hawke May 2004, pp. 1-2. See also Hawke’s later account in Silverman 2004. The 
OCC’s strong and sudden position with respect to credit cards raises the question of potential pressure from the 
Bush Administration. While this is a possibility, there is no evidence to suggest that the Bush Administration was 
interested or involved in the particularities in the specific regulatory policies of Basel II. This is not to say that they 
would not be if events escalated further, of course.
708 He would later state that his concerns were directly in response to the comments given by banks at this time. In 
his own words, “ .. .we felt that that would have been very detrimental to our credit card business.” See Hawke 
December 2003, p. 14.
709 Interview 29R.
710 Interview 64P
7,1 Interview 29R.
712 Interview 89R.
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to Congress. With the OCC now representing the concerns of the banks it was regulating, the Fed 
was thus weakened in its ability to support its conservative stance. In the words of one individual 
from the Fed, the US domestic political situation “forced the Fed to negotiate” with the OCC.713 
Surprisingly, the FDIC did not take a major stance on either of these issues at the time, but it 
shared the Fed’s concern about the OCC’s change in position vis-a-vis the credit card policy. The 
sudden change in position of the OCC on the credit card policy is remarkable when one 
considers the very negative experience that the OCC had with credit card lending practices in the 
US during this time. Consistently over the previous 3 years the OCC had been heavily involved 
shutting down several predatory credit card banking businesses across the country.714 Whatever 
this says about the state of the US regulatory environment during this period, it certainly 
shouldn’t have increased the confidence of the OCC in the safety and soundness of the US credit 
card business.
Negotiating large changes in the expected losses and credit card policies were sure to bbe 
a challenging task, since there was probably never a worse time to announce to the rest of the 
BCBS that the Accord needed substantial changes. In addition, the US BCBS delegates were not 
held in the highest regard at the time, thanks to the US’ decision to apply Basel II to only 20 US 
banks.715 Moreover, the rest of the BCBS was eager to finalize the negotiations, and agree on a
71final draft of the Accord by November 2003, in line with the Secretariat’s scheduled deadline. 
Both the UK and Japanese FSAs, along with the German regulators, were already shifting their 
focus toward implementation at the time, and held strong preferences for a timely completion of 
the Accord.717 Indeed, all European BCBS members had a strong incentive to get Basel II 
completed quickly because they wanted Basel II to be translated into the EU Capital Adequacy 
Directive. A fear at the time within Europe was that this be adversely affected by the upcoming
713 Interview 88R.
7,4 Examples include Banks such as Providian National Bank in 2000, First National Bank of Marin in 2001, and 
NextBank in 2002
715 Institutional Investor. July 2003; McGregor and Pretzlik 2003; Mingkang 2003. See also Persaud 2003.
7,6 See Dams October 2003; Rathmann 2003; Krebsbach 2003; Crabbe 2003, p. S8.
717 On the Japanese position, see comments of Makoto Hosomi in Jeffry and Thind 2003. On the UK, see Robinson 
2003; UK Advisory Group July 2003, p. 1. On the German regulator’s preferences, see Schutz et. al. 2003; 
Institutional Investor 2003.
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EU parliamentary election and the expansion of the EU’s member states, further delaying an 
already delayed process.718
Thus despite the predictable consequences for the timely completion o f the Accord, the 
Fed sent a note to the BCBS Secretariat, which was passed on to the other Committee members, 
stating the need for a dramatic change of course.719 This behavior can be considered value- 
claiming behavior because no one within the BCBS wanted these changes other than the US. A 
highly attentive and critical Congress meant that the US delegates could justify their position in 
terms of domestic acceptance of Basel II, not simply vested national private banking interests. 
Many European members suspected the changes (especially in credit cards) was due to political 
pressure; at the same time, the US delegation defended its claims stating that European criticism 
was o f a political, rather than intellectual, nature.720 The trans-atlantic spat that ensued through 
the financial press only served to fuel the OCC’s determination to push harder, and Hawke was 
resolutely unapologetic about the US delegation’s stance.721
Section 5 
The International Negotiation o f the US Demands
The BCBS, scheduled to meet in November, met one month earlier instead, at the 
beginning of October. They met in Madrid, hosted by the Governor of the Bank of Spain, Jaime 
Caruana, the Chair of the BCBS at the time. Widespread concerns that the Accord would not be 
completed on time, if at all, persisted.722 The US presented the rest of the BCBS with their 
issues, which they insisted must be addressed to ensure the US delegation’s acceptance of the 
Accord.723 There were three major demands that the US put forward, regarding three different
718 See Rathman 2003. See comments of the President of the Bundesbank in this regard in Welteke 2001, pp. 187- 
188.
719 Interview 39R, 40R.
720 Silverman 2003b; The Economist October 2003;
721 See Silverman 2003b; Jerry Hawke, quoted in The Economist October 2003. See also the analysis in Holzer 
2009, pp. 265-266.
722 Bundestag October 2003, p. 53.
723 Interview 89R, 95R.
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regulatory policies: credit cards, expected losses, and securitization. The negotiation o f the US’ 
securitization demands are discussed in Chapter 9 -  the others immediately below.
The US Credit Card Demands and Their Negotiation
The US delegation demanded that the entire credit card policy be revisited and 
substantially revised. This demand was not welcome by the rest of the BCBS, which not only 
wanted to complete the Accord, but had little interest in affecting permissive regulatory policy 
change only to suit US interests.724 Furthermore, the rest of the BCBS saw these demands as 
simply accommodating the credit card industry, and were interpreted as highly politically 
motivated because of the perceived political sensitivity of credit cards in the US at the time.725 It 
was seen as a highly political issue in the US, and BCBS participants linked this to the hostile 
legislative environment in the US at the time.726 Because of these perceived constraints, it was 
clear that the US delegation would not revoke, and changes were largely left to the US 
delegation itself to work on.
In the subsequent months, the OCC would continue to exhibit value-claiming behavior 
over the credit card policy, offering which further supports the Legislative Oversight hypothesis. 
Basel II came up repeatedly in Hawke’s legislative oversight hearing and in his correspondence 
with legislators. In this context, he pledged that there was little room for substantive 
compromise, and that the OCC would not accept features that would unduly disrupt or 
disadvantage credit card businesses “for the sake of global conformity”, and he continuing to cite 
the importance of industry acceptance of the policy.727 When Hawke discovered informally that 
some BCBS delegates offered the US a 1 April 2004 deadline to conclude the policy, he 
remarked:
724 In the words of one US BCBS participant, the European members of the BCBS “generally didn’t care about 
credit cards, other than they thought that the entire credit card discussion was a giant giveaway to the US banks!” 
Interview 88R; Corroborated in Interviews 24R, 95R. The UK and Canadian delegations were sympathetic, 
however, since their domestic banks had some credit card activity as well (though nothing like the size and extent of 
the US banks)
725 Interviews 90R, 95R. See also Hawke May 2004, p. 2.
726 Interview 95R.
727 Hawke April 2004, p. 16; Paletta March 2004; Davenport December 2003.
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We’ve got plenty of time to get these issues worked out, but we aren’t going to do 
it with a gun to our head. [...] The danger here is we get a bunch of ivory-tower 
people together coming up with some theoretical approach to those issues, and it 
could end up screwing up a very important industry.”728
While the US delegation had considerable autonomy in redesigning the credit card 
policy, it was careful to consult with US private sector groups in order to assuage domestic 
concerns. In this context, the US Agencies actively solicited the views of the credit card banks 
during this time, with several meetings held during this period.729 For example, the Philadelphia 
Fed held a large conference on the risks associated with different kinds of credit card activity in 
order to exchange views on the subject, with active participation from the New York Fed, the 
FDIC, and the OCC.730
The monocline credit card banks continued to advocate a lowering of the AVCs in the 
credit card policy, and in February the US Agencies conducted meetings with the RMA Capital 
Group to discuss its proposals.731 The RMA Capital Group had two such proposals for the AVCs 
for credit cards. Option one was to have banks estimate their own AVCs (i.e. a full internal 
models approach for credit cards).732 Option two was that the AVCs for credit cards could be 
flattened, thus reducing regulatory capital charges. The Fed and the OCC argued that option 2 
(the more conservative of the two options) would be preferable. While less than a year before the 
Capital Group had advocated that there should be a flat A VC of between 6-10%, they now 
argued for 3%.733 While the US regulators were willing to concede the point that the AVC for 
credit cards could be flat, they didn’t fully agree on exact figures. While the OCC favored a low 
AVC, the Fed wanted a higher one. They agreed to compromise — to set it at 4%, where it 
remained in the final document.734 This modification to the policy represented a clear instance of
728 See Jerry Hawke, quoted in Paletta March 2004. See also Hawke quoted in Atkins March 2004.
729 Interviews 55P, 64P.
730 Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 2004
731 Bank One November 2003, pp. 1-2; MBNA November 2003, p. 4; RMA Capital Group March 2004, p. 1.
732 Which, they added, would “provide an excellent first step in moving toward a full internal models approach.” See 
RMA Capital Group March 2004, p. 4.
733 See RMA Capital Group March 2004, p. 5.
734 See BCBS June 2004, p. 70.
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permissive regulatory policy change, since it meant that regulatory capital for credit cards would 
decline based on an underlying change to the Basel II model.735
US private sector groups also sought to influence the features of the credit card policy 
which required them to hold capital against undrawn lines. MBNA and Citigroup were 
particularly active in this regard, with MBNA making detailed arguments about the safety of 
their securitization practices to the US regulators, and with Citigroup officials meeting with US 
regulators and detailing the robustness of their own risk control systems.736 The rest of the US 
banking community, however, did not share these views in regard to the undrawn lines issue,
737including the American Bankers’ Association, Wells Fargo, Bank of America, and JPMC. 
JPMC argued that the proposed early amortization features of the Basel II credit card policy 
“made sense for credit card securitizations”, and that indeed they held capital against undrawn 
lines when they securitized credit card assets.738 At a large forum in Washington D.C., Fed 
staffers even forced banks to publicly admit whether or not they actually held capital for 
undrawn lines.739
Perhaps not surprisingly, the Fed did not concede on the undrawn lines issue, as they 
were completely convinced that it involved high degree of risk.740 The FDIC was also highly 
skeptical.741 The OCC was more supportive of the credit card banks’ arguments, but it could not 
argue against the Fed and the FDIC in light of the differences observed between different US 
banks. It was thus decided that the credit card policy should retain the requirement to have banks
735 For the lowest risk credit card exposures, capital would decrease substantially, since the AVC was lowered from 
11% to 4%.
736 14 November MBNA, p. 4-5; Philadelphia Fed 2004; See also FOIA January 2004a, p. 4; Citigroup November 
2003, p. 22.
737 RMA November 2003, p. 17; While JPMC had previously disagreed with Citibank and MBNA’s strong 
abhorrence of the undrawn lines feature, they had not stated so publically. Interview 83P.
738 Lang et. al. 2007, pp. 47-48.
739 Interview 64P; Corroborated by Interviews 67P, 87R. The fact that the banking industry was now relatively 
divided on the undrawn lines issue can be seen by the fact that by March 2004, the RMA Capital Group argued that 
it was no longer an issue of pressing concern. RMA March 2004, p. 3.
740 Interview 64P. See Philadelphia Fed 2004.
741 See comments of Keith Ligon in Fed Philadelphia 2004
208
hold capital against undrawn lines.742 While not perfect, the compromise helped to allay the 
OCC’s concerns at the time.743
Finally in May 2004, at the final BCBS meeting to finalize the Accord, the US delegation 
presented their revised credit card policy744 The rest o f the BCBS, happy to have the US 
Agencies in final agreement, accepted the changes.745 It represented an instance of permissive 
regulatory policy change, but a very circumscribed one. Regulatory capital requirements were 
reduced by changing the AVC relationship, but the undrawn lines feature would remain.
The US Expected Losses Demands and Their Negotiation
The US demand for a complete reformulation of the expected losses policy was even 
bolder than that concerning credit cards, because reforming expected losses would affect every 
bank in the G10, along with the definition of capital itself, and would thus require substantial re­
calibration of the entire Accord, subsequently risking substantial delay. While the rest of the 
BCBS was aware of the private sector distain for the expected losses policy, it was well 
recognized that groups in the US were particularly opposed.746 However, in contrast to the US 
demands to change the credit card policy, the demands to reform the expected losses policy were 
not contested by the rest of the BCBS -  they were accommodated, without contestation.747 
Indeed, the BCBS was well-aware of the private sector critique of the expected losses policy 
because of private sector campaigns in many of their own countries, as well as at the 
transnational level (see above).748 The BCBS decided together to cooperatively revise the 
expected losses policy in a particularly careful way. It was not an easy policy to address, since 
difficulties arose in light of fundamental differences in the ways banks manage their reserves.749 
A simple wholesale ‘removal’ of the expected losses policy would risk a decline in regulatory
742 As such, in the case of securitized credit card receivables, banks still had to hold capital for both the drawn and 
the undrawn portion of the securitized line. See BCBS June 2004, pp. 71,136; Compare with BCBS April 2003, p. 
61.
743 See Hawke May 2004, p. 2.
744 See Paletta 2004.
745 See BCBS May 2004.
746 See Caruana 2004, p. 3.
747 Interview 95R; Corroborated by Hawke in Silverman October 2003, p. 15.
748 Sanio welcomed the changes, and said it was good for German banks. See Dams 2003. Corroborated in 90R
749 Interview 88R.
209
capital, something that was relatively unpalatable for most BCBS members. A technical fix was 
possible through adjusting levels of capital to bank reserves, but this presented a problem: the 
various members of the Basel Committee supervised banks with very different levels o f reserves. 
Two countries in particular tended to have banks with great reserves: namely, the US and Spain. 
In recognition of this unevenness, neither the US nor the Spanish delegation sought to maximize 
their advantage.750 Instead, the BCBS as a whole sought to design the new policy in a way that 
countervailed these advantages.
The BCBS decided that when a bank’s reserves were less than its expected losses, the 
shortfall would be deducted from bank capital -  half the amount from Tier 1, half from Tier 2. If 
a bank’s reserves exceeded their expected losses, then they would be allowed to count the excess 
capital, but only toward Tier 2 capital (and only up to 20% of Tier 2 capital at that). In other 
words, banks with large reserves were systematically prevented from reaping windfall 
advantages from the change. For the majority of the BCBS, they now had assurance that the US 
would not reap windfall advantages. Furthermore, regulatory capital would not decrease — a 
point that pleased more conservative Continental European members of the BCBS in 
particular.751 While the US delegation knew that this change was not what private sector groups 
in their country wanted, the compromise was seen as essential in order to avoid both windfall 
declines in regulatory capital and potential further conflict within the BCBS.752
The German banking community, which had argued against the expected losses policy 
previously and to no avail, was delighted at the changes.753 However, the US banks and their 
associations who had actually influenced these changes believed they signified a mere pyrrhic 
victory.754 Groups such as the RMA argued that the recent changes represented “an important 
step in the right direction”, but since the removal of expected losses from the calculation of 
required capital also meant that banks had to subtract expected losses from the actual total capital 
that a bank needed to hold, they saw no real net benefit.755 These views were universally held
750 Interview 90R.
751 Interview 95R.
752 Interview 95R; See also Jerry Hawke, quoted in Rehm 2003.
753 The German delegation, and the German banks and their associations were all pleased with the changes at the 
Madrid meeting. See Die Welt 2003.
754 See, for example International Financial Law Review.
755 RMA December 2003, p. 1.
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among the US banking community.756 As one individual involved in the expected losses 
campaign put it, “ .. .we won the battle but we may have lost the war.”757
In this context, US private sector groups continued to advocate for changes. Specifically, 
they focused on criticizing the kind of assets that banks could count against expected losses, and 
argued against the caps that the new policy proposed. US banks offered detailed technical 
solutions that could be employed in order for Basel II to recognize more bank assets against 
expected losses.758 A central argument in this regard was that Basel II should recognize the value 
of a bank’s Future Margin Income (FMI) in covering expected losses.759 The US banking 
community also argued that when banks had excess provisions, these should be allocated as Tier 
1 capital, not Tier 2 capital.760 Because the BCBS proposed to put a cap on these provisions, this 
feature was also derided. Citigroup for example argued that it “had no economic basis,” and the 
Financial Services Roundtable called it “an arbitrary, unjustified limit.”761 The US credit card 
banks were also particularly disturbed at these changes.762
Both the US delegation and the BCBS as a whole received substantial comment and 
critique on how the policy should be reformed763 However private sector groups’ criticisms were 
not heeded. Indeed, the BCBS even introduced more capital into the system to compensate for 
any small declines in capital that might have resulted. Because of the extensity of the changes to 
the expected losses policy, the entire Accord had to be ‘recalibrated’, in the sense that risk- 
weight functions within the IRB models had to be adjusted to compensate for the changes made. 
While the changes to the policy meant that regulatory capital would decline slightly, this decline 
was compensated. Because regulatory capital was expected to decline by 6% from the changes to 
the expected losses policy, the BCBS introduced a ‘scaling factor’ which compensated for this,
756 Interviews 80P, 8IP, 83P.
757 Interview 55P.
758 Bank of America November 2003, p. 5; Citigroup December 2003, Appendix 1.
759 This argument was nearly universal at the time, but see for example MBNA November 2003, p. 4; MBNA 
December 2003, p. 2; Bank of America December 2003; RMA November 2003.
760 JPMC argued that excess provisions should be counted as Tier 1 capital, at the very least 50% of them. JPMC 
November 2003, p. 9; American Bankers’ Association December 2003; New York Clearing House Association 
November 2003, pp. 3-4; Financial Services Roundtable December 2003, p. 3; Corroborated by Interview 83P.
761 Financial Services Roundtable December 2003, p. 3; Citigroup December 2003, p. 2.
762 Because the new policy now restricted the extent to which reserves could be used as a component of capital, the 
result was that their total capital charge would actually increase as a result of the new policy. See MBNA December 
2003, pp. 2-3.
763 See BCBS January 2004, p. 1; Banking and Financial Services Policy Report March 2004.
211
by increasing regulatory capital requirements by 6% across the board.764 There was, however, 
one adjustment that was made which did offer some regulatory relief for certain kinds of banking 
activity, namely, the private sector argument against a 20% Tier 2 cap on excess provisions. 
Private sector critiques suggested that the recognition o f excess provisions should not be capped 
based on Tier 2 components, but should be capped based on a percentage of risk-weighted 
assets.765 The specific motivation for this particular change are not clear, but the BCBS officially 
stated that they agreed with private sector arguments that the 20% Tier 2 cap provided a perverse 
incentive to banks, and they decided instead to convert this cap to a percentage of credit risk- 
weighted assets.766 This may be the case -  however it is nevertheless clear that this small change 
offered regulatory capital relief for credit card banks in particular. Because of this change, credit 
card banks could now use their large reserves to count them against expected losses.767 This 
impacted ‘monoline’ credit card banks (such as MBNA and Capital One) especially, as it 
reduced their relative burden of Basel II capital requirements by almost 50% relative to more 
diversified banks.768
Conclusion
This chapter has examined the private sector campaigns organized around both the 
expected losses policy and the credit cards policy. In Section 1, we saw how different campaigns 
targeting the expected losses policy emerged in Canada, Germany, the UK, and the US, and at 
the transnational level as well. Despite the efforts of private sector groups organized both 
nationally and transnationally, none of these campaigns successfully achieved permissive 
regulatory policy change. Section 2 examined the substantial private sector campaign launched 
in the United States against the credit card policy. This campaign too failed to generate 
regulatory policy change.
764 The scalar was set to 1.06, and it was stated at the time that it could change in the future if the BCBS saw fit. See 
BCBS May 2004, Appendix 1; BCBS June 2004, pp. 4, pp. 12-13; The Financial Regulator 2004.
765 BCBS January 2004.
766 BCBS, 30 Jan 2004, p. 5. This percentage of RWA was worked out to .6%, although at national discretion a 
lower limit could be applied. See BCBS 2004, pp. 14, 80-81.
767 See Lang et al 2007, pp. 10-11.
768 Indeed, a later study conducted by the Fed concluded that the average percentage change in required capital for 
banks with credit card subsidiaries was 44.3%; while for monoline credit card banks it was 23.6%. Data is from 
Lang et. al. 2007, p. 43 Table 4, Panel A.
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Section 3 explored new efforts among US private sector groups to change both the 
expected losses and credit cards policies. Section 4 demonstrated how US regulators came to 
change their positions regarding these policies due to the aforementioned renewed mobilization, 
as well as the threat of constraining legislative oversight. Finally, Section 5 illustrated how the 
US delegation engaged in value-claiming behavior within the BCBS as a means of forcing 
accommodation to US private sector preferences. As we have seen, however, this behavior did 
not lead to unequivocal permissive regulatory policy change. The expected losses policy was 
modified considerably, but in a way that ensured that capital requirements would not fall. 
Conversely, the credit card policy did undergo some permissive regulatory policy change, thanks 
to efforts by specific private sector groups such as the RMA Capital Group. However, the extent 
of the permissive regulatory policy change was circumscribed, as other aspects of the credit card 
policy remained intact. This particular case of the second US credit card campaign supports the 
Mobilization and Information Network hypotheses, in the sense that the particular reactions of 
regulators and the changes in the credit card policy itself can be attributed to private sector’s 
efforts at mobilizing their concerns (with the OCC) and to providing information (to the Fed). 
The responsiveness of US regulators, their value-claiming, and the changes to the policy only 
occurred once legislative oversight was present -  suggesting support for the Legislative 
Oversight hypothesis. Interestingly, the particular disagreements within the US banking 
community over the credit card policy (specifically in regard to securitization of credit card 
receivables) was the part of the policy which was not changed. This suggests some within-case 
support for the Business Conflict hypothesis.
Despite the variegated success of the campaigns examined in these chapters, it is 
worthwhile to point out that where private sector groups were most successful was in terms of 
influencing their own national regulators. In both the credit card and expected losses campaigns, 
US private sector groups were successful in getting their regulators respond to their concerns by 
changing their regulators’ positions on these policies, and then having them represent private 
sector preferences at the BCBS. In other words, when assessed in terms of the main dependent 
variable of interest, permissive regulatory policy change, these campaigns do not offer strong 
evidence of private sector influence on the final outcome. These campaigns do however offer 
extensive evidence of private sector influence over the intermediate variables of interest, the
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position and the behavior or regulators. The configuration table below illustrates the fuzzy-set 
scores given to each o f the explanatory and dependent variables o f interest for use in later fsQCA 
in Chapter 10.
Configuration Table for Campaigns and Their 
Outcomes Examined in Chapter 8
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Chapter 9
The Securitization Campaigns
“They were so ticked off at how Basel I had been gamed [that] they wanted to close 
every possible loophole there was... It felt like we were being punished because we 
figured out a way to game it before”769
This chapter explores the private sector campaigns organized against the securitization 
policy of Basel II. Securitization is the practice of bundling future obligations associated with an 
underlying asset (such as mortgages, or business receivables) and then packaging and selling this 
bundle as a tradable security. This practice was very popular among banks while Basel II was 
being developed. Indeed, as many have pointed out within the IPE literature and elsewhere, the 
growth and structural importance of securitization during this period were central to the 
constitution of global, and particularly US, financial markets.770 As such the cases examined 
herein offer a unique opportunity to examine private sector influence upon transnational 
regulatory standard formation concerning securitization practices.
This chapter is divided into four sections. Section 1 describes the BCBS’s general 
approach to securitization, culminating in the Basel II securitization policy published in October 
2002. Section 2 then explores private sector campaigns organized in different countries and at 
the transnational level, and argues that none of these campaigns were successful in generating 
permissive regulatory policy change over the Basel II securitization policy. Section 3 then 
examines the US private sector campaign. I argue that the US campaign, characterized by an
769 Interview 6IP.
770 See Schwartz 2009; Langley 2006; Shiller 2008; Blackburn 2008.
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extensive and complex national coalition of private sector groups targeting the US regulators, 
utilized legislative oversight and information to their advantage. Section 4 analyzes the fruits of 
their labors. I argue that US regulators responded to the US private sector campaign first by 
changing their position on particular aspects of the securitization policy, then engaging in value- 
claiming behavior at the international level, and finally using information provided by US private 
sector groups to ensure permissive regulatory policy change. However, the extent of permissive 
regulatory policy change which occurred, I note, was circumscribed, offering some changes but 
denying others.
Section 1 
Securitization: A Central Regulatory Concern
The BCBS had a longstanding concern with securitization; indeed, one of the main 
motives underlying Basel II was the prevention of international regulatory arbitrage resulting 
from securitization.771 Banks were moving their risks off balance sheet through securitization 
vehicles to avoid regulatory costs, and yet regulators at both the BCBS and at national levels 
knew that risk was not actually being removed from the financial system.772 As one BCBS 
participant put it “[s]ecuritization challenged the whole fabric of banking regulation at the 
time”773 The challenge of regulating securitization was shared throughout the G10 and beyond, 
and was particularly marked in the US, where such markets were most developed.774
The approach taken toward securitization within the BCBs reflected what might be called 
a ‘cautiously stringent’ approach. Continental European BCBS members were eager to address 
this area of bank activity conservatively (see below).775 However, the US, UK, and Canadian 
BCBS participants, while committed to improved regulatory standards and reining in the 
emergent risks, also sought avoid damaging what they simultaneously believed were the useful 
elements of securitization.776 While the entire BCBS had an interest in the securitization policy, 
there was nevertheless a recognition that securitization was a highly complex and technically
771 See Jones 2000. See also Congress June 2003a, p. 53.
772 See Harris 1998.
773 Interview 21R.
774 See Costello 1998; Jackson 1999, p. 26.
775 Interviews 90R, 95R, 73R.
776 Interviews, 95R, 73R, 21R
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detailed area. Given that the US and UK delegations had the greatest expertise in this area from 
their domestic regulatory experience, the majority of the technical work of the Securitization 
Sub-Group of the BCBS was delegated them.777
This particular mix o f standpoints was reflected in the form and content of the Basel II 
securitization policy as it existed in October 2002.778 The policy attempted to recognize the ways 
banks used securitization to distribute risk within the financial system. However, in contrast to 
most other policies within the Accord, the BCBS was wary of utilizing banks’ own internal 
ratings systems to assess securitization-related risks, and favored strictness regarding capital 
adequacy requirements for securitizations. Reflecting these concerns, BCBS Securitization Sub- 
Group formulated two main approaches for securitization exposures, each reflecting relatively 
conservative assumptions. The ‘Supervisory Formula’ approach was a complex mathematical 
formula in which regulatory capital requirements would be assigned given the ‘effective number 
of exposures’, the ‘thickness’ of a securitization tranche, a ‘credit enhancement level’, and an 
‘exposure-weighted average LGD’ within a given securitization exposure.779 While banks could 
use this Supervisory Formula for assessing risk for exposures which were not externally rated by 
credit rating agencies, a number of conservative assumptions were built into the Supervisory 
Formula model. Among these was a minimum 56 basis-point value to be used as part of the 
model. What this 56 basis point value meant was that, even when banks had calculated that a 
given securitization exposure was extremely low, i.e. the ‘best of all possible cases’, the 
Supervisory Formula included a 7% floor below which their regulatory capital requirements 
could not fall.780 As an alternative to this ‘Supervisory Formula’ approach, banks could also use 
a Risk-Weighted Assets (RWA) approach to measure their level of regulatory capital for a given 
exposure.781 This approach was much less complex than the Supervisory Formula, but it could 
only be used for securitization exposures which had an external rating assigned to them.782 Like
777 The BCBS Securitization Sub-Group also often felt that there was insufficient quality information available, and 
therefore opted for higher risk weights as a default position. See for example Murra 2003. Confirmed in interviews 
84P, 40R.
778 BCBS October 2002.
779 See BCBS April 2003, p. 117-118
780 56 divided by .08 x 100% = 7%. See BCBS October 2002, p. 9; BCBS April 2003, p. 116.
781 The use of this approach depended on whether or not the bank was an originator or an investor in a securitized 
asset.
782 Actually, if an exposure was ‘unrated’, under the RWA approach, it was subject to an outright deduction from the 
capital base of a bank.
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the Supervisory Approach, the RWA approach also had a number of conservative assumptions 
built into the model; its capital floor was also set at 7%.783
While the securitization policy attempted to reflect ‘best practices’ in the management of 
securitization risk at the time, overall it was designed to be a stringent regulatory policy. The 
third Quantitative Impact Study conducted by the BCBS between October 2002 and May 2003 
revealed that, as an average across the G10, the regulatory capital requirements for securitization 
exposures would increase substantially. Due to the general lack of regulations in this area, capital 
requirements were expected, on average, to increase by an average of 129% across the most 
advanced banks in the G10 banking systems.784 It is hardly surprising then, that the Basel 
proposals sparked substantial concern within the securitization industry.785 Reflecting the 
widespread growth of securitization at the time, campaigns emerged at various national levels 
and at the transnational level as well. The most substantial campaign, as we shall see below, took 
place within the US.
Section 2 
The Variety o f Securitization Campaigns
The BCBS released its proposed securitization framework in October 2002. In the eyes 
of private sector groups across the G10, it was a complex, disconcerting and excessively 
stringent policy. As Appendix 8 details, securitization markets were booming all over the world 
at the time; thus, it is not surprising that private sector campaigns emerged in various countries, 
such as Germany, the UK, and Japan. However, the national-level campaigns were relatively 
modest, and in many case efforts were channeled into to transnationally mobilized oppositional 
campaigns.
Private sector mobilization over the Basel II securitization policy in Germany was very 
modest. The ZKA provided some detailed critiques, which centered upon the overall extent of
783 This capital floor had been based on Peretyatkin and Perraudin 2003.
784 See May 2003, p. 29.
785 In May 2003 it was widely believed within the securitizations community that CP3 was more or less the last 
word on securitization framework. See Murra 2003; Whitehead 2002; Odenback 2003.
218
capital requirements for securitization.786 The ZKA argued that the sum total of the capital 
requirements for ABS transactions should not be higher than before a securitization is 
conducted.787 However, while the ZKA argued that the cumulative capital charges for 
securitization were too high, it did not offer a specific, targeted critique of specific risk weights. 
It instead called into question the consistency of the BCBS’ approach to securitization in general, 
arguing in particular that the 56-floor should be reduced.788 German private sector groups raised 
their concerns about the Basel II securitization policy before the Parliamentary Finance
7RQCommittee. The reception within the Bundestag, however, was relatively muted.. The 
Parliamentary Finance Committee was aware of private sector concerns, but these demands were 
treated as neither urgent nor worthy of further attention.790
In the UK, concern over the potential consequences of the securitization policy was 
greater than in Germany, because of the greater extent of securitization practices in the UK 
market. However, this concern was not channeled through the peak national banking 
associations. The BBA and LIBA decried what they viewed as the unnecessarily conservative 
nature of the RBA securitization policy, but did not offer a systematic critique. They criticized 
the ‘56 floor’, but only indirectly.791 Instead, the UK banking community expressed its concerns 
through transnational organizations such as the Bond Market Association (BMA) and the ISDA.
The Japanese private sector response mirrored the British. The Japanese Bankers’ 
Association argued that the assumptions embedded in Basel II’s securitization model were 
unduly stringent, and that the risk weights should be lowered to differentiate sub-investment 
grade securitization tranches from those of higher value.792 Not only were securitization markets 
expanding at the time (see Appendix 8), but some individual Japanese banks had extensive 
investments in securitized products.
The Canadian Bankers’ Association criticized numerous aspects of the Accord’s 
treatment of securitization. The CBA organized a Securitization Sub-Group to deal with the more
786 See ZKA 2003, p. 5.
787 ZKA 2003, p. 5
788 ZKA 2003, p. 52
789 See Bundesag January 2003, p. 45.
790 See Bundestag January 2003, p. 171.
791 BBA and LIBA 2003, p. 16.
792 JBA 2003, p. 9.
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technical aspects of the Basel II policy. This body was able to generate specific technical 
proposals, which it communicated to the Canadian regulator, the OSFI.793 On the one hand, the 
CBA advocated that the 56 floor be removed, arguing to the OSFI that it would result in 
regulatory capital requirements more than double the amount banks already held, and making it 
“so punitive it could have significant impact on the merits of the business [of securitization in 
general].”794 Canadian banks however perceived the policy to be the result not of the OSFI’s 
position with respect to securitization, but rather the regulatory stance in the United States.795 As 
such, their comments on the Basel II securitization policy offered policy alternatives as well as 
critique.796
The Transnational Campaign: The SA ’
Most private sector criticism of Basel II’s securitization policy was expressed through 
transnational organizations. Even the concerns of US associations, such as the American 
Securitization Forum (ASF), were channeled into transnational activism, though this would
i • 797change over time.
The principle transnational private sector critic of Basel II’s October 2002 securitization 
draft policy was an association of associations, a coalition representing the most important 
national and international banking organizations. The European Securitization Forum, the 
American Securitization Forum, the ISDA, and the International Association of Credit Portfolio 
Managers (IACPM) joined together, and they jointly produced a highly detailed, 77-page critique 
of Basel II’s securitization policies. This group, referred to informally as the ‘Securitization 
Associations’ (henceforth the ‘SA’), included senior representatives from some of the largest 
banks in the world, such as Fortis, HSBC, Merrill Lynch, Societe Generate, MBNA, BNP
793 Interviews 60P, 6 IP. See CBA 2003, pp. 26-29.
794 CBA 2003, p. 29.
795 Interview 6IP.
796 CBA 2003, pp. 28-29.
797 Interview, 6 IP.
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Paribas, and ABN AMRO, along with the US law firm specializing in securitizations, Mayer,
7 Q O
Brown, Rowe and Maw.
After the October 2002 draft o f  Basel II was released, members o f  the SA began to 
research and collect empirical data concerning the projected impact o f  the policy, with the help 
o f  their numerous coalition partners. Their research indicated that the policy’s capital 
requirements were unreasonably high; consequently, the SA argued against the policy’s 
em bedded conservative assumptions.799 Their critiques o f  these policies were thus highly 
technical, and they had mobilized considerable quantitative resources in order to make it.800 
Based on their own extensive surveying o f securitization practices, they demonstrated 
empirically that the risk-weight assumptions o f Basel II’s securitization framework were unduly 
stringent at every point on a spectrum o f  risk. Figures 9.0 and 9.1 below illustrate the case that 
the SA presented to the BCBS in regard to ‘highly granular securitization pools’.801
Figure 9.0; BCBS Proposals and SA Proposals 
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798 Securitization Associations January 2003, p. 46.
799 It was determined that for the Supervisory Framework, the risk weights were too conservative and the formula 
too complicated -  for the RBA, risk weights were found to be even more conservative. See Securitization 
Associations January 2003, pp. 2-4, 11.
800 See Securitization Associations Jan 2003, p. 12.
801 The same relationship was argued for the ‘base case’ as well. See Securitization Associations January 2003, p. 15 
(Table 3B).
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Figure 9.1: BCBS Proposals and SA Proposals 
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This international campaign o f the SA had the distinct advantage o f meeting in 
‘roundtables’ with the BCBS Securitization Sub-Group at the time.802 While members o f this 
Sub-Group, whose most active members were US regulators, were well aware o f the systemic 
importance o f securitization instruments, the SA alleged that Basel IPs securitization policies 
would cause a liquidity crunch, which would ultimately expand beyond banks to insurance 
investors as well. Furthermore, they argued that the stringent modeling assumptions o f the BCBS 
would lead to hedge funds’ acquisition o f  non-investment grade securitization positions, which 
would in turn increase the level o f  systemic risk in the financial system as a whole.803
Regulators ’ Response
Regulators in Germany, the UK, Japan and Canada neither changed their positions nor 
their behavior within the BCBS. Although regulators in each o f these countries took an active 
interest in the concerns o f their banks, the securitization policy o f Basel II was seen as an 
important international compromise. The stringency o f this regulatory policy was important for 
Continental European (including German) members o f  the BCBS, and both the policy’s
802 As evinced in Securitization Associations January 2003, pp. 13-14. Corroborated in interview 84P.
803 Securitization Associations January 2003, p. 9.
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modeling assumptions and the details were viewed by all as essential for the proper regulation of 
securitization. No regulator from Germany, the UK, or Canada engaged in value-claiming 
behavior during this period.804 And despite the extensity of the SA’s campaign and their highly 
technical argument, their efforts did not have traction within the BCBS as a whole either. 
Although the SA continued to operate at the transnational level, the majority o f the private sector 
mobilization now took place within the United States, and focused on US regulators. Two 
leading members of the SA, the BMA and the American Securitization Forum (ASF) took the 
lead in a new, nationally focused campaign.
Section 3 
The US Securitization Campaign
Following the April 2003 draft of the Accord, the ASF and the BMA, both heavily 
involved in the SA, decided to focus on US regulators. The American Securitization Forum was 
actually an adjunct o f the (UK-US) Bond Market Association (BMA), whose members were 
involved in US securitization transactions as issuers, underwriters, dealers, investors, servicers 
and professional advisors. They decided to concentrate their attention on US regulators for a 
number of reasons. Through their engagement with the Securitization Sub-Group, members of 
the ASF had established an ongoing dialogue with the Fed. Also, in light of the high degree of 
skepticism among European BCBS members, it felt it would have a greater chance of success 
with the Americans. Furthermore, given the Fed’s seeming receptivity to empirically-based 
arguments, they believed they could persuade the Fed by providing its with data and analysis 
beyond that required to demonstrate industry-specific needs.805 Finally, it was well known not 
only that the US Agencies were taking the lead within the BCBS on securitization, but also that 
Congress was increasingly interested in the issue.
Securitization in Congress
804 Interviews 35R, 90R, 95R.
805 Interview 84P.
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The BMA began engaging with Congress on the Basel II securitization policy, following 
the failed transnational efforts. Legislative interest in the securitization proposals was strong, and 
interested in private sector commentary -  perhaps partly because of the important political 
contributions coming from the industry. The Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association (SIFMA) was the parent organization to the ASF, and was the second largest 
contributor to House Financial Services Committee Chairman’s 2002 electoral campaign.806 
Both the Senate Committee on Housing, Banking and Urban Affairs, and the House Financial 
Services Committee, invited a representative from the BMA to air their concerns during the June 
2003 oversight hearings.807 The BMA sent its President, Micah S. Green, to testify on behalf of 
the securitization industry. In his testimony to the US Senate Committee Green argued that there 
should be more reliance on internal risk models,808 and that the stringent modeling assumptions 
of the Basel II securitization policy “lacked a proper theoretical or empirical foundation”.
Furthermore, he argued that Basel II reduces the incentive for banks to participate in
securitizations, thus limiting banks’ ability “to effectively...disseminate the risk of a particular 
transaction through the marketplace.”809 Furthermore, Green framed his critique in terms of its 
dispersed social effects. He argued that the Basel II proposals would not just hurt the
securitization sector, but US consumers as well. According to Green, “considering who
ultimately benefits from a vibrant securitization market, consumers of homes, car buyers, or 
other people who need capital, this is very important”; he further asserted that securitization 
brings “the high finance, the technology of finance down to the consumer level through lower 
cost home mortgage.”810 Such a framing of the securitization policy’s costs was highly effective, 
as it co-opted concerns that a transnational regulatory policy could adversely affect the well­
being of American citizens-cum-consumers. In the both the House and Senate hearings, both 
Chairmen were very receptive and sympathetic to Green’s argument.811 Indeed, both Chairmen,
8°6 gjpfyjA donated $30,999 to Chairman Oxleys Campaign Committee and Leadership PAC in the 2002 cycle. 
Source: Opensecrets.
807 It is not clear whether these committees contacted the BMA, or vice versa.
808 Congress June 2003a, p. 35.
809 Green 2003, p. 4.
8,0 Congress June 2003a, p. 36. See also Congress June 2003b, p. 48.
811 For Shelby’s exchange with Green, see Congress June 2003a, p. 51. For Bachus’ exchange with Green, see 
Congress June 2003b, pp. 54-55.
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Representative Bachus and Senator Shelby, expressed their support for the concerns of the 
securitization industry.812
Focusing on the US Regulators
Following the Congressional hearings, groups like the ASF continued to refine their 
arguments and strategize a way to achieve permissive regulatory policy changed. They deployed 
a more focused argument to the US regulators, asserting that the conservative assumptions of the 
Basel II model were based on the market for Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO) market, and 
were derived from a questionable source. The ASF insisted that the BCBS’s touchstone LGD 
levels had been empirically demonstrated to be much higher than bank’s own internal allocation 
of capital, as indicated by best practice.813 The ASF thus maintained that the 50% LGD 
assumption would lead to “great distortions of capital” for senior, relatively thick securitization 
tranches. They argued specifically that, instead of having a different LGD assumption for each 
different kind of securitization, a workable LGD assumption for thick, granular securitization 
positions ought to be between 5% and 10%.814 Such a range was legitimized with reference to 
extensive empirical data, and bolstered by claims that the BCBS’ work represented “unjustifiable 
and punitive capital requirements for securitizations.”815 Their efforts at criticism were shared by 
many other private sector groups, such as Bank One, KeyCorp, and the Mortgage Bankers’ 
Association.816
The ASF also proposed specific alternations to the policy, such as the suggestion that, 
contrary to the existing instantiation of the securitization policy, banks should be allowed to use 
their own internal ratings for certain kinds of securitization activity. Specifically, the ASF argued 
that banks should be allowed to use their own internal ratings for Asset-Backed Commercial 
Paper (ABCP) programs. In an ABCP program, a bank establishes a special purpose vehicle
812 Senator Shelby had also explicitly questioned Hawke on how the securitization policies of Basel II would affect 
US securitization markets, given that there were much more advanced than in other countries. See Congress June 
2003a, p. 26.
813 See Securitization Associations July 2003, p 6.
8,4 ASF September 2003, p. 2; See also ASF November 2003, pp. 3-5.
815 ASF November 2003, p. 3.
816 See Capital One July 2003, p. 6; KeyCorp July 2003, p. 3; MBA November 2003, p. 7; ABA July 2003, p. 3.
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(SPV) to issue ‘commercial paper’, that is, a claim on corporate securities, for firms seeking a 
source o f finance outside of bank loans or issuing stock. While the SPV is often ‘legally remote’ 
(that is, remote from bankruptcy) from the bank that establishes it, banks try to ‘sweeten the 
deal’ by providing the buyers of the commercial paper with services such as lines of liquidity or 
credit enhancement. Because of the nature of this practice, most ABCP programs were not rated 
by external rating agencies, but rather were internally risk-assessed, i.e. within the banks 
themselves.
Through their engagement with regulators, the ASF learned that regulators were 
concerned about banks’ ability to address correlations in their internal systems. The ASF argued 
that this concern was unwarranted, since banks’ own internal risk estimates were believed to be 
just as good, if not better, than those provided by rating agencies. 817 Furthermore, the ASF 
argued to the US regulators that banks’ internal rating system for ABCP conduit transactions was 
a superior alternative to the Basel policy’s complexities.818 Their critique was actively shared by 
the American Bankers’ Association and individual US banks as well.819 The BMA also shared 
their critique, and underlined to the Fed how vital the commercial paper market was at the time. 
Such a claim was easily validated, as the commercial paper market represented the largest 
segment of the US money market — 2.665 trillion at the end of 2000 -  and was expanding rapidly 
at the time.820
Over time, specialized associations like the ASF were joined in their criticism by other 
private sector actors, such the real estate industry. Three private sector associations in the US 
were particularly concerned about the potential threats to their industries: the Real Estate 
Roundtable (RER), the Commercial Mortgage Securities Association (CMSA), and the Mortgage 
Bankers’ Association (MBA). While the RER and MBA drew members from the real estate 
industry who were significantly invested in securitization processes, the CMSA’s members 
focused on business associated with commercial real estate debt.821 As Appendix 8 illustrates, 
the Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities market was very large at this time, with $60 billion
817 ASF September 2003, p. 3.
818 Securitization Associations July 2003, p. 11.
819 See ABA July 2003, p. 6; PNC July 2003.
820 BMA May 2001, p. 2
821 The CMSA contained a very diverse membership base, including both lenders and investors in CRE debt, 
mortgage bankers, mortgage servicing firms, law firms that represent CRE debt business, bond underwriters, rating 
agencies who rate CRE debt, and accounting firms.
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in new issuance in 2002 alone. These real estate groups were particularly concerned that these 
markets would be adversely affected by Basel IPs failure to differentiate between CMBS 
instruments and other forms of securitization, such as Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs).
The RER, CMSA and MBA thus argued that Basel II should differentiate between these 
practices to accommodate the special low risk properties of the CMBS market. The RER and 
CMSA worked and coordinated their positions in presentations to both to regulators and 
Congress.822 Referring to empirical evidence, they claimed to the US regulators that whereas 
BB-rated defaults averaged over 11% for CDO and ABS instruments, for CMBS, the figure was 
only a fraction of that, at .43%.823 The MBA also made an empirical case, and added that 
because banks, life insurance firms, and pension funds were all key investors in the CMBS 
market, “the financial security of average Americans... is affected by the security and liquidity of 
the real estate debt market.”824 The RER and the CMSA focused their pro-active campaign on 
the Fed, as it was understood that this body constituted the central driving force behind the 
securitization framework. Members of the RER and the CMSA met with Ferguson and his staff 
repeatedly to discuss their concerns, and were given some reassurances that should the right kind 
of data be forthcoming, the Fed would consider having the policy changed.825
Regulators' Response
The US Agencies understood securitization not only as a vital regulatory issue, but also 
as one impacting the competitiveness of US banks. While the Fed was somewhat sympathetic to 
certain private sector critiques, the OCC was more skeptical.826 Although the Fed remained 
conservative in the face of uncertainty, it was also receiving considerable negative feedback, and 
viewed private sector mobilization as an important signal that the Basel II securitization policy 
might damage US securitization markets.827 Securitization was not only a booming practice in 
the US at the time, it was also seen to be an important systemic driver of risk mitigation at the
822 Interviews 44P, 50P.
823 RER and CMSA July 2003, p. 12.
824 MBA July 2003, p. 2; Interview 50P.
825 See RER and CMSA November 2003, p. 4. See also Croke and Roberts September 2003
826 Interview 95R.
827 For example, they were skeptical of the claims that CMBS’ were less risky. See BCBS October 2002b, p. 6; Dev 
2002.
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time. Consequently, at the October 2003 meeting of the BCBS in Madrid, the US delegation, led 
on this issue by the Fed, announced that the Basel II securitization policy needed to be revised. 
As was the case with the expected losses and credit cards policies described in Chapter 8, the Fed 
also asserted in this instance that failure to revise the policy would inhibit the US’s ability to 
ratify the Accord.
Despite raising this concern at the 11th hour, the rest of the BCBS heeded the US 
delegation’s demand. The Chair of the BCBS at the time, Jaime Caruana, was well aware of the 
substantial concern surrounding securitization proposals at the time, and thus was sympathetic.828 
Other European members were also well aware of the broad concerns over securitization, but 
they were also had stringent preferences regarding securitization, and were consequently more 
skeptical.829 Despite these differences of position, however, the Continental Europeans decided 
to let the US delegation revise the securitization framework largely as it saw fit, and did not 
resist the value-claiming behavior of the US delegation. The BCBS acknowledged the 
securitization issue as crucial to the US delegation. While the German delegation in particular 
was not entirely sympathetic to the US position, there was an implicit mutual understanding that 
they would not target vital US issues.830 There is some possibility that German delegates were 
cooperative in this way because of the fact their previous victory with SMEs -  raising the spectre 
of issue-linkage in the negotiation (this is attended to analytically in Chapter 10).
The BCBS agreed at this meeting that they would simplify the treatment o f securitization 
by eliminating the Supervisory Formula and replacing it with a less complex formula.831 Just as 
importantly, however, the US was granted the autonomy to revise the securitization framework 
largely by itself.832 The Fed was granted this autonomy not only because there was impatience 
for further negotiation, but also because securitization was seen as a highly technical subject and, 
as highly important to the US, they had the greatest incentive to ‘get it right’.833 There was thus 
confidence that the US delegation — principally the Fed — could revise the securitization
828 Caruana September 2003, p. 1.
829 Interviews 90R,95R.
830 See Bundestag October 2003, p. 59
831 BCBS October 2003, p. 1.
832 Interviews 35R, 90R, 95R. See also Bundestag October 2003, p. 66.
833 Interview 95R; See also Bundestag May 2003, p. 52; Bundestag October 2003, p. 66.
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framework appropriately, especially given the structural importance of securitization markets in 
the US — the fact that the US had (by far) the largest securitization markets.834
Continued Campaigning
After the BCBS announced that the securitization policy would be revised, a plethora of 
relatively silent groups began to speak out alongside the ASF, and all the while the issue 
remained highly salient to Congress, who wrote and put pressure on the US regulators.835 In this 
context, the ASF sought to provide US regulators with information that would persuade them to 
advocate permissive regulatory policy change.836 After surveying their membership, they 
communicated to the US regulators that the 56-floor would require them to hold “nearly double 
the economic capital” than they otherwise held, perhaps even more.837 The ASF also actively 
raised its proposals for ABCP programs, and argued that allowing banks to use their own internal 
ratings would address many of the substantive concerns of the industry as a whole. This point 
was also advocated bilaterally by many of the largest US banks.838
The RER and CMSA also provided more data to the US regulators, obtained not only from their 
members but also from rating agencies such as S&P, Moody’s, Fitch, and from the real estate 
capital markets of the US investment banks Morgan Stanley and Lehman Brothers. This data 
suggests that CMBS exposures were equivalent to, or in some cases even less risky than, 
corporate exposures, and that the ratings of these exposures was substantially backed up by 
several layers of quality control.839
Regulatory Policy Outcomes
834 Interview 95R.
835 See FSR November, 2003, p. 8; Merrill November 2003, p. 5; PNC November, p. 19; Bank of America 
November 2003, p. 53. See also Congress November 2003, p. 9.
836 According to some accounts at the time, the Fed was very receptive to detailed information at this time. Interview 
53P.
837 ASF November 2003, pp. 8,53.
838 See for example ASF November 2003, pp. 15-17. JPMC November, 2003, pp. 10, 56; CSFB December 2003, p.
4; ABA November 2003, p. 12.
839 Specifically, they argued that the historic default rate was lower -  see figures 4a and 4b in RER and CMSA 
November 2003, pp. 2,11,19, 20.
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After several months o f technical work on the securitization policy, the US regulators 
presented the rest o f  the BCBS with their proposals. These changes were not controversial within 
the BCBS, and were announced by the BCBS Secretariat after a relatively uneventful meeting in 
January 2004, and were later affirmed in the final June 2004 document. These changes reflect an 
instance o f  circumscribed permissive regulatory policy change, as some features o f  the Basel II 
securitization policy were changed, while others were not.
There were significant changes to the securitization model assumptions. Not only was the 
Securitization Formula simplified, but some o f  its parameters were altered as well, making it less 
stringent and easier for banks to use.840 For the RWA approach, the risk weights for senior 
securitization tranches were significantly lowered. Figures 9.2 details the original Basel II 
proposal in this respect, circa April 2003. Figure 9.3 illustrates the systematic lowering o f the 
risk weights in the January 2004 re-draft o f  the securitization fram ew ork.841
Figure 9.2: Risk Weight Curves for Securitized Assets in the 
April 2003 draft o f Basel II
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840 The BCBS proposed in January 2004 to lower the value o f  this key parameter from 1000 to 75. However by June 
2004 in the final Basel II document Tau is put back to 1000. See BCBS January 2004a, p. 3; BCBS June 2004, p. 
133.
841 These data are from BCBS January 2004c, p. 6. These changes remained in the final A ccord's draft. See BCBS 
2004, pp. 128-132.
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Figure 9.3: Risk Weight Curves for Securitized Assets in the 
June 2004 draft of Basel II
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The argument regarding ABCP programs was also heeded. On the basis o f  the information that 
private sector groups provided, the Fed had accepted the argument that ABCP programs should 
be given special permissive treatment. The Fed reversed its former position on how regulatory 
capital was to be measured for unrated securitization exposures, and an ‘Internal Assessment 
Approach’ was formulated. This new feature o f  the Basel II securitization policy stated explicitly 
that, when dealing with liquid facilities and credit enhancements associated with ABCP conduits, 
banks would be allowed to derive their own risk weights for unrated exposures by mapping their 
own internal risk assessments to external credit ratings.842 The BCBS claimed this measure 
reflected an approach “more aligned with industry practices.”843 Indeed, this sentiment had been 
exactly what US private sector groups like the ASF and others had been arguing. W hile there
842 BCBS January 2004a, p. 20; BCBS January 2003c, p. 2, pp. 9-11.
843 Banking and Financial Services Policy Report 2004.
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were some details and open questions that concerned US private sector groups, the overall 
picture was a positive one.844 The ASF thanked the BCBS for heeding their longstanding 
critique.845
Despite these significant changes to the Basel II securitization policy, some stringent 
aspects o f the policy remained. The regulatory capital floor for securitizations was left in place. 
While the BCBS discussed the possibility o f removing the floor, the body was not persuaded of 
the merits of a lower floor.846 Indeed, broad consensus remained regarding the value of the 56 
floor.847 As illustrated in Fjguie"S3 above, the lowest risk weight possible for securitization 
transactions remained at 7%. Furthermore, the securitization policy was not differentiated to 
accommodate CMBS markets. The BCBS had discussed the issue seriously, but it ultimately 
decided that this policy change would not be a good idea. The reasons for the rejection of this 
campaign were relatively simple: the RER and CMSA had failed to convince the Fed.849 
Furthermore, the kind of differentiation that the CMBS campaign advocated would not “improve 
materially the [risk-based assets’] overall sensitivity to risk,” thus the policy did not have traction 
within the BCBS as a whole.850
Conclusion
This chapter has examined the various private sector campaigns that contested Basel II’s 
securitization policy. This chapter began by describing campaigns that took place at the national 
level in Germany, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Japan, and also at the transnational level. 
The most extensive of these campaigns was that of the ‘Securitization Associations’ (the ‘SA’), 
which channeled the concerns of many national associations, including groups in the US. Each of 
these campaigns exhibited different characteristics, as seen in the Configuration Table below; 
however, none of them were successful in achieving permissive regulatory policy change. These
844 See FOIA February 2004.
845 ASF March 2004. See also Structured Finance International 2004.
846 See BCBS January 2004c, p. 7.
847 See April 2003, p. 116 and BCBS June 2004, p. 132.
848 See BCBS January 2004c, p. 7.
849 See BCBS January 2004c, p. 7.
850 See BCBS January 2004c, p. 7.
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cases provide further evidence that private sector groups are not always successful at achieving 
influence, despite concerted efforts
Following the failed transnational efforts, US private sector groups became extensively 
mobilized beginning in the spring and summer of 2003, and launched a considerable campaign 
regarding the securitization policy. As an example of a successful national private sector 
campaign, this campaign offers support for the Mobilization, Information Network, and 
Legislative Oversight hypotheses. Each of these underlying conditions appears to have played an 
important role in first influencing the US regulators -  especially their position on the issue within 
the BCBS -  and then in securing permissive regulatory policy change at the BCBS level.
While the precise reactions of US regulators to private sector groups’ detailed arguments 
are not known, the evidence suggests that the US regulators were very receptive to the private 
sector securitization campaign. Interestingly, when the US delegation engaged in value-claiming 
behavior within the BCBS, they were not met with resistance by the rest of the BCBS. US 
private sector groups thus played an important role in driving through a variety of changes to the 
Basel II securitization policy by providing the Fed with substantial information. However, the 
evidence also suggests that the principle architect of these changes, the Fed, was not resistant or 
‘pressured’ into such changes, but rather was receptive and cautious regarding what it saw as an 
important part of the US banking system. The Fed’s receptivity, and the fact that the rest of the 
BCBS accommodated the Fed’s demands because of the shared belief in the importance of 
securitization to the US banking system, offers some empirical support to the Mobilization 
hypothesis. The structural importance of US securitization markets was also widely recognized 
within the US and among the rest of the BCBS -  suggesting some support for the Structural 
Power hypothesis. The presence of supportive legislative oversight may have played a role in 
influencing the US regulators’ decisions, but the evidence in this regard is more ‘correlative’ 
than ‘causal’. The US regulators had been long exposed to the ASF’s arguments, but it was only 
in the summer of 2003, during a period of supportive legislative oversight, that the regulators 
decided to take steps to change the securitization policy. While the US securitization campaign 
successfully influenced the content of Basel II, the actual extent of permissive regulatory policy 
change was circumscribed -  as denoted in the fuzzy-set score of .67 for this case in the 
Configuration Table below.
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Chapter 10
Across-Case Analysis
While previous empirical chapters have engaged in detailed process-tracing analyses of 
private sector campaigns targeting different regulatory policies in Basel II, this chapter engages 
in across-case analysis. Given the diversity of contexts in which campaigns took place, 
comprehensive across-case analysis can help to ascertain whether or not general patterns of 
influence exist. Furthermore, evaluating patterns which exist across cases helps to discern the 
possibility that some aspects of the power relationship between private sector groups and 
regulators might have been missed due to the particular limitations of process-tracing analysis 
(as discussed in Chapter 2). In particular, the role of institutions and dimensions of structural 
power are explored — contextual aspects of campaigns that are not amenable to the method of 
process tracing.
This chapter is divided into five sections. In Section 1 ,1 provide a stylized summary of 
the findings in Chapters 3-9. I conclude that evidence across cases suggests strong support for 
the business conflict hypothesis, but that in general there is evidence both in support and against 
most hypotheses of the study. In Section 2 I engage with two methodological issues that are 
important to address before proceeding with systematic across-case analysis: dealing with 
possible interdependencies across cases, and considering structural power effects at the agenda- 
setting phase of Basel II’s development.
In Section 3 ,1 use fsQCA to assess the necessity and sufficiency of individual conditions 
-  both those which were ‘observed’ in earlier process tracing, and also structural power 
variables. In Section 4 ,1 use fsQCA to assess the combined sufficiency of different conditions, in 
order to assess whether or not there is a particular combination of conditions which are sufficient 
in explaining private sector influence. This analysis finds no evidence for a general 
combinatorial pattern within transnational campaigns, but it does find one for the national
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campaigns: that is, a particular ‘recipe’ of conditions which are jointly sufficient in producing 
permissive regulatory policy change (PRPC).
Section 4 introduces several institutional variables into the analysis and considers their 
possible role in producing PRPC. I use fsQCA and statistical regression analysis to assess such 
relationships across-cases, and carry out further robustness checks to consider how strong the 
empirical findings are under different conditions. In Section 5 ,1 explore some of the mechanisms 
at work across cases, paying particular attention to the intermediate dependent variable, which 
assesses whether the national regulator was influenced or not.
Section 1 
Evaluating General Patterns
The empirical chapters in this study provide an extensive resource for engaging in across- 
case analysis. In Table 10.0 below, these hypotheses are cross-configured with each of the 
empirical chapters in the study based on empirical support found through process tracing 
analysis. An ‘S’ indicates that there was empirical support for a given hypothesis, while a ‘~’ 
indicates that empirical material with which to test a given hypothesis was unavailable for that 
particular Chapter.851 A lower case ‘s’ indicates that the hypothesis was supported in that this 
factors’ absence was associated with non-influence, as per the case o f business conflict in many 
of the proceeding chapters.
Table 10.0: Evaluating Hypotheses in the Study and on the Basis of
Within-Case Evidence
851 Such an ‘overview’-type evaluation of hypotheses within a large IPE study has precedent in Drezner 2007, pp. 
206-207.
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Hypothesis EvaluationName o f Hypothesis
f f j  Legislative Oversight ~ S S S S S
f f 2 M obilization S S S S
/ / ? Information Network S S S S S
f f 4 Structural Power S S S
f f 5 Business Conflict S S s S S S S
JJ6 Coalitions S S S S S
f j 7 Transnational Pathway S ~  ~ ~ ~
ff8 National Carrier Pathway S S S S S S
As this table illustrates, within-case evidence existed for a variety o f  hypotheses, usually 
in conjunction in instances when private sector influence occurred. This stylized summary o f 
results illustrates what has been made evident throughout the chapters o f this study: that there is 
considerable contingency and diversity in the extent to which private sector groups have been 
able to achieve permissive regulatory policy change. Such a pattern is made even more evident 
when one considers that in instances where private sector influence did not occur, many o f the 
variables associated with each o f these hypotheses were present, indicating falsifying 
evidence.852 Rather than providing a stylized description o f  such falsifying evidence, which is 
inevitably highly complex, I rely on fsQCA below to evaluate these patterns across cases.
As this table illustrates, the process tracing analysis o f  earlier chapters found support for 
a number o f hypotheses in the study. In particular legislative oversight played an important role 
in five o f  the six national campaigns investigated, suggesting strong support for this hypothesis. 
We have seen that, in many o f these campaigns, regulators reacted differently to private sector
852 The notable exception to this is the Business Conflict hypothesis, which received consistent support across 
chapters.
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demands once legislative oversight was present. The mobilization of private sector groups was 
also found to be present in each of the successful campaigns examined, suggesting strong 
support for this hypothesis as well. Private sector groups communicated their preferences and 
concerns to regulators at both the transnational and national levels, and this such communication 
was seen, on a number of different occasions, to affect the responsiveness of regulators and in 
turn produce permissive regulatory policy change. However, it did not do so automatically, and 
would appear to be dependent upon other factors to be effective.
The provision of information also played an important role in a number of successful 
campaigns, although as we have seen it did not play an equal role in all cases. Campaigns such as 
the Operational Risk campaign and the Securitization campaign in the United States examined in 
Chapters 6 and 9, respectively, showed strong support for this particular mechanism of influence, 
as private sector groups strategically used studies and data to convince regulators to change 
course and to adapt policies in line with their own preferences. At the same time, we have also 
seen how in campaigns such as the first HVCRE campaign in the United States and the SMEs 
campaign in Germany, the provision of information was not an important part of the campaign’s 
success. There has been evidence for the Structural Power hypothesis as well, in that Chapter 9 
demonstrated that the structural importance of credit cards and securitization markets played a 
role in changing previously stringent regulatory policy decisions. In Chapter 3’s analysis of the 
W-factor, structural power was also considered to be a plausible factor in private sector 
influence. While private sector coalitions played an important role in some private sector 
campaigns, the evidence of previous chapters suggests that this factor was not a critical one 
(though this will be analyzed systematically below).
While this simplistic across-case evaluation reveals some patterns, by using the data 
contained in the Configuration Tables within each chapter, a systematic across-case analysis is 
possible using the methodologies described in Chapter 2. In what follows I investigate the 
necessity and sufficiency of individual conditions, as well as joint sufficiency, and I employ a 
combination of fsQCA and statistical regression analysis to assess the robustness of the findings. 
I also investigate the potential hitherto unobserved role of institutions. Before such 
comprehensive across-case analysis can take place, however, the next section investigates the 
issue of interdependencies across cases, discusses the possibilities of structural power taking
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place at the agenda-setting phase, and establishes a number of structural power variables that will 
be used in subsequent across-case analysis.
Section 2 
Addressing Interdependencies and Structural Power 
at the Agenda-Setting Phase
Before systematic across-case analysis can take place, an important issue to address is the 
issue of possible across-case interdependencies. As was discussed in Chapter 2, two kinds of 
interdependencies need to be considered: ‘spillover effects’, and ‘issue linkage’. In order to 
address spillover effects, all cases marked with an ‘I’ in the configuration table are collapsed into 
one single case using the logical OR procedure specified within the QCA literature.853 I treat 
instances where private sector groups were unsuccessful in their efforts to achieve permissive 
regulatory policy change, despite an earlier successful campaign, as a unique kind of case which 
is analyzed separately, and referred to as ‘after-campaigns’. With these changes made, I employ 
two different datasets — a dataset which includes interdependencies, as reported in the 
Configuration Tables of previous chapters, and a dataset with the spillover effects addressed 
through the logical OR procedure described in Chapter 2. FsQCA analysis below will employ 
these different datasets in the same initial analyses; however, in general the dataset with spillover 
effects eliminated will be considered the superior data, because possible interdependencies will 
be addressed, thus minimizing distortions.
Interdependencies are also a concern by means of ‘issue linkage’, whereby the 
negotiation of one policy is dependent on the negotiation of another policy. As was discussed in 
Chapter 2, a variety of aspects of the Basel II policymaking process minimize the potential for 
such an interdependency across policies, since most regulatory policies were designed as discrete 
entities, not only at different points in time, but also by different individuals in different 
subcommittees within the BCBS. Over the course of detailed process tracing, it was only in the 
negotiation of three policies that any evidence of issue-linkage was found. For the negotiation of 
the W-Factor (explicated in Chapter 3), the removal of this policy from Pillar I of the Accord
853 This involves taking the highest value for a given range of the same variable, and is a common practices in the 
fsQCA literature.
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occurred alongside the implicit agreement that another aspect of the Accord would be addressed 
more seriously than it had been, namely procyclicality. The removal of the regulatory capital 
floor o f the operational risk policy (examined in Chapter 5) was also motivated in part not by 
factors endogenous to that particular policy, but by decisions made on other aspects of the 
Accord. Finally, for the negotiation of the securitization policy -  specifically during the time of 
the strong US demands in October 2003 -  there is also some evidence of issue-linkage (in terms 
of negotiation with Germany at least), although the extent to which this issue-linkage had a 
causal impact on the negotiation of the securitization policy outcome is questionable. These three 
instances of possible issue-linkage are taken into account in the analysis below by removing 
them from the sample o f cases which analyze relations of necessity and sufficiency between the 
intermediate variable ‘regulator influenced’ and the main dependent variable, ‘PRPC’.
Addressing Structural Power at the Agenda-Setting Phase
Another issue that should be addressed is structural power at the agenda-setting phase of 
Basel II’s development. It is also important to address this here because such an analysis helps to 
establish some of the policy-level structural power variables used in subsequent analysis.
To what extent were the initial regulatory policy proposals affected by conditions of 
structural power? As Figure 2.0 in Chapter 2 described, this possibility is a very difficult 
dynamic to measure empirically, because there is no ‘prior’ regulatory policy position with 
which to compare the actual regulatory policy proposal. Consequently, an empirical analysis of 
structural power at this stage in regulatory policymaking is limited by an unknown hypothetical. 
Despite this serious empirical limitation, it is possible to investigate the relative stringency or 
permissiveness of regulatory policies when they were first proposed. To conduct this analysis, I 
considered three forms of policy-specific structural power that are associated with each of the 
business lines of the twelve regulatory policies considered in the study. Such an approach 
follows the methodological approach of assessing influence by ‘degree of preference attainment’, 
since causal processes cannot be observed.854
854 See Dur 2008a: 567.
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Table 10.1: Structural Power Properties Associated 
with Regulatory Policies’ Initial Positions
“5 “o
I  ITO !-► 
O =1 
v> 3  
»  a
o
Regulatory Policy 
Examined
Structural Power
Indicator
^rw w ~ ~
T3O
Full internal models
Internal .33
3 Interest Rate Risk .67 0 0 1
4 W factor .67 1 1 1
5 Operational risk 1 0 .33 1
6 Commercial real estate 1 .33 0 .33
7 SME Lending ~ ~ ~
8 HVCRE 1 0 0 0
9 Residential mortgages 0 1 0 1
1 0 Revolving (Credit 
Cards)
.67 .67 .33 .33
...........
1 1 Expected Losses 1 0 0
1 2 Securitization 1 1 .67 .33
Other Retail 0 .67 0 .67
Based on substantive knowledge o f  each o f these regulatory policies, I gave a fuzzy-set 
score to each o f the 1 2  regulatory policies for the costliness o f  the initial regulatory policy 
proposal, i.e. the first time the respective policy was put onto the agenda. By costliness I mean to 
assess whether or not the policy increased regulatory capital requirements. Such costliness is 
derived from the early quantitative impact studies (QISs) conducted on policies, or substantive 
knowledge o f their content when QIS data is not available. The internal ratings approach 
described in Chapter 3 and the initial residential mortgage policy described in Chapter 7 were 
both policies which when initially proposed were not costly — indeed capital was expected to 
decrease by 5% for internal ratings and 60% for residential mortgages under their respective
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initial proposals.855 However most other regulatory policies were costly at the initial proposal 
stage. The initial regulatory policy proposal for securitization for example was estimated to 
increase regulatory capital requirements by 108%. As Chapter 3 outlined, the operational risk 
capital charge was initially set at 20% of total regulatory capital -  a substantial increase in 
regulatory capital from the status quo at the time (hence why it was so strongly resisted). For this 
reason, these policies are coded as 1 in terms o f costliness. Other regulatory policies witnessed 
an expected increase in regulatory capital, but at more moderate levels. For the initial credit card 
policy, for example, regulatory capital was expected to increase by 14%.857 Likewise, for the 
interest rate risk policy and the W-factor, while the initial regulatory policy proposals were 
costly, they were not extremely costly when compared to the other policies ‘full in’ this set (and 
thus are valued at .67).
I also include a variable which assesses the potential mobility of a regulatory policies’ 
business line. Such a coding entails using knowledge about global market shares as well as the 
costs of moving business lines to other jurisdictions outside the BCBS’ purview.858 Most of the 
regulatory policies listed above are not potentially mobile in this respect -  commercial real 
estate, or the internal ratings of banks’ processes are highly unlikely to be relocated outside the 
G10. Neither is it likely that markets for these products/practices would locate elsewhere should 
the G10 impose costly regulatory requirements: to access commercial real estate markets in the 
US, one has to operate in the US; to operate internal ratings o f a G10 bank one must be a G10 
bank, etc. The significant exceptions to this are the W-factor and securitization policies. As 
Chapter 3 established, the W-factor policy involved the residual risk associated with derivatives 
transactions. While in 2001 BCBS countries have 90.5% of the world share of premium traded 
derivatives contracts within their markets, they only have 71% of the world volume of 
derivatives exchanges. Because the W-factor involved a regulatory cost on transactions, it is 
conceivable that derivatives markets could have migrated outside the BCBS in some fashion in 
response to the costliness of the regulatory policy proposal. The securitization policy proposal
855 See BCBS November 2001a, p. 3 (Table 1). A small number of banks would have increased capital requirements, 
but the majority would decrease. See BCBS November 2001a, p. 6; See BCBS November 2001b. For residential 
mortgage capital requirements, see BCBS May 2003, p. 29.
856 See BCBS November 2001, p. 5
857 See BCBS May 2003, p. 29.
858 In some other empirical examinations of the structural power hypothesis, the variation in mobility is understood 
to affect policy outcomes - see Walter 2000, p. 67.
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can also be associated with potential mobility, because securitization instruments could change 
locality on the basis of special purpose vehicles outside the G10. The ease with which such a 
change could be done arguably varied according to countries’ relationships with offshore 
entities, a factor which varies by country and not policy (this is addressed in a separate variable 
below). The securitization policy was coded at .67 rather than 1, because securitization markets, 
and the liquidity associated with them, were overwhelmingly concentrated in the BCBS 
(especially within the USA, as Chapter 10 illustrated). Thus, there would be significant market 
access and liquidity costs associated with potential mobility.859
I also included a variable for the relative size of each regulatory policy proposal. The 
relative average size of the business lines is calculable by the BCBS’s own quantitative impact 
studies, which measured the allocation of regulatory capital within the average large G10 bank 
under the de facto norm (i.e. Basel I). Because Basel I allocated capital relatively evenly across 
different business lines, these capital allocations can serve as a rough proxy for the size of the 
business lines associated with each policy. Securitization and revolving retail exposures were 
both relatively very small, at between 1.5% and 2% and between 2% and 2.8% of total capital.860 
Other business lines were quite large and occupied an extensive proportion of banks’ portfolios -  
such as residential mortgages (11 %-l 1.8%), and SME lending (9.8-18%).861 Other regulatory 
policies do not have quantitative figures associated with them, but can be judged based on 
substantive knowledge of the policy area and given their review in previous chapters. The 
internal ratings approach, for example, had to do with the vast majority of internal bank 
practices, and therefore is within this set. So is the W factor, since derivatives activity 
represented a large component of bank’s business lines at the time. The commercial real estate 
policy described in Chapter 4 was relatively limited in its reach, as was the HVCRE policy 
described in Chapter 7.862
Finally, I included a variable which assesses whether or not a given business line 
associated with the regulatory policy in question was important for financialized accumulation or 
not at the time. The concept of ‘financialization’ has been used by social scientists to make
859 This is further supported by Structured Finance International 2002 (p. 46), 2003 (p. 54) and 2004 (p. 52).
860 See BCBS May 2003, p. 29; QIS 5, p. 22.
861 See BCBS May 2003, p. 29; QIS 5, p. 22.
862 See also BCBS May 2003, p. 32.
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empirical and theoretical sense of the rise of finance in contemporary capitalism “by evaluating 
how individuals, firms and the domestic economy are increasingly mediated by new 
relationships with financial markets”.863 It is the primacy of financial sector accumulation that is 
associated with this phenomenon, as the “prevalence of the dictates of finance capital” is 
considered “a structural feature of capitalism.”864 The literature on financialization is highly 
variegated in its content and emphasis; however, there is a central locus of empirical indicators 
used to describe and/or assess the extent to which financialization has taken place. The
865phenomenon is associated with high rentier incomes, high returns on financial assets and the 
general profitability of the financial sector.866
Coding these values entails some qualitative judgment, and thus I rely on external criteria 
within the literature on financialization. While analyses of financialization are often made with 
respect to specific state contexts, or sometimes to the global economy as a whole, it is also the 
case that specific financial instruments and practices are understood to be critical to 
financialization. Several financial instruments and practices stand out in particular within this 
literature, especially asset securitization.867 While on this basis it is uncontroversial (at least by 
the standards of the existing literature) to associate the Basel II securitization policy with 
financialization, so too are the policies with business lines which fed securitization markets at the 
time, such as residential mortgage lending.868 In addition, derivatives markets are also widely 
viewed as a fundamental component of financialization, and are alluded to repeatedly in the 
existing literature.869 Consequently, each of these areas is considered fully in the set of policies 
associated with financialization as identified with the literature. Credit cards are another financial 
instrument associated with financialization, although this is done less often than with other 
financial instruments in the literature, and the credit card policy is given a .67 score (‘in but not 
fully in’ the set).870
863 See Montgomerie 2009, p. 1, from Engelen 2008, p. 111
864 Langley 2004, pp. 540-41.
865 Epstein and Jayadev 2005 50,67-68; Power, Epstein and Albrena 2003
866 Froud et. al. 2000, p. 100; Arrighi and Moore 2001, pp. 61-62; Langley 2004; Dumenil and Levy 2005, 2007;
Lipetz 2001; Raviv 2008, pp. 297-98
867 See, for example, Sassen 2010, pp. 36-37; Montgomerie 2008; Montgomerie 2009; Langley 2006
868 This point is described in Chapter 7, and is also made in Langley 2006.
869 See Pryke and Allen 2000; Bell and Sekine 2001, pp. 51-52; Dodd 2005; Pollin 2007, p. 148; Wigan 2010; 
Bienefeld 2007, pp. 23-24
870 See Montgomerie 2006; Montgomerie 2007; Montgomerie 2009.
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This analysis also raises the question of whether or not the policies selected for analysis 
may themselves select on an unknown factor which distorts these results. Of particular interest is 
the possibility that regulatory policies which were initially permissive were excluded, since cases 
would be positive evidence for structural power at the agenda-setting phase. To assess this 
possibility, I searched the Quantitative Impact Studies to specifically find regulatory policies in 
which regulatory capital was expected to decrease when the policy was initially proposed. The 
only regulatory policy which fulfilled this criteria but was not included in the study was ‘other 
retail’ lending, the part of banks’ retail lending portfolios that is not associated with either 
revolving retail exposures or mortgage exposures. The ‘other retail’ policy was expected to 
decrease capital requirements by 34-41%, and thus as indicated in the last row of Figure N 
above. I therefore coded it as non-costly.871 Assessing the importance o f retail bank lending for 
the financialization is possible since the literature on financialization has identified rising 
household indebtedness as a critical component of the financialization process.872 While there are 
many sources of household indebtedness during this period. One source is lines of credit from 
banks, a source of personal liquidity which is captured in banks’ retail lending portfolios. 
Consequently, I coded other retail as within the set of policy areas associated with 
financialization. Assessing the potential mobility of this business line is not difficult, given the 
fact that retail lending is highly localized in character, is not syndicated through banking groups, 
and is not a concern of international banking groups.873 Regarding the size of this policy, non­
mortgage, non-revolving retail lending composed approximately 7-8% of bank’s total capital, 
and thus I coded it as in but not fully in the set of large policies (.67).874
Table 10.2: Measuring Explicit Connections between Structural Power 
and the Absence of Costliness
Policies Included in Policies Included in
Study Study Plus ‘Other
Retail’
871 BCBS May 2003, pp. 23-29.
872 Montgomerie 2009, pp. 11-13.
873 Interview 55P.
874 See BCBS May 2003, pp. 23,29.
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Importance to Financialization
Test of Test of
. 8 8  .47
Test of Test of 
Necessity Sufficiency
.82 ' ' .53
Potential Mobility of Business Line ■■■■■1 -28 WM.24 .28
Large of Associated Business Line 1 .38 .91 .43
These results reveal mixed indications that structural power was at play in the agenda-setting 
phase o f Basel l l ’s development. Policies important to financialization and associated with large 
business lines appear to be necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for the absence o f  costliness. 
This might be interpreted as the BCBS ‘backing o f f  from stringent regulatory policy decisions 
for large and systemically important regulatory areas. There is no evidence, however, that the 
potential mobility o f business lines associated with different policies played a role as a structural 
determinant o f  costliness at the agenda-setting phase, either in terms o f  necessity or sufficiency. 
As Table N above demonstrates, results are not affected when the ‘other retail’ policy is included 
in the fsQCA. A test o f joint sufficiency also revealed that there was no combination o f 
conditions which was logically sufficient above the standard 75% threshold when ‘other retail’
0*7C
was included or not.
Understood in its most comprehensive sense, structural power is hypothesized as 
affecting not only the policies proposed on the agenda, but also policies that were not on the 
agenda. Understood in this strict sense, however, there is no clear empirical strategy which can 
assess the efficacy o f  the structural power hypothesis, since such an empirical test confronts a 
substantial observational equivalence problem. Put simply, when one considers the range o f 
potential factors which might explain why a phenomenon did not occur, there is not only an 
expansive possible list, but no way o f knowing how that list should be delimited. In the context 
o f  Basel II, one could plausibly ask (to use a hypothetical example) why a special new, stringent, 
regulatory capital requirement for predatory lending was not put on the agenda, or indeed was 
never even discussed. It may be a fruitful line o f  inquiry to ask why such a policy was not on the 
agenda. However, it is not a question that can be investigated from a positive empirical point o f 
view, because there are no observed phenomena (let alone variation) to be explained. Latour’s
875 The presence o f financialization and large business line, combined with the absence o f  mobility yielded a .73 
consistency score. When ‘other retail* is excluded from the sample, this decreases to .67.
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argument that non-observable phenomena may be irrelevant if they leave no trace seems 
prescient here . 8 7 6
In order to systematically consider the importance o f  structural power at the 
policym aking phase, I make use o f  the three policy-level structural variables listed above plus 
two additional structural power variables which are derived from the factor indices described in 
Chapter 2. Table 10.3 below illustrate the factor scores for the countries in the study for both o f 
these variables. For each o f  these variables, I used the fuzzy-calibration method within the
o n n
fsQCA 2.0 software to generate a continuous fuzzy-set scoring for each variable. Based on the 
set o f  all countries in the RSPSF variable, I defined an upper benchmark o f 1.5, 0 for the 
crossover point, and -1.5 for the non-membership benchmark. For the SDSFK variable, the same 
method was used, but with thresholds o f  .5, 0, and -.5, respectively. The fsQCA software 
converts the factor scores to a continuous fuzzy-set score by means o f a transformation based on 
the log odds o f full membership in the set . 8 7 8
Table 10.3: Factor Scores and Fuzzy-set Values for 
National-Level Structural Power Variables
Relative Structural Power 
of the State in Finance 
(RSPSF)
Structural Dependence of 
the State on Finance 
Capital 
(SDSFK)
Country Factor Continuous Factor Continuous
Score Coding Score Coding
Canada -0.3831 0.24 0.144115 0.70
Germany 0.81345 0.92 -0.22762 0.20
Japan 1.43792 0.99 -1.78519 0
United States 2.05756 1 0.384374 0.91
United Kingdom 0.66898 0 . 8 8 0.403185 0.92
I also consider the possibility that the potential mobility o f a policy’s business line might 
influence outcomes not only by nature o f the policy in question, but also by the potential for
876 Latour 2004, p. 70.
877 See Ragin, Drass and Davey 2006.
878 See Ragin, Strand and Ribunson 2008.
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capital within a given country to ‘flee’ offshore.879 While the BCBS has formally banned the use 
o f offshore shell banks,880 because soft-law rules are not necessarily universally enforced and 
because off-balance sheet vehicles are not bound by the strict reporting requirements that apply 
to banks as a whole, it seems at least plausible that offshore financial centers may affect the 
constraints the BCBS is subject to.881 To operationalize this possibility, I utilized Schwartz’s 
recently analyzed list of countries which contain substantial corporate shell activity.882 These 
localities are used for corporate bookkeeping purposes, and as such represent convenient places 
where banks can establish special purpose entities or structured investment vehicles. 
Consequently, they represent localities from which banks in BCBS countries could potentially 
move their assets (provided that these countries were not believed to eventually comply with 
Basel II, or to not enforce it). I obtained data from the IMF’s surveys o f portfolio investment 
flows for each BCBS country and measured the percentage of total world portfolio investment 
activity accruing to the list of corporate shell countries.883 A fuzzy-set score was provided to 
each of the countries in the study for this variable ‘Offshore Shell Potential’, which is used as 
one of the several structural power variables analyzed below.884
Finally, before proceeding, as one last test of possible structural power selection effects, I 
examine the relationship between private sector mobilization, broadly conceived, and the 
numerous structural power variables employed in the study. I perform such a test because it is 
possible that private sector groups in structurally privileged situations might mobilize differently 
because they suspect they are structurally privileged in a particular way. Such privilege could be, 
for example, a by-product of the state in which they are located in, or the regulatory policy 
domain in which they are engaged. To test this possibility, I ran correlation tests on a matrix of 
each of the structural power variables used in the study against different measures of private
879 The literature stressing the importance o f ‘preferential tax regimes’ on the operation of global finance (Palan, 
Murphy and Chavagneux 2010; Palan 1998) are relevant in this context only as an institutional constant. Inasmuch 
as they may be critical to actual processes, tax havens operate as a relative constant across policies. Where they may 
be relevant as a factor which varies across countries — since access to corporate shells may vary by policy.
880 Sharman 2010, p. 10
881 Sharman 2010, p. 15; Palan, Murphy and Chavagneux 2010
882 See Schwartz 2009, p. 62.
883 This method of calculation has precedent in Schwartz 2009, pp. 62-63, though I used different data. Specifically,
I used Table 8 -  Geographic Breakdown of Total Portfolio Investment Assets. See 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/geo.htm
884 The countries of focus of this study express the majority o f variation across the BCBS -  from 2% to 24%. I 
provided a four-value fuzzy-set score to each of the countries in question: Germany at 2% became 0; Canada at 4% 
became .33; the UK at 14% became .67; the US at 15% became .67; and Japan at 20% became 1.
248
sector m obilization in order to test for highly correlated (i.e. above .80) relationships. I first 
performed this test against the mobilization variable, as reported in Table N below. I then did so 
against the variable for information, and an ‘alternative’ metric for mobilization, which simply 
combines (by summation) the value o f the ‘m obilization’ and ‘inform ation’ fuzzy-set values . 8 8 5  
As Table 10.4 illustrates, none o f the variables in this matrix are highly correlated, suggesting 
that the structural power selection effect in question is not apparent.
Table 10.4: Correlation Tests for Structural Power Variables 
with Mobilization Indicators
Information
RSPSF
SDSDF .39 .35 .36
Financialization -.00 .07 -.01
Potential M obility -.06 -.26 -.17
Offshore Shell “ .12 .05 '.05~
Potential _________ __
Size -.23 -.32 -.27
Section 3 
Testing Necessity and Sufficiency
The Configuration Tables at the end o f  Chapters 3-9 provide a wealth of information 
which can be analyzed systematically using fsQCA and other forms o f  across-case analysis. The 
‘non-interdependent dataset’ constitutes a total o f  32 cases — ", transnational campaigns, and 26
885 1 also conducted a test which entertains the most expansive possible notkn o f mobilization by summing all 
fuzzy-set scores, and conducting a correlation test on the structural power ccnditions in the study. The same results 
apply.
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national campaigns. As Table 10.5 below demonstrates, there was considerable variation on the 
main dependent variable, ‘permissive regulatory policy change’.
Table 10.5: Distribution of Dependent Variable for 
All Campaigns
Fuzzy-set 0 .33 .67 1
Value
All Campaigns Number of 22 3 3 5
cases
Transnational Number of 4 1 1 1
Campaigns Cases
N um D er of IS 2 2 4
As this Table illustrates, while most national campaigns were unsuccessful in achieving the 
ultimate goal o f  permissive regulatory policy change (PRPC), some were successful. This 
variation can be analyzed through fsQCA by examining the conditions associated with each o f 
these cases. Using this data, I used fsQCA to discern which relations between the explanatory 
variables and the dependent variable o f  interest constituted a relation o f logical necessity. In 
other words, what explanatory variables are necessary for the outcome o f permissive regulatory 
policy change (PRPC) to occur? The use o f a consistency score allows me to assess the extent to 
which the superset relationship between a given explanatory variable approximates logical 
necessity for the dependent variable to occur across cases. Tests o f  logical necessity within the 
existing literature necessitate a consistency score which is higher than 75% (the typical 
consistency cutoff for sufficiency), and so I define the consistency cutoff for necessity at 85%.886
Table 10.6 below reports the results o f this analysis, with each explanatory variable being 
expressed in accordance with tl 
up at the second decimal place.
• 007
he expectation o f its related hypothesis. All values are rounded
886 Ragin 2008, p. 118; Schneider and Wagemann 2009b, p. 406; Ragin 2006.
887 In other words, connoting absence (~) o f  enemies is displayed, because the Business Conflict hypothesis expects 
the absence o f  business conflict to be a necessary condition for influence, not business conflict itself.
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Table 10.6: Necessity Analysis Results for Private Sector Campaigns
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
M obilization 1 1(1) 1
Coalition 1 1(1) 1
Inform ation .67 95( 95) .95
Non-Bank Allies 0 .58(61) .58
—Fnemies 1 .95(89) .95
Legislative Oversight (Supportive) .84(83)
~ Legislative Oversight (Oppositional) ~ 1(1)
Relative S tructural Power of the State in ~ 
Finance
.97
S tructu ral Dependence of the State on ~ 
Finance
... .... . .- . - . .......... ..... ... ,.. ...... . ,■.............. : . ... . ...
.70
' m s
Im portance to Financialization 1 .33 .33
Potential Mobility of Business Line .5
'
.17 .17
Size of Business Line 1 .67 .67
Offshore Shell Potential ~ .56
Private sector mobilization, coalitions, and lack o f enemies are necessary conditions across both 
transnational and national-level campaigns. The use o f information is a necessary condition for 
influence only for the national campaigns, and this is also the case for the absence o f 
oppositional legislative oversight. Only one kind o f national-level structural power condition was 
found to be individually necessary, and that was the structural power o f  the state in finance. Both 
its continuously-coded and manually coded variants were consistent above the 85% threshold. 
Two policy-level structural power variables were above the 85% consistency threshold -  
importance to financialization and size o f the associated business line -  but interestingly only for 
the transnational campaigns.
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I then engaged in a test o f  the sufficiency for each o f the individual explanatory variables 
employed in the campaigns examined in chapters 3-9. As is conventional in the fsQCA literature, 
I use a 75% consistency threshold . 8 8 8  Table 10.7 below reports the results from this analysis.
Table 10.7: Individual Sufficiency Analysis Results for Private Sector Campaigns
Consistency Consistency Consistency
Score Score Score
Mobilization
its
.32
.30
.28( 35) 
.35(.40)
.29
.33
Information .27 ,36(.43) .34
Enemies 22(.24)
egislative Oversight (Supportive) .42(.52)
Non
~ Legislative Oversight (Oppositional) ~ .21 (.24)
Relative Structural Power o f the State in ~  • .26(.26)
Structural Dependence o f the State on 
Finance Capital
.21 (.21)
Importance to Financialization .50 . 2 0 . 2 0 i||J!
Potential M obility o f Business Line .50 . 2 1 . 2 1
Size o f Business Line .32 . 2 1 . 2 1
Offshore Shell Potential ~  .26
As these results indicate, no individual explanatory condition is sufficient above the 75% 
threshold in explaining the outcome o f permissive regulatory policy change. This result is the 
same not only for transnational and national campaigns, but also for all campaigns combined. In 
other words, however construed, there is no ‘one thing’ or one single condition on its own which 
is logically sufficient in explaining private sector influence across cases.
888 It is widely accepted within the fsQCA literature that a 75% consistency threshold should be employed, 
especially for tests o f  sufficiency. See Ragin 2006a, p. 3; Ragin 2008, pp. 118, 136; Schneider and Wagemann 
2009b, p. 406.
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Section 4 
Combinatorial Analysis
In contrast to simple analyses of necessity and individual sufficiency, one of the 
analytical strengths of fsQCA is its capacity to analyze combinations o f factors which are 
sufficient in producing the outcome of interest (as discussed in Chapter 2 ).889 FsQCA allows for 
the systematic analysis of conjunctural causation, i.e. the notion that the presence or absence of 
individual conditions is not what explains outcomes, but rather the particular combinations of 
factors.
I first employ fsQCA to analyze whether or not there is any evidence for combined 
sufficiency on all the cases examined within the study. I note from the outset that such an 
analysis which does not differentiate between transnational and national campaigns is somewhat 
artificial, since there are conditions in national campaigns (such as legislative oversight) which 
are not in transnational campaigns. Nevertheless, I run the fsQCA software and find that there is 
no combination of factors which is sufficient above the 75% threshold of consistency. The 
combination of mobilization, information, coalitions, non-bank allies and lack of enemies is 
consistent only at 56%, and therefore cannot be said to be a sufficient combination. This finding 
supports the notion, discussed earlier, and remarked upon throughout this study, that there are 
great idiosyncrasies in the operation of private sector influence. However, once again I note that 
collapsing all campaigns into the same dataset is potentially misleading.
Transnational Campaigns
I then differentiate the data and employ fsQCA to engage in a test of combined 
sufficiency for the transnational campaigns in the study only. Such an analysis is constrained by 
the number o f explanatory conditions that can be specified within a given model to be tested. 
Recent experimental research by Marx suggests that there is a relationship between the number 
of conditions considered and the number of cases in a QCA dataset. 890 This relationship is
889 See Schlosser et. al. 2008; Ragin 2008. See also discussion in Chapter 2.
890 See Marx 2006, pp. 18-20.
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sim ilar in character to a ‘degrees o f  freedom’ constraint in conventional statistical analysis. 
M arx’s experimental research suggests that models be specified which fall above these curves to
OQ 1
ensure a high degree o f reliability.
Figure 10.0: Conservative QCA Model Specification Floors892
50
40
• —<10% Probability 
**->33%  Probability
Number of Conditions
While his data presumes an even distribution on the dependent variable (and the data for this 
study clearly does not), it does suggest a need for caution in the number o f conditions included in 
a fsQCA combined sufficiency test, especially when the data set is very sm all . 8 9 3  On this basis I 
specify different models o f  no greater than four or five conditions.
Table 10.8 below indicates findings for tests o f joint sufficiency for the transnational 
cases, in which I used fsQCA’s to find the highest consistency score on a given number o f  
combinations o f  explanatory conditions. I specified four different models in which joint 
sufficiency might be expected based on different combinations o f explanatory conditions, as 
indicated by the ‘filled’ black squares below. The ‘A ’s in Models 1 and 2 indicate that fsQCA 
indicated the absence o f a condition, rather than (the expected) presence o f a condition. As 
Models 1-5 have consistency scores below the 75% threshold, none o f these models can be 
considered logically sufficient. In models 6-10, I used fsQCA to ‘find’ combinations o f
891 Marx 2006, p. 21
892 Data is from Marx 2006, p. 19 (Table 5)
893 This conservative precaution is recently employed in Avdagic 2001, pp. 15-16
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conditions with the highest consistency scores, using the ‘Subset-Supersef analysis function in 
fsQCA 2.0.
Table 10.8: Tests of Joint Sufficiency for Transnational Cases
Model
Explanatory
Condition
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0
1 Mobilization
■ T2 Coalition
3 Information
4 Non-Bank Allies
5 -Enemies
6 Financialization
7 Potential Mobility
8 Large Business Line
Consistency of 
Solution
.60 .50 .50 .50 f.(i ; .75 .75 .75 .75
Number of Cases 2 3 3 4 3 1 1 1 1 1
As Figure N illustrates, models 6-10 all have consistency scores ju st at the 75% 
threshold, thereby suggesting that each o f these combinations is at the threshold o f a logically 
sufficient combination. However, as the last row indicates, there is only one case in which the 
specified models actually exist: the W -factor case. As noted in Chapter 3, there was some 
evidence that structural power may have been at work. These findings provide further support for 
that claim, but they do not constitute across-case evidence, since the W -Factor is only one single 
case. Furthermore, as the W-Factor case was one in which there was evidence o f issue-linkage, 
these findings cannot be said to be robust from a case-oriented perspective, since the outcome 
may have relied on other considerations.
These findings suggest that no pattern o f logical sufficiency exists across the 
transnational campaigns in the study. To be sure, however, this finding does not mean that 
transnational private sector influence has not occurred in the formation o f Basel II. As two o f the 
cases in Chapter 3 have demonstrated, influence did indeed take place -  in particular in the case 
o f the use o f internal ratings. However, these findings do suggest that, at least for the cases 
examined in this study, there is no consistently sufficient pattern that suggests a relationship
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across cases between the particular content o f  transnational private sector campaigns and 
permissive regulatory policy change.
National Campaigns
I then use fsQCA to engage in a test o f  combined sufficiency for the national campaigns 
examined in the study. Following the conservative recommendation by Marx and Avdagic 
described above, I employ models o f  4 variables each. I first specify 5 different models o f  four 
conditions each in which observed conditions combine to produce a potentially jointly sufficient 
result. In order to attend to the possibilities o f interdependencies across the data, for each o f  these 
models, I ran fsQCA for the ‘fu ll’ dataset, as indicated by ‘A ’, and the non-interdependent 
dataset, ‘B \  As described in Chapter 2, this dataset uses all data from the Configuration Tables 
for national campaigns, but uses the logical OR procedure to collapse data into a common value. 
As Table 10.9 below illustrates, these different models produce very different consistency scores, 
but this variation is similar across datasets A and B.
Table 10.9: Joint Sufficiency Tests for Observed Campaign Characteristics
Model 
I
Model 
2
Model 
3
Model 
4
Model 
5
E xplanatory  C ond ition
M obilization
C oalition
Inform ation
N on-B ank  A llies
-E n e m ie s
Leg. O versigh t (S upp .)
Leg. O versigh t (O pp.)
C onsistency  o f  Solution
N um ber o f  C ases
As Table 10.9 illustrates, only Model 2 is consistent above the 75% threshold, and this feature is 
the same for both variants A and B. This feature suggests that a combination o f conditions is 
jointly sufficient for PRPC: a campaign that utilizes information, and has non-bank allies, a lack 
o f enemies, and legislative oversight present, is a logically sufficient combination for private 
sector influence across the cases examined. To investigate this data further, I used Subset
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Analysis within fsQCA to specify all possible models between 3 and 4 conditions which have 
consistency scores above the 75% threshold. Table 10.10 below reports the results, which uses 
the non-interdependent dataset (B in the above).
Table 10.10: Joint Sufficiency Results using Subset Analysis
M ode
Explanatory Condition
M obilizat ion
Coalition
Information
Non-Bank A lies
Enemies
Leg. Oversight (Supp.)
Leg. Oversight (Opp )
Consistency of Solution
Number of Cases
A total o f  9 different models were ‘discovered’ through the Subset Analysis which fulfilled the 
criteria specified above. The highest consistency score is Model 1, with a consistency score o f 
.83. Once again the same pattern emerges in terms o f the consistent configuration, though now 
we have a firmer basis from which to conclude this combination is the ‘optimally consistent’ 
solution, or ‘recipe’, as it is sometimes called in the QCA literature . 8 9 4  When ‘after-campaigns’ 
(national campaigns which took place after PRPC was secured at least once over a given policy) 
are eliminated from the dataset, the consistency score rises to 1 — perfect consistency. 
Eliminating ‘after-campaigns’ means eliminating the second HVCRE campaign described in 
Chapter 7. Because this campaign featured information, non-bank allies, lack o f enemies, and 
legislative oversight but did not achieve PRPC, this case serves to lower the overall consistency 
score if included.
To test the robustness o f the findings for the national private sector campaigns, I ran
895several regressions using the non-interdependent dataset. For the first Model, Model A, I 
analyzed the data through a simple logistic regression model . 8 9 6  Because logistic regression
894 The language of a ‘causal recipe' is employed in Ragin 2008.
895 Only this dataset is utilized because statistical regression analysis has a strong observational independence 
condition.
896 Logistic regression models are sometimes used to compare fsQCA results. See Grofman and Schneider 2009.
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analysis requires a binary dependent variable, I recoded all .67 values for PRPC as 1 and all .33 
as 0. I then ran a regression on this data using logistical regression technique sometimes used in 
small datasets, called ‘Firthlogit’, to estimate the net effects o f the explanatory variables on the 
outcom e . 8 9 7  The results are consistent with the analysis above which suggests that no individual 
condition/variable can ‘explain’ PRPC on its own, though I would urge caution in interpreting 
levels o f  statistical significance on such a small dataset.
Table 10.11: fsQCA and Regression Results for Dependent Variable o f 
‘Permissive Regulatory Policy Change’ (PRPC)
Model A B c  D E
Private Sector Mobilization 2.746 .247
Information 2.596 .329 .600***
Enemies -1.947 -.232 -.260
National Coalition .841 .244
Non-Bank Allies -.431 -.023 -.048 .148 .101
Legislative Oversight 
(Supportive)
.238 .173 .426** .422**
O o
tn
7 Legislative Oversight .004 -.230
(Oppositional)
Constant -4.894** -.256 -.150 .055 .044
D f 18 18 21 22 23
8  R2_________________________________  .6195 .5606 .3038 .2865
Note: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, and ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% 
level. All p-values in regressions o f  such a small size should be treated with caution.
1 then deploy a simple OLS model to estimate the net effects o f  each explanatory variable in the 
national campaign data on the outcome o f permissive regulatory policy change . 8 9 8  As Model B 
above reports, none o f the individual explanatory variables co-varies in any statistically
897 Firthlogit is a module for the Stata statistical software, and was developed by Joseph Coveney. See Firth 1993; 
Georg 2006; Heinze and Schemper 2002; Zorn 2005; Georg 2006.
898 1 used Stata Version 9.0.
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significant way with the outcome o f interest . 8 9 9  I then ran OLS regressions using different 
combinations o f  the core ‘recipe’ described above, as indicated by Models 3-5 above, and found 
statistical significance in the information and supportive legislative oversight variables. While 
these results are only supplementary in character, they (and in particular Model 3) support the 
recipe finding as per above. As with all o f  these findings, however, because o f the small number 
o f observations regressed (N=26), the levels o f statistical significance should be treated with 
great caution.
An important consideration is whether or not the observed campaign characteristics 
might themselves combine with structural power variables. To analyze this possibility, I repeated 
the Subset analysis technique described above, this time including the 6  structural power 
variables. As Table 10.12 illustrates, 8  different combinations o f  conditions had consistency 
scores o f  above 75% (combinations already described above, were excluded).
Table 10.12: Combining Observed Campaign 
Characteristics and Structural Power Variables
M o d e l
E xplanato ry  C ondition
M obilization
C oalition
Inform ation
N on-B ank  A llies
E nem ies
Leg. O versigh t (Supp .)
Leg. O versigh t (O pp.)
R SPSF -  C ontinuous
SD SFK  -  C ontinuous
Im portance to F inancialization
Potential M obility
L arge B usiness L ine
Potential Shell M obility
C onsis tency  o f  Solution
N um ber o f  C ases
As these results illustrate, there are a number o f  models which have relatively high consistency 
scores, such as Models 1 and 7, but these only cover one single case, and therefore cannot be
899 This result should be taken with great caution, as high P-values on regressions with a small number o f 
observations are not necessarily indicative o f statistical non-significance.
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considered across-case patterns. Model 2 covers three cases, and suggests that the ‘allies’ 
variable might be replaceable when a large business line is in question. Likewise, Model 5 
suggests that the absence of enemies might be replaceable in a context o f state structural 
dependency on finance capital. For each of these models, however, only four cases are fulfilled -  
and they are only those in the US. While these combinations should not be discounted on this 
basis alone, Models 3 and 6 stand out as superior in the sense that they cover more cases, across 
both the US and Germany, and therefore can be considered more generalizable. Both of these 
models suggest the importance of the relative structural power of the state in finance as a 
functional substitute to one of the components in the optimal ‘recipe’ highlighted above.
As a final investigation of how ‘agency’ variables might combine with structural power 
variables, I ran successive models including the recipe plus each structural power variable 
individually, to see if any 5-variable combination of the recipe plus a structural power condition 
could improve upon the recipe finding. I found that none of these models were able to do so. 
However, when the RSPSF variable was included, the consistency score remained the same (at 
.83), and five cases satisfied the condition. What these and the above findings suggest is that the 
RSPSF does not diminish the sufficiency of the recipe, and may be considered a functional part 
o f it.
Finally I considered structural power variables by themselves, again performing the 
Superset Analysis to find the combination of causal conditions with the highest consistency 
score. There was no combination of conditions above the 75% consistency threshold, and the 
highest consistency score for a combination of structural power variables was .52, for 
RSPSF*Importance to Financialization*Potential Mobility of Business Line*Large Business 
Line. This finding suggests a challenge to the Structural Power hypothesis, since there is no 
combination of structural power conditions which is jointly sufficient in producing PRPC.
Section 5 
Considering the Impact and Relevance of Institutions and 
State Power
An important consideration in this study is the extent to which the outcomes observed 
across cases are related to the institutional characteristics of the countries considered in the
260
study. The role of institutions may affect outcomes either as constraints on actors’ behavior, 
channeling the energies of interest groups, or, alternatively by acting as resources for actors’ 
behavior.900 Institutionalist arguments of private sector influence find their clearest explication in 
the political economy of trade literature,901 but also exist in arguments about private sector 
influence in financial sectoral policy, particularly in quantitative studies that work within a 
public choice analytical framework.902 Institutionalist arguments sometimes arise in commentary 
and discussion of private sector influence as well, as seen for example in the recent comments of 
Lord Turner regarding regulatory capture in the US versus the UK, and also in some qualitative 
studies, such as that o f Zhang and Underhill’s argument that regulatory capture occurred in 
Thailand and South Korea because of weak national institutions.903 Moreover, Busch has argued 
that a thoroughgoing empirical understanding of how interest groups work in financial sector 
politics means appreciating the workings of such institutions, not only in terms of how actors 
will behave, but also in terms of how decision-makers will respond.904
In the context of this study, particular attention to institutional variation is important 
because successful national campaigns only took place in two out of the five countries studied, 
namely the United States and Germany. This finding raises the question of whether or not there 
are some institutional particularities common to these two states which have enabled private 
sector success — conditions which might be absent in other countries. Across most of the 
institutional variants examined in the study, however, Germany and the United States are 
different. As Chapter 2 illustrated, Germany is clearly a CME, while the US is clearly not. Given 
that a variety of literature suggests this distinction should have a material impact on financial 
sectoral outcomes, the fact that successful national private sector campaigns are found in these 
different settings suggests that this distinction is not a significant determinant of private sector 
influence (see also below).905 Other differences between the US and Germany abound. As the 
factor analysis of Chapter 2 revealed, the US state is structurally dependent on finance capital, 
whereas the German state is not. Germany is a parliamentary system of government, while the 
US is a presidential one; Germany is a proportional representational system, while the US is not;
900 Keohane and Milner 1996; Streeck and Thelen 2005; Clark 1998.
901 Cf. Rogoswski 1989.
902 See Posen 1993; Barth, Caprio and Levine 2006; Rosenbluth and Schaap 2003; Kroszner and Stratmann 1998.
903 See Turner in Ford 2009; Zhang and Underhill 2003: 246-247
904 See Busch 2007.
905 See Wade 2007, pp. 125-7; Schwartz 153-55; Zimmerman 2010, pp. 125-6
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and G erm any’s political leadership at the time o f  legislative oversight was left-wing (the Social 
Democratic and Green Coalition), while in the US it was right-wing (the Republican Party). 
From a simple comparative perspective, these differences suggest that successful private sector 
influence is not contingent upon particular institutional conditions.
To analyze the role o f institutions on outcomes, I replicated the method utilized earlier 
for structural power variables. I first engaged in a test o f  individual necessity and sufficiency o f 
each o f the institutional variables described in Chapter 2. Continuous values were converted to 
four value-fuzzy set scores, and missing data for Germany on the importance/position on 
deregulation variables was regarded as .33 (out but not fully out o f the set), based on substantive 
knowledge o f  the political climate in Germany with respect to regulation. For necessity and 
individual sufficiency analysis, each variable is considered in its present and absent (~) form, as 
indicated in Table 10.13 below. As these results indicate, the tests o f  individual necessity 
indicate that there are only two (related) conditions which are necessary for PRPC to occur: de 
jure-regulatory independence, and the ‘independence factor’ described in Chapter 2.
Table 10.13: Tests of Individual Necessity and Sufficiency 
for Institutional Variables
___________________________ Necessity Sufficiency
Causal Condition Consistency Consistency
CME Score .31 .19
-  CME Score .69 .26
Revolving Door .55 .23
-Revolving Door .67 .34
De Jure Regulatory Independence 1 .24
-  De Jure Regulatory Independence 0 o
Independence Factor . 8 8 .26
~ Independence Factor .19 .19
Importance of Deregulation .67 .29
-  Importance of Deregulation .55 .28
Position on Deregulation .67 .27
-Position on Deregulation .55 .30
Proportional Representation .33 . 2 0
-Proportional Representation .67 .25
Right Wing Executive .67 .36
-Right Wing Executive .67 . 1J
Parliamentary System .33 .11
-Parliamentary System .67 .50
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Since one is a component of the other, these cannot be considered unrelated factors, and must be 
considered separately in any forthcoming analysis. What this finding suggests, however, is that 
independence of the regulatory agency is a necessary condition for PRPC. This is a very 
unexpected finding, and appears somewhat contradictory. As Table N below reports, no 
condition is individually sufficient in explaining PRPC. The latter findings regarding the content 
of political systems in which national campaigns took place complements Busch’s recent finding 
that political system variation had no observable effect on the form of regulation adopted 
nationally.906
I also replicated the Superset Analysis conducted above. Superset analysis of the 
institutional factors alone revealed that there is no combination of institutional conditions that is 
sufficient above the 75% level. This finding suggests that it is not institutional conditions alone 
that are producing the outcomes observed, and thus further supports the notion that the observed 
actions of private sector groups had a causal impact on the outcome. I then included the each of 
the conditions which form the ‘recipe’, and investigated how these might combine with 
institutional variables to produce different consistency scores. I found that no combination of 
‘recipe’ conditions and ‘institutionalist’ conditions combines with a greater consistency score 
than the recipe alone across cases.
These findings suggest a challenge to an institutionalist position regarding private sector 
influence. The finding that a high level o f regulatory independence is a necessary condition for 
private sector influence is the exception to this. It should be noted, however, that this finding is 
both contradictory to most expectations (independence should impede influence, not enable it), 
and that the actual extent of variation on this institution was extremely limited within the BCBS 
countries, as described in Chapter 2. The strength of these findings might be further investigated 
using different measurements of institutional diversity, but it is notable that even if one imagines 
other sources of institutional variation between the US and Germany, this variation is 
considerable. Germany and the US have very different kinds of policy networks in finance.907 
Financialization is associated with ‘Anglo-American’ capitalism of the period under study,
906 See Busch 2008.
907 See Busch 2008.
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which clearly encapsulates the US (and the UK), but certainly not Germany.908 The literature on 
‘rentier power’ clearly suggests that the US rentier class had considerable institutional strength 
during this period, whereas in Germany this was not the case.909 Each of these sources of 
variation potentially undermines the argument that particular institutional arrangements produce, 
or contribute to private sector influence, because influence took place despite this institutional 
diversity.
The finding that the revolving door variable does not appear to affect outcomes is 
supported by additional qualitative evidence from within previous chapters. Tom de Swaan, the 
previous Chair of the BCBS, took a prominent role on the Managing Board of Directors of the 
IIF. The IIF was, as we have seen, an extremely vociferous and engaged private sector group 
across a number of campaigns. The IIF’s success was, however, highly variable, with their 
internal ratings campaign being a success, but other campaigns such as operational risk and 
expected losses being failures, new sentence suggesting at least one way in which the revolving 
door does not affect outcomes. A similar example can be seen in the personnel movement of a 
critical Senior Economist at the US Federal Reserve Board, John Mingo, who became the lead 
consultant to the RMA Capital Group. This group too was highly important within the US, as we 
have seen with the HVCRE campaign, the credit card campaign, the expected losses campaign, 
and the residential mortgage campaign. However, as we have seen across chapters, the success 
rate of the RMA Capital Group was, like the IIF, highly variable, and thus it is difficult to 
support the notion that the revolving door positively or negatively affected regulatory policy 
outcomes. A more focused and extensive study might be appropriate to fully interrogate such 
claims.
I
To conduct a more systematic empirical test, I ask how the ‘recipe’ competes against 
alternative explanatory variables in explaining PRPC. Using statistical regression analysis, I 
specified six different models in which the ‘recipe’ variable competes for a statistically 
significant net effect on PRPC. The ‘recipe’ variable is coded as an interaction term, in which its 
strength varies by the extent to which each of the conditions within the recipe described above 
are met. As was the case with other explanatory variables, I include each of the structural power
908 See, for example, Langley 2004, p. 540.
909 Cf. Power, Epstein and Abrena 2003; Epstein and Jayadev 2006.
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variables and each o f  the institutional variables described in Chapter 2, which vary by country. 
M odel 1 pits the recipe variable against the structural power variables, and finds the recipe to be 
the only variable with a statistically significant coefficient; the same is true (at least at the 5% 
level o f significance) for all other models. The remaining models select institutional and 
structural power variables which are not highly correlated. M odel 2 includes institutional 
conditions related to deregulation and regulatory independence, whereas Model 3 includes 
regulatory institutions, and Model 4 includes electoral institutions. Models 5 and 6  include 
combinations o f structural power characteristics and institutions in non-correlated combinations. 
As Table 10.14 illustrates, the ‘recipe’ variable is consistently statistically significant at least at 
the 10% level, and usually at the 5% level.
Table 10.14: OLS Regression Results for Recipe 
Competing with other Variables
■ ■
1 ‘Recipe’ 7 4 7 ** .629** .609** .563* .687* .563*
2 RSPSF -  Continuous .365 .259
3 SDSFK -  Continuous .235 - . 1 1 1
4 Importance to 
Financialization
164 -.175
5 Potential Mobility -.503 -.249
6 Large Business Line -.048 -.029
7 Offshore Shell Potential -.039 m m i
8 CME Score . 1 1 0 .198
9 Revolving Door -.490 - .....— -.428
10 De Jure Reg. Independ. 1.625* 1.694
11 Independence Factor .829 -.454
12 Importance of Dereg. .776
13 Position on Dereg. . -LOO
14 PR System .231
15 Right Executive -.231 '
16 Parliamentary System -.550* -.405
Constant -.109 -.321 -1.180 .550* -1.391
Df 18 21 21 21 18 20
R2 0.4719 0.4076 0.4128 0.4308 0.4757 0.4308 \
This kind o f  statistical regression analysis is useful to test the efficacy o f  statist 
arguments that involve the importance o f state power in affecting outcomes. Simmons, for
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example, has argued that the US is “hegemonic” in international financial regulatory affairs, 
because of its considerable market size, and thus able to act unilaterally.910 Numerous works in 
political economy have contested such a claim regarding US dominance, but still argue for the 
importance o f state power.911 To a certain extent, this has already been addressed in the ‘relative 
structural power of the state in finance’ (RSPSF) variable, which encapsulates one version of 
state power. On the other hand, as described in Chapter 2, because RSPSF was constructed on 
the basis of relative position of states, it does not match well with some statist arguments. 
Consequently, following this literature I use Gross National Income (GNI) as a proxy 
measurement of state power.912 As is standard in the statistical literature that uses such a large 
figure, I also took the natural logarithmic function (In) of these values as well as an alternative 
measure (GNIln).913 Finally I performed a manual fuzzy-set coding of state power in this vein 
using the following codings: the US and Japan =1, Germany and the UK =.67, and Canada=.33, 
GNIfs.
To consider how well the recipe competes for net effects on PRPC in comparison to 
statist arguments, I re-ran regression models 1 and 6 above, but with RSPSF being replaced with 
each one of the GNI variables (GNI, GNIln, and GNIfs) in succession. The results were no 
different in terms of levels of statistical significance or magnitude of effects than that above. I 
also ran simple regressions with only the recipe variable and each of the GNI variables in 
succession. Against each measurement of GNI, the recipe variable was statistically significant at 
the 5% level, while the GNI variable was not. Finally, I also tested the GNIfs against PRPC 
within fsQCA. The results are similar to that described above for the relative structural power of 
the state in finance: GNI is a necessary condition (at 89% consistency), but is not a sufficient 
condition (at 27% consistency). These results thus support the notion that a national campaign 
taking place in a powerful state is a necessary condition for private sector influence at the 
transnational level.
As a final robustness check, I examined whether or not the particular fuzzy-set 
measurements used might have generated the observed results, an important question given the
910 Simmons 2001, p. 595.
911 See Drezner 2007, pp. 23, 121; Braithwaite and Drahos 1999, p. 113; Posner 2009.
9121 selected 2001, the middle of the period of study. This variable is consistent with those who see state power in 
financial regulation as largely influenced by market size, as per Simmons 2001 and Gidinis 2008.
913 See Geortz 2009.
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criticism o f fsQCA as a method, as discussed in Chapter 2. First, I recode all values for 
‘permissive regulatory policy change’ as ‘crisp sets’, i.e. as Is or Os, whereby a .33 score is 
converted to 0 and a .67 score is recoded to 1 .1 then reran the fsQCA analysis described above to 
see if  the results are different. They are not: the recipe is exactly the same combination o f 
explanatory variables, and the consistency score is only slightly smaller, at 80%. I then recoded 
the original variables along a different spectrum from the one employed in the study, employing 
.83 and .17 values, as is sometimes done within the fsQCA literature. This analysis yielded the 
same recipe as well, but with a consistency score o f  82%. These results are summarized in Table 
10.15 below. What they suggest is that, rather than biasing the results o f the study, the specific 
values used to code fuzzy-set values do not have a significant effect on the main combinatorial 
finding o f the study.
Table 10.15: Robustness Checks for Different Fuzzy-Set Measurements
Fuzzy-Set
Coding
Values
Out o f  
the Set
Mostly 
Out o f  the 
Set
Mostly In 
the Set
Fully in 
the Set
Consistency Score 
When Using this 
Method
Values in 0 .33 .67 1 83%
Study
‘Crisp’ set 0 0 1 1 80%
Values
‘Alternate’ 0 .17 .83 1 82%
Values
Section 5 
Mechanisms across Cases
While the above two sections have found a specific combination o f  variables to be 
relevant in explaining permissive regulatory policy change, the data provided by the previous 
empirical chapters still presents the opportunity to explore these relationships further. In 
particular, what are the mechanisms by which private sector groups succeed in influencing Basel 
II’s content? Earlier chapters which engaged in within-case analysis explored the mechanisms 
within each case.
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We have seen that while no one thing that private sector groups do can exercise influence 
over Basel II, a specific combination o f explanatory variables is sufficient for influence — w hat I 
have called the ‘recipe ’ . 9 1 4  This finding has been investigated using both fsQCA and statistical 
regression techniques. It is also worthwhile to point out, however, that there is strong qualitative 
evidence for these findings as well. This can be illustrated by a simple contrast o f five different 
national campaigns, two o f which were successful and three o f which were not, as illustrated in 
Table 10.16 below. The content o f  the successful German SME campaign was strikingly 
different from the Japanese SME campaign examined in Chapter 5, as there was a lack o f  a 
private sector coalition and use o f information in the latter. Three conditions missing in the US 
residential real estate campaign correspond to its failure to generate PRPC, a point that was 
illustrated starkly in the narrative described in Chapter 7. If we draw from the ‘fu ll’ (i.e. 
potentially interdependent) dataset, another such case shows a similar pattern. The ‘first’ US 
credit card campaign was mobilized and organized as a coalition, but failed to acquire non-bank 
allies or generate legislative oversight associated with its aims. In contrast, the German SME 
campaign and the first HVCRE campaign displayed the configuration suggested by the recipe, 
and did generate PRPC. As the respective chapters (4 and 7) made clear, these respective 
campaigns took place in very different contexts, to say nothing o f the institutional differences 
between the US and Germany.
Table 10.16: Comparing Different Combinations of Conditions Across
Different Campaigns
German Japanese US US first US Credit
SME SME Residential HVCRE Card
Campaign Campaign Real Estate 
Campaign
Campaign Campaign
2001-2003
Private Sector Mobilization P P P P P
National Coalition P *A* P P P
Information P *A* P P p
Non-Bank Allies P *A* P p *A*
Enemies A A *p* A A
Legislative Oversight 
(Supportive)
P P *A* P *A*
Legislative Oversight 
(Oppositional)
A A *p* A
A
Did Permissive Regulatory YES NO NO YES NO
Policy Change Occur?
914 The language of a ‘recipe* to describe a combination of sufficient conditions is also used by Ragin 2008.
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To further investigate the mechanisms o f influence, it is also possible to focus on the 
intermediate dependent variable, the extent to which the national regulator has been influenced 
or not. To investigate this I first ask whether or not ‘regulator influenced’ is a necessary 
condition for PRPC change to occur. I find that it has a consistency score o f 94.5 %, indicating 
nearly a perfect superset relationship. In order to take into consideration the possibility that 
‘issue-linkage’ affected outcomes, I then removed the cases where there was some possibility o f 
issue-linkage the post-2001 US operational risk campaign, and the US securitization campaign. 
A test o f  necessity under these conditions yields a consistency score o f  1 -  perfect consistency. A 
simple correlation test o f  ‘regulator influenced’ with PRPC yields an 84% correlation; with the 
cases containing possible issue-linkage removed, this becomes 81% - still highly correlated. A 
test o f  sufficiency o f ‘regulator influenced’ yields a consistency score o f  74%, and 71% when the 
abovementioned cases are eliminated. These finding are striking in that it conforms well to 
specific qualitative findings within a variety o f  the individual cases explored in Chapters 4-9. 
Specifically, while influencing a national regulator was usually the precondition for PRPC, in a 
number o f different instances where the regulator was influenced by a national campaign, this 
intermediate influence did not lead to PRPC. As Table 10.17 below demonstrates, the nine cases 
within the study in which the national regulator was influenced by private sector groups, only six 
o f these cases also featured permissive regulatory policy change.
Table 10.17: National Campaigns that Were Successful in 
Influencing the National Regulator1
1 SMEs 2001-2002 Germany
.33 CRE 1999 Germany
1 CRE 1999-2000 Germany
1 Operational 2001 United States
Risk
1 HVCRE 2003 United States
0 Expected 2002 Germany
Losses
.33 Expected 2003 United States
Losses
.67 Credit Cards 2003 United States
.67 Securitization 2003-2004 United States
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This finding in itself is an interesting finding, because it suggests that influencing their 
regulators is not a ‘surefire way’ for private sector groups to influence the content o f Basel II. 
Nevertheless, as we have seen in several o f the case stidies mentioned above, there is causal 
evidence for the ‘regulator influenced’ mechanism at work. On this basis, we can ask: what 
influences a regulator? I conducted a test o f necessity an! individual sufficiency on each o f  the 
explanatory conditions in the study for the outcome ‘ egulator influenced’. The results are 
reported in Table 10.18 below.
Table 10.18: Necessity and Sufficiency Analysis 
Results for ‘Regulator Inrluenced’
liifellJIS  i >4 I h  'i \
. .  m
M obilization .96 .42
Coalition .96 .49
Inform ation .83 .48
Non-Bank Allies .48 .50
-E nem ies .91 .31
Legislative O versight (Supportive) .70 .55
~ Legislative O versight (Oppositional) 1 .31
Relative S tructu ral Power of the State in .97 .33
Finance
S tructu ra l Dependence o f the State on Finance 
C apital
.64 ....... .32
Im portance to Financialization .39 .30
Potential M obility of Business Line .13 .21
Size of Business Line .61 .24
CM E Score .37 .28
Revolving Door .48 .25
De Ju re  Reg. Independence 1 .31
Independence Factor .84 .32
Im portance of Deregulation .57 .31
Position on Deregulation .57 .29
PR System .39 .30
Right Executive .61 .42
Parliam entary  System .39 .17
GNIfs .87 .33
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As these results illustrate, the individual conditions necessary for permissive regulatory policy 
change to occur are also those necessary for the national regulator to be influenced, with only 
two exceptions. Supportive legislative oversight was a necessary condition for PRPC to occur, 
yet it is not necessary for the national regulator to be influenced. As the third column in this 
table illustrates, no individual condition was sufficient in explaining the regulator being 
influenced, which is consistent with earlier findings for PRPC. I then conducted a test of joint 
sufficiency of the national campaign data, using only the non-interdependent data and setting 
‘regulator influenced’ as the outcome. The fsQCA findings in terms of combinatorial 
relationships are also exactly the same, with the recipe in the same configuration o f outcomes 
and having a consistency score of 83%.
Conclusion
This chapter has engaged in across-case analysis using a variety o f methods. Rather than 
discussing the significance of the findings of this analysis, this conclusion provides a summary 
of the main across-case findings. The central finding of the across-case analysis is that rather 
than any individual condition being sufficient in generating permissive regulatory policy change 
(PRPC), there exists a complex combination o f conditions that does so; however, this 
combination is only significant for national-level campaigns. This combination of conditions 
suggests that underneath the contextually rich and highly complex world of private sector 
campaigning, there is a conjunctural causal process at work which can explain private sector 
influence. Specifically, across-case analysis found that when private sector groups utilize 
information, have non-bank allies, and have supportive legislative oversight on their side, they 
are able to influence their regulators and, in turn, generate permissive regulatory policy change at 
the transnational, BCBS level. Other factors such as mobilization and the presence of a national 
coalition do not diminish this sufficiency, but they do not appear to be a critical part of the 
recipe. This ‘recipe’ is, however, conditional on the absence of enemies within the national 
campaign -  a finding also observed in within-case analysis of previous chapters. This result has 
been tested using a variety of methods, and has been supported both by investigating underlying 
mechanisms and through reference to individual cases which were explored qualitatively in 
earlier empirical chapters.
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While this ‘recipe’ has been shown to be robust in competition with macroeconomic and 
macro-institutional factors, it is also a very fragile and contingent recipe for influence. To risk 
stretching the analogy, it is not a recipe for which private sector groups can easily assemble the 
ingredients. The reason is that there is no ‘one thing’ that was done which influenced regulators 
and outcomes, but rather a number o f things that, once in place, have had powerful effects. This 
‘conjunctural’ pattern suggests that none o f  the individual hypotheses in the study can be 
supported in terms o f logical sufficiency. There is no sufficient path to influence: there is only a 
recipe, a combination.
In terms o f necessary conditions, a variety o f  conditions fulfill the criteria as consistently 
necessary conditions as specified in this chapter. Table 10.9 below lists those conditions which 
were deemed necessary across cases in different scales and forms o f analysis in this chapter. An 
‘N ’ indicates that the condition was necessary above the 85% threshold specified in the study; a 
indicates it was not; and a grey coloring indicates that testing necessity was not possible for 
that given scale/form o f  analysis.
Table 10.9: Conditions Fulfilling Necessity Criteria Across Different 
Scales and Forms o f Analysis
Transnational Cam
paigns 
Agenda-Setting 
Stage
N
ational Cam
paigns
Regulator Influenced
Mobilization N N N
Coalition N N N
Information
1 ~
N -
-Enemies N N N
Oppositional Legislative Oversight N N
Relative Structural Power of the State in Finance N N
Importance to Financialization N N - -
Large Associated Business Line N N - -
De Jure Regulatory Independence N N
GNIfs
.......................... .....................
N N
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While these overall results are very complex, several findings are relatively consistent across 
different scales and forms of analysis. Specifically, mobilization, coalitions, and the absence of 
enemies are all necessary conditions whenever they have been tested. Each of these conditions is 
necessary for PRPC in both transnational and national campaigns and is also necessary for the 
national regulator being influenced by its domestic private sector.
Table 10.20 below offers a succinct summary of overall hypothesis evaluation. The 
Legislative Oversight Hypothesis receives strong but conditional support, as it has been shown to 
be a consistently critical condition for PRPC, but one which is contingent on other factors also 
being present. The plethora of within-case evidence that regulators respond to the threats 
associated with legislative oversight further supports this position, as does the fact that while 
legislative oversight is not a necessary condition, it came close (with consistency scores of .84 
and .83 in different tests in this chapter). Legislative oversight was important not only in 
influencing regulators’ behavior, but also for affecting the bargaining dynamic within the BCBS 
in a way that favored private sector preferences, as seen for example in the German commercial 
real estate campaign described in Chapter 4. Furthermore, many first-hand accounts from private 
sector participants affirm the importance of this factor.915
The Mobilization Hypothesis received some support but primarily as a necessary 
condition, rather than as critical part of the jointly sufficient ‘recipe’ of conditions. To be sure, 
including mobilization does not diminish the consistency of the recipe; however, it was not 
found to be a critical component of it. Within-case analysis of earlier chapters conveyed in many 
instances the importance of private sector mobilization, and yet even these narratives suggest its 
importance primarily as a necessary condition.
The Information Network Hypothesis received relatively strong support in the within- 
case analysis of previous chapters, with private sector groups providing key information which 
led to PRPC, such as Chapter 3’s finding with respect to internal ratings, and Chapter 9’s finding 
with respect to securitization. While its necessity across scales/forms of analysis was found to be
915 Especially Interviews 77R, 78R, and 90R.
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variable, it was nonetheless found to be a critical component part of the jointly sufficient recipe, 
and therefore received strong but conditional support.
The Structural Power Hypothesis received very inconsistent support. Although some 
within-case evidence of structural power at work was found, across-case evidence for the 
efficacy of structural power was very mixed, for both national-level and policy-level structural 
power variables. The structural dependence of the state on finance capital was neither a 
necessary condition nor part of a jointly sufficient one across cases. None of the three policy- 
level structural power variables were found to be of relevance to the national campaigns, but 
large associated business lines and importance to financialization were necessary conditions for 
transnational campaigns, and furthermore provided evidence for structural power at work at the 
agenda-setting phase. Within across-case analysis of national campaigns, the ‘relative structural 
power of the state in finance’ (RSPSF) was found to be a necessary condition. This finding, and 
the fact that RSPSF was found to be also necessary as a condition to influence the national 
regulator suggests that the findings of this study may be conditional on structurally important 
states within the international financial system (so too does the ‘GNIfs’ variable which has 
similar characteristics to RSPSF, as noted above). Such states may be the only ones to bargain 
aggressively in international negotiation, or it may be the case that private sector groups only 
mobilize significant campaigns in these states, since they believe the probability of their success 
to be higher. I note however that, according to the analysis of possible structural power selection 
effects in Chapter 2, there is some limitation to the diversity of structural power conditions 
explored in this study. Specifically, ‘externally weak’ but ‘internally strong’ states, such as 
Sweden and Spain have not been represented in this study, thus limiting the possible 
generalizability of these findings.
The Business Conflict Hypothesis receives strong across-case support, since it was both a 
critical part of the recipe and a necessary condition. This finding was the most straightforward in 
the entire study: whenever business conflict was present, private sector campaigns were not able 
to influence the Accord. Such an outcome was found not only in across-case analysis, but also 
concrete empirical cases — such as the transnational operational risk campaign, and the US 
residential mortgages campaign.
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The Coalitional Hypothesis received very mixed support. The presence o f  non-bank allies 
in a campaign was found to be a critical part o f  the jointly sufficient recipe o f conditions 
producing PRPC, but the presence o f a national coalition was not. This variability suggests that 
while private sector coalitions are undoubtedly important, the particular content and efficacy o f 
the coalitional form  matters a great deal. We have seen in individual cases examined that 
coalitions helped to coordinate positions (such as the internal ratings campaign in Chapter 3), 
and in other instances coalitions played a key role in not only coordinating information exchange 
among private sector groups, but also in building a unified voice and generating legislative 
interest and sympathy with private sector concerns (such as in the second SME campaign 
examined in Chapter 5). Coalitional activity, as we have seen in previous chapters, is relatively 
commonplace in private sector campaigns, at both the national and transnational levels, and 
across-case analysis affirmed its importance as a necessary condition for private sector influence.
Table 10.20: Evaluation Summary o f ‘Means of Influence’ Hypotheses
Nam e of H ypothesis O verall E valuation
H , Legislative Oversight Strong But Conditional Support
h 2 Mobilization Some Support
h 3 Information Network Conditional Support
h 4 Structural Power Variegated
H s Business Conflict Strong Support
H 6 Coalitions Mixed Support
In terms o f pathways o f private sector influence, on the basis o f earlier within-case 
analysis and the analysis o f  this chapter we can say that there is mixed evidence for the 
Transnational Pathway hypothesis. On the one hand, instances o f  influence clearly occurred at 
this level. As we have seen in the Internal Ratings and W-Factor campaigns examined in Chapter 
3, there is evidence that private sector groups exerted such influence. As we have also seen in the 
analysis o f  this chapter, however, there are no relationships o f individual or jo in t sufficiency for 
the transnational campaign examined. The National Carrier Hypothesis, on the other hand, 
received stronger support. Two conclusions can be drawn from this finding. The first being the
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purely empirical finding that given the associational diversity of private sector mobilization over 
Basel II, the national scale appeared to work best for the campaigns investigated herein. Second, 
this result also produces further (albeit indirect) evidence in support o f the legislative oversight 
hypothesis; indeed, the threat of legislative oversight is the only power resource or ‘means’ that 
private sector groups lacked in their engagement with regulators at the transnational level. The 
robustness of this particular finding, however, should be interrogated in further empirical 
research, especially since the number of transnational campaigns examined in this study was 
small in comparison to the number of national-level campaigns.
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Conclusion
This study engaged with a central question: How do private sector groups influence 
transnational financial regulatory policymaking? To answer this question, I investigated the 
different actions and strategies that private sector groups employed in their attempts to influence 
the content of transnational financial regulatory policy, which I referred to throughout as ‘private 
sector campaigns’. Using extensive primary empirical material relating to the formation of the 
Basel II Accord between 1998 and 2004, I examined the relationship between the content and 
context of these campaigns, and their varied levels o f success. I further used a variety of 
qualitative and quantitative methods to test different hypotheses prevalent within the existing 
academic literature regarding how private sector groups influence financial regulatory 
policymaking.
I undertook process tracing analysis to ascertain the relationships between the 
explanatory variables of interest, namely, the actions and contexts of private sector efforts, and 
the dependent variables of interest, the reactions of regulators and permissive regulatory policy 
change. Through a series of narratives detailing private sector groups’ reactions to, and 
campaigns concerning, the formation of Basel II, I have analyzed the operation of private sector 
influence in its particular institutional contexts. While process tracing allowed me to explore 
private sector influence in Basel II through ‘within case’ analysis, I also analyzed patterns across 
the cases in the study through Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), as well as 
statistical regression analysis. By analyzing in empirical detail the actual content of private sector 
campaigns, their conduct, and regulators’ reactions to them, I ascertained several instances of 
private sector influence over a number of different regulatory policies within the Accord, and 
many other instances of non-influence. I further established patterns that affected this variation.
This study has not sought to critique or ‘prove’ any existing theory. The primary aim, 
rather, was to engage in detailed empirical study to explore an under-examined terrain and to test
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specific hypotheses, under the neo-pluralist assumption that there may be a variety o f power 
resources available to private sector groups, both in terms of instrumental actions and structural 
power resources and contexts. Empirical hypothesis testing serves not only to ascertain the 
validity of social scientific conjectures made within the social world, but also to account for 
actual processes within that world. Exploring private sector attempts at exercising influence over 
the formation of the Basel II Accord thus enabled me to engage in an analysis of a particular 
dimension of the political economy literature which is extensively theorized, but rarely 
empirically researched: namely, private sector influence over transnational financial regulatory 
policymaking. By way of conclusion, I first summarize my main empirical findings, and then 
discuss their implications for the existing literature and some dominant theoretical paradigms 
within IPE.
Main Findings: 
What is Inside the Black Box o f Influence?
The aim of this study, as discussed in the Introduction, was to ‘look inside’ the ‘black 
box’ of private sector influence over financial regulatory policymaking through detailed 
empirical study. What have I found inside? We have seen that private sector influence can be 
pervasive, as it occurred throughout the Accord’s formation and over a range of different 
policies. We have seen that private sector groups’ means of influence were diverse, not only in 
their variety but in their contextually-bounded deployment. However, we have seen also found 
that private sector influence was highly contingent, in particular on the factor of business 
conflict. A central finding in this regard is that there is a specific recipe of factors that are both 
necessary and sufficient for private sector groups to achieve influence. Finally, we might also say 
that this recipe is itself highly fragile, since its individual components are not under the control 
of any one actor.
Pervasiveness
Private sector groups successfully organized to influence Basel II both at the 
transnational and national levels. I documented numerous instances where private sector
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campaigns successfully generated permissive regulatory policy change in the Accord by 
convincing the BCBS as a whole to change course as they were developing a particular 
regulatory policy; by proposing new permissive regulatory policies; and by either convincing or 
enabling their national regulators to represent their preferences within the BCBS. In short, 
private sector groups exercised their influence over the Accord in numerous different ways. In 
this regard I have found support for both the ‘Transnational Pathway’ hypothesis and the 
‘National Carrier’ hypothesis, in various instances. But what were the power resources or 
‘means’ that private sector groups used?
Diversity
This study has demonstrated that private sector groups use a diverse range o f power 
resources in the realization of their ends. In some cases, they successfully utilized information to 
convince regulators to change course on a policy. In other cases, they made prodigious use of the 
threat of legislative oversight over their national regulator. Their mobilization strategies were 
often an important element in their campaigns, and offered important signals to regulators in a 
number of different contexts. Coalitions were also formed and served to coordinate strategies and 
information among private sector groups. Private sector groups were successful at influencing 
the Accord when organized at both the transnational level and at the national level. The diversity 
of means that private sector groups used was extensive; yet influence persist amidst a variety of 
different institutional conditions and contexts.
Contingency
Yet despite these diverse power resources, private sector influence was highly contingent 
on a particular set of conditions which, if not in place, failed to realize its aims (see below). This 
finding points to the high degree of contingency of successful private sector influence. While it is 
perhaps tempting to allude to the immanent contingency of nearly all social processes, I pursued 
the investigations of patterns nonetheless. Within-case analyses pointed to the importance of 
business conflict in particular. When private sector groups do not express a unanimous set of 
regulatory preferences, and when they mobilize against each other’s aims (‘business conflict’),
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even the most substantial private sector campaigns were found not to succeed. Across-case 
analysis has also enabled me to evaluate each of these hypotheses in the study as a necessary 
and/or sufficient condition in generating influence over Basel II’s regulatory policies, and here 
too the findings suggest contingency.
Within both the transnational and national campaigns explored, 1 found across-case 
support for the Mobilization, Coalitions, and Business Conflict hypotheses as underlying 
necessary conditions for influence to occur. Under some circumstances, the Structural Power 
Hypothesis was also found to be an important necessary condition as well, though this 
importance varied with the particular of structural power condition explored. However, none of 
these hypotheses received support as individually sufficient conditions for influence. Utilizing 
the particular strengths of fsQCA, I also engaged in an analysis of the combined sufficiency of 
different sets of conditions present within the campaigns examined. Here the findings were 
striking. Analysis of transnational campaigns revealed that no particular combination of 
conditions was found to be sufficient in generating influence. Within the national campaigns 
examined, however, I found a distinct combination of conditions which were found to be 
sufficient in ensuring private sector influence, which I have characterized as a particular ‘recipe’ 
of sufficient conditions.
A Recipe
FsQCA demonstrated that within the national private sector campaigns examined, a 
particular ‘recipe’ of conditions were sufficient in generating private sector influence in Basel II. 
Specifically, nationally organized private sector campaigns are sufficient in producing the 
outcome of permissive regulatory policy change when they utilize information, have a legislative 
environment supportive to their efforts, and act in an environment free of business conflict. This 
‘recipe’ is not 100% consistent across cases, but it is robust even when subject to empirical 
validation checks using a variety of different methods and measurement techniques. 
Furthermore, because the study has engaged in detailed process tracing analysis of private sector 
campaigns, we can point to specific instances where this ‘recipe’ has led to private sector 
influence. In other words, this finding is not the result of simple covariate analysis. Rather, it is a
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finding which was arrived at, and stands up to, methodological triangulation. As Chapter 10 
demonstrated, the ‘recipe’ of conditions which are together sufficient in generating private sector 
influence is robust in comparison with other factors, such as a variety o f forms of institutional 
circumstances. I interrogated the specific mechanisms that may be at play within this recipe, and 
here too the findings stand up to scrutiny. Yet while the ‘recipe’ represents a relatively strong 
and robust finding, it is, in another, perhaps more substantive sense, very fragile.
Fragility
The recipe described above is fragile in at least two senses. First, it is fragile in the sense 
that there is no ‘one thing’ that private sector groups can do to influence their regulators and 
regulatory policy outcomes; rather, ‘a number of things’ must be in place for influence to take 
place. Second, it is fragile in another, more substantive sense, since the conditions that constitute 
the recipe are not easily generated through intentional action. In this regard, it would be 
misleading to say that there is an ‘optimal strategy’ that private sector groups could pursue to 
exert influence. On the contrary, many of the conditions -  or ‘ingredients’ -  in this recipe are, 
significantly, conditions which no one group can control.
A number of examples help to illustrate this point. In the case of the US campaign 
surrounding the residential mortgage policy within Basel II, banks were not able to control the 
fact that mortgage insurance companies provided regulators with useful data to support their 
conclusions, nor were large banks able to control the fact that small community banks used their 
resources to countervail demands for permissive regulatory policy change. In a similar manner, 
we have seen this dynamic at the transnational level, during the operational risk campaign. The 
Institute of International Finance and the International Swaps and Derivative Association were 
steadfastly opposed to the operational risk policy of the BCBS, yet they were not able to control 
the fact that a ‘splinter group’ emerged within their ranks, the International Technical Working 
Group, which provided the BCBS with data that enabled them to design a highly stringent 
regulatory policy. The fragility of the recipe can be further shown through the ways in which 
some of the resources of private sector groups are not even of their own making. Legislative 
oversight in the US was generated in large part by the radical opposition to the Pillar I capital 
charge for operational risk led by the Financial Guardian Group. Yet once a process of legislative
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oversight was in place, diverse groups were able to make use of it, including not only large banks 
that, for example, generated demand for changes to the securitization and the credit cards 
policies, but also small banks who were also thereby able to leverage their demands.
All of these findings, though interesting in and of themselves, suggest a number of 
implications for the existing literature. In what follows, I first discuss some of the limitations of 
this study in terms o f addressing the central research question. I then turn to the contributions 
that the findings of this study might make to the existing literature and future research programs.
Contributions 
o f the Study and Its Findings
As has been made clear from the outset, this study has not purported to explain the 
entirety of Basel II’s content, nor has it sought to ‘add up’ instances of influence in order to 
produce an overall evaluation. Rather, the aim has been to explain private sector groups’ role in 
influencing specific regulatory policies within the Accord with the intention o f better 
understanding just how private sector influence in transnational financial regulatory 
policymaking actually works. In this regard, the important historical structures underlying the 
basis for Basel II’s early formation, and the reasons for the Accord itself, have not been 
systematically explored. As Chapter 2 has established some configurations of structural power, 
such as ‘externally weak’ but ‘internally strong’ states have been left out of analysis. This 
focused research design does not mean, however, that the findings of this study do not have 
important implications for the existing literature exploring the political economy of financial 
regulation.
In what follows, I argue that there are three clear implications for different literatures. 
First, I focus on the existing empirical claims regarding ‘regulatory capture’ of the BCBS in the 
IPE literature, which have been widespread. Second, I argue that the findings of this study also 
speak to existing theoretical perspectives on private sector influence more generally, and debates 
within them regarding the respective role of instrumental and structuralist perspectives. Finally, I 
argue that the particular approach taken in this study, that o f empirical pragmatism and neo­
pluralism, can offer insights to IPE more generally.
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Regulatory Capture in the IPE o f Finance Literature
One implication of this study’s findings is related to the tenability of strong statements 
concerning regulatory capture which, as we have seen in Chapter 1, are highly prevalent in the 
IPE of finance literature. A generous interpretation would be that the claim regarding ‘regulatory 
capture’ in the case of the BCBS has been only ‘contingently’ correct. As I demonstrated 
throughout this study, private sector groups were indeed able to successfully influence the 
content of Basel II, across a number of different contexts. However, in many other instances, 
private sector groups were spectacularly unsuccessful. This study has explored the determinants 
of this variation, and has revealed some patterns which may be relevant for future investigation 
of regulatory capture.
A less generous interpretation would suggest that existing depictions of regulatory 
capture are highly misleading. The depictions of private sector influence examined in Chapter 1 
denote an extensity of influence that is incommensurate with the existing evidence. It is entirely 
possible that campaigns this study has not explored may reveal a more extensive level of 
influence than represented herein. Nevertheless, variation in outcomes has been a persistent 
theme in this study, and as an empirical fact it is undeniable: private sector groups didn’t always 
get the regulatory changes they wanted. We have seen that this variation is true not only when 
the largest banks in the world clamor for change, but also when many of the associations of the 
largest banks in the world clamor for change. Private sector groups only influenced Basel II 
under very particular conditions. Their influence was much rarer than ‘regulatory capture’ would 
suggest, and even when private sector groups were successful, they were often successful only in 
circumscribed ways.
It might be said that the existing depictions of ‘regulatory capture’ are at a level of 
descriptive generalization that it is not subject to challenge, in the sense that some private sector 
influence occurred, and that (from a normative perspective) ‘some’ is ‘too much.’ This argument 
is completely reasonable. However, such an argument is of a different type than the strong 
empirical assertions actually made within the literature regarding Basel II, which claim that
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Basel II is the prime example of “capture of the regulatory process by the industry it is supposed 
to regulate”;916 that Basel II signifies “the capture of regulation by large multinational banks”;917 
that the “private sector is writing its own script”;918 that the BCBS “fell victim to regulatory 
capture by large international banks”919; and that Basel II is “the perfect example of regulatory 
and supervisory capture”920 or “the domination of global financial supervision and regulation by 
private actors.”921
It is indeed the case that Basel II’ s risk sensitive approach to capital adequacy offers 
advantages to some of the largest and most sophisticated banks in the world. However, as I have 
argued in Chapter 1, preference alignment between a regulatory policy and private sector groups 
is not sufficient evidence that private sector groups were responsible for the content of such 
policies. To be sure, some permissive regulatory policies were successfully advocated by banks. 
The most significant in this regard would be the expanded use of internal ratings within banks’ 
risk portfolios. However even in this case the BCBS’ policy still reflected a significant departure 
from what private sector groups had been demanding. Moreover, large banks did not achieve the 
objective that many scholars claimed they achieved, namely the use of their own internal credit 
risk models to set their own levels of capital adequacy. Examination of structural power at the 
agenda-setting phase suggested the possibility that private sector groups may have benefited 
from some (but not all) structural constraints associated with regulators’ initial regulatory policy 
proposals, but only in particular ways (as necessary, but insufficient conditions for influence).
This study has not sought to ‘add up’ influence or to give a holistic account of ‘how far 
influence has gone.’ My objective has been to focus on the how question of private sector 
influence, with the aim of better understanding the machinations of this off-cited but seldom 
empirically explored phenomenon. As Saner and Yui have recently remarked, we are just 
beginning to explore the complex of relationships between state and non-state actors in the 
process of transnational policymaking.922 I consider this study, as a specific and empirically 
focused one, to make a modest contribution to that vast and developing literature. Much of the
916 Helleiner and Porter 2009, p. 20.
917 Ocampo 2009, p. 10
918 Tsingou 2004, p. 11.
919 Goldin and Vogel 2010, p. 13.
920 Tsingou 2010, p. 24.
921 Underhill and Zhang 2008, p. 533.
922 See Saner and Yiu 2008.
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existing literature has emphasized that non-state actors such as private sector groups play an 
increasingly important role in processes of globalization; I have shown this role to be important, 
but I caution that we should be careful not to overstate it. I consider the generalizability of the 
findings of this study to be potentially contingent themselves on the historical and structural 
conditions in which Basel II was forged. In this regard it is possible that different actors within 
the financial sector may possess more effective strategies or capacities to influence regulators, 
either instrumentally or structurally. Perhaps, for example, because the banking sector is more 
highly regulated than parts of the financial sector such as hedge funds and/or investment banks, 
regulators have a stronger degree of discretion and therefore power over their banks. This view 
would certainly be consistent with the finding regarding the importance of legislative oversight 
and non-bank allies.
Implications for the Political Economy ofBanking Regulation Literature
Because of the particular approach taken in this study, namely that of neo-pluralism, and 
because I have considered a range of hypotheses drawn from different research programs within 
political economy, my findings have implications for diverse literatures. In what follows I first 
discuss these implications of my findings for instrumentalist and structuralist perspectives on 
private sector influence before discussing the significance of my findings for neo-pluralism.
Instrumentalist Perspectives
As I described in Chapter 1, there are a variety o f different perspectives on the political 
economy of financial regulation which focus on the actions of private sector groups, which is 
sometimes referred to as ‘instrumentalist’ perspectives.923 Public choice approaches to banking 
regulation that emphasize the importance of legislative oversight as a tool for disciplining 
regulators have been vindicated in a number of case studies examined in this study. As I 
demonstrated in a variety of different instances, private sector groups’ use of legislative 
oversight has proven an effective tool in this way. For national private sector campaigns, it is a
923 As established in Chapter 1. See Fuchs and Lederer 2007
285
very important necessary condition, both to influence regulators and to engender actual 
permissive regulatory policy change at the transnational level. On both these counts, however, it 
was found to be an insufficient condition in and of itself, and must be combined with other 
factors to be effective.
The literature on ‘policy networks’, from which I drew several hypotheses, also receives 
some support from my findings, but such support is highly conditional and qualified. Private 
sector groups have successfully exchanged information with their regulators, and have mobilized 
to communicate their concerns, not only formally but informally as part of an ongoing dialogue 
in many instances. Mobilization was found to be a critical necessary condition, but an 
insufficient one as well, whereas information was a critical part o f the recipe of jointly sufficient 
combination of conditions. Information is not individually sufficient perhaps because regulators 
do not accept it at face value; rather, they are often deeply skeptical of its underlying basis. The 
importance of private sector coalitions was found to be mixed, and in a very particular way: 
national or transnational coalitions were found to be important necessary conditions, whereas 
they weren’t essential parts of the ‘recipe’ of combined sufficiency. The involvement of non­
bank allies in a campaign was, however, found to be a highly important part of that recipe. This 
finding was an interesting and somewhat surprising one, and may suggest complementary 
support for the view that it is only when threatened that national regulatory agencies adapt to 
pressure. In contrast to campaigns waged exclusively by banks and their various associations, 
non-bank private sector groups are not under the discretionary control of regulators; as such they 
may be (or may be perceived to be) a more threatening force than banks themselves.
While this study added to the tradition of policy network theory, its findings were also 
critical of it. The process-tracing involved in studying various campaigns at both national and 
transnational levels allowed for not only a deeper understanding of bank-regulator interactions 
during an important and significant instance of policymaking, but also allowed for the testing of 
hypotheses. As Thatcher has noted, because policy network analyses often lack a substantive 
theory of power, hypothesis testing tends to be lacking.924 Similarly, Macartney has opined the 
lack of attention to the specific role o f interest groups in policy networks in finance.925 The
924 Thatcher 1998, p. 404.
925 Macartney 2008.
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respective role of mobilization, coalitions, and the use of information in campaigns has been 
investigated systematically across cases, thus adding to the already-existing work which explores 
this domain. However, the policy networks that were uncovered in this study suggest a much less 
cooperative relationship between banks and regulators as is often depicted in the existing 
literature. While the exchange of information and dialogue were often very cooperative and 
cordial, conflict between regulators and private sector groups was also endemic. More 
importantly, in order to affect actual policy change, much more was needed that communication 
through the given policy network, as dense as those relationships may have been. It was, quite 
consistently, the force of legislative oversight, along with other specific campaign elements, that
Q 'l i '
incented regulators to change.
Structuralist Perspectives
A prominent tradition of thinking about private sector influence over regulatory 
policymaking considers the structural power of private sector groups. As Chapter 1 detailed, 
structural power arguments take a variety of different forms in different literatures. Do my 
findings confirm or challenges the claims made within this broad tradition? At the most basic 
level of analysis, the considerable variation in levels of success should give pause to the efficacy 
of structural power arguments. On the one hand, one could suggest that simply the presence of 
costly private sector mobilization suggests that structural power has ‘failed’, and thus the 
campaigns examined were ones where empirical tests of structural power were mute or 
redundant. As I have argued, however, the causal effects of structural power may occur at either 
the agenda-setting phase or the policymaking phase, and both phases have been investigated. 
Moreover, the examination of the possible ‘structural power selection effects’ associated with the 
countries, and policies, chosen for analysis revealed a diversity of structural power conditions in 
the sample, minimizing the possibility that the campaigns investigated were ones which selected 
for particular structural power characteristics already.
926 The notable exception to this would be the US operational risk campaign in 2001 which, as argued in Chapter 6 
and Chapter 10, possessed a unique conflation of conditions which led to policy change.
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Many have commented on the difficulties of measuring structural power, and thus of 
assessing its related claims empirically.927 At the same time, those working within some 
structuralist traditions have argued for the need to focus on specific mechanisms and channels of 
capital’s power.928 This study has taken up a variety of structural power claims as empirical 
claims subject to scrutiny, not only where possible in process tracing analysis, but also through 
the utilization of five different structural power variables, assessed through different across-case 
methodological techniques.
Two classes of frequently cited and theorized variants of structural power arguments 
were found to have no empirical support in the context of Basel IPs development. The structural 
dependence of the state on finance capital was not found to affect the success of national-level 
campaigns. The same was true for the potential mobility of different business lines associated 
with different regulatory policies -  even when country-level variation in the capacity to access 
corporate shells was considered. That both of these variants of structural power arguments are 
prominent within the political economy literature should give us pause. It is of course possible 
that the formation of Basel II represents a very special case in which structural constraints 
operate differently. While such a conjecture would have to be tested empirically, given the 
diversity of different kinds of regulatory policies examined herein (at least in terms of different 
areas of banking activity), there is some evidence to support Levy and Egan’s argument that 
international institutions are, in relative terms, isolated from structural pressures in comparison
• i 9^ 9with states. “
As Bemhagen has recently pointed out, there are no established standards for measuring 
structural power claims empirically.930 Given the relative paucity of actual tests of structural 
power hypotheses, one wonders whether or not this paucity is due to the fact that structural 
power is difficult to test by its nature or because it is actually tested so infrequently. It is 
certainly testament to the latter that the findings of this study add to only a small number o f other 
existing studies — all of which have either extremely mixed, or wholly negative findings
927 See Bemhagen 2008; Duer 2008a, p. 567; Fuchs and Lederer 2007, p. 6.
928 See Levy and Egan 2000, p. 140.
929 Levy and Egan 2000, p. 145.
930 Bemhagen 2008.
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regarding the empirical efficacy of structural power claims.931 It is also tempting to suggest that 
structural power claims are rarely investigated as empirical propositions because those who 
mobilize such claims do so within traditions where they have become an accepted part of 
political ontologies, as in much Neo-Marxian theory and world-systems theory. Such a 
suggestion certainly echoes Langley and Schwartz’s recently accounts, respectively, regarding 
the self-referential and untested claims regarding financialization.932 How ironic, then, that this 
variant of structural power claims received some support in this study. This support was highly 
qualified, however: a regulatory policy important to financialization was found to be an 
important necessary condition for private sector influence only in transnational campaigns and at 
the agenda-setting level of Basel II’s development. A large regulatory policy was also found to 
have the same across-case patterns.
The notable exception to these mixed results with respect to structural power was the 
finding regarding the relative structural power of the state in finance, which was found to be a 
persistently necessary condition for private sector influence over Basel II. Being a member of a 
state with relative structural dominance in the financial domain, such as Germany or the United 
States, would seem to be a necessary condition for private sector influence through the national 
pathway. It is tempting to suggest that private sector groups in such states mobilize ‘more’ or 
‘harder’, because they suspect they have an advantage in achieving influence by virtue of their 
states’ representatives at the BCBS. While such a dynamic seems plausible, correlation tests 
suggested this relationship to not be the present.
Statist and Institutionalist Perspectives
State power was found to be an important necessary condition for private sector 
influence, in the same way that the relative structural dominance of the state in finance was 
found to be. This finding suggests an important role for state power in channeling private sector 
concerns, as noted above. In this respect, the fact that four out of six instances of influence 
through the national pathway were via the United States may suggest the structural importance of
931 See Bemhagen and Brauninger 2005; 2007,2008; Walter 2000; Helleiner 2008.
932 See Langley 2004, p. 541; Schwartz 2008, pp. 32-36.
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the US. On the other hand, however, influence from the US was often less systematic than that of 
Germany, as the influence generated by US campaigns was highly circumscribed in the case of 
credit cards and securitization. In this regard, the fact that German regulators were, under the 
right conditions, able to influence the Accord in significant ways, even despite US resistance, 
suggests support for a number of authors’ contentions operating within a statist tradition that the 
US no longer maintains dominance in international financial affairs, at least in banking. As 
such, this study adds to those who have criticized Simmons’ hypothesis regarding US dominance 
in financial affairs.934 I have done so in different ways: While the work of Drezner has 
considered state power based on qualitative analysis across regulatory issue domains, my study 
was o f course focused solely on financial regulation; while Posner’s research has examined 
securities regulation, my focus has been on banking.935 At the same time, the contribution of my 
study shows the limits of state power. A strong state may be a necessary condition for private 
sector influence over transnational financial regulatory policymaking, but it is one of several, and 
is not a sufficient condition. Moreover, by demonstrating instances of successful transnational 
campaigns, I have shown that private sector groups need not even work through their states as a 
matter of course, but can influence policymaking on a transnational basis.
This study also explored the respective role of institutions in driving, and/or conditioning 
private sector influence. An institutionalist approach might consider interests to be endogenous 
to the institutions which order actor behavior, and thus empirical regularities should be found 
among particular institutional configurations as they correspond to outcomes. My findings 
provide a challenge to such perspectives.936 Through across-case analysis which considers a 
variety of institutional conditions, I have shown that institutional factors or configurations are 
poor predictors of influence. In addition, I have shown from qualitative within-case analysis that 
private sector influence occurred under a variety of institutional contexts: at the transnational 
level in a number of instances, and at the national level in macroinstitutional environments that 
were strikingly different from one another. In this sense, the agency-oriented perspective 
advanced in this study has received considerable support as a fruitful line of enquiry. Despite
933 See Drezner 2007, pp. 23, 121; Braithwaite and Drahos 1999, p. 113; Posner 2009.
934 Simmons 2001.
935 Posner 2009; See also Posner and Veron 2010.
936 As we saw in Chapter 2, however, the extent of institutionalist diversity is limited in some dimensions. As such 
the empirical grounds that this study provides to challenge institutionalist claims can be considered limited to the 
institutionalist variety within the G10.
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these contributions, there are limits to how far my findings regarding the importance of 
institutions might be. In particular, the low level of institutional diversity that actually existed 
within the G10 at the time of Basel II’s development suggests the possibility that institutional 
configurations outside this spectrum may yield different results. In addition, it might be pointed 
out that other areas of financial regulation, such as hedge funds, the securities sector, and 
insurance are regulated under different institutional conditions, meaning that findings in those 
areas may be different, potentially, than those I have found in banking.937
Neo-Pluralism and the Approach Taken in This Study
More than any other tradition within political economy, my empirical findings support 
the perspective that I have taken, that of neo-pluralism. Both instrumental actions taken by 
private sector groups and structural conditions have been used to explain influence, an approach 
commensurate with the existing neo-pluralist literature.938 Support for a neo-pluralist perspective 
has been most vividly demonstrated by the strong findings regarding business conflict. While 
business conflict has been explored in a variety of different transnational policy domains within 
the literature on neo-pluralism, such as trade and the environment, this study further 
demonstrates the efficacy of this mechanism in the domain of banking regulation.939 I have not 
only shown the operation of business conflict through within-case analysis, but also 
demonstrated its importance as a mechanism which functions across-cases. These findings are 
relevant not only for neo-pluralism but for other traditions which emphasize business conflict — 
for example the Amsterdam School of IPE which emphasizes the ‘fractionalization of capital’.940
In analyzing both instrumental actions and structural power conditions together as 
empirical questions (rather than philosophical ones), following Sell, I have considered structural 
power and instrumental actions to act in potential conjunction with one another.941 While it is a
937 While Basel II did feature mobilization of investment banks and some insurance firms (such as in Chapter 7 and 
8), these firms were engaged with issues of commercial banking regulation, not the direct regulation of their 
industries per se.
938 See Falkner 2007, Sell 2000, pp. 92-93.
939 See Cox 1996; Falkner 2010.
940 Compare, for example, Cemy 2010: 304-5 and Falkner 2010 with Van Apeldoorn 2004; Overbeek 2004; 
Macartney 2009; Van der Pijl 1984.
941 See Sell 2000, pp. 92-93.
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mainstay of neo-pluralism that structural power should be taken seriously, the precise conditions 
under which structural power is operative are not explored empirically.942 I have tested such a 
notion empirically, and found ‘agency’ conditions much more important than ‘structural power’ 
ones, though some (such as the relative structural power of the state in finance) are important 
necessary conditions, and do not diminish the consistency o f a jointly sufficient solution.
It is with respect to contingency of private sector influence that this study has made its 
most central contribution. More so than its initial progenitors such as Lindblom, the proponents 
of neo-pluralism within IPE tend to emphasize the complexity and contingency of private sector 
influence. As Cemy has recently noted in his recent work on neo-pluralism, processes and 
outcomes in the context of globalization can be regarded as highly contingent on multiple 
complex and often unpredictable factors.943 Similarly, Sell has called for similar attention to the 
contingency of private sector influence over transnational policymaking as well.944 Even beyond 
neo-pluralism, broader discussions about IPE as a field also advocate attention to contingency. 
Amin and Palan, for example, have called for an IPE which analyzes “how power is mobilized in 
a system of fragmented authority”, point to the incredible complexity of “new forms of politico- 
economic rearrangement”, and advocate for the appreciation of contingency by analyzing 
different forms of state-capital relations, “with varying outcomes in different social and cultural 
settings, depending on the balance of power and interest between the two players...”945 This 
study has not only embraced such a view of contingency; it has revealed particular patterns of 
contingency.
As I stated at the outset of this study, claims regarding contingency are themselves 
empirical claims: for an outcome to be contingent, it must be contingent on something else. 
Rather than simply pointing out this contingency, I have used a variety of methods to explore 
just what private sector influence is contingent on. While existing studies within this literature 
have empirically captured the complexity and contingency of private sector influence, they have 
typically done so by means of either a small number of comparative case studies (such as the
942 Cerny 2010:104:9; Falkner 2007
943 Cemy 2009; 2010, pp. 105, 117-127.
944 Sell 2000, pp. 92-93.
945 Amin and Palan 2001, pp. 568, 560, 573.
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work o f Falkner) or an intensive empirical narrative tracing events (such as the work of Sell).946 
There are many strengths to both of these approaches, many of which I have adopted. However 
it is striking that the existing literature has not made use of new methods developed within the 
social sciences, such as QCA, especially given its non-linear additive nature and appreciation for 
causal complexity and contingency. While used increasingly in comparative politics and 
sociology, QCA has not been applied to either IPE or studies of private sector influence. 
Recently, Schneider and Wagemann have discussed the uneven usage of QCA, and the fact that 
while originating in the United States, it has been much more widely used by scholars within 
Europe.947 Whether or not, as they argue, this unevenness is due to the less pervasive 
methodological divides within Europe is an open question; what is more certain is that the use of 
such new methods might help satisfy Katzenstein’s recent call for more ‘analytical eclecticism’ 
in IPE, at least in terms of employing a diversity of empirical methods.948
Recently Underhill has stated that “if  political economy is by nature 
interdisciplinary...then an interdisciplinary and inter-methodological capacity can only prove 
positive”.949 As agreeable as this statement is, it would seem that interdisciplinarity has been 
taken much more seriously than the utilization of a diversity of methods, at least when across- 
case methods are concerned. Intellectual and cultural divisions within IPE, whether characterized 
by a American/British-School division or by ‘Third Generation IPE’/ ‘everyone else’ are often 
quite starkly separated not only on ontological lines, but also along methodological ones, 
reflecting in many ways quantitative/qualitative divisions within political science more 
generally.950 Since fsQCA represents a bridge between these two worlds -  and offers to ‘lure 
social science from the doldrums’ as Ragin has recently put it951 -  those seeking to reconcile 
approaches would do well to utilize this new method of across-case analysis.
946 See Falkner 2001; Falkner 2007; Sell 2000; Sell 2003.
947 Schneider and Wagemann 2010, p. 377.
948 Katzenstein 2009, p. 133. See also Farrell and Finnemore; Katzenstein and Sil 2008.
949 Underhill 2009, p. 354.
950 See for example Underhill 2009, p. 348; Cohen 2009, pp. 399-400; See also the interventions on methodological 
differences in Blythe 2009 and Helleiner 2009. The American/British school typology is attributable to Cohen 2007, 
2008.
951 Ragin 2006b.
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Beyond Basel II
While the BCBS is one of the most important institutions in global financial governance, 
it is one single institution among many. Because of the focused empirical nature of this study, I 
have not sought to actively engage in generalizable claim-making or claim-testing beyond the 
cases that I have examined herein. Basel II was developed in a very particular time and place. 
The BCBS has institutionalized modes of procedure, and a structure which is in many ways 
particular to itself, and do not represent general features shared by other institutions. In this 
regard it must be left an open question whether or not the findings o f this study are generalizable 
to other instances of transnational regulatory policymaking. I consider this question an empirical 
one, and leave it open to further research, cognizant of the fact that, as Biithe has recently 
observed, the study of international regulatory cooperation is still only in its infancy.932
The recent transformation of the Financial Stability Forum into the Financial Stability 
Board, and the changed participatory structure of the BCBS, mean that the configurations of 
country representation in formal institutions of global financial governance have changed 
remarkably.953 These changes include the formal inclusion of countries such as India and China 
which, if  their comments on the Basel II process are any indicator (to say nothing of their own 
domestic regulatory regimes), have not only different regulatory preferences than their G10 
colleagues, but considerably different capacities as well. How exactly these differences will 
transform the BCBS’ work remains to be seen. The sets of norms and discourses which were in 
place during the formation of the Basel II Accord have changed since the recent global financial 
crisis. Many widely accepted principles have been substantially challenged, in particular the 
widespread acceptance of the ‘efficient market hypothesis.’954 Relatedly, attentive publics and 
governments have been highly critical of what is often viewed as the demonstrable failure of 
regulation in light of the crisis. The standards of stringency within the context of Basel II’s 
development are also comparatively permissive when contrasted to contemporary discussions. In 
this regard, the BCBS is currently attempting to construct an improved global regulatory regime 
for banking regulation, and has been actively consulting actively with private sector groups in 
the effort to construct a ‘Basel IIP. What will the result of this interlocution be, given the present
952 Biithe 2008, p. 208.
953 For a summary of many of these recent transformations, see Helleiner and Pagliari 2010.
954 See, for example, FSA 2009.
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political-economic climate? How and when will the private sector continue to exert influence in 
the pursuit of its preferences? Which regulatory proposals will never even make it to the floor of 
legislatures, or into the discussions in Basel? What role will private sector groups play in this 
process? These are not only fascinating questions -  they are also pressing ones.
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Appendix 1 
Interviews Conducted
This study involved extensive field research in which I conducted interviews with 97 
different individuals who were involved in the formation of, and private sector contention 
around, Basel II. This Appendix provides a brief discussion of the interview methodology used 
and provides a list of the individuals I interviewed for the study. Interview subjects were selected 
on the basis that they were either 1) involved in the creation of the Basel II Accord in a 
regulatory function (i.e. as participants within the BCBS), or 2) were involved in the private 
sector efforts to influence its content. Individuals were selected on the basis of availability, rather 
than through a representative sampling method. Names and contact details were found through 
the trail of documentation left in the wake of Basel II’s development, and through follow-up 
contacts and interviews themselves, whereby relevant contacts were given by interview subjects. 
Names of relevant individuals were often provided through lists of BCBS participants in BCBS 
documentation and studies, while private sector group participants’ names were often cited in 
letters to the BCBS. Initial contact was usually made through a formally written letter (in English 
or German) or, occasionally, an email. Follow-up calls, letters and emails occurred as necessary. 
Because of the methods employed in the study, the selection of interview subjects followed the 
‘non-probability sampling’ method described by Tansey, which is typical of process-tracing 
analysis not intending to generalize findings to particular behaviors, but rather to reconstruct 
events and to corroborate findings.955
In the manner commensurate with process tracing for ‘elite interviewing’, I used 
interview subjects primarily 1) to reconstruct a set of events as they took place, i.e. as a source of 
empirical material, and 2) to corroborate what has been established/claimed by other sources.956 
The interviews were semi-structured in that I had written questions ranging from very general to 
very specific, but there were numerous opportunities for the interview participant to casually
See Tansey 2007.
956 See Tansey 2007, pp. 766-767.
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elaborate on a particular issue or event.957 As is conventional in elite interviewing, interview 
subjects were found through an iterative process o f using names from documentation, as well as 
gathering contacts as the process of interviewing proceeded.958 1 took care to cross-corroborate 
information about international private sector activity by spreading the interview sample though 
not only interviewing individuals who were involved as staff o f the international associations, 
but also the individuals who were involved as members of these associations as well.
An important challenge within interviewing is to minimize ‘experimenter effects’ — the 
effects that the interviewer produces the information that they want to generate.959 Because my 
research design does not entail a ‘thesis’ to be ‘proven’, I consider the severity of this problem to 
be minimized. I followed basic guidelines in qualitative interviewing techniques in this regard, 
but not ‘cueing’ respondents, and seeking to obtain a true account o f past events as they took 
place. One persistent difficulty with semi-structured interviews concerning past events is the 
problem of individuals’ memory. I accounted for this by corroborating interview-generated 
claims with other sources of evidence. In general, I did not consider a claim to be genuine unless 
it was corroborated by additional evidence, such as documentation or other claims from other 
interview participants. A further central challenge of interviewing for research is the 
unintentional misrepresentation of events.960 This I addressed by asking questions about specific 
events rather than overall accounts and, at times, by asking various interview respondents to 
reflect on other factual claims of other interviewees. Furthermore I also brought up documentary 
sources of information in many interviews once responses were already given, by bringing up 
examples of events and preferences from written material such as speeches, testimony, 
newspaper articles, and research studies, and asked my interview subjects to give an account of 
whether these events and preferences were accurate or not. Most interviews lasted over an hour, 
and were conducted at the interview subjects current place of work.
List o f  Interview Participants
957 Improvisation in this regard is key, especially for elite interviews where schedules o f interview participants can 
be especially tight. Odendahl and Shaw 2001, p. 305
958 See Odendahl and Shaw 2001, pp. 305-307
959 See Weiss 1994, pp. 211-212.
960 See Weiss 1994, pp. 147-148.
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Interview participants are listed below with their name (unless they asked to be listed as 
anonymous), and the primary organization that they worked for during the period under 
investigation. To be clear, many of these individuals now work for different organizations: I list 
only the organization that they worked for during the time of interest to the study. It is important 
to point out that many o f the interviewees listed below from specific firms were also members of 
associations as well. Below the name o f their organization is the location where the interview 
was physically conducted (otherwise the telephone locations are indicated). This list is not 
chronological - as part of my effort to further promote the anonymity of interview-based claims 
made within the text (in which a source from an interview is listed as R for ‘regulator or public 
institution’ and P for ‘private sector participant’).
Interview Participants Involved 
Primarily in Public Agencies
Andrew Crockett 
Director
Bank for International Settlements 
New York 
13 November 2007
Roger Cole 
Senior Associate Director 
Banking Regulation and Supervision 
US Federal Reserve Board 
Washington, D.C.
1 August 2008
Claes Norgren 
Director of the Swedish FSA 
Stockholm 
12 October 2007
Oliver Page 
Director, Complex Groups Division
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Financial Services Authority 
London 
17 October 2007
Roger Ferguson, Jr.
US Federal Reserve Board 
Washington, D.C.
21 November 2007
Jaime Caruana 
Governor 
Bank of Spain 
Washington, D.C. 
20 November 2007
William McDonough 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
New York 
16 July 2008
Patrick de Fontnouvelle 
Quantitative Analysis Unit
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 
Boston 
13 May 2008
Barbara Bouchard 
Federal Reserve Board 
Washington, D.C.
17 May 2008
Kevin Bailey 
Deputy Comptroller, Capital and Regulatory Policy 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
Washington, D.C.
19 May 2008
William Lang 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 
Philadelphia 
15 July 2008
John Hawke, Jr. 
Comptroller of the Currency 
United States Treasury 
Washington, D.C.
18 November 2008
Larry Meyer 
Member of the Board o f Governors 
Federal Reserve Board 
Washington, D.C.
31 July 2008
Anna Lee Hewco 
Federal Reserve Board 
Washington, D.C.
17 May 2008
John Jordan 
Quantitative Analysis Unit 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 
17 July 2008
David Jones 
Division of Research and Statistics 
Federal Reserve Board 
Washington, D.C.
31 July 2008
Kim Olson 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
New York 
25 July 2008
Bradford Case 
Economist
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
Washington, D.C.
30 July 2008
Reinhold Vollbracht 
Deutsche Bundesbank 
Frankfurt 
8 November 2008
Jens Conert 
German Ministry of Finance 
Berlin 
7 November 2007
Charles Freedland 
Deputy Secretary General 
BCBS Secretariat 
Basel 
25 May 2006
Vesa Vanhanen 
DG Enterprise 
European Commission 
Brussels 
31 May 2006
Howard Davies 
Director 
UK Financial Services Authority 
London 
5 July 2007
Seregdi Laszlo 
Hungarian Financial Services Authority 
Budapest 
20 October 2007
Carter K. McDowell 
House Financial Services Committee 
Washington, D.C.
17 May 2008
Jason Cave 
Senior Capital Markets Specialist 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Washington, D.C.
31 July 2008
Eric Rosengren 
Quantitative Analysis Unit 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 
Washington, D.C. to Boston (telephone) 
16 May 2008
Anonymous Regulator 
Federal Reserve Board 
Washington, D.C.
31 July 2008
Michael Gordy 
Division of Research and Statistics 
Federal Reserve Board 
Washington, D.C.
31 July 2008
Tom de Swaan 
Member o f the Governing Board 
De Nederlandsche Bank 
26 November 2007
Richard Spillenkothen 
Director, Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation 
Federal Reserve Board 
Washington, D.C.
1 August 2008
David Gibbons 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
New York to Chicago (telephone)
15 August 2008
Marc Saidenberg 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
New York 
18 August 2008
Darryl 1 Hendricks 
Senior Vice President, Bank Supervision Group 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
New York 
2 September 2008
Gerhard Hoffman 
Bundesbank 
Berlin 
13 April 2009
Daniel Nuoy 
Bank of France 
Paris 
21 June 2009
Ruediger Gebhard 
BaFin 
Bonn 
29 October 2007
Interview Participants Involved 
Primarily from Private Sector
Joseph Sabatini 
JP Morgan 
New York 
21 July 2008
Tony Peccia 
Bank of Montreal and CIBC 
New York to Toronto (telephone) 
23 July 2008
Arjun Mathai 
Bank Gesellschaft Berlin 
London 
26 September 2007
Finn Rieder
Bundesverband der deutscher Banken 
Berlin 
2 October 2007
Harald Lob 
Kreditanstalt filer Weideraufbau 
Cologne 
13 September 2007
Jens Tolckmitt 
Association of Foreign Banks in Germany 
Frankfurt 
9 October 2007
Deborah O. McKinnon 
Mortgage Bankers' Association 
Washington, D.C.
19 May 2008
Dan Kohlbrenner 
State Street Global Advisors 
Boston 
28 May 2008
Wolfgang Vahldiek 
Association of Foreign Banks in Germany 
Frankfurt 
9 October 2007
Rudolf Siebel 
Bundesverband Investment and Asset Management 
Frankfurt 
9 October 2007
Charles Dallara 
Institute of International Finance 
Washington, D.C.
20 November 2007
Richard Coffmann 
Institute of International Bankers 
New York 
14 November 2007
Rob Strand 
American Bankers' Association 
Washington, D.C.
15 November 2007
Robert Davis 
America’s Community Bankers 
Washington, D.C.
19 November 2007
Ulrich Stumpp 
Verband der Burgschaftsbanken 
Bonn 
7 November 2007
Chitra Muralikrishnan 
Royal Bank of Canada 
Toronto 
26 June 2008
Reinhard Kudiss 
Bundesverband Deutscher Industrie 
Berlin 
31 July 2007
Niels Oelgart 
Deutscher Industrie und Handelskammertag 
Berlin 
1 August 2007
Norman Nelson 
New York Clearing House 
New York 
14 August 2008
Axel Nitschke 
Deutscher Industrie und Handelskammertag 
Berlin 
1 August 2007
Andres Portilla 
Institute of International Finance
Washington, D.C.
20 November 2007
Paul Smith 
American Bankers' Association 
Washington, D.C.
21 November 2008
John Mingo 
Risk Management Association Capital Group 
{also Federal Reserve Board) 
Cambridge to Montana (telephone)
13 May 2008
John W. Carlson 
Financial Services Roundtable 
Washington, D.C.
17 May 2008
Joerg Oertgies 
Bundesverband der deutscher Banken 
Berlin 
2 October 2007
Heiner Brockmann 
Deutscher Industrie und Handelskammertag 
Berlin 
2 October 2007
Ute Aschenbrenner 
Zentralverband der deutscher Handwerks 
Berlin 
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Appendix 2 
Indicators Used for Variable Codings
Table A2.0: Four Value Fuzzy Set for ‘Permissive Regulatory Policy Change’
Observable characteristics I f  Relationship 
Found, This 
Indicates:
Membership in set Value
Regulatory capital requirements decrease 
substantially, such that the change is unambiguously 
permissive
An instance of 
influence
Fully in 1
Regulatory capital requirements decrease, but not 
substantially, such that while change has clearly 
been in a permissive direction, there are still 
elements which did not change in this direction
Circumscribed
influence
Mostly but not fully 
in
.67
Some elements of the policy change reflect 
permissiveness, but these are either 1) very modest 
or 2) compensated by more restrictive regulatory 
policy changes within the same policy
No influence, but 
some effect on 
the form of policy
Mostly but not fully 
out
.33
No change, or change is not in a permissive 
direction
No influence Fully out 0
Table A2A : Four Value Fuzzy Set for ‘Change in Regulators’ Position’ (CRP)
Observable characteristics Membership in set Value
Regulator clearly changed their position on a policy Fully in 1
Some evidence of regulator changing their position on a policy Mostly but not fully in .67
Logic would support the notion that a regulator changed their 
position, but there is no empirical evidence available
Mostly but not fully out .33
No evidence of a regulator changing their position Fully out 0
Table A2.2: Four Value Fuzzy Set for ‘Value Claiming Behavior’ (VCB)
Observable characteristics Membership in set Value
Regulator clearly engaged in value-claiming behavior Fully in 1
Some evidence of regulator engaging in value-claiming behavior Mostly but not fully in .67
Some indication that the regulator may have postured toward value- 
claiming behavior
Mostly but not fully out .33
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No evidence of a regulator engaging in value-claiming behavior Fully out
Value-Claiming Behavior
For indicators o value-claiming behavior, I draw heavily from the indicative behaviors 
suggested by Odell, especially under his understanding of the ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ 
variants of value-claiming behavior. Odell 2001 provides an extensive list of empirical indicators 
of value-claiming behavior, and I employ many of these indicators. In instances of value 
claiming behavior, the negotiator:
• Criticizes the other country’s actions or arrangements, blames it for the problem 
under discussion
• Rejects or ignores demands for concessions or delays their concession
• Demands concessions for the benefit of his or her own country
• Takes steps to worsen the other’s alternative to agreement and improve her own
• Attempts to exclude from the agenda issues on which her own country would 
probably have to make concessions
• Threatens to take action harmful to others unless they yield the desired concessions
• Threatens or imposes counter threats or sanctions
Fuzzy Set Calibrations for Explanatory Variables
The tables below provide the fuzzy-set coding scores for each of the main explanatory 
variables of interest described in Chapter 2. As with the main dependent variable of interest, 
permissive regulatory policy change, these fuzzy-sets are calibrated to 4-values, 0 (full non­
membership in the set), 1 (full membership in the set), .33 (out but not fully out of the set), and 
.67 (partial membership in the set). The underlying basis behind of the explanatory variables are 
described in Chapter 2, and this list provides a guide only -  fuzzy-set scores are justified on the 
basis of the qualitative evidence provided within each empirical Chapter (Chapters 3-9).
Table A2.3: Four Value Fuzzy Set for Private Sector Mobilization
Highly concerted, oppositional campaign______________  Fully in
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Campaign of opposition Mostly but not fully in .67
Policy commented on More or less out .33
No private sector mobilization Fully out 0
Table A2.4: Four Value Fuzzy Set for Coalitions
Organized and coordinated coalition of groups Fully in 1
Organized coalition of groups More or less in .67
Potential coalition of groups More or less out .33
No coalition Fully out 0
Table A2.5: Four Value Fuzzy Set for Information
Strong informational content of the campaign -  studies 
conducted, elaborate technical arguments made, 
exchanged with regulators
Fully in 1
Some clear informational content of the campaign -  
studies conducted and technical arguments made to 
regulators
Mostly but not fully in .67
Some informational component to the campaign, but not 
extensive
More or less out .33
No or very little informational component to the campaign 
-  arguments are made but do not represent the 
communication of specific and detailed information
Fully out 0
Table A2.6: Four Value Fuzzy Set for Enemies of the Campaign
Evidence of some private sector groups both supporting the 
policy in question and opposing the claims of other groups
Fully in 1
Some private sector groups either support the policy in 
question or oppose the claims of other groups
More or less in .67
Some indications of business conflict More or less out .33
No coalition Fully out 0
Table A2.7: Four Value Fuzzy Set for Legislative Oversight
Legislative oversight is present and focused on this policy Fully in 1
Legislative oversight is present, and this policy has been 
identified
Mostly but not fully in .67
Legislative oversight is not present for this policy, but the 
possibility is in view
More or less out .33
Legislative oversight is not present for this policy Fully out 0
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Appendix 3 
Constructing a Population of Policies
Because there is not a ready-made list available of policies that together constitute the Basel 
II Accord, it is necessary to first carefully construct a population of policies from which 
subsequent analysis can draw from. I employ three main criteria for the collection of policies, 
which together help to establish the delimiting parameters for the cases that can be considered 
for analysis. For a policy to qualify into the total population of policies, it must fulfill the 
following criteria:
1) Significance. The regulatory policy was identified as significant by the BCBS
2) Coherence. The regulatory policy is of such a nature that its outcome can be relatively 
unambiguously understood as a coherent whole, and thus positions can be taken on it in a 
coherent manner.
3) Relevance. The development o f this regulatory policy involved the presence of at least 
one of the explanatory or dependent variables of interest.
Collecting Policies by Significance
Defining the significance of a regulatory policy is a methodological challenge, since the 
qualification of ‘significant’ is not only highly subjective, but that subjective selection may also 
be systematically biased. What is significant to a regulatory might not be significant to a private 
sector group, and vice versa. Recognizing this challenge, significance is determined by the 
following criteria. A policy is deemed significant if it has been flagged by the BCBS as a 
significant aspect of the Accord in some way. This could be for a variety o f reasons: because a 
change was made to this policy, because the policy was removed, because the policy was 
introduced, because it was controversial, etc. There are two ways in which the qualification of a 
policy in this way can be ascertained from the available empirical material.
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The first way that policy significance can be ascertained is through the BCBS’s own 
quantitative studies of the Accord itself. The regulatory agencies that compose the BCBS have 
an incentive to measure the impacts of the Accord’s policies across the G10 (and beyond the G10 
as well). As such they conducted several Quantitative Impact Studies (QISs), both over the 
course of Basel II’s development, and after it was finalized as well. In each of these studies, the 
BCBS tried to ascertain how the Accord was going to affect the status quo in banking practices 
at the time. These QISs provide a good indication of the policies that the BCBS believed to be 
significant, because it would be senseless to measure the impact of policies which were deemed 
otherwise. An example of a policy case ascertained in this way is ‘mortgage lending’. The fact 
that the BCBS saw this policy within the Accord as significant is evinced by the fact that in 
several QISs, they conducted a quantitative estimate of how the regulations they had developed 
were expected to influence the way that banks behaved in regard to mortgage lending. This QIS 
data reveals a number of policies of interest for the BCBS, which are summarized in Column N 
of Table N below, under the heading ‘Quantitative Criteria’.
The second method in which the significance of a policy can be ascertained is through the 
reports of significant events which occurred over the course of the formation of Basel II. This 
requires a qualitative analysis of the documentation that the BCBS produced during this period, 
including its newsletter reports and updates. This method however does not involve much 
qualitative judgment on behalf of the researcher, in that the updates that the BCBS produced 
typically involved list of policies which they were either conducting work on or which they 
wished to report significant decisions on. These policy characteristics are summarized in Table 
A3.0 below.
Table A3.0:
Selection of Policies by Differen Criteria
# Policy Areas Significance:
Quantitative
Criteria
Significance:
Qualitative
Criteria
Coherent? Included?
1 Corporate Yes Yes
2 Bank Yes
3 Sovereign Yes Yes
4 SME Lending Yes Yes Yes Yes
5 Specialized
Lending
Yes Yes
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6 Residential
Mortgages
Yes Yes Yes Yes
7 Revolving Yes Yes Yes Yes
8 Other Retail Yes Yes
9 Equity Yes Yes No
10 Purchased
Receivables
Yes
11 Other Assets Yes
12 Securitization Yes Yes Yes Yes
13 Counterparty
Risk
Yes Yes
14 Specific Risk Yes
15 Market Risk Yes
16 Related Entities Yes
17 Other Deductions Yes
18 Partial Use Yes Yes
19 Operational Risk Yes Yes Yes Yes
20 Interest Rate 
Risk
Yes Yes Yes
21 W factor Yes Yes Yes
22 Repos Yes
23 Procyclicality Yes
24 Maturity Yes Yes No
25 Expected Losses Yes Yes Yes
Selecting Policies on Coherence
As Table N illustrates, the two combined significance criteria highlighted above yields a 
total of 25 different policies within the Accord that are suitable for analysis based on the 
significance criteria. As Column 5 highlights, however, not all of these policy areas fulfill the 
criterion of coherence. For a policy to be coherent, a position on, and outcome within, a policy 
must be relatively unambiguous to understand. Coherence is important not only conceptually, but 
also methodologically, since the task o f process-tracing changes to a final policy outcome over 
time is not possible if ‘the policy’ in question constitutes disparate elements. For example, the 
policy toward ‘related entities’ or ‘other deductions’ are not coherent, because they refer to a 
disparate number of policies, referring to different operations within other policies. Because an 
examination of policy development, influence, and negotiation requires specificity, a policy is 
only coherent if can, at least potentially, refer to a specific decision made about that policy.
Selecting Policies on Relevance
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The third criterion a policy must fulfill to qualify into the total universe o f policy cases to 
be examined is that the policy must have relevance for the study. To be relevant to the study 
entails that private sector groups engaged in a campaign over a given policy. This affects does 
not affect the population of policies already discerned above. It does however affect the total 
population of policies in the study, because some policies may have been excluded from 
selection based on the criteria above. Perhaps, for example, there are policies which private 
sector groups thought to be significant, but which the BCBS did not take notice of, chose to 
ignore, or simply chose not to discuss in their publically available documentation or in their QIS 
studies.
One dimension of the potential systematic bias of the policy significance criterion can be 
illustrated through a simple 2x2 table, as in Table A3.1 below. All policies that were significant 
to the BCBS would have a high likelihood of being selected (i.e. boxes (a) and (c), below). 
Policies which were not significant to either the BCBS or private sector groups (i.e. box (d)) 
might experience a systematic bias of not being selected, but this is acceptable, because no party 
of interest defines them as significant and they are thus irrelevant to the study.961 However 
policies that were not deemed significant to the BCBS, but were deemed significant to private 
sector groups might also be systematically excluded (i.e. box (b)). As there is some probability 
that they would have been included in the QISs and publically-issued documentation of the 
BCBS, the chances of these kind of policies being selected is not as low as in box (d). 
Nevertheless, it does represent a plausible systematic bias that should be addressed.
Table A3.1: Matrix of Possible Systematic Bias due to Policy Significance Criteria
Significant to BCBS?
Significant to PSGs? Yes No
Yes a) High b) Medium
No c) High d) Low
961 They may however be relevant to another study based on the same empirical subject, for example a normative 
study of what was left out of what the BCBS and private sector groups were concerned with during this period, and 
what they thought to be of relevance. However such considerations are not a part of this study.
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A policy or policies in box (b) might be policies that private sector groups exercised a campaign 
over, but were unsuccessful in getting the BCBS to respond, for example. Such cases would be 
relevant for analysis, since they might imply a unique configuration of causal condition and 
outcomes. Furthermore, a pro-active campaign which was unsuccessful in its endeavors might 
also be in box (b). Excluding such cases would represent not just a loss of diversity in the study, 
but a potential distortion of its general findings as well. This possible systematic bias is, 
thankfully, one that can be (at least partially) corrected. Policies can be searched for which 
private sector groups considered of significance, but which, for whatever reason, were not 
identified as significant in the criteria highlighted above. Searching for such policies inevitably 
involves some qualitative assessment on behalf of the researcher. Such a search is also a process 
that is highly inductive, so such policies will have to be justified for inclusion. I have selected 
four policies in this regard.
The first is the policy of full internal credit risk models. As subsequent within-case 
analysis within Chapter 1 will affirm, the importance of this policy was highlighted in a number 
of semi-structured interviews with both private sector and regulatory interview participants, and 
has also been identified by other researchers that have examined Basel II. This greatly 
strengthens my confidence that the inclusion of this policy into the population of significant 
policy cases is supportable. Relatedly, the second policy included is the policy of employing 
banks’ own internal risk ratings into the Accord’s risk models -  a practice known as the ‘Internal 
Ratings’ approach. This is probably the most broadly defined policy within the Accord, but it 
nevertheless is a highly important one.
The third policy I have included is the policy toward commercial real estate lending. This 
policy is included in the total population of policies because this is a policy which experienced 
legislative oversight (in Germany). This case is thus included in order to maximize the diversity 
of causal conditions present within cases (maximizing such diversity is critical for a test of 
sufficiency, for fsQCA). The fourth policy included is a policy drawn from the specialized 
lending category of the Accord. While specialized lending as a whole was not determined to 
qualify for the criterion of coherence, one subset of the specialized lending part of the Accord 
can be identified in which there is coherence, and in which specific policy changes can be 
observed over time. This subset of the specialized lending part o f the Accord refers to a specific
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form of real estate: ‘high volatility commercial real estate’, or HVCRE. As subsequent within- 
case analysis will affirm, this policy was not highly significant for most of the BCBS, but was 
highly significant for the US delegation, and for private sector groups within the US which 
advocated its removal.
Finally, two regulatory policies within Basel II which could have been included in this 
study have been excluded. These are the policy on ‘Maturity’ (i.e. risks associated with the 
length of a risk exposure), and the policy toward banks ‘Equity’ exposures. Systematic 
exploration of both of these policies has been undertaken. However campaigns associated with 
these policies have been excluded from the present study for two reasons. First, it is not possible 
within the space constraints of the present format to describe the (albeit fascinating) campaigns 
surrounding these policies. Second, the findings of the campaigns associated with these policies 
were found to be no different from the findings o f the study overall, and their exclusion can be 
justified on this basis.
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Appendix 4 
Technical Terms in Bank Regulation
Like the 1988 Basel Accord, the Basel II Accord specifies a series o f minimum capital 
adequacy requirements on banks. The percentage of total capital to assets that a bank must hold 
as ‘regulatory capital’ is 8%. However Basel II is much more complex than the original Accord 
in that it attempts to specify the risk associated with a wide range of bank activities, and weight 
the risks of these activities as a percentage of the total 8% required. Thus a bank loan to a student 
might be risk-weighted at 150%, meaning that for each dollar on a loan that a bank gives, it is 
required to hold 12 cents (8% x 1.50) as regulatory capital to buffer itself against the risks of this 
loan.
Basel II has many different component parts to it, and there are many different options 
for banks and regulators to use to abide by the Accord. It consists of three pillars: Regulatory 
Capital Requirements, Supervisory Review, and Market Discipline. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
this study focuses on the first pillar. There are also several different ‘levels’ or ‘Approaches’ 
within the Accord that banks and/or regulators can use depending on the level of sophistication 
or national regulatory discretion. The Standardized Approach is relatively simple and bases risk 
weights for different activities on the basis of external rating grades. The Internal Ratings-Based 
Approaches, however, allow banks, for some risk parameters, to estimate risks themselves. There 
are several key inputs (or ‘risk parameters’) that are part of the complex mathematical formulae 
of the Internal Ratings-Based Approach:
PD -  Probability of Default. This is the probability that a borrower from a bank will 
default (i.e. not pay back) on a credit offered to them.
LGD — Loss Given Default. This is a quantitative estimate of the severity of a loss from a 
defaulted credit.
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EAD — Exposure at Default. This parameter quantifies the size of the banks exposure 
when a particular credit defaults, in other words, the ‘amount at risk’ from that particular 
credit.
AVC -  Asset Value Correlation. This parameter assesses the relationship between the 
riskiness of bank lending in relation to its probability of default. It is used to assess the 
extent to which loan defaults occur in waves or ‘clusters’ together (i.e. that credit risks 
are correlated with one another)
For the Foundation Internal Ratings Based Approach, banks can estimate their PD values, but 
other risk parameters are set within the Accord. For the Advanced Internal Ratings Based 
Approach, banks can estimate their PD values and (most of) their LGD values. Other risk 
parameters are typically employed within the risk models that the Accord specifies. There is also 
a plethora of special conditions and exceptions to these general rules.
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Appendix 5 
Empirical Dimensions o f Processing Banks
The top 10 custodial banks in the world at the time are listed in Figure A5.0 below. As is evident, 
US banks largely dominate the high end o f this market. Not only were the top 4 custodial banks 
all American, but 6  out o f  the top 10 were American.
Figure A5.0: Top 10 banks in the world by Assets under Custody 
(Billions of SUS)962
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As Figure A5.0 also illustrates, however, banks such as JPMorgan Chase and Citigroup had 
comparably large assets under custody in comparison with State Street and Bank o f New York, 
and considerably more than Mellon. Thus the size o f  a bank’s assets under custody cannot 
explain the reaction to the operational risk policy among US banks. However, a more reliable 
predictor o f  preferences in regard to the operational risk policy is the extent to a bank relied on
962 This data is sourced from de Fontnouvelle et. al. 2005, p. 57 (Table 3), and p. 58 (Table 4)
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income from its custodial services as a core part o f its business model. A good indicator o f  this is 
the simple ratio o f a bank’s operational income to its total income. As Figure A5.1 below 
illustrates, in this regard State Street and Mellon were much more reliant on operational income 
than their counterparts JPMC, Citigroup, and Keycorp. This might help to explain why the 
former group were so radically opposed to the operational risk policy, while the latter group were 
not.
Figure A5.1: Ratio of Operational Income to Total Income of: 
5 bank sample963
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This division can also be seen in another way, through a metric o f how many loans a 
bank makes with respect to its asset base. This can be measured by a ratio o f the value o f  a 
banks’ total loans to its total assets. As Figure A5.2 below demonstrates, once again there is a 
noticeable division among the ‘radical opposition’ and the ‘supportive group’ described in 
Chapter 6  -  especially between State Street and the other banks. The significance o f this metric 
is that it demonstrates not what the costs o f  the operational risk policy would have been to each 
bank, but rather the relative benefit that Basel II’s credit risk policies would have for banks. As 
Figure A5.2 makes clear, banks such as State Street and Mellon had very small number o f loans 
in comparison with their total assets (their total assets are represented in Figure A5.3, and help to 
illustrate the size differences in the banks as a whole). As such, they stood to gain less from the 
liberalizing advantages o f Basel II’s credit risk policies than other banks -  even though those
963 This data is sourced from de Fontnouvelle et. al. 2005, p. 55 (Table 1).
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other banks also engaged in custodial services and would thus incur new regulatory capital costs 
from the operational risk policy.
Figure A5.2: Ratio o f Total Loans to Total Assets: 
5 Bank Sample
State Street Mellon JPMorgan Citigroup Keycorp 
Chase
Figure A5.3: Ratio of Total Bank Assets: 
5 Bank Sample
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Appendix 6
US Commercial Real Estate Exposures
This Appendix illustrates some o f the features o f  US commercial real estate holdings, 
which can be used to supplement the discussion in Chapter 7. In 2003, US holding companies 
with over $200 billion at the time only had 5.3% of their loan portfolio dedicated to commercial 
real estate. However, smaller holding companies with assets under $15 billion had double the 
commercial real estate exposure on average (10.7% ) . 9 6 4  Figure A6.0 below illustrates the relative 
size o f commercial real estate lending in various US banks.
Figure A6.0: 
Percentage of Commercial Real Estate Lending in Various US Banking Portfolios 
(as of end-September 2002):965
964 See Moore 2003, p. 8.
965 See Moore 2003, p. 9.
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As Figure A6.0 illustrates, large US banks such as Citibank and JPMorgan Chase had few CRE 
exposures as a percentage o f their total portfolios, while smaller US regional banks had large 
exposures, and thus perceived that they would be severely affected by the HVCRE policy in 
Basel II as it stood at the time. O f the 7 banks listed above with high percentages o f  commercial 
real estate lending, the last 5 were all based in the US Southeast . 9 6 6  While such Southeastern 
regional banks had substantial CRE lending exposures -  especially in comparison to large US 
banks as Figure A6.0 above has demonstrated, their economic weight was comparatively modest. 
As Figure A6.1 below illustrates, Southeastern banks at the time had much less capital and assets 
than the largest US banks at the tim e . 9 6 7  Figure A6.2 demonstrates that in terms o f  both capital 
and assets, the Southeastern regional banks composed a very small fraction o f the top 100 US 
total at the tim e . 9 6 8
Figure A6.1: Comparison of Tier 1 Bank Capital (Millions of SUS)
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966 Wachovia was a large US bank but has substantial exposure in the US South. North Fork was based in New 
York but was relatively small.
967 Data is from The Banker database.
968 The source data is from The Banker database, and is calculated by the author as a percentage o f the largest 100 
banks in the US as ranked by their total Tier 1 capital in 2003.
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Figure A6.2: Comparison of The Share o f Top 100 US Bank Capital, differentiated 
by % o f Tier 1 Capital, and % of Tier 1 Assets
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Appendix 7
US Banks’ Credit Card Exposures
Figure A7.0 below illustrates the size o f  the assets that US credit card banks held at the time 
when US private sector campaigns took place, in 2003 and 2004. Figure A7.0 demonstrates that 
Citibank and MBNA dominated the US credit card banks in terms o f  total managed assets.
Figure A7.0: Total Managed Credit Card Assets of the US Credit Card Banks, 
June 2004 (US$ billions)969
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While banks like Citibank and MBNA had the largest credit card exposures, this does not mean 
that they such exposure weighed equally heavy on each banks’ overall business. Indeed, as
969 Data is obtained from Lang et. al. 2007, p. 37. Note that Citibank's value is calculated by the present author by 
taking the sum value o f  Citibank SD and Citibank NV.
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Figure A7.1 below demonstrates, the percentage o f  these banks’ managed credit card assets to 
their total assets presents a different picture to that above. This figure illustrates that, as a 
percentage o f total bank assets the credit card business for banks like MBNA and Capital One 
were substantial. For banks like Citigroup, however, while it dominated the credit card market at 
the time, this represented a relatively smaller share o f their total managed assets. W hat this 
meant was that ‘monoline’ credit card banks such as MBNA and Capital One were particularly 
sensitive to the Basel II credit card policy as it was proposed. Since the credit card business was 
their main business line, and the credit card policy was stringent, this would affect them more 
severely than other banks.
Figure A7.1: Ratio of Managed Credit Card Assets to 
Total Assets of the Bank (%)970
I1 F
970 Data is obtained from Lang et. al. 2007, p. 37. Note that Citibank's value is calculated by the present author by 
taking the sum value of Citibank SD and Citibank NV.
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Appendix 8 
Securitization Markets in the G10
This Appendix is used to supplement the claims made in Chapter 9 on the structural 
importance o f securitization and o f securitization activity in the US economy specifically. 
During the period under study, there were increases in the size o f securitization markets reaching 
510 fold in Asia (with most activity centered in Japan), 20-fold in Europe, and 5-fold in the USA 
during this period. However the size o f securitization markets in the USA unambiguously 
dwarfed those o f elsewhere. In the USA, the securitization market was estimated to value at $2.7 
trillion, as pointed out by Figure A8.0 below . 9 7 1  Not only was this market large, but it was also 
expanding at a rapid pace. The actual issuance o f new securitization instruments was much 
greater in value in the US as compared to other countries and regions o f  the world, as illustrated 
by Figure A8.1.
Figure A8.0: Comparative Estimations of Securitization Market Size 
in 1998 and 2003, Europe, Asia, and the USA Compared 
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971 Data is from Green 2003.
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Figure A8.1: New Issuances o f Securitizations, Various Regions, 
_________1996-2001 (in Billions o f US Dollars)_________
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Notably, the differences in these values are not due solely to the respective size o f  the 
financial markets in each o f these countries. The average percentage (by value) o f securitization 
instruments within the portfolio o f  large banks in the G10 at the time was 2%. The average 
percentage (by value) o f securitization instruments within the portfolio o f large banks in the US
972was over 7%.
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS)
The CMBS market within the United States during the period under study was very large, 
and played a vital role in US debt markets and the US real estate industry generally, at the time. 
Nearly 14% o f all US commercial real estate debt and 40% o f commercial real estate equity was 
being securitized at the time -  and this was done primarily through CMBS instruments . 9 7 3  The 
CMBS market had begun in the US in the mid- 1980s and had grown to a $550 billion
972 See BCBS June 2006, p. 22, Table 11; OCC et. al„ p. 7, Table 4. Note that US Figure is from 2004, and G10 
average figure is for 2003.
973 Also through REIT vehicles -  Real Estate Investment Trusts
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securitization market, all backed by US real estate mortgage loans.974 By 2003, the US had the 
vast majority o f the global share o f  this market in with 82% o f new issuances that year emerging 
from the US.975 As Figure A8.2 below illustrates, the size o f the CMBS market in the US was 
very large -  while it had tapered o ff since the late 1990s, it still represented a substantial absolute 
value.
Figure A8.2: Size of the CMBS Market in the USA, 
1985-2003 (measured in billions o f SUS).976
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See RER and CMSA November 2003, p. 3.
975 Author’s calculation, based on an estimated $11.5 billion in international issuances and $52.3 billion in US 
issuances in the first three quarters o f 2003. Source for data: RER and CMSA November 2003, p. 3.
976 Data is from RER and CMBS November 2003, p. 3. Originally sourced at ‘Commercial Mortgage Alert'. Note: 
2003 figure is implied, as first 9 months had $52.5 in new CMBS issuance, which was calculated by 1.333 to equal 
an implied issuance for 2003 o f  $69.73 Billion. Calculation by present author.
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